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ABSTRACT
Background: Genetic technologies have identified some of the genes implicated in
cancer susceptibility. Women with mutations in breast/ovarian cancer-susceptibility
genes (BRCA1 and 2) have a lifetime combined risk of breast/ovarian cancer of more
than 80%. Risk reducing surgery (RRS) reduces cancer risk by as much as 90% in
high risk populations. Despite this, some BRCA1/2 mutation-positive women say no
to RRS.
Purpose: To illuminate an understanding of why women at high risk of developing
breast/ovarian cancer say no to risk reducing surgery (RRS).
Design: Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography was combined with Dolby-Stahl’s
(1985) literary folkloristic methodology to provide a contextualised narrative of the life
experiences of six high risk women who said no to RRS. The participants’ stories
were captured through semi-structured interviews then read and interpreted through
the lenses of three literary theories namely Marxist, Foucauldian and Feminist.
Findings: Different understandings of risk were central to the decision to say no to
RRS. RRS was understood as a risk to body and self which superseded the genetic
risk of cancer. However despite having the strength to keep their still-healthy bodies
intact, the participants benchmarked their decisions to say no against the dominant
discourse on cancer risk, leaving them in an unending state of flux as to whether they
had made the right decision. The participants shared a genetic pessimism but there
also existed an emergent private folklore which illuminated how they attempted to
make sense of their experiences and negotiate the conflicts and contradictions thrown
up by competing discourses.
Conclusions:

The relationship between genetic testing and cancer prevention

strategies is not straightforward and genetic information has the potential to harm as
well as help high risk women. It is important health care providers approach this area
from the viewpoints of those directly involved since without understanding; strategies
to support these women may be ineffective.
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Preamble
When Oscar-winning actor Angelina Jolie announced in the New York Times on 14th
May 2013 that she had undergone bilateral risk reducing mastectomy followed by
reconstruction with breast implants, the world took notice. Jolie’s editorial in the New
York Times (2013, May 14), entitled “My Medical Choice”, described her decision to
undertake RRS after she tested positive for a BRCA1 gene mutation which
significantly increased her risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.

Jolie’s mother died from ovarian cancer aged 56. Her aunt had breast cancer and
died shortly after Jolie’s editorial was published. Jolie’s lifetime risk of developing
breast cancer was estimated to be 87%, and ovarian cancer, 50%. Jolie stated “I
decided to be proactive and to minimise the risk as much I could” (Jolie, 2013, para
5), a decision her partner Brad Pitt described as “absolutely heroic" (Pitt, 2013, cited
in Messer, 2013, para 2). Jolie (2013, para 11) further explained her decision:
I wanted to write this to tell other women that the decision to have a
mastectomy was not easy. But it is one I am very happy that I made.
My chances of developing breast cancer have dropped from 87 percent
to under 5 percent. I can tell my children that they don’t need to fear
they will lose me to breast cancer. (…) and they know that I love them
and will do anything to be with them as long as I can. On a personal
note, I do not feel any less of a woman. I feel empowered that I made a
strong choice that in no way diminishes my femininity…. I want to
encourage every woman, especially if you have a family history of
breast or ovarian cancer, to seek out the information and medical
experts who can help you through this aspect of your life, and to make
your own informed choices.
Angelina Jolie’s familial cancer story made headline news around the world and
sparked extensive media, medical and public debate regarding the sensibility or not of
having one’s healthy breasts removed in order to prevent cancer developing. Her
editorial attracted more than 1700 reader comments compared with 170 for an
editorial following the Boston Marathon bombings (List, 2013). Macmillan Cancer
Relief, a leading United Kingdom (UK) Cancer Charity, reported an 1140% increase in
visits to the online genetic breast cancer self-assessment tool (Macmillan Cancer
xiii

Relief, 2013) and the number of women undergoing genetic testing for breast/ovarian
cancer doubled in some areas of North America (Chustecka, 2014). Cancer Council
Australia similarly reported an 866% increase in women phoning their help line as a
result of the ‘Angelina effect’ (Chustecka, 2014).

Dr Allan Spigelman, director of

Sydney’s Kinghorn Cancer Centre not only predicted increased numbers of women
undergoing genetic testing worldwide, but also hinted at the sensibility of Jolie’s
decision given her genetic status:
I fully anticipate there will be very significantly renewed interest in
breast cancer gene testing across the world as a result of this highprofile person very sadly carrying the gene change but very bravely
going ahead to have preventative surgery. (“Jolie’s mastectomy
revelation” ABC news, 2013, May 15)
The furore surrounding Angelina Jolie’s breasts reflects Western society’s obsession
with the female breast (Thomas, 2006) and public ownership of female body parts
(Millsted & Frith, 2003). Jolie’s story and the prominence attached to it also exposes
the public’s fascination with genetics and genetic testing (Royal et al., 2010) and the
perceived importance of genetics in everyday life (Anderson, 2002; Bates, 2005).
Warnings that genetics services would be unable to cope with demand highlighted the
almost panic reaction to the news of Jolie’s surgery and the significance afforded to
breast/ovarian cancer genetics and RRS.

The overall message from Jolie’s story was clear: “a woman at genetic risk should
feel empowered to remove both breasts as a way to prevent the disease” (Grady,
Parker-Pope & Belluck, 2013, para 2). On March 24th, 2015, Jolie followed up on her
original editorial to reveal that she had subsequently also undergone removal of her
ovaries and fallopian tubes to reduce her risk of developing ovarian cancer. Angelina
Jolie, it appears, has opted to manage her genetic breast/ovarian cancer risk through
RRS and she stated that she felt empowered by her decision. This decision is in
keeping with Western medical discourse and identifies Jolie as a sensible woman who
has acted appropriately by forfeiting her breast and ovaries to protect her health, her
xiv

life and her family.

However, some women have a different experience: those

women’s experiences are the focus of this study.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
“Everyone who is born holds dual citizenship in the kingdom of the well and the
kingdom of the sick. Although we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or
later each of us is obliged, least for a spell, to identify ourselves as citizens of that
other place.”
(Sontag, 1978, p. 3).

Foreword
This research is broadly concerned with the decision to say no to risk reducing
surgery (RRS) for hereditary breast/ovarian cancer (HBOC).

Modern Western

medicine has led the increasing emphasis on genetic testing for many human
ailments including HBOC (Conrad, 2001). Recognition of a genetic component to
breast/ovarian cancer development has fuelled a public demand for information,
reassurance and genetic testing (Chustecka, 2014) which has in turn led to an
increasing number of women being offered RRS to remove healthy breasts and
ovaries in order to reduce the risk of future disease (Stratton & Rahman, 2008).

The focus of this study are women who have been identified with carrying a genetic
mutation which predisposes breast/ovarian cancer development and who have been
offered but said no to RRS. For ease of writing the term ‘high risk’ is used to refer to
women who carry these mutations. The aim of this study was to explore the
experiences of high risk women who said no to RRS, and to illuminate an
understanding of why these women made what appeared to be anti-health decisions
in the context of modern Western medicine. The influence of dominant medical and
sexual discourses is considered, as it is argued such communal discourses influence
perceptions of women and women’s experiences in Western society and the resulting
decisions they make with regards to RRS.

1

This study is timely in light of growing public and professional interest on genetic
causes of disease and subsequent management of pre-disease ‘patients’.

This

interest was palpably exposed in 2013 following revelations one of the world’s most
famous women had undergone surgical removal of her healthy breasts because of a
genetic predisposition to breast/ovarian cancer.

The resulting media coverage

catapulted genetic testing and RRS into the public domain and sparked extensive
debate on the rights and wrongs of what is arguably extreme preventative medicine.

Introduction
My interest in the topic of this study dates back to the early 1990s whilst working as a
Breast Care Nurse Specialist. In my clinical practice, I primarily dealt with women
undergoing surgical and medical interventions for breast cancer. At this time, women
who attended the Breast Clinic because they had a family history of breast cancer, the
so-called ‘worried well’, were managed ad hoc as there were no clinical guidelines
which outlined best practice for these women. Their management inevitably involved
a clinical breast examination, mammography, ‘reassurance’ and discharge from the
clinic with no follow up. This changed in the early 00s when clinical testing for genetic
breast cancer became widely available. The ‘worried well’ became ‘presymptomatic
patients’ and guidelines were developed which outlined how such women should be
counselled, screened and managed. I worked with many women who had a family
history of breast/ovarian cancer and witnessed first-hand the anxiety, fear and distress
which accompanied their situation. Despite genetic counselling and risk estimation
information, for some of these women, their perceived reality involved a frightening
choice: amputate their breasts and ovaries or develop cancer. It was my work with
these women which ignited my interest in cancer genetics and propelled an interest in
developing ways of supporting high risk women through their difficult journey,
culminating in this dissertation.

2

Contextualising the research
Continuing advances in molecular biology, health technologies and imaging have
changed the landscape of Western medicine as the quest for the ever-earlier
detection of disease continues (Moynihan, Doust, & Henry, 2012). This is exemplified
by the Human Genome Project (HGP) which began in 1990 and aimed to unearth and
understand the genetic makeup of the human species (National Institutes of Health,
(NIH), 2010).

The primary goal of the HGP was to determine the sequence of

chemical base pairs which make up Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (DNA) and to identify
and map the approximately 25,000 genes of the human genome from both a physical
and functional standpoint. This map would reveal everything which is genetically
determined about an individual’s life: their genetic blueprint. This blueprint could be
used to identify an individual’s susceptibility to certain disease conditions and inform
specifically tailored strategies for the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease
(Jenkins & Collins, 2003). The human genome sequence was eventually completed
in April 2003 and more than 1800 genes implicated in the development of a number of
diseases have been discovered (NIH, 2010).

The sequencing of the human genome led to the identification of two genes (BRCA1
and BRCA2) which are implicated in the development of up to 10% of all breast
(Apostolou & Fostira, 2013) and ovarian (Prat, Ribe & Gallardo, 2005) cancers.
Deleterious mutations in these genes confer a significantly elevated lifetime risk of
developing breast and ovarian cancer (Rebbeck, Kauff & Domcheck, 2009), although
debate exists as to the most accurate risk estimation (National Cancer Institute (NCI),
2013). The discovery of, and subsequent clinical testing of these genes implies the
generation of diagnoses on the basis of risk rather than causality (Webster, 2002)
leading to a subset of high risk patients who have no symptoms of disease but who
may develop cancer.

Genetic testing represents a shift from a diagnostic model of

medicine to a more prognostic-preventive model increasingly concerned with future
3

health (Paul, Banerjee & Michl, 2014).

Whilst strong evidence supports a link

between certain gene mutations and the development of cancer (Apostolou & Fostira,
2013), the tendency to treat genetic risk as disease in itself (Conrad, 2007) means
people who carry BRCA1/2 mutations are essentially marked for cancer. Genetic
testing thus has the potential to cause harm by revealing variations in genetic makeup which are associated with certain diseases, but which may never cause a threat to
health (Faulkner, 2012; Melzer & Zimmerman, 2002).

Medical interventions to manage high risk women range from surveillance strategies
to RRS and chemoprevention (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
(NICE), 2013). RRS does not entirely negate risk (Kraus & Adlard, 2013), however
there is conclusive evidence Risk Reducing Mastectomy (RRM) and Risk Reducing
Salpingo-oophorectomy (RRSO) significantly reduce the risk of developing breast and
ovarian cancer in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Kraus & Adlard, 2013; Lostumbo,
Carbine & Wallace, 2010).

Therefore, although overall risk is lowered, cancer

development following surgical removal of the breasts and ovaries can and does
occur (Lostumbo et al., 2010). This means some women who have their healthy
breasts and ovaries removed will still go on to develop cancer which adds to the
complexity of the decision making around risk calculation and RRS.

Additionally,

although RRS reduces disease incidence in high risk populations, evidence to support
a survival benefit is weak (Neuburger, MacNeill, Jeevan, van der Meulen & Cromwell,
2013) because should a woman develop cancer, she may be cured by conventional
treatments. Therefore, located within the myriad of molecular and genetic discoveries
are a group of women for whom technological advancements have raised many
questions which cannot yet be resolutely answered. This is an important area of
health research as the increasing number of women experiencing complex
psychological issues as a result of being identified at high risk of cancer is well
recognised (Eijzenga, Hahn, Aaronson, Kluijt & Bleiker,

2014; Lerman, Croyle,
4

Tercyak & Hamann, 2002) and women owing BRCA1/2 mutations experience
significant levels of emotional distress and anxiety (McLamara, 2013). This is not
surprising given cancer remains the most feared of diseases (Vrinten, van Jaarsveld,
Waller, Wagner & Wardle, 2014) and is surrounded by a discourse of fear and terror
(Harrington, 2012).

The need for research
In an ever more technical world, advancements in medical technologies mean
problems of a biological or pathological nature are increasingly able to be resolved,
yet a corresponding efficacy in solving social and ethical dilemmas created by such
advancements has yet to be achieved (Paul et al., 2014). In relation to HBOC, clinical
advancements in the field of genetics have changed the landscape of the
management of high risk women yet research on the impacts of such advancements
is comparatively limited.

In 2013 in the UK, NICE published updated clinical guidelines for the classification,
care and management of familial breast/ovarian cancer. The Guideline Development
Group noted, with concern, the relative paucity of evidence upon which to base
recommendations in many areas covered by the guidance. An overall increase in
research on all aspects of HBOC was recommended. Similarly, a Cochrane Review
on cancer genetic risk assessment in familial breast cancer (Hilgart, Coles & Iredale,
2012) concluded that more research on peoples’ experience of the cancer genetics
journey was needed, including decision making with regard to the uptake of
preventative measures such as RRS. Of particular note, the authors’ emphasised
research on the impact of testing on those identified as high risk as an important area
for further research, again highlighting the need for studies to explore women’s
experiences of being identified as owning a cancer predisposing gene fault.

5

This study addresses an important area of concern in contemporary health care: the
care of people with presymptomatic conditions. The expansion of genetics in medicine
has led to the identification of an increasing number of women as high risk of
developing breast and/or ovarian cancer. In keeping with clinical guidelines, women
identified as high risk of developing cancer will be required to make a decision as to
whether to have their healthy breasts and/or ovaries surgically removed to prevent
cancer (Eijzenga et al., 2014; Fuller & Anderson, 2006).

Public and professional interest in genetic testing continues to grow (Chustecka,
2014; Paul et al., 2014) and thresholds for genetic testing for breast/ovarian cancer
have lowered (NICE, 2013) pre-empting an increase in RRS (Semple et al., 2013).
An understanding of the needs of these women has yet to be obtained and they face
a complex and, at times, difficult and distressing journey (Mahon, 2011; McLamara,
2013).

The growing dialogue on breast/ovarian cancer predisposition is reflected in the
coining of the term ‘previvor’ in 2000.

The origin of the term is attributed to the

American-based non-profit organisation FORCE (Facing Our Risk of Cancer
Empowered) and the term ‘previvor’ is now a registered trademark of the organisation.
A ‘previvor’ is someone who does not have cancer but has a genetic predisposition to
developing cancer (Mahon, 2011): a pre-survivor (Cruz, 2007). The word was
described by Time magazine as being in the top 10 buzzwords for 2007 (Cruz, 2007)
and its seemingly increasing importance reflected in the United States of America
(USA) Congress supporting the designation of September 29th 2010 as ‘National
Previvor Day’ (US Government, 2010). Although the concept of ‘previvorship’ is not
the focus of this research, it none-the-less highlights the increasing prominence of
HBOC in the public discourse. It is also interesting to note that the use of the term is
now entering the professional discourse on hereditary breast/ovarian cancer (Hoskins,
6

Roy & Greene, 2012; Mahon, 2011; Pirzadeh, 2012; Tercyak, Mays, DeMarco, Sharff
& Friedman, 2011). Use of the term ‘previvor’ is not without controversy (Oransky,
2012) and the ‘previvorship’ concept in health care research highlights how public and
professional discourses can influence each other in contemporary health care.
Moreover, the concept of previvorship reveals further evidence of medicalisation in
health care (Oransky, 2012), in this case, the medicalisation of the risk of disease.

Scholars have increasingly commented on medicalisation within Western culture,
whereby aspects of human life come to be considered as medical problems (Maturo,
2012) which can then be reduced or cured by medical interventions (Conrad, 2001,
2005).

In this study, it is argued that women and their bodies and breasts are

medicalised as a result of social, cultural and moral attitudes concerning the breasts
and breast/ovarian cancer genetics. The medicalisation of women’s breasts and the
medicalisation of the risk of breast/ovarian cancer have implications for the ways in
which women experience being diagnosed with a genetic predisposition to developing
cancer, and to the subsequent decisions they make about their care. Medicalisation
then constructs the breasts and ovaries of high risk women as faulty and is supported
by a medical discourse which seeks to deal with the risk of cancer through various
interventions on the body.

Biomedicine is the dominant Western medical discourse (Lane, 2014). Biomedicine is
an organ-based approach to medicine which focuses on disease mechanisms (Lane,
2014) and is underpinned by the conviction that humans are biological organisms
understood by the examination of constituent parts using the empirical scientific
methods (Mehta, 2011).

Accordingly, disease is a result of identifiable causes,

located within the individual and best attended to by corrective surgical and
pharmacological interventions (Filc, 2004; Mehta, 2011). The discourse of Western
biomedicine is legitimised by its historical status and affiliation with scientific
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disciplines (Davis, 2008).

The biomedical model is helpful for those affected by

disease as it is in the main, effective in diagnosing and treating disease (Lane, 2014).
However, recognition of the impact of societal and cultural forces on the development,
treatment and meaning of illness and disease is limited within this model (Davis, 2008;
Filc, 2004; Lane, 2014). Thus the biomedical model is challenged by those who claim
disease is a phenomenon with a biological component but also entails social stigmas
and labels which require the individual to construct an identity which takes account of
the illness (Davis, 2008). Hence the biological cannot be separated from the social
and personal aspects of disease (Lane, 2014). This is particularly important in relation
to cancer given the discourse of fear and terror (Harrington, 2012) within which cancer
is enmeshed.

Despite this, there is a paucity of

research

focussed on

understanding why some people refuse conventional therapeutic interventions for
managing cancer within the context of Western medical discourse (Citrin, Bloom,
Grutsch, Mortensen & Lis, 2012; Frenkel, 2013; Verhoef, Rose, White & Balneaves,
2008).

This study concerns the experiences of high risk women who say no to RRS despite
its emergence as the principle primary intervention for reducing breast/ovarian cancer
risk (Ingham et al., 2013) and clinical guidance that surgery be offered to all high risk
women (Cancer Australia, 2011; NICE, 2013). It is contended that the women in this
study rejected the conventional therapeutic approach despite being at high risk of
developing cancer. Davis (2008) notes that, all individuals are essentially ‘at risk’ of
illness, disease or harm simply by being alive although for the majority this risk is
tolerable and resides in the background of the person’s life. However, being identified
as having a genetic predisposition to cancer conveys inevitability about cancer
development (Crabb, 2006) and brings this risk into the foreground of life (Davis,
2008).
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What then for the woman with a genetic predisposition to breast/ovarian cancer facing
RRS to remove her still healthy breasts and/or ovaries?

These presymptomatic

women live in a society where cancer seems omnipresent and remains the most
feared (Vrinten et al., 2014) and stigmatised of diseases (Clarke & Everest, 2006) and
where breast and ovarian cancer remain leading causes of death (Australian Institute
of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 2012; World Health Organisation (WHO), 2009).
These women have been informed they are genetically predisposed to developing
breast and/or ovarian cancer as a result of genetic testing, yet medical science cannot
prevent cancer, nor can any guarantee be given of avoiding cancer, even following
removal of the breasts/ovaries. There is an assumption women at risk of cancer will
engage in preventative strategies as they are the only sensible course of action
(Davis, 2008). How then do we understand those who reject the conventional within
modern Western medicine and make what appear to be ‘anti-health’ decisions
regarding avoiding cancer?

This is the juxtaposition women with a genetic

predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer face: although still healthy, these
women are being asked to undergo surgical removal of their organs.

The predicament of high risk women offered RRS is further complicated by the
symbolisation of the breast, and to a lesser extent the ovary, as a defining part of the
female form. Davis (2008) notes the female breast is an icon of the private individual
self and the culturally shaped public self. The meaning attached to, and the resulting
folklore surrounding the female breast is in many ways highlighted by the acceptance
of cosmetic breast augmentation in Western society which reifies the notion of the
perfect breast (Filc, 2004). Further, Filc (2004) argues the undertaking of a potentially
risky surgical procedure in order to perfect breasts which do not conform to the
socially and culturally constructed ideal is another example of the hegemony of
Western medical discourse and resulting medicalisation of non-medical issues.
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Justification for the approach taken
A growing body of literature exists on genetic breast/ovarian cancer and the merits of
various therapeutic interventions and responses to such interventions. The focus of
research in the main has been concerned with efficacy of different risk reducing
interventions and the associated potential benefits and harms. There is an absence
of research which investigates the social, cultural and historical contexts in which
decision making around HBOC is made. The majority of studies, to date, have used
standardised psychometric instruments to assess the impact of risk, risk calculation
and risk reducing interventions on women at risk of developing HBOC. Such
instruments utilise pre-determined criteria for measuring women’s responses,
attitudes, beliefs and so forth, which arguably leads the research from the standpoint
of the researcher and assumes what the women’s responses might be beforehand.

The focus has tended to be on identification and measurement of variables which may
influence or predict decision-making in high risk women. A challenge inherent in this
type of approach is attempting to make real-life, personal experience fit into
preconceived, so-called expert opinion on what is important.

It may be contended

that such approaches fail to take account of the entire range of influences on making
health-related decisions, conscious and sub-conscious, known and unknown, to which
women in Western society are subject. Moreover, despite the importance attached to
women’s breasts and ovaries in Western society, little consideration has been given to
the ways dominant societal discourses impact on women’s experiences and decision
making in relation to RRS.

What is lacking from this body of research is an

understanding of the experience of saying no to RRS from the perspective of high risk
women based on the material and social conditions of their everyday lives.

The approach taken in this study sought to explore the experiences of high risk
women who said no to RRS. Further, by giving voice to this group of women, this
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study revealed an understanding of the public and private folklore shared by these
women, of a life trajectory compounded by living with a cancer predisposition. This
voice was heard within the context of personal, social, cultural and historical
influences.

Illuminating an understanding of this will help inform and influence

counselling of high risk women.

A qualitative approach which combined Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography with
Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology was used as a method through
which the women’s stories could be gathered, read and interpreted. Each woman’s
experiences were valued and worthy of investigation. This approach is particularly
suited to understanding an individual’s experiences at key moments in their lives
(Surr, 2006) such as women who had been told they are at high risk of developing
cancer but said no to RRS. Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology was
used to unravel and interpret these women’s stories and to determine the private
folklore of this group of women. Without such an understanding, it is difficult for health
care providers to justify approaches taken to support and care for such women.
Without understanding it is argued, there can be no real knowledge.

Significance of the research
The significance of this study is the generation of new knowledge related to the
experiences of women who say no to RRS following a mutation-positive genetic test
result. The study questions taken-for-granted assumptions of how women who are
formally acknowledged to be high risk of developing cancer make the decision to take
no action. By stimulating debate and providing future directions for research on how
high risk women come to say no to RRS, this study opens up possibilities for critically
examining current care practises of high risk women and has implications for how
information is presented and communicated to high risk women.

The knowledge

gained will assist in the care of women through the development of information and
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support strategies which are relevant and meaningful to high risk women considering
RRS. This knowledge will inform health professionals, educators and policy makers
of new ways to consider the management of presymptomatic genetic testing to
transform disease prevention and develop targeted interventions.

Purpose of the research
The purpose of this study was to explore the experiences of women who said no to
RRS following a mutation-positive genetic test result.

The aims of the study were:
1. To explore the experiences of high risk women who say no to RRS.
2. To create new knowledge regarding the refusal of RRS in high risk women within
the framework of Western medical discourse.
3. To add to the current understanding of how high risk women come to say no to
RRS and make recommendations for the care, counselling and support of such
women.

Chapter summary and overview of chapters to come
This chapter introduced the issues of concern in this study and outlined the purpose
and aims of the research. Justification for the approach taken has been presented
and the need for and significance of this research is explained. Chapter 2 comprises
a review of pertinent literature in order to contextualise the analysis which follows in
subsequent chapters. In Chapter 3 the methodological approach taken is described
and justified. Chapter 4 outlines the steps taken in the conduct of the study and
provides a comprehensive overview of the literary theories used to interpret the
participants’ experiences.

Chapter 5 introduces the participants, describes how

intimacy was established presents the participants’ biographical timelines with family
histories and epiphany moments.

Chapter 6 is the analytic chapter in which the
12

women’s experiences and influences on their decision to say no to RRS are
interpreted through the three literary theory lenses.

The thesis concludes with

Chapter 7 which draws together the key findings from the study, considers
implications for clinical practice and further research and presents the researchers’
reflexive account.

To conclude this section, it is important to stress it is not the intention of this thesis to
criticise genuine attempts to reduce the harm caused by breast/ovarian cancer nor to
deny the potential positive impact genetic testing and RRS can have on the lives of
some high risk women. Likewise, any critique is not directed at the women making
difficult choices when faced with the prospect of hereditary breast/ovarian cancer.
Rather, the aim is to problematise the dominant discourse on genetic testing and RRS
which constructs such interventions as universally and inherently a good thing. This
thesis critiques ways in which women at risk of cancer and their choices are
represented in discourse. It presents alternate meanings attached to the experience
of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian and in doing so, generates
broader discourses which construct how HBOC is talked about and ultimately
experienced. If medicine is to abide by its founding principle to ‘first do no harm’, then
any medical advancement which does appear to cause harm in some women is
worthy of exposure and investigation.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The overall purpose of this literature review was to provide an overview of the issues
of concern in this study in order to contextualise the analysis which follows in later
chapters.

The approach taken in this study contends that a communal folklore

surrounding breast/ovarian cancer exists. This communal folklore is underpinned by
dominant modes of thinking which consent to or censure certain ways of being and
acting when faced with the risk of cancer. In the dominant medical discourse, women
identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer are able to circumvent their
genetic destiny through the surgical removal of their still-healthy breasts and ovaries.
Medical discourse fails to articulate an understanding of other dominant gendered
discourses which shape the experiences and lives of high risk women in Western
society because ideologies of treatment for risk take precedence. The decision of
women identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer to say no to RRS is
argued to be ‘anti-health’ within current Western medical discourse however as will be
discussed, this decision makes sense when it is made within other dominant
discourses. This is the paradox faced by high risk women.

At this point, attention is drawn to the rapidly changing landscape that is HBOC. The
introduction to this thesis highlighted how HBOC has been catapulted into the public
arena in the last two years as a result of widespread media coverage of Angelina
Jolie’s risk reducing surgery to remove her breasts and ovaries.

Professional

discourse on the management of HBOC is likewise dynamic with the most recent UK
guidelines published as recently as July 2013 (NICE, 2013). These guidelines in
themselves reveal not only is the medical management of HBOC currently unstable,
but also that much remains unknown about how best to manage HBOC in terms of
clinical and psychosocial indicators since gaps exist in the evidence base to support
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current clinical recommendations. This is not surprising when one considers it is not
yet 20 years since the two key genes implicated in the development of HBOC were
mapped, isolated and subjected to extensive scrutiny.

Consequently widespread

genetic testing has been available for a relatively short period of time therefore
research around risk reducing interventions is somewhat limited in comparison to
other areas of cancer care.

The nursing research in relation to the care and

management of women facing HBOC is an emergent area therefore gaps also existed
in the literature in relation to sourcing relevant sources to support this research. This
meant it was necessary at times to extrapolate from wider literature which related to
women diagnosed with breast and/or ovarian cancer.

This in itself was not

problematic and as is seen, it is evidence of dominant yet dynamic discourses on risk,
genetics and cancer which expose women with no disease to a number of influences,
ideologies and impacts which are also faced by women with breast/ovarian cancer.

Search parameters
The literature search commenced in 2009 using several electronic databases:
MEDLINE, Medline In Process and Other Non-Indexed Citations, MEDLINE Daily
Update, CINAHL, CancerLit, EMBASE, Cochrane Library, PsycInfo, Web of Science
and Journals@OVID. The search was limited to articles written in English and was
updated on a continual basis.

The generic internet search engines ‘Google’

(http://www.google.co.uk) and ‘Google Scholar’ (https://scholar.google.co.uk/) were
also utilised as potential sources of literature. Government and health organisation
websites were accessed and a hand search conducted of the reference lists of papers
and documents retrieved for additional literature. Literature over 10 years old was
included if it was of a seminal nature and/or written by prominent authors in the field.

A number of key search words were utilised in the search which reflected the key
areas of concern and included: familial, genes, genetic, genetic testing, screening,
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hereditary, breast, ovarian, cancer, predisposition, susceptibility, risk, high risk, cancer
risk, communicating risk,

BRCA, mastectomy, oophorectomy, prophylactic,

preventative, risk reducing, surgery, Western, medical, medicine, discourse, women,
female, femininity, society, ideology and medicalisation. Literature pertaining to the
method was also extensively searched using the same process and involved the key
search words: interpretive biography, biographical, Marxism, Marxist, feminist,
feminism, Foucault, Foucauldian, literary theory, literary criticism, folklore, life stories,
personal experience narratives and narrative analysis.

A considerable body of literature was found in relation to risk reducing interventions
for high risk women. Given the focus of the research were high risk women who say
no to RRS within the context of Western medical discourse, this study was
contextualised within several key areas of literature. First, literature relating to
breast/ovarian cancer genetics, risk estimation and genetic testing was reviewed. The
focus of the review then narrowed to draw upon literature related specifically to risk
reducing interventions and the physical and psychosocial impacts of RRS.

The

review concludes with a discussion of the concepts of medicalisation and risk and how
these concepts have contributed to contemporary understandings of breast/ovarian
cancer. Literature pertaining to the method is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

Cancer genetics
The term ‘cancer’ refers to a number of diseases caused by the uncontrolled division
and replication of abnormal cells in a part of the body.

In normal cells, growth and

division is a carefully regulated process which depends on the interaction of a number
of regulatory factors contained within the genetic material of the cell, the DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) (Corner, 2008).

Homeostasis is maintained when there is a

balance between cell proliferation and cell death.

Cancer results from a series of

genetic alterations which lead to a progressive disordering of the normal cell control
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mechanisms, a multi-step process known as carcinogenesis (Corner, 2008) the
process of which is influenced by a number of genetic, epigenetic and non-genetic
factors (Van Gerpen, 2007).

All cancers have a genetic basis, that is, they occur as a result of mutations in genes.
Genes are sub-units of DNA and are formed as 23 pairs of chromosomes; therefore,
cells contain two copies of each gene (Cancer Research UK, 2014). The majority of
cancers are caused by acquired, chance mutations through an individual’s exposure
to endogenous and exogenous DNA-damaging elements (Stratton, 2011) such as
viruses, radiation, carcinogenic agents and naturally occurring random mutations
which corrupt DNA. These are known as somatic mutations and are present only in
the damaged cells, therefore these mutations cannot be passed to offspring (ArdenJones, Thomas, Docherty & Eles, 2008).

Multiple mutations which corrupt both

copies of a gene are necessary before loss of cellular control occurs. Whole genomesequencing studies have shown between 1000 and 10,000 somatic mutations to be
present in most adult solid tumours (Baird & Caldas, 2013).

In contrast, inherited mutations, such as those associated with HBOC, are germline
mutations which means the mutation is present in the sex chromosomes (of the sperm
and ova) hence can be passed on to offspring (Arden-Jones et al., 2008). During
conception, the developing zygote randomly inherits a single copy of every
chromosome from each parent. Since there are two copies of each chromosome, the
child could inherit the faulty (mutated) copy or the normal copy. If either parent has a
germline mutation, each child conceived has a 50:50 chance of inheriting that
mutation (Cancer Research UK, 2014).

Additionally, because the mutation is in the

germline, it will be present every DNA-containing cell in the individual’s body (ArdenJones et al., 2008). Germline mutations confer increased susceptibility to cancer
through various mechanisms including directly promoting cell growth, altering the rate
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of mutation in somatic cells and loss of modulating harmful effects of carcinogen
exposure (Stratton, 2011).

Cancer is more likely if a mutated version of the

chromosome/gene is inherited because the person already has one faulty copy of a
gene therefore requires less subsequent corrupting events to develop cancer, as
outlined in the diagram below.

Sporadic cancer: mutation on both copies of gene acquired over time

Uncontrolled cell proliferation leading to cancer.

Inherited cancer: one mutated copy inherited and already present

Uncontrolled cell proliferation leading to cancer.
Figure 1: Sporadic versus inherited mutation gene corruption.
Breast/ovarian cancer predisposition
Breast cancer is the most common cancer diagnosed in women and accounts for
almost 25% of all female cancer (NICE, 2013). The worldwide overall lifetime risk of
women developing breast cancer remains approximately 1 in 10 (NCI, 2013).
Western countries, the risk is higher.

In

Women in the United Kingdom (UK) and

Australia have a 1 in 8 chance of developing breast cancer before the age of 85
(AIHW, 2012).

Sixty-six percent of deaths from breast cancer occur in Western

countries, although breast cancer incidence and mortality continues to rise in
developing countries (WHO, 2008).
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The worldwide overall lifetime risk of a woman developing ovarian cancer is
approximately 1 in 71 or 1.4% (NCI, 2013). The risk in Australia is comparable at 1 in
77 (AIHW, 2010).

In the United Kingdom however, the risk is higher at 1 in 54

(Cancer Research UK, 2012).

Reasons for this are believed to be a higher

prevalence of known risk factors such as older age, high fat diet and high alcohol
consumption, fewer pregnancies/children and higher usage of hormone replacement
therapy (Cancer Research UK, 2012).

The clustering of breast cancer in families has been recognised for several hundred
years, although it was not until the mid-20th century when more systematic attempts to
document ‘cancer families’ led to the hypothesis some breast cancers may have a
strong hereditary element (Easton, Antonio & Thompson, 2008).

Epidemiological

studies identified first-degree female relatives of women with breast or ovarian cancer
were more likely to develop the disease than the general population, and this was
more likely to be a result of genetic predisposition rather than environmental or
behavioural factors (Stratton & Rahman, 2008). It is now estimated up to 10% of
breast (Apostolou & Fostira, 2013) and ovarian (Rosenthal et al., 2012) cancers are
hereditary, that is, attributable to deleterious mutations in the genetic material passed
on from parents to offspring.

Family history is considered the most significant risk

factor for ovarian cancer development (Easton et al., 2008; Prat et al., 2005) and one
of the most important for breast cancer development (Antoniou & Easton, 2006; NICE,
2013).

Genetic mutations and breast/ovarian cancer predisposition
Gene sequencing technology has identified some of the genes implicated in
susceptibility to breast/ovarian cancer development (Antoniou & Easton, 2006; NICE
2013). These include the BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, TP53, and PTEN genes although
mutations in the latter three are rare compared with BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations
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(Walsh et al., 2006). Thus, BReast CAncer1 (breast cancer susceptibility gene 1)
and BReast CAncer2 (breast cancer susceptibility gene 2), are considered the most
important cancer predisposition genes (Bradbury & Olopade, 2007) and the majority
of women identified as high risk will carry a deleterious mutation in one of these genes
(NICE, 2013).

BRCA gene mutations are also associated with a higher risk of other

cancers including cancers of the head, neck and skin (Narod & Offit, 2005), pancreas,
uterus and biliary system (Thompson & Easton, 2001) and fallopian tubes and
peritoneum (Casey et al., 2005).

Identified in the mid 1990’s, BRCA1 and BRCA2 are genes located on chromosomes
17 and 13 respectively. BRCA1 and BRCA2 are tumour suppressor genes involved in
various cell regulation functions including DNA repair, cell cycle regulation and
apoptosis (the process of programmed cell death) (Yoshida & Miki, 2004). Tumour
suppressor genes prevent neoplastic development by repressing or inhibiting cell
division and growth thus maintaining homeostasis. BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations
therefore are not oncogenes, that is, they do not cause cancer. Rather their inability
to function normally increases the likelihood of malignant transformation in cells.

Thousands of different disease-associated mutations in the BRCA1/2 genes have so
far been identified although much fewer are known to be deleterious (Antoniou &
Easton, 2006; Borg et al., 2010). It is estimated approximately 0.25% of the general
population will carry BRCA1/2 mutations (NCI, 2014).

This figure rises to 2% for

women with breast cancer, 5% for men with breast cancer and 10-15% for women
with ovarian cancer. Rates in the Ashkenazi Jewish population are higher at 2.5% for
the general population, 10% for women with breast cancer, 19% for men with breast
cancer and 36-41% for women with ovarian cancer (NCI, 2014). The higher incidence
of BRCA mutations in people of Ashkenazi Jewish descent is a result of what is
termed the ‘founder effect’. This occurs when a new population is established by a
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small group of people (founders) who are culturally and/or geographically isolated,
leading to inbreeding and a loss of genetic variation (Ferla et al., 2007). Founder
mutations are those present in the DNA of the founders of the new population which
can be passed down to other generations.

Three founder mutations (two in BRCA1

and one in BRCA2) are known to be present in the Ashkenazi Jew population
accounting for this particular group’s higher incidence of inherited breast and ovarian
cancer (Ferla et al., 2007).

Transmission of BRCA1/2 mutations occurs in an autosomal dominant pattern which
means inheriting only one copy of the mutated gene increases cancer risk (NCI,
2014). Each child of a carrier parent has a 50% chance of inheriting the mutated copy
therefore both mothers and fathers can transmit a BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation to sons
and daughters.

Figure 2: Autosomal dominant inheritance.*
(*Attribution: By U.S. National Library of Medicine (Genetics Home Reference) [Public domain], via Wikimedia
Commons)

BRCA1/2 mutations and breast/ovarian cancer risk estimation
Germline mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 confer higher risks of developing breast
and ovarian cancer although penetrance, the likelihood of a mutation-carrier
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manifesting the disease, is incomplete (Lessick, 2007) therefore not all mutation
carriers will go on to develop the disease. Since there is no test or intervention which
can accurately predict who will go on to develop breast/ovarian cancer, many women
will have RRS needlessly (Lostumbo et al., 2010) because they would never have
developed cancer. Thus the genetic pathway associated with breast/ovarian cancer
gene mutations differs to that of other single disorder/high penetrance genes such as
those associated with Huntington’s disease where penetrance is almost 100% (Melzer
& Zimmerman, 2002).

Attempts have been made to estimate the cancer risk conferred by BRCA1/2
mutations.

The majority of studies have identified BRCA1 mutations as conferring

greater risk than BRCA2 (NCI, 2014).

Three large meta-analyses have been

conducted although in the most recent (van der Kolk et al., 2010) a greater risk for
breast cancer was associated with BRCA2 mutations. van der Kolk et al. (2010)
acknowledged the BRCA2 breast cancer risk reported was higher than most other
published data, but reasons for this were not fully articulated. Risk estimates by
mutation and cancer type are summarised in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Risk estimates by mutation and cancer type
Authors

Cancer
type

BRCA1 mutation risk by age
70 years

BRCA2 mutation risk by age
70 years

van der Kolk et
al. (2010)

Breast

71.4% (95% CI, 67.2 - 82.4%)

87.5% (95% CI, 82.4 - 92.6%)

van der Kolk et
al. (2010)

Ovarian

58.9% (95% CI, 53.5 - 64.3%)

34.5% (95% CI, 25.0 - 44.0%)

Chen &
Parmigiani (2007)

Breast

57% (95% CI, 47% - 66%)

49% (95% CI, 40% - 57%)

Chen &
Parmigiani (2007)

Ovarian

40% (95% CI, 35% - 46%)

18% (95% CI, 13% - 23%)

Antoniou et al.
(2003)

Breast

65% (95% CI, 44 - 78%)

45% (95% CI, 31 - 56%)

Antoniou et al.
(2003)

Ovarian

39% (95% CI, 18 - 54%).

11% (95% CI, 2.4 - 19%).
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Cancers arising as a result of BRCA1/2 mutations are also associated with a number
of negative biological characteristics in comparison with sporadically occurring
cancers. These include younger age at diagnosis, (Salhab, Bismohun & Mokbel,
2010), more aggressive disease (Kuhl, Kuhn & Schild, 2005; Zagouri et al., 2013),
negative prognostic indicators such as oestrogen-receptor negative status (CalderonMargalit, & Paltiel, 2004; Domcheck et al., 2010) and contralateral disease (Evans et
al., 2013).

BRCA1/2 mutations are also associated with an increased risk of male breast cancer.
Male breast cancer is rare and accounts for less than 1% of all breast cancer cases
(Tai, Domchek, Parmigiani & Chen, 2007) and the general population risk of breast
cancer in men is 0.1% (Berliner, Fay, Cummings, Burnett & Tillmanns, 2013).
Increased rates of male breast cancer of 1.2% (Tai et al., 2007) and 4% (Ottini et al.,
2003) have been reported in BRCA1 mutation carriers. The link with male breast
cancer is more established for BRCA2 mutations (Weiss, Moysich, & Swede, 2005)
with increased rates of 6.8% (Tai et al., 2007) and 5 – 10% (Institute of Cancer
Research, (2015) reported.

Overall then, there is agreement owning a BRCA1/2 mutation confers an increased
risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer but the magnitude of risk varies. Several factors
are apparent which may explain this. Although gene mutations have been identified
which appear to predispose cancer development, the exact mechanism by which this
process occurs is not understood.

Different BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations are

associated with varying degrees of penetrance (Njiaju & Olopade, 2012).

For

example, mutations in the central region of the BRCA1 gene confer lower breast
cancer penetrance than mutations in other positions on the gene (Thompson &
Easton, 2001).

Available evidence also suggests breast/ovarian cancer risk is

modified through various genetic, epigenetic and non-genetic factors which impact on
23

penetrance. Age at diagnosis of affected relative, cancer type in affected relative,
parity, body mass index, exposure to endogenous hormones, age at menarche and
menopause, early oophorectomy and breast density are believed to modify cancer
risk in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Antoniou & Easton, 2006) and the general
population (Easton, Antoniou & Thompson, 2008).

A further complicating factor is

that several known risk factors for breast cancer in particular also have a hereditary
basis, for example, breast density and age at menarche/menopause (Easton et al.,
2008).

This means clusters of breast cancer may appear in families without a

heritable gene mutation.

Accurate risk estimation in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers is also hampered because not
all genes involved in cancer development have been identified or understood
(Antoniou & Easton, 2006). It is estimated that BRCA1/2 mutations account for less
than 5% of the total incidence of breast/ovarian cancer (Oldenburg, Meijers-Heijboer,
Cornelisse & Devilee, 2007) and no more than 25% of familiar breast/ovarian cancer
(Antoniou & Easton, 2006).

There is general agreement many more cancer genetic

susceptibility genes exist which have not been discovered (NCI, 2014; Oldenburg et
al., 2007). Furthermore, the ways in which multiple genes modify cancer risk is not
understood which further limits the effectiveness of risk estimation in mutation carriers
(Antoniou & Easton, 2006).

The model used to estimate cancer risk also impacts on the risk estimate obtained
(Antoniou, Pharoah, Smith & Easton, 2004; NICE, 2013).

A range of computational

risk assessment models have been developed in attempts to quantify risk assessment
for individuals with a breast/ovarian cancer family history (Bradbury & Olopade, 2007).
The use of a particular model must be tailored to the individual’s characteristics and
family history, which must be similar to the study population upon which the model is
based (NCI, 2014). Moreover, no model has been developed which takes account of
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all cancer risk factors, ethnicity, and individual non-genetic risk factors (Bradbury &
Olopade, 2007; NICE, 2013). Different models show variation in risk estimate for the
same clinical scenario (NCI, 2014) therefore a degree of expertise is needed in
choosing the most appropriate model(s) for calculating risk breast/ovarian cancer risk
(Bradbury & Olopade, 2007).

It is widely acknowledged current models of risk

estimation are more accurate in determining population risk and are limited in their
predictive ability for individual risk calculation (Antoniou & Easton, 2006; Bradbury &
Olopade, 2007; NICE, 2013; Prado, Andrades & Parada, 2010).

Overall then, although understanding of breast/ovarian cancer genetics is increasing,
much remains unknown about how breast/ovarian cancer develops in women who
carry BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations. Current interventional strategies for high risk
women, including RRS, are based on risk estimations gained from mathematical
models which are acknowledged as being limited in terms of predictive ability for
individual risk calculation. Moreover, much of the information used in genetic
counselling is based on uncertainty and probability (Emery, Murphy & Lucassen,
2000) rather than sureness and certitude.

A Cochrane review on RRM

for the

prevention of breast cancer (Lostumbo et al., 2010) highlighted there was insufficient
evidence regarding its effectiveness in reducing mortality in all but very high risk
women and stated there was a risk of over-treatment for many women. Nonetheless,
cancer prevention remains central to worldwide cancer control strategies and attempts
to identify high risk individuals who may benefit (in terms of lowering risk) from
aggressive risk reducing strategies remain a key feature of cancer medicine.

Genetic testing for breast/ovarian cancer predisposition
Clinical testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations became available in 1996
(Bonadies, Myer & Matloff, 2011) and now forms a standard part of HBOC
management (NICE, 2013). Although the associated technology is now established,
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the overall process is complex and uncertainty exists regarding who and when to test
and the most accurate methods of estimating and communicating risk (NICE, 2013).
Additionally, challenges exist in determining the accuracy of a family history. There
may be poor communication between families, dates of diagnosis may be inaccurate
or unknown and there may be missing information if relatives are deceased or
estranged (Parker, London & Aronson, 2013).

Malignancies of the pelvis and

abdomen are commonly confused in families (NICE, 2013), for example, believing a
cancer of the cervix or endometrium to be a cancer of the ovary or vice versa.
Genetic testing is also prone to revealing incidental findings, or information which was
not requested such a child conceived through an extra-marital affair or an adopted
child (Greenbaum, 2013) hence people may withhold information or intentionally
provide erroneous information (Parker et al., 2013). In cases where the family history
is unclear or incomplete, it is necessary for clinicians to make decisions on testing
locally on a case-by-case basis (NICE, 2013). It is evident therefore the genetic
testing journey is varied and people’s experiences will differ depending on their family
and personal history and the geographical area in which their health care services are
situated. Consequently, this section provides a general overview of genetic testing for
illustration purposes but it may be individual experiences differ to those presented.

Genetic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations in suspected HBOC families is a
two-step process. The first step involves a mutation screen on the DNA (obtained
through a blood sample) of an affected family member, that is, a living person
diagnosed with breast or ovarian cancer. This is referred to as diagnostic testing
(National Library of Medicine, 2013) and involves searching the affected person’s
DNA to identify a particular mutation on the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene. If a deleterious
gene mutation is identified, other unaffected family members can be tested for the
presence of the mutation, a procedure known as predictive (or presymptomatic
testing) (National Library of Medicine, 2013). If the mutation is found in the person’s
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DNA, they are classified as high risk and a personalised risk assessment can be
generated. If on the other hand the person has not inherited the mutation, their risk is
the same as the general population risk. A third outcome is the individual is found to
own a variation of unknown (uncertain) significance (VUS) (Esplen & Bleiker, 2015).
No robust clinical data is available to recommend a specific strategy for dealing with
VUS therefore the clinical management of such individuals requires to be
individualised according to family history and other personal risk factors (NCI, 2014).

Threshold for genetic testing
Genetic testing for cancer predisposition involves significant financial and human
resources and has important implications for those tested, therefore guidance exists
on when individuals should be offered a diagnostic or predictive test. NICE (2013)
guidelines allow mutation screening on individuals where there is a 10% or greater
likelihood of detecting a deleterious mutation. This figure is lower than the previous
threshold of 20% set by NICE in 2006 therefore more people now meet the criteria for
genetic testing.

The Manchester Scoring System (Evans et al., 2004) is the most frequently used
empirical scoring system to estimate the likelihood of detecting a BRCA1/2 mutation in
an individual’s DNA (NICE, 2013). The score generated is dependent upon various
criteria including the age at diagnosis of affected individuals, type of cancer, the
presence of male breast cancer and/or multiple cancers in the family. A higher score
equates with higher likelihood of a gene mutation being detected and therefore aids
decision making on who is suitable for testing (Evans et al., 2004). In Australia, the
Familial Risk Assessment - Breast and Ovarian Cancer (FRA-BOC) (Cancer Australia,
2011) is used to estimate an unaffected woman’s risk of developing breast/ ovarian
cancer and identify who should be referred to a specialist family cancer clinic for
further assessment and testing. The process is presented diagrammatically below.
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Figure 3: Genetic testing process.
Intervention strategies for women at high risk of developing breast/ovarian
cancer
Genetic testing for breast/ovarian cancer predisposition is carried out on the premise it
allows interventions aimed at reducing cancer morbidity and mortality (Esplen &
Bleiker, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2012). Although there is an emerging literature on the
benefits and drawbacks associated with risk reducing interventions, gaps exist in the
evidence to support such strategies (NICE, 2013; Schwartz et al., 2012). This is not
surprising when one considers BRCA1 and BRCA2 were only identified in 1996
therefore the evidence to date has been accumulated in a relatively short period of
time. The implication of this is current guidance on management is likely to continue
to be modified over coming years as new evidence emerges and preliminary research
study findings are validated or not. Indeed the literature review for this study identified
a rapidly changing medical and genetic landscape in relation to breast and ovarian
cancer even over the relatively short study period.
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Surveillance strategies
Surveillance strategies for high risk women are based on the premise early detection
of disease potentially reduces cancer-related morbidity and mortality (NICE, 2013). A
number of surveillance strategies have been implemented and evaluated in attempts
to devise an optimal strategy for high risk individuals.

Breast examination
There is no evidence breast self-examination (BSE) or clinical breast examination
(CBE) confers any survival benefit in high risk women (Horsman et al., 2007; NICE,
2013).

Both procedures have been identified as potentially harmful (Koster &

Gotzsche, 2003; NICE, 2013) as there can be an association with unnecessary
biopsies, anxiety and false reassurance leading to delays in diagnosis should an
interval cancer develop (Horsman et al., 2007).

CBE however is recognised as

potentially beneficial if undertaken by a skilled clinician in conjunction with other
surveillance measures (Horsman et al., 2007; NICE, 2013). In keeping with health
advice aimed at the general population, high risk women are encouraged to be ‘breast
aware’ by knowing how their breasts look and feel and to seek medical advice if any
changes or abnormalities become apparent (NICE, 2013).

Surveillance by imaging
Mammography and more recently magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) are the main
surveillance methods for detecting breast cancer (NICE, 2013).

The majority of

published evidence relates to mammography owing to the relative recency of MRI
screening.
history

of

NICE (2013) recommend BRCA mutation carriers with no personal
breast/ovarian

cancer

commence

annual

mammographic

breast

surveillance at age 40 years and annual MRI surveillance at age 20 years, although
breast surveillance has been recommended elsewhere to commence as early as 25 –
30 years of age (de Gonzalez, Berg, Visvanathan, & Robson, 2009).
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There is established evidence mammography reduces breast cancer mortality in the
general population (Independent UK Panel on Breast Cancer Screening, 2012;
Warner et al., 2011) but there is much uncertainty regarding absolute benefit in terms
of lives saved and possible harms of screening (Independent UK Panel on Breast
Cancer Screening, 2012). Similarly, mammography has become widely used in the
high risk population although available evidence has yet to demonstrate the overall
safety and efficacy of it (de Gonzalez, et al., 2009) and the impact on survival
(Horsman et al., 2007; Schwartz et al., 2012).

Mammographic screening in BRCA mutation carriers poses particular challenges
owing to breast and tumour biology, the age of the target population and the potential
harms of mammography (Horsman et al., 2007; Kuhl et al., 2005; Zagouri et al.,
2013).

Breast density in pre-menopausal women makes mammography less

sensitive and therefore less effective in detecting malignancy (Warner et al., 2008).
There is the potential for harm because a dose-response relationship exists between
ionising radiation and breast cancer development (Kuhl et al., 2005; Preston et al.,
2009) therefore high risk women who commence mammographic surveillance at an
earlier age will accumulate a greater lifetime exposure hence a greater risk of
mammography-induced cancer (de Gonzalez, et al., 2009; Kuhl et al., 2005; Kurian,
Sigal & Plevritis, 2010). Moreover, some deleterious BRCA mutations are associated
with a reduction in capacity to repair DNA (Brennan, 2002; Kuhl et al., 2005) therefore
the breasts of high risk women may be paradoxically more sensitive to the harmful
effects of mammography (de Gonzalez et al., 2009; Kuhl et al., 2005; NICE, 2013).

Mammographic screening is also associated with increased psychological distress
and anxiety and reduced quality of life (Kurian et al., 2010). Women may be falsely
reassured by a ‘clear’ result and therefore neglect to report breast abnormalities which
occur during the interval between scans (Griffiths, Bendelow, Green & Palmer, 2010).
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False positive results can lead to unnecessary exploratory operations and increased
biopsies (Hallowell, 1988; Kurian et al., 2010), whereas false negatives may result in
malignancy being missed and delay diagnosis of cancer (Kurian et al., 2005).

Attempts have been made to address the potential drawbacks of mammographic
surveillance through the implementation of MRI screening. MRI offers some benefits
particularly in younger women as it is unaffected by breast density and does not use
ionising radiation (Kuhl et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2008). MRI hence offers improved
sensitivity over mammogram (Kuhl et al., 2005; NICE, 2013, Warner et al., 2008) but
is less specific (Evans & Howell, 2007; Kuhl et al., 2005) particularly for invasive and
in situ cancer (Kurian et al., 2005).

Evidence suggests a combination of

mammography and MRI may offer the most effective surveillance strategy in high risk
women (Kuhl et al., 2005; Warner et al., 2008), but more data are required to
determine the associated risks and benefits across a range of outcome indicators
(Horsman et al., 2007; Schwartz et al., 2012).

No effective screening method for ovarian cancer exists (Chai et al., 2014; Domcheck
et al., 2010). Ovarian surveillance for high risk women aims to detect tumours at
sufficiently early stage to improve survival given the poor prognosis associated with
late stage ovarian cancer (Evans et al., 2009). Surveillance utilising transvaginal
ultrasound (TVU), (combined with serum CA125 testing) has been the most
extensively investigated (Das & Bast, 2008).

All evidence to date suggests annual

TVU and/or serum CA125 monitoring has no impact on survival in high risk women
(Das & Bast, 2008; Domcheck et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2009; Moyer, 2012) and the
potential harms of screening have been highlighted as an area of concern (Moyer,
2012).
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One of the largest studies to examine the safety and efficacy of ovarian surveillance in
high risk women was the UK Familial Ovarian Cancer Screening Study (FOCSS)
(Rosenthal et al., 2012). Phase 1 of the study of 3563 high risk women ended in 2010
and found screening in the year prior to a diagnosis of ovarian cancer reduced the
incidence of late stage cancers but did not increase the incidence of early stage
(stage 1) cancers. A non-significant trend to increased survival was found but this may
have been a result of lead-time bias, that is, longer survival owing to earlier diagnosis
rather than efficacy of screening. The authors concluded that increased frequency of
screening could potentially improve the detection of stage 1 ovarian cancers hence
may lead to improvement in survival. Phase 2 of the trial was designed to investigate
4-monthly surveillance on a sample of 4531 high risk women. Recruitment to this
phase has ended with results to be published late 2015.

Primary prevention
Interventions for the primary prevention of breast/ovarian cancer in high risk women
comprise chemoprevention, RRM and RRSO.

Chemoprevention
Chemoprevention is defined as “the use of natural, synthetic, or biologic chemical
agents to reverse, suppress, or prevent carcinogenic progression to invasive cancer”
(Tsao, Kim & Hong, 2004, p.

150).

In relation to breast and ovarian cancer,

chemoprevention strategies aim to exploit hormone related pathways which influence
cancer development. Notably, oestrogen acts as a potent growth factor for breast
cancer cells and increased serum concentrations of oestrogen are strongly associated
with the development of breast cancer (Travis & Key, 2003).

Several drugs are

available which decrease exposure to oestrogen: aromatase inhibitors (AIs) which
work by blocking oestrogen production and selective oestrogen receptor modulators
(SERMs) which block the effects of oestrogen on breast tissue (Calderon-Margalit &
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Paltiel, 2004). SERMs have been most widely used and studied and currently form
the mainstay of chemoprevention of breast cancer (NICE, 2013). Tamoxifen is the
most widely used SERM although several newer agents are under investigation
(Howell & Evans, 2013).

There is well established evidence tamoxifen, a non-steroidal anti-oestrogen agent,
improves disease-free and overall survival in women with breast cancer (NICE, 2013).
Consequently, a number of clinical trials have been designed to assess the efficacy
and safety of tamoxifen as a chemoprevention agent. The largest of these was the
US Breast Cancer Prevention trial which recruited 13,388 women aged 35 and older
between April 1992 and September 1997 (Fisher et al., 1988). The double-blinded
trial randomly assigned women to receive tamoxifen 20mg daily (n=6706) or placebo
(n=6681) for five years.

Early data suggested a benefit in taking tamoxifen over

placebo with a reduction in breast cancer development of 45% in the tamoxifen group.
This prompted the investigators to unblind the trial and disclose the findings early to
allow the women in the placebo group to take tamoxifen in view of its reported clear
benefits in lowering breast cancer risk.

However, the adverse event profile was

greater in the tamoxifen group where there were statistically significant increases in
endometrial cancers, cataracts, pulmonary emboli and deep venous thrombosis. The
exception was fractures where a protective effect from tamoxifen was found. Fisher et
al. (2005) later published seven-year and final update data which reported similar
reductions in breast cancer incidence among women taking tamoxifen and
comparable rates of adverse events.

Additionally, although more breast cancers

developed in the placebo group, deaths from breast cancer was not statistically
different between the groups therefore an overall positive impact on survival was not
equivocally demonstrated (Fisher et al., 2005).

Subsequent large, international

clinical trials of tamoxifen to reduce breast cancer risk in high risk women have
confirmed its potential to significantly lower breast cancer risk but also confirmed the
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associated increased risk of adverse events (Cuzick et al., 2002, 2007; Visvanathan
et al., 2009).

The unfavourable side effect profile of tamoxifen has led to efforts to source other
SERMs which may be beneficial in reducing breast cancer risk (Vogel et al., 2010).
The Study of tamoxifen and raloxifene (STAR) trial (Vogel et al., 2006, 2010) was one
of the largest and involved almost 20,000 high risk postmenopausal women. Results
demonstrated that raloxifene was slightly less effective than tamoxifen in reducing
breast cancer risk but conferred a lower risk of endometrial cancer development,
thromboembolic events and cataracts than tamoxifen (Vogel et al., 2010).

In summary, tamoxifen and raloxifene are used to lower breast cancer risk in high risk
women but confer a number of potential adverse events.

Evidence suggests the

benefit is greatest in preventing oestrogen receptor positive cancers with little or no
effect on oestrogen receptor negative cancers (Cuzick et al., 2013).

Since the

majority of BRCA1 mutation carriers are more likely to develop oestrogen receptor
negative cancers, women with mutations in BRCA1 may not benefit from tamoxifen or
raloxifene (Calderon-Margalit & Paltiel, 2004) and further trials are needed to
determine the specific effects of chemopreventive agents on different types of
BRCA1/2 mutations (Cuzick et al., 2013; Visvanathan et al., 2009).

Risk reducing surgery (RRS)
RRS is the principle primary intervention for reducing breast/ovarian cancer risk
(Guillem et al., 2006; Ingham et al., 2013). The aim of RRS is to prevent cancer
mortality whilst minimising the potential negative sequelae of such interventions
(NICE, 2013).
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Risk reducing mastectomy (RRM)
RRM is the surgical removal of the breast in the absence of malignancy to reduce the
risk of breast cancer developing (NCI, 2014).

No surgical technique is able to

remove all breast tissue since it is spread anatomically across the entire anterolateral
chest wall and axilla, therefore a balance must be struck between removing maximal
amounts of breast tissue and leaving a physically and cosmetically acceptable result
(Guillem et al., 2006).

Several mastectomy techniques exist under different names which reflect the degree
of tissue removed.

Total mastectomy provides greatest breast cancer protection

since it involves removal of the entire breast including the nipple and areola complex
(NCI, 2014). Subcutaneous mastectomy preserves the nipple and areola complex but
leaves the most residual tissue (Guillem et al., 2006) hence a greater risk of cancer
development (Zagouri et al., 2013). More recently, the total skin sparing mastectomy
(TSSM) has been proposed as an effective method for maximising breast tissue
removal and cosmesis (Zagouri et al., 2013). TSSM removes the breast tissue but
the entire skin envelope of the breast, including the outer nipple and areola complex,
are left intact (Peled et al., 2012). Peled et al. (2012) undertook the largest review to
date on TSSM carried out on 657 breasts (428 patients) between 2001 and 2010.
The data obtained showed no significant negative oncologic or post-operative
outcomes leading the authors to conclude TSSM is both oncologically safe and
technically viable, although the relatively short period of follow up of the women was
acknowledged. However, skin sparing mastectomy can leave behind as much as
10% residual breast tissue therefore longer term follow up studies are required to
confirm its overall oncological safety (Salhab et al., 2010).
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Risk reducing salpingo-oophorectomy (RRSO)
Since oestrogen is a potent growth factor in the development of breast cancer, RRSO
reduces the risk of both breast and ovarian cancer (Domchek et al., 2010; Guillem et
al., 2006). Interestingly, although most BRCA1 associated tumours are oestrogen
receptor negative, RRSO still has a protective effect which is believed to occur owing
to a reduction in circulating oestrogen metabolites with carcinogenic properties
(Salhab et al., 2010). High risk women are therefore recommended to undergo RRSO
once childbearing is complete and prior to natural menopause (Challberg et al., 2011).
RRSO involves the surgical removal of both ovaries and fallopian tubes since BRCA
mutations also confer a higher risk of fallopian tube and peritoneal cancers (Salhab et
al., 2010).

Similar to RRM, it is not possible to remove all ovarian epithelial tissue

and a residual amount of tissue will remain following RRSO (Guillem et al., 2006).

RRSO is generally carried out laparoscopically (Ingham et al., 2013) unless extensive
intra-abdominal adhesive disease is suspected (Ward, 2015). Laparoscopic RRSO is
argued to be a relatively straightforward from a surgical perspective (Guillem et al.,
2006) although as with any surgical procedure, adverse effects are possible. A key
issue with RRSO is the surgical induction of early menopause and the potential
physical and emotional sequelae of such, which is explored in more detail later on in
this chapter.

Impact of RRS on cancer risk and cancer survival
Studies consistently show a reduction in breast cancer risk/development following
RRS in high risk populations (Domcheck et al, 2010; Lostumbo et al., 2010; Guillem et
al., 2006; NICE 2013). The first study to quantify risk reduction estimates in BRCA1/2
mutation carriers was initiated by Rebbeck et al. (2002) who followed BRCA1/2
mutation carriers recruited from 22 North American and European centres between
1974 and 2008 (follow up was until the end of 2009). Rebbeck et al. (2002) reported
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RRSO prior to menopause reduced ovarian cancer risk by approximately 85% and
breast cancer risk by approximately 25% in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers. Eight (n=259,
3.1%) ovarian cancers were diagnosed at or following RRSO compared with 58
cancers (n=292, 19.9%) in matched controls with a mean follow up of between five
and 8.8 years. Data on breast cancer risk reduction were later reported by Rebbeck
et al. (2004) who reported RRM with RRSO reduced breast cancer risk by as much as
95% in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers while RRM alone reduced breast cancer risk by
90% in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers with intact ovaries. Mean follow up was 6.4 years
in which two women (n=105, 1.9%) who underwent RRM developed breast cancer
compared with 184 (n=378, 48.7%) in matched controls.

Domcheck et al. (2010) reported later findings following the end of the PROSE study
follow-up period. Risk reduction estimates were expressed as hazard ratios where
possible. BRCA1/2 mutation carriers with no history of breast cancer who underwent
RRSO had a lower risk of ovarian cancer compared with those who did not (6% vs
2%; HR, 0.28 [95% CI, 0.12-0.69]) and a lower risk of first diagnosis of breast cancer
in BRCA1 mutation carriers (20% vs 14%; HR, 0.63 [95% CI, 0.41-0.96]) and BRCA2
mutation carriers (23% vs 7%; HR, 0.36 [95% CI, 0.16-0.82]). No breast cancers were
detected in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers who underwent RRM (n=247) compared with
98 breast cancers (n=1372, 7%) in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers did not. Overall, RRM
was confirmed as conferring a statistically significant decreased risk of breast cancer
in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers and RRSO as conferring a statistically significant
decreased risk of breast and ovarian cancer in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers.

Domcheck et al. (2010) also reported mortality and morbidity data from the PROSE
study.

A survival benefit for RRM alone could not be demonstrated however in

women who underwent RRSO compared with those who did not, there were fewer
diagnoses of ovarian cancer (1.1% vs 5.8%) and breast cancer (11.4% vs 19.2%) and
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lower all-cause mortality (3.1% vs 9.8%). Recent data reported by Finch et al. (2014)
confirms RRSO reduces ovarian cancer risk and all-cause mortality.

Following a

mean follow up of 5.6 years, RRSO was associated with an 80% reduction in the risk
of ovarian, fallopian tube, or peritoneal cancer in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers and a
77% reduction in all-cause mortality.

Ingham et al. (2013) presented survival data from a study involving 345 BRCA1
mutation carriers and 346 BRCA2 mutation carriers with no history of breast or
ovarian cancer which demonstrated an overall survival benefit with any type of RRS
(RRM and/or RRSO) which are summarised in Table 2 below. Although all-cause
deaths were recorded, the authors reported the majority of deaths occurred from
breast or ovarian cancer. Ovarian cancer deaths were more common than breast
cancer deaths in BRCA1 carriers. Additionally, it was reported a reduction in mortality
was found in women undergoing RRM alone but this was not statistically significant
once adjusted for age.

Table 2: Survival rates according to risk reducing intervention (Ingham et al.,
2013)
Procedure/number of
Number of
10 year survival
women
deaths
No RRS/n=457
71
84.3% (95% CI, 80.1 – 87.8%)
RRM/n=58

1

98.1% (95% CI, 87.1 – 99.7%)

RRSO/n=108

4

98.2% (95% CI, 92.9 – 99.6%)

RRM and RRSO/n=68

1

98.3% (95% CI, 88.6 – 99.8%)

To sum up, there is convincing evidence RRS lowers the risk of breast/ovarian cancer
in high risk women, but estimates of the magnitude of reduction vary. Furthermore,
RRS does not does not entirely negate risk (Lostumbo et al., 2010). The remaining
risk of breast cancer post RRM is believed to be 10% or less with an approximately
5% risk for peritoneal carcinoma post RRSO (Lodder et al., 2002) although these
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figures have yet to be adequately quantified. Evidence regarding the impact of RRS
on survival is weak (Neuburger et al., 2013) and further studies are needed to
compare RRS with optimal screening (Domchek et al., 2010). If a high risk woman
elects not to undergo RRS and has effective surveillance and intervention should
breast cancer develop, the paradox is that she may be cured by less extensive breast
conservation surgery (Lostumbo et al., 2010; Press, Fishman & Koenig, 2000).

Impact of RRS
The surgical removal of any body part exposes people to anaesthetic and surgical
risks (Bosma, Veen, de Jongh & Roukema, 2012) and the invasive effects of surgery
may impact negatively on body image (Atkinson & Pudner, 2010). General risks of
surgery and anaesthesia include pain, infection, septicaemia, haematoma formation,
haemorrhage, major organ dysfunction, thrombosis formation, nerve damage, skin
breakdown and death (Bosma et al., 2012). Women who undergo RRM with breast
reconstruction additional face risks associated with these procedures and younger
women undergoing RRSO must also contend with issues surrounding premature,
surgically induced menopause. Not surprisingly then, both RRM and RRSO have the
potential to cause physical and psychological morbidity (Altschuler et al., 2008).

Evidence suggests women undergoing RRS experience a range of adverse events
and a degree incapacitation for which they are largely unprepared (Hatcher &
Fallowfield, 2003; Rolnick et al., 2007).

The most commonly reported physical

symptoms post-RRM include numbness and loss of sensation (Barton et al., 2005;
Gahm, Wickman & Brandberg, 2010; Hallowell et al., 2012; Metcalfe, Esplen, Goel &
Narod, 2004; Rolnick et al., 2007), tingling sensation (Gahm et al., 2010; Metcalfe et
al., 2004), pain (Barton et al., 2005; Bresser, 2009; Gahm et al., 2010; Hallowell et al.,
2012; Rolnick et al., 2007) and infection (Barton et al., 2005; Gahm et al., 2010;
Metcalfe et al., 2004). Other reported adverse events include swelling (Metcalfe et al.,
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2004), seroma formation/lymphatic fluid leakage (Barton et al., 2005), limited arm
movement (Barton et al., 2005; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003) and difficulty sleeping
(Gahm et al., 2010; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003).

Post-operative complications frequently necessitate additional surgical interventions
cumulatively exposing women to further surgical risks (Barton et al., 2005), more so if
breast reconstruction is also carried out (Gopie et al., 2013; Guillem et al., 2006;
Rebbeck et al., 2004). Zion et al. (2003) reported 6% of women undergoing RRM
without reconstruction n=318) required at least one further operation compared to
52% of women who had also undergone reconstruction (n=1099), mostly related to
implant problems. Hatcher and Fallowfield (2003) likewise found implant removal
because of infection to be problematic following RRM with half of respondents
reporting post-operative complications still ongoing 18 months after surgery.

More

recently, Koskenvuo, Svarvar, Suominen, Aittomäki and Jahkola (2013) reported
findings on 55 women undergoing either bilateral or contralateral RRM, 85% of who
also underwent breast reconstruction with autologous tissue transfer and/or implant
insertion. Overall, 42% of women experienced complications which required reoperation. Almost a third of complications were due to problems with autologous
tissue transfer and 42% were a result of implant problems.

The physical impacts of breast removing surgery have emotional consequences which
may lead to women having negative feelings towards their post-surgery bodies as a
result of scarring, changes and altered body image (Brandberg et al., 2008; Hallowell
et al., 2012; Lindwall & Bergbom, 2009).

A relationship also exists between

increasing incidence and severity of surgical complications and reduced psychological
wellbeing (Hopwood et al., 2000) and regret following surgery (Gahm et al., 2010),
highlighting again how RRS has the potential to significantly impact on physical and
emotional wellbeing.
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RRSO also involves a range of potential adverse physical impacts as a result of the
surgical procedure itself and the resulting loss of ovarian function in premenopausal
women. In addition to the general risks of surgery, RRSO can result in excessive
bleeding (Kauff et al., 2002; Meeuwissen et al., 2005), urinary and bowel problems
(Guillem et al., 2006; Kauff et al., 2002; Michelsen, Dørum & Dahl, 2009) and
pain/discomfort (Fang, Mckenzie, Miller and Daly, 2005; Madalinska et al., 2005;
Michelsen et al., 2009).

Moreover, in premenopausal women, a surgical menopause is induced resulting in an
abrupt decline in gonadal hormones (Kotz, Alexander & Dennerstein, 2006). The
resulting oestrogen deprivation is associated with an increase in severity of
menopausal symptoms and negative bodily changes which impact on physical and
emotional well-being, more so than the more gradual decline which accompanies
natural menopause (Bresser, 2009). Loss of ovarian function following RRSO results
in a range of negative sequelae including vaginal dryness (Bonadies et al., 2011;
Fang et al., 2009; Finch et al., 2011; Robson et al., 2003), night sweats and hot
flashes (Bonadies et al., 2011; Finch et al., 2011; Tollin, 2011), sleep disturbances
(Bonadies et al., 2011; Tollin, 2011), hair thinning (Bonadies et al., 2011) cognitive
changes (Guillem et al., 2006), dyspareunia (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2009;
Finch et al., 2011; Hallowell et al., 2012), weight gain and change in body shape
(Bonadies et al., 2011; Hallowell et al., 2012).

Oestrogen deprivation in also associated with higher risks of all-cause mortality
(Sharma, 2011), a loss of bone mineral density resulting in an increased risk of
osteoporosis and bone fracture (Cohen et al., 2012; Guillem et al., 2006; Sharma,
2011) and an increase in onset and incidence of cardiovascular disease (Guillem et
al., 2006; Sharma, 2011) which may shorten lifespan (Howell & Evans, 2011). The
increasingly recognised health risks associated with premature menopause
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(Domcheck et al., 2010) requires a judgement to be made regarding the use of
hormone replacement therapy (HRT) in high risk women who undergo RRSO (Finch
et al., 2014). HRT reduces menopausal symptoms and is associated with benefits to
cardiovascular and bone health (Bresser, 2009; Rebbeck et al., 2009) but also confers
an increase in breast cancer risk in the general population (Beral, Reeves, Bull &
Green, 2011; Fournier, Berrino, Riboli, Avenel & Clavel‐Chapelon, 2005) although
studies exploring this link are of varying quality (NICE, 2013). The increased risk
observed in the general population raises legitimate concerns that HRT use may
negate the protective effects of RRSO in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Rebbeck et al.,
2005).

Several studies have reported observational data which suggests HRT does

not increase breast cancer risk in women undergoing RRSO (Anderson et al, 2003;
Challberg et al., 2011; Rebbeck et al., 2005).

Furthermore and somewhat

paradoxically, Rebbeck et al. (2009) reported RRSO in women under 45 years of age
may be associated with increased mortality if HRT is not taken due to the risks to
cardiovascular health. Further research is needed to determine the benefits and risks
of HRT use in BRCA1/2 carriers (Domcheck et al., 2010; Madalinska et al., 2006;
Rebbeck et al., 2009).

In addition to the physical risks outlined above, the folklore and symbolisation
attached to female breasts and ovaries in Western society means RRS exposes
women to potential negative psychosocial impacts (Schulzke, 2011). Breast loss is
more often constructed as an emotional rather than physical crisis because it is
equated with a loss of sexual identity and attractiveness (Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011)
and ovarian loss is associated with a negative effect on body image, femininity and
personal identity (Hallowell et al., 2012). Commonly reported psychosocial impacts of
RRS include a negative impact on body image (Altschuler et al., 2008; Bonadies et
al., 2011; den Heijer et al., 2012; Gopie et al., 2013; Hallowell et al., 2012; Kurian et
al., 2005; Sheppard & Ely, 2008) sexuality (Altschuler et al., 2008; Kurian et al., 2005;
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Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011; Sheppard & Ely, 2008) and sexual activity or functioning
(Bonadies et al., 2011; Gahm et al., 2010; Hallowell et al., 2012; Sheppard & Ely,
2008). Women also report feeling less attractive following RRS (Gahm et al., 2010;
Gopie et al., 2013; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011; Sheppard & Ely, 2008) and experience
reduced emotional wellbeing associated with cosmesis, ‘womanliness’ and the
irreversibility of the surgery (Altschuler et al., 2008; Howard, Balneaves, Bottorff &
Rodney, 2011; Sheppard & Ely, 2008).

Negative psychosocial impacts can present as a result of the surgery itself but may
also be exacerbated by physical impacts such as pain, swelling, loss of sensation
(Gahm et al., 2010; Gopie et al., 2013) and oestrogen deprivation (Bonadies et al.,
2011). The post-operative period can also incur a period of immobilisation which
results in absence from work and interferes with home and family commitments
(Hallowell, 1998) which may be longer than anticipated if complications and further
operations are required (Gopie et al., 2013).

Overall then, RRS is associated with a number of potential negative impacts on
physical and psychosocial wellbeing, but at the same time, the procedure does reduce
risk in high risk populations therefore offers a degree of protection from cancer and its
harmful effects.

The potential to reduce cancer-related worry/anxiety was largely

presented in the literature as the most positive impact of RRS (Hatcher & Fallowfield,
2003; Fang et al., 2005; Gopie et al., 2013; Guillem et al., 2006; Hallowell et al., 2012;
Hatcher, Fallowfield & A’Hern, 2001; Hopwood et al., 2000; Litton et al., 2009; Lodder
et al., 2002; Lostumbo et al., 2010; van Dijk et al., 2003).

Such findings have led to

suggestions that RRS may be the only way high risk women can effectively reduce
cancer worry (Litton et al., 2009).

However, the relationship between reducing

cancer worry and RRS is not straightforward. Although an anticipated reduction in
cancer worry is a key driver in the decision to undertake RRS (Fry, Rush, Busby-Earle
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& Cull, 2001a; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003; Lodder et al., 2002; Litton et al., 2009)
women with high levels of cancer worry who undertake RRS report equivalent levels
of cancer worry following surgery to women who do not have RRS (Fry, Busby-Earle,
Rush, & Cull, 2001b). Furthermore, cancer-related worry was also found to be linked
to the impact of surgery in terms of satisfaction and regret following surgery. Women
who exhibited greater cancer-worry and anxiety were less likely to be satisfied with
the results of surgery (Metcalfe et al., 2004) and felt most regret following surgery
(Fuller & Anderson, 2006). This is concerning as it suggests women may be driven by
worry to undertake RRS yet may remain worried and experience less satisfaction and
more regret following surgery.

To conclude this section, RRS is an effective way of controlling cancer risk in high risk
populations but much remains unknown about the best way to manage women at high
risk of HBOC (Kurian et al., 2010; NICE, 2013). Although RRS may reduce cancerspecific distress, this is replaced by other problems including negative impacts on
physical, emotional and psychosocial health (Gopie et al., 2013). Decision-making
about RRS can thus be understood as a negotiation of competing risks to body and
self: although surgery may offer protection from cancer, the folklore in Western society
surrounding the female breasts, and to a lesser extent the ovaries, means surgery to
remove these organs results in other risks to a woman’s body and self-identity
(Howard et al., 2011).

Surgical interventions on women’s bodies in response to risk can be understood as an
expansion of medicalisation whereby risk is treated in the same way as disease
(Conrad, 2007). The next section explores this concept further through a critique of
medicalisation, risk and risk management practices in relation to HBOC.
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Medicalisation, risk and HBOC
The concepts of medicalisation and risk were useful in this study as a means of
positioning HBOC within wider societal and medical discourses which impact on high
risk women and their experiences. The discussion to follow therefore provides a
background against which women’s decisions to refuse RRS are contextualised. The
examination of risk as a medicalised phenomenon in Western society adds to
contemporary understandings of how cancer risk is constructed and managed.
Furthermore, the ongoing and increasing medicalisation of women’s breasts and
ovaries in Western society is understood as a product of emerging genetic and
medical technologies which both define and produce women’s bodies in particular
ways and allow still-healthy organs to be surgically removed on the basis of risk.
Attention is also drawn to the medicalisation of the female breast, as exemplified
through the normalisation of cosmetic and reconstructive breast surgery, which serves
as evidence of the importance placed on women’s breasts in Western society, a key
area of concern in this study.

Medicalisation
The concept of medicalisation is used to examine ways in which aspects of human life
are constructed as medical problems requiring intervention (Maturo, 2012). Although
the disease of breast/ovarian cancer is real, the women in this study were diseasefree yet they faced surgical ‘treatment’ to prevent a potential future cancer from
occurring. This represents a medicalisation of risk (Maturo, 2012) as risk factors
themselves are perceived as disease (Conrad, 2005, 2007).

Riska (2003) claimed the trend in biomedicine to focus on how individuals’ behaviours
influence disease development, promotes a risk-factor approach to health. Breast
cancer risk in particular is frequently associated with so-called ‘lifestyle factors’
(Finkler, 2000), fuelling a wide body of research aimed at modifying women’s lifestyles
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in order to reduce cancer risk (Chlebowski, 2010). Thus, an individual’s lifestyle and
habits are constructed as risk factors for certain diseases which can be modified
though compliance with medicine.

Such assumptions about health and disease

further drive medicalisation in Western society because individuals charged with selfresponsibility for health seek increasingly technical medical solutions to repair their
‘broken’ bodies (Conrad, 2005).

Of particular relevance to this study, it has been argued in this era of genomic
medicine (Conrad, 2005), that the hegemony of the gene (Finkler, 2000) has placed
genetics at the centre of the public and professional dialogue on cancer (Maturo,
2012). Modern medicine’s seemingly increasing ability to identify individuals at risk of
disease by nature of their genetic make-up problematises the concept of health itself.
Genetics further drives medicalisation by expanding the medical gaze to include
people with no pathology but who may develop disease at a point in the future (Crabb,
2006; Riska, 2003) because perceptions of the value of genetic tests are vastly
inflated (Conrad, 2005; Finkler, 2000; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Melzer & Zimmerman,
2002).

Moreover, the availability of genetic information on people regarding their future risk of
disease has created a new category of ‘patient’: those who are pre-disease (Webster,
2002).

Genetic testing allows the identification of people who are “potentially ill”

(Conrad, 2005, p. 8), “genetically at risk” (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 486) or what Finkler
(2000, p. 58) referred to as “perpetual patients without symptoms”. Timmermans and
Buchbinder (2010, p. 409) similarly argued genetics had led to a population of people
trapped between normalcy and pathology as “patients-in-waiting”.

Genetic testing

thus has the potential to do more harm than good by marking people for disease
which may never happen or cause a threat to health (Faulkner, 2012).
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Medicalisation and female experience
The concept of medicalisation is particularly useful in examining women’s health
experiences owning to the patriarchal nature of Western medicine which tends to
support traditional male/female roles in society (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2010; Waitzkin,
1978, 1989) and categorise medical issues on the basis of gender (Bilton, et al., 2002;
Griffiths et al., 2010). Consequently, normal female experiences such as childbirth,
menstruation and menopause have been medicalised in Western society (Purdy,
2001; Riessman, 1983; Westfall & Benoit, 2008; Wylie, Potter & Bauchspies, 2012).
The menopause for example, is viewed as a hormonal deficiency which predisposes
women to heart disease, osteoporosis, Alzheimer’s disease and ultimately a
premature death. Other factors such as diet, exercise and socio-economic factors
which have a greater impact on female longevity receive less attention (Riska, 2003).
The medicalisation of women’s experience is arguably no more evident than in
relation to the breasts. In this study, it is argued women and their bodies and breasts
are medicalised as a result of social and cultural assumptions about women’s bodies
which allow elective surgical interventions on healthy breasts, for ‘cosmetic’ reasons
or for cancer risk.

Women’s breasts have been manipulated by societal discourses and the medical
profession for some time. The first surgical correction of the breasts is believed to
have taken place in 17th century Europe when a woman’s very large breasts were
surgically removed by a barber to reduce the pain and embarrassment caused
(Ferguson, 2000). Until the 20th century, surgery to the breasts was primarily carried
out to remove tumours or reduce the size of large breasts (Jacobson, 1998).
Interventions to enlarge breasts are a relatively modern phenomenon, reflecting
changing social and cultural expectations of what women should look like (DarlingWolf, 1997) and how cosmetic surgery is tailored to meet the body

aesthetic

considered ‘fashionable’ in different times and cultures (Riggs, 2012).
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Coco (1994) identified culturally specific perceptions of the female breast drove
medicalisation and created the “official breast” (Coco, 1994, p. 35).

The official

breast conformed to externally-imposed cultural norms and values against which other
breasts were viewed as substandard and deviant. The medicalisation of women’s
breasts was palpably exposed in the 1980s when the American Society of Plastic and
Reconstructive surgeons (ASPRS) used the term ‘micromastia’ to describe the
‘disease’ of small breasts (Wilson, 2002). Micromastia medicalised and pathologised
small breasts, identifying them as something abnormal that required an operative cure
(Ferguson, 2000). The following quote from a past president of the ASPRS, taken
from Coco (1994, p. 32) accentuates the derision with which small breasts were
viewed and the perceived link between a woman’s breasts and life experience:
(…) these deformities [small breasts] are really a disease
which result in the patient’s feelings of inadequacy, lack of
self-confidence, distortion of body image and a total lack of
well-being due to lack of perceived femininity.
The
enlargement of the underdeveloped breast is therefore very
necessary to ensure the quality of life of the patient.
Consequently, a double pathology is evident (Ferguson, 2000): small breasts
constitute a disease and the trauma caused by having small breasts causes
psychological distress in need of medical treatment.

Medicalisation thus allows

medical practice to act as a vehicle for controlling breasts which are considered
deviant for the purpose of securing conformity with social norms (Thomas-Pollei,
2008).

Breast augmentation surgery is now the most common cosmetic procedure globally
and rates have increased by more than 800% since the 1990s (Lavigne et al., 2013).
Most breast augmentations are carried out in women aged 20 – 30 years (Wilson,
2002) although in Brazil, age 15 is considered the ideal age for enlarging breasts
(Riggs, 2012).

Since implants last on average 10 – 15 years, most women will

require multiple surgical interventions to maintain their altered breasts.

Breast
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enlargement has been carried out using injections of paraffin and wax and insertion of
glass balls, plastic wool, animal fat, ivory, ox cartilage and synthetic sponges
(Donohoe, 2006). The first documented use of silicone to enlarge breasts dates back
to the Second World War, when silicone in the form of engine coolant, was injected
into the breasts of Japanese prostitutes to suit the preferences of American
servicemen (Ferguson, 2000).

Silicone injections directly into the breast were

considered too dangerous by the American Food and Drug Agency hence silicone
implants were developed as a safer alternative (Darling-Wolf, 1997).

Since the 1950s, silicone gel filled implants have been the intervention of choice to
enlarge women’s breasts (Donohoe, 2006). In the booming cosmetic surgery market,
the previous medical use of silicone in devices including urinary catheters,
intravenous tubing and pacemakers ostensibly made it the ideal synthetic for
enlarging breasts.

However, silicone is not as inert as previously believed and

silicone entering the bloodstream has been linked to reports of blindness, gangrene,
auto-immune disorders (Ferguson, 2000) and connective tissue diseases and
neurological disorders (Donohoe, 2006). Other complications associated with silicone
breast implants include decreased sensitivity of the breasts and nipples, painful
swelling and hardening of the breasts, implant rupture and encapsulation (Wilson,
2002). Between 1985 and 1998, around 180,000 adverse reactions and 118 deaths
have allegedly occurred as a result of silicone implant insertions (Ferguson, 2000).
Post-augmentation surgery complications are associated with an increase in
depression and suicide, especially in relation to multiple implant surgeries (Breiting et
al., 2004). Breast augmentation decreases the sensitivity of mammography (Donohoe,
2006) and although no evidence has been found to suggest silicone implants cause
breast cancer, the presence of silicone implants may delay diagnosis of breast cancer
and adversely affect survival following diagnosis (Lavigne et al., 2013).
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In contemporary Western society, female breasts are medicalised to the extent plastic
surgeons are now able to define and construct the ‘perfect breast’ (American Society
of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS), 2014). The concept of the ‘perfect’ breast derived from
the writings of plastic surgeons Mallucci and Branford (2012, 2014) who aimed to
produce a guide for women and surgeons to achieve “more acceptable, longer lasting
results and ultimately more beautiful breasts" (ASPS, 2014, para 12). Mallucci and
Branford (2012) undertook an observational study of the breasts of 100 topless
models identified by the editors of a tabloid newspaper as having the most attractive
breasts and compared these with women identified as having ‘less attractive breasts’
in order to define “critical ideals of breast beauty” (p. 65) A follow-up survey (Mallucci
& Branford, 2014) was conducted to determine the ideal breast and concluded the
"upper pole to lower pole ratio of 45:55” had universal appeal in defining the perfect
breast hence “this proportion should be used as a basis for design in aesthetic
surgery” (Mallucci & Branford, 2014, p. 436) as deviation from the ‘norm’ produced
less attractive breasts.

Such suggestions reify the ‘perfect breast’ as something

women need and completely preclude discussion of social, cultural and economic
drivers in breast medicalisation and the potential harmful effects of a medically
unnecessary surgical procedure.

Equally it can be argued the prominence of surgical breast reconstruction in
definitions of breast cancer treatment (Haines et al., 2010) further medicalises the
breasts and promotes a view women without breasts are deviant and/or diseased
(Crompvoets, 2012; Ferguson, 2000). Cobb and Starr (2012) drew parallels between
breast reconstruction post-mastectomy and cosmetic breast surgery and argued both
are aesthetic practices which promote a view women need a particular body and
breast type. This serves as evidence of medicalisation of the female breasts/body
because both are socially mandated but medically unnecessary procedures.
Furthermore, the prominence of cosmetic surgery has been argued to drive
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expectations women’s breasts can be improved following RRS and reconstruction (de
la Peña-Salcedo, Soto-Miranda & Lopez-Salguero, 2012). In the de la Peña-Salcedo
et al. (2012) paper, examples of such improvements are provided, namely large,
spherical, silicone implants which are significantly greater in size than the woman’s
pre-operative breasts, accompanied by the commentary “Note the postoperative
aesthetic outcome, by far better than the preoperative condition” (p. 144). There is, as
Löwy (2010, p. 215) claimed, a promise of “new breasts for the old” which supports
the medicalisation of women’s breasts and bodies and promotes a particular type of
breast as acceptable and necessary.

However it must also be acknowledged the relationship between medicalisation and
the body/breasts is complex and multi-factorial because medical interventions have
unquestionably improved many areas of women’s health. Purdy (2001) rightly points
out some areas of health which have been medicalised such as infertility and
childbirth are at least in part medical issues. Thus medicalisation is not fundamentally
unwelcome but rather part of the problem and the solution to improving women’s
health (Riessman, 1983). Although childbirth has been largely medicalised in Western
society, accompanying improvements in pain relief, infection and mortality have
resulted (Riessman, 1983). Breast augmentation surgery can give women a feeling of
being empowered by doing something positive about looks in order to resemble the
norm (Cheek & Porter, 1997) hence a medical diagnosis can support a woman’s
legitimate claim for breast enlargement surgery for mental health reasons (Conrad,
2005). Moreover, cosmetic breast surgery may serves as a means of achieving social
and economic security for some women whose life circumstances are otherwise
curtailed (Davis, 1995; Morgan, 1991). Breast reconstruction following breast loss
may impact positively on quality of life and improve body image (Bresser, 2009).
Furthermore, once a disease or condition is medically authenticated and endorsed,
social stigma is reduced and shortcomings in the individual which may have been
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attributed to the development of the condition are mitigated, hence medicalisation may
offer comfort to those afflicted (Lock & Nguyen, 2010). Thus women are not merely
passive victims of medicalisation, but may seek medical intervention in order to
improve their lives and life experiences (Conrad 2007; Green, Thompson & Griffiths,
2002; Griffiths et al., 2010; Lock & Nguyen, 2010).

In summary, the concept of medicalisation applied to this study suggests the risk of
breast/ovarian cancer is now conflated with the disease of breast/ovarian cancer,
allowing medical interventions to remove healthy breasts and ovaries. Furthermore,
the normalisation of cosmetic surgery and the essentialness of reconstruction
following mastectomy medicalises women’s breasts and bodies and stigmatises
women with breasts which are absent or ‘deviant’. This is the reality faced by the
women in this study: the medicalisation of risk means RRS appears prima facie to be
the obvious action to deal with cancer risk. What is concealed in the medicalisation
discourse is the uncertainty associated with genetic risk calculation for individuals and
ways in which perceptions of risk influence decision making in response to risk. The
next section further explores the concept of risk and examines how differing
constructions and perceptions of risk may influence how people and institutions such
as medicine respond to risk.

The concept of risk
This study concerns women identified as high risk of developing breast and/or ovarian
cancer who say no to RRS despite evidence of its effectiveness in lowering cancer
risk, a decision which is argued to be at odds with Western medical discourse on how
best to attend to risk. Accordingly, a review of the concept of risk is mandatory as
perceptions of risk and decision making in response to risk are key concepts in
providing a framework for understanding the women’s stories in relation to their high
risk status and RRS.
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Health care is increasingly organised, described and practised around the construct of
risk (Maturo, 2012; Robertson, 2000).

Within medical discourse, risk is now

established as a fundamental feature of cancer development (Davis, 2008) and as a
key construct in public health and preventative medicine (Hallowell & Lawton, 2002).
The concept of risk has been extensively written about and problematised across the
social and natural sciences. Across disciplines, risk is generally agreed to be about
uncertainty and response to uncertainty.

However, the conceptualisation of risk

differs according to discipline-specific assumptions about the nature of the human
world. Irrespective of the stance taken, a politics of risk now exists and public and
professional debate is intensified through scientific, medical and legal discourses on
the nature of risk and how risk impacts on people’s everyday lives (Tulloch & Lupton,
2003).

Risk in the natural sciences
In the natural sciences including medicine, the concept of risk is grounded in
assumptions about the natural world and the laws of nature which govern it. Risk is
defined as the probability distribution of harmful events and risk calculation uses
statistical computations based on binary logic utilising probability theory (Grossi,
2005). This traditional approach to risk values logic and positions humans as rational
actors who make sensible decisions based on objective truths when faced with risk
(Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006).

From a medical perspective, the concept of risk is most frequently associated with
factors which modulate the probability of a disease or condition occurring, worsening
or improving.

There is a focus on identifiable, measurable risk factors, causal

relationships and statistical models which predict outcomes (Costa & Carneiro, 2011;
Offord & Kraemer, 2000) so that risk can be reduced and future harm prevented
through accepted health promotion strategies (Costa & Carneiro, 2011; Ilkilic, 2009).
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In medicine, information from clinical and epidemiological studies is used to collate
evidence for determining risk.

In order to determine cause-effect relationships,

randomised controlled clinical trials are considered the ‘gold standard’ approach
(Pearson, 2010). Where this is not feasible, observational case-control and cohort
studies are used.

These studies typically make comparisons between groups of

people with/exposed to the risk factor and groups not carrying/exposed factor in order
to calculate an odds ratio of how likely/unlikely an outcome is to occur in different sub
groups (Ho, Peterson & Masoudi, 2008). Such studies cannot determine causality,
only association between variables and/or risk factors/exposure (Costa & Carneiro,
2011). Epidemiological data identifies risk factors for disease/conditions which are
then manipulated through clinical trials.

If an overall reduction in harm is

demonstrated, the intervention becomes standard treatment for that particular group
of patients (Karlawish, 2010).

Risk calculations are used in HBOC management in several ways: to calculate the
probability of identifying a deleterious mutation in an individual, to calculate the
probability of an individual developing cancer should a mutation be present and to
calculate the risks/benefits of risk reducing interventions (Costa & Carneiro, 2011). A
number of risk-assessment models have been developed to facilitate risk calculation
although no model exists which is able to account for all factors which affect risk
(Evans & Howell, 2007).

Some of the challenges inherent in calculating risk for

breast/ovarian cancer predisposition were discussed earlier in this chapter.

In

addition, these models are highly complex and arguably beyond the understanding of
most people (Klitzman, 2010). To contextualise this, an example of a risk estimation
model is shown below.
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To construct CIs for the log (RR) estimates, we assumed that the parameters
were asymptotically normally distributed with the covariance matrix given by
inverting the information matrix. Cumulative risk or penetrance and 95% CIs
were

calculated

from

the

cumulative

incidence

λ(t),

where

, where ik is the incidence in noncarriers in the kth
age band of length tk and βk is the ln(RR) in the kth age band. The variance of
the cumulative risk is given by the expression

and the cumulative risk F(t) is then given by F(t)=1-exp[-Λ(t)], with a 95% CI of
. Uncertainty in RRs for factors with more
than two categories (e.g., center) is presented as floating CIs.
Figure 4: Example of a risk estimation equation (taken from Antoniou et al.,
2003, p. 1121).

Despite the primacy of risk-estimation models the context of supporting decision
making around RRS, some challenges are evident. Studies examining breast/ovarian
cancer risk and RRS tend to be observational and use case-control studies or
mathematical computations (Lostumbo et al., 2010) owing to ethical challenges in
devising a randomised controlled trial to determine causality (Kurian et al., 2010).
Indeed as Frasier, Greenberg & Neuman (2015) note, there is no Level 1 evidence
which demonstrates a survival benefit with RRS and this is unlikely to ever be
available given the ethics associated with randomising women to surgery or no
surgery.

This means data from studies show an association between RRS and

reduced cancer incidence, but cannot categorically determine that surgery caused the
reduction in risk. Although risk-estimation models are able to provide information on
population risks for breast/ovarian cancer (NICE, 2013) it is not possible to predict
which women will go on to develop the disease (Evans & Howell, 2007). If a woman
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undergoes RRM and RRSO and does not develop cancer, it is not possible to know if
surgery prevented cancer or if she would never have developed the disease in the
first place. Furthermore, no risk-estimation model is able to account for all factors
which affect risk (Evans & Howell, 2007) and the relationship between genes and the
social and physical environment hence individual risk estimates are highly
questionable in many circumstances (Lock, 2005). Genetic knowledge in particular is
not fixed or absolute and is often anomalous and ambiguous (Timmermans &
Buchbinder, 2012), therefore risk calculations require clinicians to use judgement to
determine significance of test results and apply to individual people, a judgement
which is based on both known and unknown factors.

In summary, risk has become an increasingly important concept in modern medicine.
Models of risk calculation are algorithmic, focussing on objective measurements, risk
factors and evidence-based risk reducing interventions. The construction of risk as a
statistical measure is problematic because it may not be representative of individual
risk (Costa & Carneiro, 2011). Furthermore, risk in the medical discourse fails to
incorporate individual perceptions and understandings of risk (Timmermans &
Buchbinder, 2012) which influence health behaviours (Davis, 2008). In contrast to risk
in the natural sciences, sociological perspectives of risk are based on the assumption
that all social action, including risk practices, are shaped by social institutions and
culture rather than rational planning and logic (Taylor-Gooby & Zin, 2006). The next
section therefore focusses on sociological theories of risk which examine perceptions
of risk and risk management in social and cultural contexts in order to elucidate how
people understand and respond to risk in contemporary society.

Sociological and cultural perspectives on risk
A substantial and growing body of literature on risk exists in the social sciences which
reflect the importance of risk as a defining cultural characteristic of modern society
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(Maturo, 2012). The increasing complexities of technology and of social institutions
which govern people’s lives serve not only to identify risk, but also to publicise risk
and the at times catastrophic results of technological and social breakdown (Peterson
& Wilkinson, 2008). Paradoxically, the increased ability to identify risk has raised
awareness of society’s inability to control risk and hazards to life. The recognition
society and technology are not able to rescue humans from risk politicises risk and
gives rise to debate and conflict which has fuelled increasing interest in risk research
(Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). Three key sociological theories on risk are evident in
the literature (Brown, 2014; Zinn, 2008): Beck’s Risk Society, Douglas’ Cultural
Theory and Governmentality theory which draws on Foucault’s work on modern
society and ways in which institutions and organisations exert control over individuals.
The discussion to follow focusses on key concepts in relation to the sociology of risk
which were particularly relevant to this study.

The Risk Society
One of the first sociological theories of risk was proposed by the German sociologist
Ulrich Beck. Beck (1992, p. 21) defined risk as “a systematic way of dealing with
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself”. The
consequences of modernisation were argued to be a set of risks or hazards which
were unlike any previously experienced in pre-modern societies, thus creating a risk
society. Beck (1992) argued people’s perception and experience of hazards and risk
changed as society modernised and related this to a three stage periodisation of
social change: pre-modernity, simple modernity and reflexive modernity.

In pre-

modern societies there was no real notion of the concept of risk (Giddens, 1998).
Although hazards and risks to life existed, they were attributed to non-human sources
(Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006) and occurred through fate, divine intervention or nature:
that is, danger was placed on mankind from ‘outside’ society (Beck, 1992).

As

society modernised, the economy and way of life changed and became shaped by
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industrial/technological processes and problems. Industrialised societies produced
‘goods’ such as wealth, employment and technological and scientific advancement but
also ‘bads’ or dangers (Lash & Wynne, 1992) such as pollution, crime and traffic
accidents (Zinn, 2008). Modern was not inherently good but rather was increasingly
problematic and modern societies were progressively uncertain societies to live in.
Beck (1992) referred to this as a process of reflexive modernisation: the
modernisation of modern society itself.

Reflexive modernisation challenged

established ways of knowing and existing social structures because of awareness that
societies’ dangers and hazards are in the main, created by society itself (Zinn, 2008).
A preoccupation with danger and the need to avoid danger through controlling
measures gave rise to the concept of risk (Giddens, 1998). Reflexive modernity is
thus co-existent with the risk society; in effect its own self-creation resulting from a
dystopian industrialised society (Lash & Wynne, 1992). Hence, modern societies are
risk societies and being ‘at risk’ is now an integral part of the human condition (Beck,
2006).

It is important to identify the risk society is no more ‘risky’ than previous societies
(Giddens, 1998). Rather the nature of risk and how risk is perceived and experienced
has changed with modernisation (Lupton, 2006; Zinn, 2008).

Technological

advancement allowed hazards to be identified before they occurred and humans
moved from living life as fate to living life as uncertain. Contemporary risks such as
radiation and food toxins are often invisible until made visible and defined by experts
(Beck, 2006).

Likewise, modern technology has allowed genetic mutations to be

identified and a category of risk attached. Adam and van Loon (2000) contend this is
an area of public concern and suggest genetic technology has superseded nuclear
power as the greatest concern in late-modern society.
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The technology to define, categorise and measure genetic risk allows experts and
expert knowledge to dramatise or minimise risk (Beck, 1992). Breast/ovarian cancer
risk is defined by experts then placed onto women as a result of their genetic material,
individualising risk (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003) and attaching human responsibility to risk
(Lupton, 2006).

Risk has come to mean the anticipation of a future bad event,

experienced in the present, creating a politics of fear and a politics of prevention
(Beck, 2009). Women at high risk of developing cancer are thus expected to manage
risk through medical interventions such as RRS, surveillance and chemoprevention,
each of which carries its own set of risks. Paradoxically, freedom of choice, autonomy
and self-agency are promoted in a society of increasing uncertainty, creating tension
between freewill and doing what appears sensible to reduce risk (Zinn, 2008).

Beck’s (1992) risk society has been criticised for failing to account for the role
inequalities play in modern society and how gender, race and socio-economic
influences impact on risk and risk perception (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003). Some have
also argued risk society dogmatically over-emphasises the prominence and relevance
of risk in everyday life and fails to capture what is essentially different in modern
society (Elliot, 2002).

Nonetheless, Beck’s (1992) risk society is useful in

problematising medical and genetics discourses in relation to risk by highlighting how
genetic technology has created and heightened awareness of new genetic risks, and
placed responsibility for risk at the door of affected individuals, such as the women in
this study.

Cultural theory and risk
Another central theory in sociological risk research is the Cultural Theory of risk which
draws on the work of anthropologist Mary Douglas and is based on the belief risk
practises are a product of acculturation and social learning (Lupton, 2006). Cultural
theory forms part of Douglas’s (1970) wider typology of Grid and Group societies. In
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Douglas’s (1970) theory, ‘grid’ refers to laws, social relations, expectations and other
constraints imposed on a group which regulate the actions of individuals. ‘Group’
refers to how bonded and well-connected group members feel with each other as a
result of group dynamics.

Different grid/group environments reflect varying degrees

of social stratification and social solidarity and therefore how individuals function and
participate within groups (Fox, 2000).

In terms of risk, cultural theory supports a social constructionist view of risk and
contends different risk responses are entwined with different patterns of social
organisation and how people perceive risks to their group/society (Brown, 2014; Fox,
2000). Like Beck (1992), Douglas (1992) claimed the meaning associated with risk
changed over time. Historically, risk was a neutral concept as it took account of the
probability of both losses and gains which could result from an action or event.
However as society modernised, Douglas (1992) argued risk became equated only
with loss.

Whereas previously ‘high risk’ could lead to ‘high gain’, risk became

associated with negative outcomes, danger and loss.

Cultural theory then identifies

risk as a social-cultural construct (Brown, 2014) and explains risk in terms of how
people understand and react to perceived dangers in their societies.

The equating of risk with danger in modern societies maligns those who engage in
‘risky’ pursuits and people/things which present a danger (Petersen & Wilkinson,
2008) and becomes a vehicle to apportion blame for unwanted outcomes (Lupton,
2006). Moreover, risk becomes a conduit for moral regulation because risks and riskbehaviour are undesirable, involving some intervention to avoid, minimise, correct or
rectify (Peterson & Wilkinson, 2008).

In relation to HBOC, medical discourse

assumes risk avoidance is the norm and that people will take steps to reduce the risk
of cancer developing.

Saying no to RRS is thus seen as a form of risk-taking

therefore women who refuse RRS may be seen as ‘risky’, creating a feeling of
60

individual and group uncertainty which may serve to exclude women from certain
social groups and create a sense of non-belonging. Although breast/ovarian cancer is
a ‘natural’ danger, in modern society risk is politicised into a moral concern (Brown,
2014) hence women who say no to RRS may be held accountable and blamed for
their ‘risky’ behaviour.

Governmentality
The Governmentality perspective on risk in sociological theory draws on Foucault’s
theorising on societal governance strategies. Although the concept of risk was not
extensively written about by Foucault, theories about power, self-regulation and
control in modern society have been applied to sociological theories on risk and the
role played by risk in the regulation of modern societies (Lupton, 2006). Foucault used
the term ‘governmentality’ to refer to the relationship between ‘governing’ and
‘mentality’ (Zin & Taylor-Gooby, 2006) and the way modern states exercised control
over the individuals to maximise the productive power of the population (Turner,
2008). Punishment and coercion were curtailed in favour of more subtle persuasive
techniques which ensured social control through various societal institutions including
medicine, the family, education and so forth (Gutting, 2008). Risks to the desired
social order such as illness, poverty and unemployment were constructed as
problems which could be solved through taking the appropriate actions (Lim, 2011).
In the modern state however, although governments are responsible for identifying
and distributing risks across society, risk avoidance is socially constructed as an
individual duty (Maturo, 2012) hence risk thus becomes personal rather than societal,
making it a moral technology which demands individual action (Lupton, 2013).
Relating governmentality theory on risk to Western medicine reveals a connection
between risk, medical discourse and risk reducing practices. In modern society, good
health is perceived as a fundamental human right therefore health practices are
constructed as inherently good (Crabb, 2006).

Moreover, in the modern state
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individuals are constructed as free-thinking, rational beings who make autonomous
choices to better themselves and the wider society (Lupton, 2013), therefore
responsibility for health is a requirement of good citizens (Peterson & Wilkinson,
2008).

Since risk is now morally charged, it is a tool of power because once

individuals are aware of risks, they are increasingly expected to self-regulate, conform
to normalising strategies and reduce risk (Brown, 2014; Lemke, 2004). Women who
conform to cancer risk management strategies by disciplining their risky bodies in
accordance with medical discourse are doing ‘the right thing’, whereas those who do
not, such as the participants in this study, may be considered morally lax (Lupton,
1995). Although not held personally accountable for their genetic material, women
are held responsible for the actions taken or avoided to manage genetic risks
(Hallowell & Lawton, 2002; Ilkilic, 2009).

To conclude this section, sociological theories on risk are primarily concerned with
how risk has come to be a defining feature of modern societies.

Of particular

relevance to this study, changing perceptions of health based on risk perceptions for
future disease are an inevitable outcome of advances in genetic testing in modern
society (Maturo, 2012).

Genetic testing for BRCA mutations permits a shift in the

conceptualising of risk from abstract associations to something tangible and
quantifiable. In modern medicine, the genetic risk of cancer represents a shift from
disease as categorical (either the disease is present or it is not) to disease as
dimensional on the continuum of risk. Disease as a pathological condition of the body
is replaced with a reconstruction of disease as future impairment, or what Lupton
(2006, p. 17) referred to as a “liminal category of wellness”; neither diseased nor fully
well. However risk is in itself only a form of information and no test can definitively
predict who will and who will not develop cancer.
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Sociological perspectives on risk thus expose the irony of risk in modern society and
in modern medicine. Attempts to calculate and control for risks to health are a key
area of concern in modern medicine despite risk being by its very nature
unpredictable, unknown and ever changing. In medicine, attention is focussed on
presenting accurate, objective risk calculations and communicating these in such a
way that individuals can make rational responses based on knowledge of the ‘facts’.
Within this discourse, personal, subjective and contextual meanings attributed to risk
are unaccounted for, despite their importance in decision making. The next section
expands this discussion by turning attention to risk communication in health care,
especially in relation to the complex area of genetics.

Communicating cancer risk
Communicating information about cancer risk aims to inform individuals about risk
management options whilst limiting anxiety and distress (Braithwaite, Emery, Walter,
Prevost & Sutton, 2006). Communicating genetic risk attempts to reconcile personal
perceptions of risk with objective assessments of risk (McInerney‐Leo et al., 2006) so
that clinicians can present data to individuals in a way which facilitates autonomous,
informed decision making (Eijzenga et al., 2014) However, despite the importance
placed on autonomy and communicating risk in medicine, the best way of
communicating risk is unknown (Ahmed, Willoughby & Edwards, 2012; Heshka,
Palleschi, Howley, Wilson, & Wells, 2008) and the complex relationship between risk
estimates, personal risk perceptions and risk communication is not well understood
(Braithwaite et al., 2006; Klitzman, 2010; NICE, 2013; Wagner, 2011). It is therefore
widely acknowledged that communicating information about risk is inherently complex
and challenging (Bingham, 2012; Klitzman, 2010) and how risk is communicated
impacts patient perceptions of risk and subsequent decision making in response to
risk (Ahmed et al., 2012; Dauer et al., 2011; Wagner, 2011).
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Genetic testing to determine cancer risk is underpinned by the premise knowledge of
genetic status will reduce cancer worry, prevent unnecessary interventions and allow
interventions to reduce risk of disease development (Esplen & Bleiker, 2015; Nelson
et al., 2014). However, imparting information on cancer risk has been shown to both
increase and decrease anxiety (Braithwaite et al, 2006; NICE, 2013), therefore people
receiving information on risk incur benefits and losses depending on whether the
result is favourable or not (Case, Andrews, Johnson & Allard, 2005; Nelson et al.,
2014).

Moreover, individuals receiving unfavourable results who experience an

increase in anxiety may attempt to ignore the result in order to relieve inner tension
(Case et al., 2005; Leydon et al., 2000) and hence may chose not to take part in
suggested risk reducing interventions (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Turney, 2009).

The extremely complex nature of genetic information (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Case et
al., 2005; Hoskins et al., 2012) and growing body of knowledge on cancer genetics
poses particular challenges in communicating risk (Eijzenga et al., 2014; Evans &
Howell, 2007).

In order to assimilate the information given, an understanding of

genetics and the mathematics of risk is required (Case et al., 2005), but such an
understanding is argued to be out with the scope of most people (Klitzman, 2010;
Swanson, 2002; Tamir, 2010). Statistical data is frequently complex and problems
exist with health literacy (Hoskins, Werner-Lin & Greene, 2014) and the ability to
access, interpret and act upon numerical and statistical data, is generally poor
amongst the public (Turney, 2009) and indeed some health care professionals (Costa
& Carneiro, 2011).

In medicine, risk is viewed as a rigorous estimation of probability based on statistical
models hence personal perceptions of risk are considered a form of bias, tainted by
emotional, personal and cultural experiences (Lupton, 2000). Personal over/under
estimates of risk in comparison to the ‘official’ objective risk estimate are considered
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confounding or distorting factors which may skew the data (Costa & Carneiro, 2011).
Communicating risk may therefore be problematic because differences exist between
scientific and lay understandings of risk calculations (Dauer et al., 2011; Paul et al.,
2014). Although genetic counselling has been shown to improve accuracy of risk
estimation in BRCA-associated cancer (Nelson et al., 2014), women frequently overestimate their personal risk of cancer compared with the objective risk estimate
(Hoskins et al., 2014; Nelson et al., 2014) and perceptions of risk may remain
unaltered or inaccurate even when knowledge of genetics increases (Borzekowski,
Guan, Smith, Erby & Roter, 2013; Braithwaite et al., 2006; Heshka et al., 2008). This
may occur because cancer anxiety can impact on the ability to assimilate genetic
information (Hoskins et al., 2012) and because objective risk calculations do not take
account of what people do with genetic information (Paul et al., 2014). Whereas
biomedicine is concerned with diagnosing risk of disease, individuals are concerned
with the impact of disease such as how severe it will it be (Paul et al., 2014) and the
impact on families (Hoskins et al., 2012) and children (Eijzenga et al., 2014). Hence
the perceived impacts of are more important than the objective risk calculation in
decision making around RRS (Hoskins et al., 2012; Tong et al, 2015; Witt, 2013).

Overall then, a number of subjective indicators influence risk perception which models
for calculating and communicating risk are unable to account for (Dauer et al., 2011;
Paul et al., 2014; Wagner, 2011). These include beliefs about inheritance and risk
which may interfere with how risk information is assimilated (Finkler, 2000; Hoskins et
al., 2012; NICE, 2013). The presence of a family history of cancer may lead a person
to believe personal risk is very high, even when the objective measure calculates risk
to be low/normal (Klitzman, 2010) hence the objective measure may be interpreted by
the individual as ‘wrong’. The calculated objective risk is therefore arguably irrelevant
to what a person perceives their risk to be.
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One reason for this may relate to how complex risk information is interpreted (Ahmed
et al., 2012; Dauer et al., 2011). A difference exists between objective risk estimates
based on statistical calculations and perceived risk estimates which incorporate
individual experiences, cultural beliefs and societal practices (Davis, 2008).

The

public at large are generally limited in their understanding of genetics (Klitzman, 2010)
hence may find it difficult to interpret uncertainty and ambiguous results (Werner-Lin,
2008), confuse probability with inevitability (Melzer & Zimmerman, 2002; Paul et al.,
2014) and in the case of HBOC, erroneously believe penetrance to be 100% (Novas &
Rose, 2000). Misconceptions about genetic data and statistical tests can also mean
lay expectations are not in alignment with available knowledge regarding risk and
certainty of disease development (NICE, 2013), which may lead to inappropriate use
of risk reducing interventions (Klitzman, 2010).

Framing effects, or how risk is presented and communicated, also influences
interpretation of risk (Ahmed et al., 2012; Dauer et al., 2011; Wagner, 2011). For
example, the risk of death from an intervention looks very different when presented as
the risk being 0.002 versus 0.001 compared with being presented as a 50% increased
risk of death. In cases where risk estimates are identical, those framed as a gain, for
example, 200 lives may be saved, are more likely to be accepted favourably than
those presented as a loss, for example, 200 lives may be lost (Costa & Carneiro,
2011). Similarly, individuals may experience difficulties interpreting population risk in
terms of personal risk. O’Doherty and Suthers (2007) illustrate using the following
example: if a woman is identified as having a 60% lifetime risk of developing breast
cancer, this means of 100 similar women, 60 will develop breast cancer, 40 will not.
Whilst this information provides information on cancer development in populations, it
does not provide the women with personalised information on risk.

Surgery may

confer for example, a 50% reduction in risk in high risk populations, but each
individual person will either develop cancer or not hence the individual risk is 0% or
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100% (Costa & Carneiro, 2011).

Indeed Samerski (2006) argues the concept of

personal risk is an oxymoron because by definition, statistical probabilities refer to the
occurrence of events in a statistical population therefore it is simply not possible to tell
an individual what they really want to know, which is if they will develop cancer or not
and how severe the disease will be. Using O’Doherty and Suthers (2007) example,
when a woman is identified as having a 60% lifetime risk of breast cancer, she
becomes a member of the high risk group yet there is still no way of knowing if she
will develop the disease. The high risk woman must therefore attempt to make sense
of her personal risk of developing cancer using statistical data which ironically does
not relate in any way to her personal situation.

It is evident therefore, a difference exists between expert and lay understandings of
risk which statistical and decision making models are unable to account for. Whereas
medical/genetic experts are likely to focus on ‘real’ objective risks and research
findings, individuals experience risk as embodied owing to the potential risks to the
body associated with certain procedures or events (Green et al., 2002; Ilkilic, 2009;
Paul et al., 2014). Thus for women contemplating RRS, individual perceptions of risk
and the importance attached to different risks are likely to influence decision making
more than objective risk estimates and evidence-based findings (Hoskins et al., 2012).
The significance of the risk is captured not by the risk itself, but by the meaning
attached to the risk.

To sum, this literature review has examined various theoretical constructions of risk
and the challenges presented by HBOC, cancer risk and effective risk communication.
It can be concluded that personal perceptions and understandings of risk are
influenced by a range of factors over and above the statistical models, risk estimations
and outcome probabilities which underpin the medical pathway for RRS. It is clear the
decision to accept or say no to RRS is highly complex, multifaceted and deeply
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personal therefore the stories of those who say no to RRS add a valuable and
necessary dimension to current understanding of how people come to make decisions
about RRS when faced with a BRCA1/2 mutation.

Summary of literature review
This section has reviewed literature pertaining to several areas of particular relevance
to this study.

A review of research relating to breast/ovarian cancer, cancer

predisposition and genetic testing outlined contemporary understandings of HBOC
which underpin the medical pathway for managing breast/ovarian cancer risk. Current
risk reducing interventions were then discussed and an examination of the potential
physical and psychosocial impacts of such interventions concluded that RRS was
associated with a number of potentially positive and negative sequelae. A critique of
the concept of medicalisation suggested the experiences of women with BRCA1/2
mutations take place within a discourse of medicalisation which constructs risk, breast
and bodies as targets for medicine and permits radical surgical interventions on
healthy bodies. Finally, the concept of risk was examined from the perspectives of the
natural and the social sciences with a focus on analysing how risk is presented,
interpreted and understood at the level of both society and the individual.

The literature review demonstrated a wealth of research has been conducted on RRS
for HBOC despite it being a relatively modern phenomenon. An emerging body of
research which focussed on decision making around RRS was evident which
appeared to focus primarily on two key areas: the identification and measurement of
variables which may influence or predict decision-making in women facing RRS, such
as age/parental status; and the potential physical and psychosocial impacts of RRS.
The majority of studies have attempted to explore decision making around RRS and
the impacts of RRS through quantitative means, with structured psychometric testing
being the most common method employed.

While these studies are helpful in
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uncovering relationships between variables which may influence decision making and
in identifying adjustment issues associated with RRS, they do not allow an in-depth
exploration of the meaning of risk or understanding of how risk is understood and lived
by women who carry BRCA1/2 mutations. No research was found which considered
the experience of cancer in the woman’s family and key moments in the lives of those
facing RRS such as the confirmation of a positive family history, receiving a mutationpositive genetic test result and being offered and saying no to RRS.

This was

surprising given the focus of the research is an inherited condition which manifests
itself through the diagnoses of parents, siblings and other family members.
Additionally, little research was found which attempted to situate the decision to say
no to RRS within the framework of Western medical discourse, despite the
prominence of medicine in outlining how women high risk women should attend to
their breast/ovarian cancer risk.

Hence, current research is unable to capture the human and very personal nature of
deciding whether to accept or say no to RRS and fails to account for the entire range
of influences on making decisions, conscious and sub-conscious, known and
unknown, which are more than the sum of parts. Despite extensive research, current
knowledge is limited in terms of understanding of how high risk women come to make
what appear to be ‘anti-health’ choices within Western medical discourse by saying no
to RRS, despite conclusive evidence of its effectiveness in reducing cancer risk. This
research is an attempt to address this gap.

The following chapter introduces and discusses the methodological approach taken
and its suitability for the study of high risk women who say no to RRS within the
framework of Western medical discourse.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter describes and justifies the research approach taken to explore the
experiences of women identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer who
say no to RRS. RRSO is estimated to confer an 80% reduction in ovarian cancer risk
and a 50% reduction in breast cancer risk while RRBM confers at least a 90%
reduction in breast cancer risk in BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (Koskenvuo et al., 2013).
Genetic testing and RRS are increasingly offered to high risk women (Hooker et al.,
2014).

This, in turn, may have led to an increase in the number of women

experiencing complex psychological and emotional turmoil as a consequence of being
labelled ‘high risk’ in terms of developing cancer (Lerman et al., 2002; Mahon, 2011)
by the communal folklore of medicine.

Contextualising the research approach taken in this study
Advances in technology which enable the identification of women at risk for
developing breast/ovarian cancer mean juxtaposition is created. Healthy women are
advised to remove healthy breasts and ovaries against a backdrop of societal norms
which dictate a particular female aesthetic and nurturing role as standard. However,
for a group of women, the risk of developing cancer may not be sufficient to agree to
surgery. These women are saying no to the removal of healthy tissue to deal with
risk.

The women in this study were disease-free, yet were offered radical disfiguring
surgery to remove healthy breasts and/or ovaries. The dilemma experienced for these
women, is individual and personal. In order to understand and give meaning to these
experiences it is necessary to be cognisant that when individuals make a decision
about their personal lives, they do so within the confines of a particular discourse
(White, 2004). Therefore, the decision to say no to RRS must be considered using a
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research approach which allows the voice of these women to be captured within the
context of the discourses used to make sense of their experiences.

Traditional empirical research approaches which use quantitative methods such as
clinical trials and psychometric tests (Polit & Beck, 2013) are unable to illuminate why
these women decided not to undergo RRS which could potentially prevent cancer and
ultimately save their life. Quantitative approaches focus on ordering and rationalising
lives (Denzin, 1989) and attempt to infer meaning about experience by analysing the
number of responses to predetermined categories (Rowley, 2005).

The control,

identification and measurement of criteria which are assumed to influence the
phenomenon under examination take primacy (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008). Within this
context, personal influences which impact on experience may not be elicited if they do
not fit with the predetermined assumptions of what is important. Szumacher (2006)
contends traditional empirical approaches are limited in terms of understanding
personal health decisions because of their quantitative nature and grounding in the
dominant medical culture; such approaches are unable to capture the depth and
complexity of women’s experiences in relation to being identified as high risk of
developing breast/ovarian cancer and saying no to RRS. These women needed a
voice, prompting the need for a methodology which encouraged the women to tell
their stories of how they experienced and perceived their bodies following a diagnosis
of owning a BRCA1/2 gene mutation.

Frank’s (1995) seminal work ‘The Wounded Storyteller’ contended that the experience
of illness silences the voice of the individual but that this voice may be reclaimed
through storytelling. Potts (2000) claimed the voices of women, in particular, were
often silenced and made invisible. For this reason research pertaining to women
should preserve their presence as central to the research to avert reducing women to
objects of investigation.

In keeping with this position, Crotser and Dickerson (2010)
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posited that the complexity of cancer genetics added a challenging dimension to the
creation of meaning about the experience of being identified as high risk of developing
breast/ovarian cancer, adding the use of stories provided a means through which
women may express and communicate meaning about the experience. Women’s
stories of experience in relation to HBOC are, therefore, an important source of
personal and collective meanings attached to what is a common and present reality in
the lives of women in Western society.

In contrast to empirical, quantitative approaches, qualitative approaches are rooted in
the belief there is no single reality which can be discovered, but rather multiple,
socially constructed realities exist (Denzin, 1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) which can
be studied to produce divergent inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). Moreover, qualitative
methodologies and their underlying philosophical assumptions are appropriate for
understanding the multifaceted and individual nature of personal health (Holloway &
Wheeler, 2010), since they are based upon the belief that multiple realities exist within
socially and mentally constructed individual realities (Bryman, 2004) and are
applicable when the focus of the research is to increase understanding of poorly
understood phenomenon (Creswell, Hanson, Plano & Morales., 2007; Polit & Beck,
2013).

Qualitative research methodologies are inherently interpretive as they aim to make
meaning of specific experiences (Creswell, et al., 2007; Denzin, 1989; Denzin &
Lincoln, 2011; Holloway & Wheeler, 2010; Schwandt, 2000).

Research on social

aspects of human existence has become increasingly concerned with meaning and
interpretation resulting in a rising use of interpretive approaches (Harris, 2006;
Sandberg, 2005). Harris (2006) further claimed no action, behaviour, trait or object
was inherently good, bad or neutral, rather meaning was indeterminate until it was
ordered through social interaction. Qualitative approaches take into account the wider
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contexts of people’s lives and broader social, political and cultural frameworks in
which life and experience take place (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Holloway & Wheeler,
2010).

Broadly speaking, an interpretive research approach seeks to describe and
understand experiences of individuals and set these within the context of social,
cultural and historical influences (Holloway & Wheeler, 2010). The aim therefore is to
create meaning rather than uncover the ‘truth’, since no universal truth exists (Denzin,
1989): only creation of meaning which is reflective of wider social, political, historical
and cultural influences is achievable. In this study, the interpretive paradigm and
underlying principles of research were utilised to enable an understanding of the
experiences of high risk women which led them to say no to RRS, and place them
within the context of historical and social constructs, as the experiences of these
women can only be understood within the contexts of the worlds in which they live.

The interpretive approach
The ontological and epistemological assumptions which underpin the interpretive
approach lie in the belief humans are constantly interpreting and re-interpreting the
dynamic world in which they exist. The roots of the interpretive approach are often
attributed to the work of German sociologist Max Weber (1947 – 1964) which has
subsequently been developed by other phenomenologists. Many variations of the
interpretive approach exist but shared by all is a phenomenological base which
advocates humans are inextricably linked to their world through lived experience of
that world (Sandberg, 2005). Hence there is no objective or universal real world, only
a world as experienced.

Undertaking interpretive research requires the researcher to engage in a process of
understanding the constructed realities of the research participants (Uzzell & Barnett,
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2006) rather than impose meaning on the lives lived by others (Harris, 2006). An
interpretative approach rests on inter-subjective construction of meaning and
understanding (Angen, 2000) and emphasises interpretation and understanding are
unavoidably bound and, understanding of social action may only be achieved by
relating to an individual or group empathically (Holloway & Wheeler, 2010).

No ‘truth’ or single interpretation of reality can be judged as uniquely right or wrong
because all claims to knowledge are open to multiple and differing interpretations and
reinterpretations (Smith, 2008). Therefore, the researcher must denote the processes
involved in interpretation which lead to different views being expressed (Harris, 2006).
Thus, researchers taking an interpretive approach reject ‘taken for granted’ and
‘common sense’ notions of understanding the world and those who exist within it
(Embree, 2009) and accept the reality of human experience is subject to an infinite
number of variations and interpretations resulting in a “state of perpetual flux” (Oakes,
1977, p. 12). Knowledge is seen to be a construction of realities. Hence issues and
events in societies are not unambiguous truths or facts but rather a collection of
indistinct actions, events or problems which were aggregated by humans to create a
social reality.

This rejection of an objective, knowable reality external to human consciousness is
reflected in the belief that creation of social reality will always be coloured by
historical, cultural, ideological and gender-based constructs (Sandberg, 2005).
Importantly, it follows then if reality is never fixed but is socially constructed, then
language itself is also socially constructed because language is created within the
societies in which it exists. It may be argued, therefore, that language is intrinsically
context-bound and lacks any fixed meaning. In other words, language creates rather
than describes reality, resulting in multiple differing interpretations of what reality is
(Haralambos & Holborn, 2000).
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Underpinning any interpretive research approach is the assumption that the story told
is able to be articulated in language which will be understood by both teller and
listener/researcher. A central concept then in the interpretive approach is language
as a conduit for social change. Language is the tool through which humans typify
experience and meaningfully communicate it to others, resulting in shared
understandings. Language is not a representational system which reflects or mirrors
objective reality, rather it acquires its meaning through the ways it is socially defined
and used in differing social situations and practices (Sandberg, 2005).

In this study, language is the medium through which high risk women meaningfully
communicated their experiences regarding refusal of RRS. Davis (2008) and Seale
(2001) identified that the language used to discuss breast and other cancers was
constructed in such a way to endorse a particular approach to dealing with cancer,
namely fighting and winning the battle against the disease. Additionally, Davis (2008)
found breast cancer language incorporates personal, social and cultural meanings of
disease. Therefore, the women’s stories in this study reflect personal and societal
views on how people with or at risk of cancer should speak, act and behave.

Allowing the women’s stories to be shared in this way advanced an understanding of
the experiences of saying no to RRS and situated the women’s lived experiences
within personal, social, cultural and historical influences. Moreover, the interpretive
approach demanded the researcher interpret and re-construct the story making the
process a biographical endeavour.

Notably biographical methods are particularly

suited to understanding lives of individuals and/or key periods within them (Surr, 2006;
Jones, Glintmeyer & McKenzie, 2005). Thus, an interpretive approach encompassing
a biographical method was appropriate in this study which aimed to create
understanding of how high risk women came to say no to RRS.
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The biographical method
The roots of the biographical method can be traced back to the interpretive paradigm
developed by the Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920s, following research which
was first to use biographical material to gain understanding of sociological issues,
namely the lives of Polish migrants in Europe and America (Apitzsch & Siouti, 2007).
Although then overshadowed by an upsurge of quantitative sociological research
approaches, the biographical method began to increase in popularity again in the
1970s (Apitzsch & Siouti, 2007; Denzin, 1989), in part spear-headed by feminist
writers who argued social enquiry into the human condition was not possible without
the biographical method (Johnstone, 1999). Denzin’s (1989) ‘Interpretive Biography’
further stimulated research using interpretive methods which aimed to illuminate an
understanding of how individuals in society gave meaning to life and how researchers
could capture those meanings in text.

The term ‘biographical method’ applies to a range of research activities including
narrative,

life

histories,

autobiographies,

storytelling,

interpretive

biography,

reminiscence and ethnography (Bornat, 2008). The diverse range of biographical
methods which exist and the dynamic, personal and individualistic nature of
biographical data add to the complexity of such a research process.

Bornat (2008) suggests a structure for all biographical approaches based on four key
themes.

Biographical data collection is a socially interactive process whereby

researcher and participant engage in face to face dialogue. A focus on expression of
self encourages the emergence of feelings and emotions which provide insight into
personal perceptions and understandings of experience and create subjective
knowledge. Data collected will have an obvious or implicit structure comprising a
beginning and an end and which can be connected to prior theory. The accounts
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created are contextual, that is, they are given meaning within frameworks of time and
space and frameworks or agendas imposed by the researcher/interpreter.

These themes were important in this study as they reflected the desire to create a
safe environment whereby women were encouraged to share deeply personal
experiences and created an account which was reflective of personal reality. The
nature of the situation; having a family history, being tested and then diagnosed with a
genetic predisposition to cancer, being offered and then saying no to refusing RRS,
meant the women’s experiences were necessarily temporal as they were drawn into
that sequence of events. Furthermore, dominance of medical and sexual discourses
in Western society meant the women’s experiences could not be divorced from the
social world therefore it was necessary to situate them within it.

Irrespective of biographical method utilised, common to all approaches is the
underpinning belief that an individual’s biography is a social construct (Apitzsch &
Siouti, 2007), and as such is influenced by inner personal knowledge and experience
and prevailing cultural patterns of the time. Thus data obtained from the biographical
method is viewed as historically, culturally and experientially bound and therefore
open to multiple interpretations.

The overall aim of the biographical method is to explore ways in which humans
construct understanding about their lives and to determine how they influence and are
influenced by significant life events (Jones et al., 2005; Surr, 2006). Notably, Denzin’s
(1989) interpretive biography allowed the researcher to construct an understanding
and represent the lives of those whose experiences do not conform to dominant
societal perspectives (Williams & Holmes, 2005).

Biographical methods construct

documents of the “sociality of the individual” (Apitzsch & Siouti, 2007, p. 13) which
allow analysis of how individual and societal influences impact on the creation of
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identity.

Apitzsch and Siouti (2007), further argued this makes biographical

approaches particularly suited to studies concerned with women’s experiences as
biographies reveal aspects of personal and social influences on the construction of
identity and gender. Further, biographical methods were particularly suited to this
study because the experiences of women with a family history of breast/ovarian
cancer were woven into stories and how they experienced and perceived their bodies.
Denzin (1989) asserts that the point of origin for human life lies within the family;
therefore biographical texts begin with a family history.

The participants in this study had witnessed family members suffer and sometimes die
from cancer and had said no to RRS despite conclusive evidence of its effectiveness
in reducing cancer risk. It is argued that this refusal was at odds with Western medical
discourse therefore using Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography allowed the women’s
decisions to be considered in light of personal, social and cultural phenomena.

Interpretive biography
Key to the interpretive biographical approach is acceptance that societies, cultures
and human experience can be inscribed and read as social texts. Denzin (1989, p.
11) defined interpretive biography as “(…) creating literary, narrative, accounts and
representations of lived experiences. Telling and inscribing stories”. In other words,
human experience can be represented by symbolic statements.

The focus of interpretive biography is both on understanding how people give
meaning to their lives, and how to capture these meanings in written, narrative and
oral forms (Denzin, 1989). A central assumption underpinning the approach is the
meanings people attribute to their lives and experiences are socially constructed and
arise from interpretations of their own and others’ behaviour. Although people live
independently in society and create personal history, society influences how a life is
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lived. The interpretive process is fundamental to this method as it provides the basis
for understanding and making-meaning of the experiences of others as created in the
biography (Denzin, 1989).

Denzin (1989) further stated understanding is both a

subjective and an inter-subjective, emotional process. That is, understanding involves
drawing on both personal experience/the personal experience of others, and upon
shared common experiences to construct shareable emotional feelings and cognitive
understandings of the life experiences of another.

Thus biographical research is

“interventionist” (Denzin, 1989, p. 82) and is able to give voice to those who are
unable to tell their story or who are denied a voice to speak.

Notably in Denzin’s approach, biographical data is gathered which captures
“epiphanies or “turning point moments” which leave a mark on people’s lives (Denzin,
1989, p. 17).

Epiphanies often relate to crisis moments and are fundamental to

meanings people attribute to life and may have a positive or negative effect. Meaning
is attached to epiphanies retrospectively as the experience is re-lived and reinterpreted in response to both the individual’s and others’ reactions to the
experience.

Epiphanies consequently alter meanings associated with past

experiences and bear influence on individual identity. By studying epiphanies, the
researcher is able to illuminate significant experiences in an individual’s life after
which their life is irrevocably changed (Denzin, 1989).

Owning a genetic mutation and being advised there is a high risk of developing cancer
is an experience for some women. This experience constitutes an epiphany moment
since life changes forever as women face a future bound to the gene fault (Finkler,
2000).

However, human experience does not occur in a vacuum, but rather the

experience is situated within broader historical, cultural and institutional milieu of an
individual’s life (Williams & Holmes, 2005). This supports Denzin’s (1989) view that a
person’s life experience cannot be considered in isolation but rather is inextricably
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interwoven into the entire fabric of the society, history and culture in which that
individual exists:
No self or personal-experience story is ever an individual
production. It derives from larger group, cultural, ideological
and historical contexts. To understand a life, the epiphanies
and self-stories that shape that life, one must penetrate and
understand these larger structures. (Denzin, 1989, p. 73)
Epiphany moments are thus contextualised within social relationships and shared
social and cultural norms (Jones et al., 2005), therefore a focus on epiphany moments
attempts to make meaning of human experience within personal/individual and
social/universal constructs. In this study, the epiphany moments of high risk women
were contextualised against the backdrop of a health care system which espoused a
particular discourse (Filc, 2004) and a society in which existed a communal folklore of
what a woman ‘is’ and should look like. This approach valued everyday subjective
experience as worthy of investigation and offered a unique insight into the
experiences of women who had been identified as having a genetic predisposition to
cancer yet had said no to RRS, and what this meant for them.

Methods of gathering biographies
Interpretive biography relies on oral and written accounts of experience which are
interpreted and reconstructed to arrive at shared understanding and meaning.
Essentially, a biography is a form of narrative study in which the experience of an
individual’s life is captured in text (Creswell et al., 2007). When a person’s life is
written about, the story told may attempt to cover the life completely or partially,
depending on the experiences deemed as important to the story (Denzin, 1989).

Humans are essentially storytellers who use storytelling to make sense of life.
(Moen, 2006). Moreover, stories about life are embodied as they are about bodies
and are told through bodies (Blix, Hamran & Normann, 2012). Jarviluoma, Moisala
and Villko, (2003) contended stories about personal experience cannot exist without
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being gendered, as both teller and recipient of the story are embodied beings who
interpret the story against personal and cultural perceptions of gender.

Denzin (1989) used the terms self-story, personal narrative and personal experience
narrative to describe differing biographical forms aimed at gathering accounts of the
lives of individuals. All share similarities and differences as alluded to by Denzin
(1989, p. 47) when he stated “every term carries traces of other terms” and that the
methods are themselves defined by each other in terms of difference. All are based
upon an interpretive process which requires an individual to enter the emotional life of
another and presupposes a life has been lived which can be studied, constructed,
reconstructed and written about. Thomas-MacLean (2004) similarly stated analysis of
people’s stories created understanding of the meaning of ill health and how people
related the body to the social world.

Cherry et al. (2013) reported exposure to the

stories of women who had experienced types of RRS could help women considering
it. Stories are essentially re-constructions of experience and interpretation of stories
may advance health professionals’ understanding of people’s health related
experiences (Holloway & Freshwater, 2007). This supports the views of Chapman
(2002) who stated that the voices of those living with genetic conditions must be
heard, as the debate arising from advances in genetic technology and testing
continues.

Personal experience narratives
When a life is written about, it becomes a story of personal experience. In telling the
story, the individual recounts events and experiences of past and present and may
also anticipate future events yet to come (Liamputtong, 2009).

Stories have a

chronological dimension as the sequence of life events are recounted, and a nonchronological dimension which involves the construction of the whole story from
smaller stories contained within (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 2000).

Frank (1995)
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explained that people tell stories whereas narratives are created when stories are
analysed. Narratives are thus storied ways of knowing and communicating
(Riessman, 2006). During storytelling a teller engages in sharing and recounting an
experience or event with a listener. A narrative is created when meaningful events
are identified, organised and linked together to create order (Gray, Fitch, Fergus,
Mykhalovskiy & Church, 2002). In research, narratives do not speak for themselves
but rather require interpretation to be used as data (Riessman, 2006). The narrative
constructed is situated within wider social and cultural contexts and reveals personal
realities and social structures and processes (Gray et al., 2002).

In this study, the participants’ stories became personal experience narratives. Simply
put, personal experience narratives are stories people tell about personal experiences
(Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985) and describe events which exist independent of the
telling, since the focus is on sharable experience. The participants told stories as a
way of making sense of the world and communicating thoughts, feelings and
experiences in relation to being identified as having a genetic predisposition to
developing cancer and subsequent related events. The personal experience narrative
was created by linking non-random events in relation to the women’s experiences in a
meaningful way.

Personal experience narratives are not primarily intended for sharing in social groups
and may be told only to another listener, the sharing of which creates an emotional
bond between the two (Denzin, 1989). Dolby-Stahl (1985) referred to this as the
creation of intimacy: a bond between two equals who have the capacity and skills to
share aspects of life experience with each other. It is the creation of intimacy which
evokes a personal response from the teller and allows private folklore and personal
meaning to be revealed.

In the research setting, intimacy develops between the

participant (as story-teller) and the researcher (as listener) through realisation the
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experience is mutually understood (Williams & Holmes, 2005). Similarly, Riessman
(2001, 2006, 2008) argued that a co-construction between the teller, the audience and
the told always exists when gathering narratives. Data emerges from the relationship
between the teller, researcher-as-listener and the context of the telling of the story
(Riley & Hawe, 2005).

Personal experience narratives describe a set of events which generally follow a
linear structure, that is, they have a beginning, middle and an end (Denzin, 1989). In
this study, the life trajectory of the participants in relation to their turning point or
epiphany moments up to completion of interviews provided the scope of the personal
experience narrative gathered for data analysis. This described a causal sequence of
connecting events as the participant’s story unfolded through events in time.

Notably, personal experience narratives, or stories, are constitutive of reality and
personal identity (May, 2012). Therefore these narratives draw meaning from common
understandings which exist within a group and may also express the “private folklore
or meanings” (Denzin, 1989, p. 44) and parts of the “inner life” of the story teller
(Dolby-Stahl, 1985, p. 47). The examination of personal experience narratives allows
the researcher to connect people’s meaningful experiences to the society in which
they live and to larger institutions which shape society through ideological practices
(Denzin, 1989). Denzin (1989) advocated the analysis and subsequent interpretation
of personal experience narratives was carried out using techniques of criticism. One
such approach is Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic method, discussion of which
and application to this study now follows.

Literary Folkloristic Methodology
This study required a methodology which allowed the participants to tell their stories in
relation to how they experienced and perceived their bodies within the discourse of
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Western medicine.

The interpretive approach taken was consistent with social

constructionist perspectives of society which advocate reality is a dynamic, socially
constructed phenomenon and humans create social reality through their interactions
with others and their resulting interpretations and understandings. The stories people
communicate through language is one key way in which social reality is constructed
by humans and represent the perceptions, values and experiences of the story teller.
Moreover, personal experience narratives are literary productions because the teller
continually engages in a process of selecting or rejecting what to say from an infinite
number of possible things to say (Dolby-Stahl, 1989). Literary folkloristic methodology
allowed the in-depth analysis of these stories, as told from the view point of the story
tellers (in this case the high risk women who had said no to RRS) and created an
understanding of the experience of being identified as owning a genetic mutation and
saying no to RRS.

Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) methodological approach contends narratives of personal
experience sit within the genre of folklore. Folkloristic methodology seeks to both
explain people’s beliefs and practices in their own terms and to contextualise these
views socially, culturally and historically (Oring, 2004). It has been argued that the
study of folklore is central to our understanding of how human civilisation developed,
since folklore study showed how cultures developed in the same way geology and
palaeontology influenced Darwinian Theory (Trubshaw, 2003).

The term folklore is a widely defined but arguably often misunderstood term. Although
frequently believed to concern uncorroborated myths, legends and fairy-tales, the
term was first coined by the British historian William John Thomas in 1846, as a way
of bringing together in one discipline the range of traditions, rituals, cultures and
beliefs (lore) of different peoples around the world (folk) (Simpson & Roud, 2000).
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The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
defined folklore as:
Folklore (or traditional and popular culture) is the totality of
tradition-based creations of a cultural community, expressed
by a group or individuals and recognized as reflecting the
expectations of a community in so far as they reflect its cultural
and social identity; its standards and values are transmitted
orally, by imitation or by other means. Its forms are, among
others, language, literature, music, dance, games, mythology,
rituals, customs, handicrafts, architecture and other arts
(UNESCO, 1990, p. 239).
Alan Dundes, a leading folklorist credited with establishing folklore studies as an
academic discipline, proposed a simplified definition of folklore as being about ‘form –
function – transmission’ (Trubshaw, 2004). Folklore was traditionally transmitted
aurally between members of a folk group although more recently electronic media and
forms of communication also transmit folklore (Trubshaw, 2004). The transmission of
folklore is contextual and establishes group identity through shared meanings and
understandings which are reflective of larger shared understandings of the group but
which may be unstated (Trubshaw, 2004). Although folklore is originally created by
group members, it ultimately serves to define and perpetuate group membership by
excluding those who lack the shared understanding. For these reasons, Trubshaw
(2004) goes on to suggest Dundes’ definition be amended to ‘form – context –
transmission’ to reflect the complexity and contextuality of modern society. However,
not all communication transmitted between groups and between people would be
considered folklore, therefore distinction must made between what folklore is and is
not.

For Trubshaw (2004) the crucial difference was folklore was unedited or

unmediated whereas other forms of communication such as those transmitted by the
mass media and large organisations, governments and so forth was not.

This

viewpoint is in keeping with the earlier work of Hufford (1998, p. 301) who defined
folklore as “unofficial culture” in contrast to “official culture” which was associated with
an office, post or other bureaucratic position. Comparison is made between this and
Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) ‘communal folklore’ which described collectively held views in
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populations or societies which are transmitted through informal communications and
customary stories. Common to all is acknowledgment of norms which are collectively
but unofficially held by members of a group or society and which are communicated
and perpetuated through membership.

Hufford’s (1998) definition of unofficial versus official culture, highlights the description
and interpretation of reality as transmitted through folklore and non-folklore
communication is a political process in which social relations related to power and
authority are influenced by dominant discourses. The Marxist sociologist Gramsci
(1971) used the term ‘hegemony’ to describe the rule of one class over another by
using coercion or more subtle persuasion to ensure the ruled class accepted the
ideologies, rules and laws of the ruling (hegemonic) class. Again, this is similar to
Hufford’s concept of official culture and is more likely to disperse ‘edited’ or ‘mediated’
communication to promote compliance. Similarly Trubshaw (2004) linked folklore to
political activity as it was a means of transmitting poems, songs and stories which
could contest the hegemony and promote the emergent ideologies of other groups.
The folk of contemporary folklore are described by Dundes (1980, p. 6) as:
(…) any group of people whatsoever who share at least one common
factor. It does not matter what the linking factor is – it could be a
common occupation, language or religion – but what is important is that
a group formed for whatever reason will have some traditions which it
calls its own.
Dolby-Stahl (1985) expanded the concept of folklore in her literary folkloristic
methodology to distinguish between ‘communal’ and ‘private’ folklore: communal
folklore represented the traditional stories and beliefs collectively held by the wider
population, and private folklore represented what was exclusively shared by a subgroup of the population and which was not necessarily publicly revealed.

Private

folklore is revealed when intimacy is created between the willing participant and the
researcher-as-listener during the interview process: “the teller teaches the listener to
know him better” (Dolby-Stahl, 1985, p. 51). For Dolby-Stahl, exploration and analysis
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of private folklore contained within personal experience narratives was fundamental to
creating meaning and understanding of the lives of people.

Like Denzin (1989),

Dolby-Stahl (1985) acknowledged the challenges associated with understanding and
creating meaning from the written and oral texts of others, since there can be no
permanence of the original text: as soon as words are spoken, they disappear. At
most, the researcher can retain a written or taped copy of what was said for later
analysis and interpretation.

Central to Dolby-Stahl’s methodology is the concept of the “informed listener” (1985,
p. 54). It stands to reason that any individual can listen to the story of another and
offer a response to that story. This response may be valuable and meaningful to
understanding the story, especially if the listener shares cultural commonalties with
the teller. However, Dolby-Stahl (1989, 1985) argued the contribution of the informed
listener was potentially more valuable. An informed listener is one who not only
shares aspects of the teller’s folk group, but also uses literary theory to critically
deconstruct the text, discover hidden clues and identify themes and motifs, and
crucially, takes full responsibility for translating what was heard (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).
This is of great importance, as in keeping with Denzin (1989) it is argued that one can
never accurately replicate a life or life experience, therefore the focus is on the text
created by the individual and not the individual per se. On hearing the story, the
listener must create meaning along with the storyteller, and the listener is responsible
for their response to the story.

Listening to the story is thus a creative act during

which the listener brings their own store of personal and cultural perspectives to bear
on the interpretation (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).

Dolby-Stahl (1985) contended the most important feature of any interpretive project
was the reader was able to see how the story was interpreted in the way it was. It is
essential therefore the researcher-as-listener demonstrates how responses evolved
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and how interpretations were arrived at. Literary theory is used to critically deconstruct
the personal experience narratives to identify themes, attitudes and allusions
reflective of societal expectations which influence how a life is lived and experienced
(Williams & Holmes, 2005).

Analysis of biographical data therefore requires an

approach which makes sense of the teller’s life and understands the life from both a
private and public perspective.

Biographical analysis
The methodological approach taken in this study combined Denzin’s (1989)
interpretive biography with Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology to
provide a method for gathering, reading and interpreting participants’ personal
experience narratives. This meant analysing the participants’ personal experience
narratives for meanings of experience which could then be interpreted using the
techniques of literary criticism.

However, neither Denzin (1989) nor Dolby-Stahl

(1985) outlined any particular method for writing and reading biographical texts exists,
rather it was argued a range of literary techniques may be utilised to analyse and
communicate experiences connected to the life of the individual.

Wide variation in biographical methods (Bornat, 2008) coupled with differences in how
researchers employ the concept of personal narrative (Thorne, Kirkham & O’FlynnMagee, 2004) means diverse strategies of data analysis are associated with
interpretive approaches. However, common to all is the requirement to construct texts
for further analysis by organising the texts/data, creating field notes and/or choosing
particular sections of the text for detailed inspection (Riessman, 2006). Denzin (1989)
acknowledged all data analysis techniques had inherent weaknesses in them since
the study of human experience was inevitably fraught with contradiction and
ambiguity.

Data analysis is an intuitive process when conducting interpretive

biographical research therefore specific analytic techniques are rarely prescribed nor
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the steps taken clearly articulated (Bryman & Burgess, 2002). Thus the process of
data analysis in interpretive studies eludes a methodological orthodoxy and instead
employs techniques which fit best with the research aims and overall epistemological
and ontological assumptions of the study.

It is generally agreed the most appropriate tool for analysing biographical data is that
which suits the focus of the research (Surr, 2006), addresses the study aims (Creswell
et al., 2007) and allows the researcher to make sense and create understanding of
the participants’ significant life experiences (Liamputtong, 2009; Thorne et al., 2004).
The favoured approach to data analysis will reflect the researcher’s epistemological
assumptions, values and cumulative experience (Dolby-Stahl, 1985). Thus there are
no fixed or mandatory procedures associated with biographical analysis, rather
justification for the particular data analysis approach taken must be provided. Bornat
(2008) however cautioned against over-explaining analytical procedures when
undertaking interpretive biography as this suggests the researcher (as interpreter) is
in a position of authority and control which can serve to eclipse the participants’
responses.

Consensus exists that data analysis in biographical research is an intuitive process
(Bryman & Burgess, 2002) which involves separating the chronology of events from
the meanings individuals attach to them (Bornat, 2008). The focus of data analysis
remains on uncovering meaning of significant experiences of people and relationships
between experiences (Gültekin, Inowlocki & Lutz, 2003). The researcher sets out to
make connections between the participants’ past, present and future experiences and
reveal influences and contexts which may have shaped experience which participants
may or may not be aware of (Bornat, 2008).

89

The interpretive biographical approach taken in this study is dependent upon analytic
induction, a process which seeks understanding of phenomena which illuminates
characteristics, patterns and structures in a theoretically useful way (Thorne et al.,
2004). This allows understanding of an individual’s inner world to be created and
shared with those outside that world (Fraser, 2004). Notably, this analysis reveals
knowledge of experiences or events considered threatening or traumatic to people
(Gültekin et al., 2003) such as those associated with being identified as high risk of
developing cancer. Additionally, analysis may include reference to folk sayings and
proverbs (Aronson, 1995) and reveal aspects of the participants’ private and
communal folklore (Dolby-Stahl, 1985). Data analysis is a complex process however
as references to such events and experiences are threaded throughout the text,
revealed in various ways, hidden or glossed over, therefore the analysis seeks out
explicit and hidden meaning in the text (Bornat, 2008).

In this study, the aim of data analysis was to generate understanding of the
participants’ experiences of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian
cancer and saying no to RRS in order to create knowledge which may be applied in a
theoretically meaningful way. Additionally, the study aimed to understand the public
and private folklore of the women so that their life experiences could be understood
within the context of personal, social, cultural and historical influences.

Narrative

analysis was particularly suited to this study as it allowed the systematic study of
personal experience and meaning (Riessman, 2001, 2005).

Narrative analysis

facilitates a focus on events, emotions, feelings, meanings and explanations
contained within the participants’ stories (Liamputtong, 2009), and so makes visible
what was important about an individual’s experience. Narrative analysis can makemeaning of turning point moments (Riessman, 2001, 2005), or what Denzin (1989)
referred to as epiphanies, which change an individual’s biography.
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Burck (2005) argued that narrative analysis illuminates ways in which people
construct themselves within groups and societies and how people position themselves
in relation to dominant notions of self. Riessman (2001, 2006) described this as a
way in which individuals construct and claim personal identity. The participants’
stories in this study were analysed from the perspective of how personal identities
were formed against a backdrop of dominant social and cultural discourse and
ideologies.

Narrative analysis is an umbrella term for various theoretical approaches to
interpreting stories (May, 2012; Riessman, 2006; Stephens & Breheny, 2013). The
approach taken is dependent upon the study aims and theoretical orientations of the
researcher (Shi, 2008). However, all approaches provide a way of systematically
analysing personal experience narratives and share a common tactic: the analysis
takes the stand point of the storyteller as its starting point (Riessman, 2001, 2005,
2006; Riley & Hawe, 2005). Riessman (2005, p. 2) contends different approaches to
narrative analysis reflect whether the study focus is on “the told” or “the telling” and no
one approach is superior to another. Approaches to interpreting stories thus differ on
questions relating to why and how stories are told (Riley & Hawe, 2005).

Riessman

(2001, 2005) described various approaches but highlighted the approaches are not
mutually exclusive and different approaches may be combined in one study.

In this study, Riessman’s (2005, 2006, 2008) thematic narrative analysis informed the
data analysis process. Thematic analysis is the most commonly utilised method of
narrative analysis and is frequently used in health care research to increase
understanding of people’s experiences of illness and disease (Riessman, 2005, 2008)
and has been used widely in folklore studies (Riessman, 2008).
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When using thematic analysis, the researcher seeks ideas, themes and clues from
within the participants’ stories and compares these across stories. Importantly, rather
than breaking the personal experience narratives down into coded segments,
thematic analysis keeps the story intact and interprets and compares each
participants’ story as a whole. The sequence of the narrative is preserved and large
sections of the text are presented in some detail to illustrate themes (Riessman,
2008). Comparing the narratives against each other as a whole reveals broader
contexts which shape personal experience. In contrast to other forms of narrative
analysis, thematic narrative analysis focuses less on form and narrative devices used
to construct stories and more on content and themes (Riessman, 2005, 2008). Thus
the focus is on what was said not how it was said or the purpose of telling. A focus on
content produces a chronological account of experience which is then evaluated for
the meaning attached to events and experiences (Elliot, 2005).

Language is viewed as a resource for communicating experience rather than the
primary object of investigation, maintaining the focus on the personal experiences of
the storytellers. Nonetheless, particular word choices, metaphors and references to
folklore may be exposed and investigated in terms of their function within the text and
the meanings they carry (Riessman, 2008). Thematic analysis therefore facilitates a
focus on the told which comprises reports of events and experiences and how these
were lived and experienced (Riessman, 2008).

From this, an awareness of the

individual in society is gleaned which allows an understanding of social and cultural
groups and structures and relationships between them (Elliot, 2005).

This is in

keeping with Denzin (1989) who asserted that to understand a life, consideration must
be given to the wider social and cultural structures which shape human experience.

In thematic analysis, data is interpreted in light of thematic elements developed by the
researcher in accordance with the research aims, a priori knowledge, emergent theory
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and the data produced (Riessman, 2001, 2008).

Providing explanation of and

rationale for chosen categories allows the researcher to exhibit transparency in the
research process and affords the reader an opportunity to reflect on the logic
underpinning the analysis (Fraser, 2004). This is an important aspect in this study,
because it was reasoned it was incumbent on the researcher to be transparent
throughout the research process and provide rich, substantive accounts of
participants’ experiences which demonstrated how a particular interpretation was
arrived at.

Thematic narrative analysis has been criticised on the basis it assumes a common
language exists which will be understood by all (Riessman, 2006). Such criticism
could however be extended to any analytic research approach as all involve language
in all its ambiguity and instability.

Hence, the approach taken in this study

acknowledged the challenges inherent in the study of human experience but
contended accepting and negotiating these was integral to understanding the
experiences of the participants. The application of narrative analysis in this study is
described in Chapter 4.

In summary, analysis of personal experience narratives reveals knowledge of and
about the individual concerned. However, biographical researchers are only ever able
to “create the subject in the text that is written” despite the subject (person) having
lived a ‘real’ life with ‘real’ experiences (Denzin, 1989, p. 23). The participants in this
study were real people who existed independently of the text, but for the purposes of
this research, the participants were created as subjects in text within particular
discourses and historical periods. The subjectivity of personal experience narratives
used to capture the participants’ biographies was acknowledged as strength because
it is this subjectivity which creates human reality (Denzin, 1989). The participants told
stories of their lives and their experiences of being identified as high risk of developing
93

cancer and saying no to RRS. However, the stories told were one of a number of
stories which could have been told hence biographical methods used to construct
lives in text are literary productions and accordingly, are open to multiple, differing
interpretations. The subjectivity of personal experience narratives therefore also lays
the approach open to criticism because of their ambiguous, temporal and shifting
nature. Accordingly, the next section discusses the ambiguous nature of truth and
how this was negotiated in this study.

Truth, validity and evaluation in interpretive research
Designing and undertaking effective and meaningful research is the goal of all
researchers (Angen, 2000: Holloway & Wheeler, 2010) therefore it is essential all
research irrespective of the approach taken presents the findings from research and
the subsequent interpretation of data in some credible way (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008;
Major & Savin-Baden, 2010). The overall aim then of all data analysis is to transform
raw data into a clear and credible account of the research findings (Fossey, Harvey,
McDermott & Davidson, 2002; Liamputtong, 2009). Extensive epistemological debate
exists as to the most useful and appropriate way to achieve this, notably in relation to
what constitutes ‘the truth’, ‘truths’ and ‘truthfulness’ (Major & Savin-Baden, 2010) and
whether or not research is able to identify a true version of reality (Cohen & Crabtree,
2008; Smith, 2008).

Traditional criteria for evaluating research are rooted in the positivist paradigm and
presuppose an objective measurable reality exists independent of the interests of the
researcher (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).

The standard

conventional criteria used to assess the quality of the research are validity, reliability
and generalisability. Internal validity is the extent to which a data collection instrument
measures what it intends to measure while external validity relates to how far the
study results can be generalised to other populations (Polit & Beck, 2013). Reliability
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refers to the consistency of an instrument and is a measure of how well the instrument
produces the same or similar results if administered under the same or similar
conditions (Parahoo, 2006). Establishing validity and reliability are important factors
in generalising the study findings: drawing broader inferences from particular
observations through the demonstration of cause and effect relationships. Traditional
research approaches attempt to produce an objective description of reality in order to
make predictions about how individuals will act in that reality, or respond to a
particular intervention, on the basis consistency of response (Cohen & Crabtree,
2008). In contrast, the methodological approach taken in this study was grounded in
the belief humans are constantly interpreting and re-interpreting the dynamic world in
which they exist in order to make meaning of experience. The approach taken was not
preoccupied with a search for ‘the truth’ thus traditional criteria for evaluating research
were not applicable.

The interpretive approach utilised in this study rejected the

notion of an objective, knowable reality external to human consciousness and instead
argued multiple realities exist within socially and mentally constructed individual
realities.

Hence the experiences of high risk women who say no to RRS were

considered in light of social, cultural and historical influences which shaped human
experience and consented to certain ways of speaking and behaving. Rather than
searching for objective truths and explanation, the focus of this research was on
understanding and meaning-making (Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985).

Denzin (1989) claimed that positivist epistemologies directed the research process in
a search for absolute truths and turned the subject of the biography into an object.
However, humans are not objects and are exposed to a wide range of influences on
behaviour (Crossan, 2003).

Research carried out in the interpretive paradigm

presupposes reality is fluid and co-constructed.

Knowledge is gained through

negotiation between the researcher and the participants (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008;
Lincoln & Guba, 1986).

In this study, distinction was drawn between objective
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markers of experience and the subjective meanings attached to them by individuals
(Denzin, 1989).

Undertaking biographical research requires acceptance of the

ambiguous nature of truth and reality notwithstanding real people living real lives with
real experiences.

Denzin (1989) explained this stance by referring to different

standards of autobiographical truth. Facts are events which occurred (or which will
occur) and are able to be corroborated, such as being identified as owning a genetic
mutation which increases a woman’s risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer.
Facticities are how these facts were lived and experienced by individuals, for
example, the subjective experiences of women diagnosed with owning a genetic
mutation. Fiction is a narrative account which deals with facts and facticities, real or
imagined, and may therefore be true or false. A true fiction is one which is faithful to
facts and facticities attempting to represent these in accordance with how they existed
and were experienced, creating verisimilitude (Denzin, 1989): demonstration of the
appearance of truth (Major & Savin-Baden, 2010).

Accordingly, the personal

experience narratives of the women in this study represented a version of reality
which appeared to be faithful to facts and facticities and which reflected what was
important to how the experience was constructed, understood and made sense of at
the time.

Personal experience narratives are “temporal productions” (Denzin, 1989, p. 73):
stories of the past, told in the present and only one of a number of stories which could
have been told.

Moen (2006) similarly discussed the fictional nature of personal

experience narratives, drawing distinction between the lived life and the life
experienced. The lived life comprises the events which occurred and are able to be
corroborated. A life experienced comprises feelings, values, sentiments, thoughts,
inflections and all forms of meaning known to the individual whose life it is. Capturing
the life told creates a personal experience narrative shaped by cultural conventions
inherent in telling the story, social contexts and audience responses (Moen, 2006).
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Another distinction exists between the story told and the story heard (Denzin, 1989).
The story is told through language, itself a symbolic, metaphoric and changing
medium which influences how the story is shared and heard. Different perspectives
and interpretations are brought to bear upon the story from the differing biographical
positions of teller and listener. Differences between teller and listener merge to form a
collective version of the story told, at a point in time. In this sense, just as there is no
one truth about the lives of others, similarly there is no one truth or single
interpretation researchers are able to make regarding the life experiences of others
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).

It may equally be argued empirical/scientific data are open-ended temporal
productions. For example, as recently as September 2012, scientists uncovered new
‘facts’ about breast cancer which were previously unknown (Cancer Genome Atlas
Network, 2012).

Breast cancer is now ‘known’ to comprise four genetically distinct

types, one of which shares genomic similarities with a particular type of ovarian
cancer.

This new information has been interpreted in Western medicine as

knowledge likely to re-shape scientific understanding of cancer, paving the way for
more therapeutic interventions and cures.

The revelation of new knowledge and

subsequent contemporary understanding about cancer and treatment accentuates the
shifting nature of science and the impermanence of scientific truths.

Indeed the

Human Genome Project itself is evidence of the impermanence of scientific
knowledge par excellence, as knowledge of the causes of disease prior to the
mapping of the human genome is now called into question and re-examined in light of
new genetic information. This in itself is not surprising, nor is it unexpected. It stands
to reason treatment for cancer will change as scientific discoveries continue to reveal
previously unknown information about the disease and its manifestations. The key
point however remains: no permanent, time or value-free criteria exist for determining
what knowledge is true (Denzin, 1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) and no special
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research methods exist which automatically and inevitably lead to ‘the truth’ (Smith,
2008).

The line between fact and fiction is blurred in biographical texts and true stories are
those which are believed in (Denzin, 1989). Any storyteller can construe facts about
his or her life and no-one can know what is true and what is false on every occasion.
All storytellers chose what to divulge and what to keep hidden (Dolby-Stahl, 1985,
1989; Thorne et al., 2004) therefore the personal experience narratives of the
participants in this study reflect a personal understanding of reality. Social, cultural
and ideological conventions guide what people in society feel able to say and not say
at any given time, hence what is presented is an edited version of reality (Denzin,
1989).

However, what is shared is what was important to how experience were

constructed and what sense women made of experience at the time. If the storyteller
deliberates that their experience was real and believes in its existence, then the story
told is authentic. The importance of the story is that it describes the experienced
reality as opposed to the real reality (Bate & Robert, 2007). This is the essence of the
interpretive approach.

For Denzin (1989) and Dolby-Stahl (1985, 1989), preoccupation with validity, reliability
and generalisability is set aside in favour of a concern for meaning and interpretation.
In this study, interpretive biographical techniques of literary criticism were used to
understand participants’ subjective experiences rather than accumulate facts about
their lives (Green & Thorogood, 2009). Denzin (1989) said that subjectivity creates
rather than distorts reality.

Similarly, Riessman (2001, p. 696) affirmed that

subjectivity is a strength of the interpretive approach rather than a weakness: “the
approach does not assume objectivity; rather, it privileges positionality and
subjectivity”.

Blix et al. (2012) confirmed that temporality and impermanence of
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personal experience narratives were not problematic but rather an opportunity for
obtaining a deeper understanding of the human condition.

The interpretive approach has been criticised on the basis it lends itself to an
‘anything goes’ approach to research and suggests any claim to knowledge is as
worthy or valuable as any other (Smith, 2008). Interpretivists however counter-argue
all any individual can do is describe and justify knowledge on criteria which are
historically and temporally shifting. For both researcher and participant, the story is
constructed around the interests and intents which make the story meaningful.
Consequently it is not possible to achieve a neutral or an unbiased opinion since
humans are unable to negate or eliminate a priori knowledge and influences from past
experiences (Smith, 2008).

From the above discussion, it is evident a key challenge in this study was reconciling
the desire to capture, understand and make-meaning of the experiences of high risk
women who said no to RRS with recognition that there can never be one true or
precise representation of a woman’s life. For researchers using biographical analysis,
the tension between relativism and material reality must be addressed. If one accepts
biographical methods are able to capture and represent the life of the person in text,
how does the researcher deal with the lack of any objective truth or reality and present
findings which will be accepted and evaluated as credible and worthwhile?

Attempts to define evaluation criteria more in keeping with epistemological
assumptions underpinning qualitative research approaches have been made. In their
seminal work, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 290) acknowledged the need for qualitative
research findings to be presented in a credible and meaningful way: “how can an
inquirer persuade his or her audience that the research findings of an inquiry are
worth paying attention to?”

Lincoln and Guba (1985, p .299) argued traditional
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positivist criteria for evaluating research were based on assumptions of “naïve
realism”, a belief in unchanging, tangible truths which served as benchmarks against
which study findings could be reliably measured against.

However as previously

argued, the theoretical standpoint taken in this thesis contended what constitutes
knowledge, and by extension ‘the truth’, is impermanent and only ‘true’ within the
historical, cultural and societal contexts in which it was produced and maintained.
This study was a study of human experience. It did not seek to make context-free
truthful statements about experience or seek to identify cause and effect relationships
which could allow the findings to be generalised. Rather the study aimed to provide a
credible account of how the participants came to say no to RRS by offering
interpretations of how multiple, interacting factors, events and processes shaped
experience. Traditional ways of claiming knowledge which are based on objectivity
and freedom from bias in research studies were thus incongruent with the
methodological approach taken in this study.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed alternative criteria to validity, reliability and
generalisation for demonstrating rigour and trustworthiness in qualitative inquiry. In
particular, Lincoln and Guba (1985) rejected the value of validity: if no one true reality
exists, there can be no claim to ever completely accurately represent someone else’s
reality through the research process. Furthermore, since reliability is a precondition of
validity, it follows the concept of reliability is equally extraneous in qualitative inquiry
(Butler-Kisber, 2010). Instead, Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed the concept of
‘trustworthiness’ in qualitative research which has four main criteria. Credibility is
used in place of internal validity and refers to the level of congruence between the
researchers’ findings and the participants’ realities, or the truth value of the research.
The concept of transferability is used in place of external validity and relates to the
degree to which the study findings can be applied to other contexts or other
populations. Reliability is replaced by dependability which concerns evidence of how
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likely the study would yield the same or similar findings if repeated on a similar
population in a similar environment. Confirmability is suggested in place of objectivity
and is a means by which the researcher demonstrates the findings were produced by
the focus of the study and not as a result of any biases on the researcher’s part.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) also suggested a range of techniques which could be
utilised to demonstrate rigour and establish the trustworthiness of the research. Ways
of increasing credibility include member checking, peer review, negative case analysis
and prolonged engagement in the field. The use of thick description to present the
findings in such a way so others can determine if relevant to their setting facilitates
transferability. For dependability and confirmability, the use of an audit trail which
clearly links the findings and interpretations to the original data sources and ensures
the researcher’s processes are logical, traceable and acknowledged is advised.
However, others have argued such ‘checks’ on accuracy of data interpretation still
assume an objective reality exists which can be accurately measured to uncover truth
and are therefore incongruent with an interpretive approach (Cohen & Crabtree,
2008). Similarly, Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olsen & Spiers (2002) argued such concepts
were not relevant to all types of qualitative research including feminist approaches
and those utilising critical theory, such as in this study, where the researcher’s
interpretations form part of the data.

Further work of Lincoln and Guba (1986, 1989) sought to extend the debate on
evaluative criteria for qualitative inquiry.

It was acknowledged the concept of

trustworthiness, and its accompanying criteria, were initially devised to parallel
conventional criteria in the absence of other measures. Although trustworthiness was
proposed as an improvement on the traditional criteria, Lincoln and Guba (1986,
1989) nonetheless acknowledged the inherent misnomer in devising new criteria
which were analogous to the rejected positivist criteria.

Devising equivalent criteria
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suggested the issues of importance were the same for both approaches and diverted
attention away from devising suitable interpretive alternatives. To this end, Lincoln
and Guba (1986, 1989) proposed an additional criterion of ‘authenticity’ as a means of
demonstrating the quality of qualitative research.

Holloway & Wheeler (2010)

summarised the components of authenticity thus: fairness refers to the extent to which
a range of different realities, or constructions of reality, are presented by the
researcher. The research findings should raise consciousness of and develop new
insights into the phenomenon under investigation (ontological authenticity) and
increase understanding and appreciation of the views of others (educative
authenticity). Authentic research also stimulates action (catalytic authenticity) and
empowers others to act (tactical authenticity).

Thus the concept of authenticity

appeared to address issues of importance in qualitative research such as
understanding of different realities/multiple interpretations, mutual understandings,
ethical research and empowering others, and therefore was more responsive to the
needs of qualitative researchers (Fossey et al., 2002).

However, despite extensive

theorising by Lincoln and Guba and many others, no one set of criteria with which to
gauge the quality of qualitative research has yet been devised (Fossey et al., 2002;
Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Holloway & Wheeler, 2010). Widespread debate remains
evident in the literature regarding the value of specific criteria for evaluating utility and
worth of interpretive and other types of qualitative research. The drive for a single set
of evaluative criteria suggests a uniformity amongst qualitative approaches which
does not exist.

The use of criteria relevant to qualitative research however, facilitates a focus on
exploring human experience in relation to social, cultural and historical contexts rather
than objective scientific data. There is general agreement further critique of what
constitutes quality criteria in qualitative research is needed (Fossey et al., 2002; Guba
& Lincoln, 1994). However, irrespective of the labels attached, researchers must
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demonstrate their research has truth value which requires consistency in the
language, concepts and methods used (Fossey et al., 2002; Holloway & Wheeler;
2010).

To this end, a general consensus on fundamental criteria for evaluating

interpretive research exists (Cohen & Crabtree, 2008) which informed the approach
taken in this study.

The research should be ethical, important and be clearly and coherently articulated.
Rich, substantive accounts of participants’ experiences should be presented which
illuminate subjective meanings and reflect multiple ways of seeing a phenomenon
(Cohen & Crabtree, 2008). There must be transparency throughout the research
process and discussion of issues such as the positioning of the researcher and power
relationships must be made explicit (Caelli, Ray & Mill, 2003). The interpretive lens of
the researcher must be visible and accessible during the course of the research
(Thorne et al., 2004) and researchers must demonstrate self-reflection and explain
how a particular interpretation was gleaned (Angen, 2000; Holloway & Wheeler,
2010). The researcher must also take steps to outline his or her stance in relation to
the participants, methodology and method and demonstrate honesty and consistency
between methods and researcher (Fossey et al., 2002; Major & Savin-Baden, 2010).
In this study, these steps have been addressed in several key ways: by making
explicit reference to these criteria when describing and justifying the study design and
processes; by presenting the participants’ stories in their own voice through the use of
substantive accounts of experience and thick description to support the interpretations
offered and by the inclusion of a reflexive account (see Chapter 7) which discusses
the ways in which the researcher’s subjectivities may have influenced the research
process. This study therefore is presented as a credible account of the experiences
of high risk women who said no to RRS and the meanings the women used to make
sense of their experiences.
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Chapter summary
The interpretive approach taken in this study provided a contextualised narrative of
the life experiences of the study participants. It was evident the women were folk and
belonged to many different folk groups.

They were mothers, sisters, patients,

daughters, friends, colleagues, neighbours, bosses and employees, to name but a
few.

Additionally, as women in Western society, they were subject to communal

folklore surrounding the female body, the breasts and ovaries, cancer and death and
dying.

In particular, the women in this study had said no to RRS despite its

effectiveness in reducing cancer risk in high risk populations and as such shared a
private folklore which contributed to their decision to say no to surgery.

The methodological approach taken acknowledged every interpretation contains
subjective elements thus neither researchers nor participants are able to escape
personal beliefs and ideologies, social circumstances and lived experiences.
Interpretation therefore is a social and political endeavour rather than a purely
cognitive act (Schwandt, 2000). The most important feature of interpretive research is
not whether the researcher accurately recounts the person’s life experience, but
rather the reader is able to see how the story was interpreted in the way it was (DolbyStahl, 1985). It is essential therefore for biographical researchers to make sense of
the lives of participants whilst recognising the resulting texts will be reflective of
personal ideologies (Williams & Holmes, 2005).

Analysis of biographical data

therefore required an approach which made sense of the teller’s life and understood
the life from both a private and public perspective.

This study used a synthesis of Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography and DolbyStahl’s (1985, 1989) literary folkloristics as a framework for gathering, reading and
interpreting the stories of the study participants (Williams & Holmes, 2005). Denzin’s
interpretive approach informed the gathering and reading of biographical data which
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was analysed and interpreted using the literary folkloristic method.

This strategy

provided a contextualised narrative of the life experiences of high risk women who
said no to RRS and is represented in Figure 5 below. While the research process has
been kept intact, this has been presented here rather than at the beginning of the
chapter as it represents how this approach was arrived at by the author as part of the
process of using literary theory within the biographical method. Application of this
approach is presented in the following chapter.

Interpretive process

Denzin’s
Interpretive
Biography

Personal
Experience
Narratives

Literary
theories

Cultural
understandings/
Communal
folklore

Researcher
as informed
listener

Reflexive
process

Private folklore

Figure 5: Overview of methodological approach taken in the study.
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CHAPTER 4: THE METHOD
Introduction
In this study, Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology was used within
Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biographical approach as a framework for the analysis of
participants’ personal experience narratives.

Dolby-Stahl (1985) stops short of

prescribing a particular method by which to undertake this process but does however
offer guidance on prerequisites which researchers should attend to when utilising the
literary folkloristic method:
(1) an acknowledged “documentary” frame; (2) clear allowance for the
individual response of the listener; (3) commentary by an audience-interpreter
whose relevant “folk group” is the same as the storyteller’s; (4) identification of
an audience-interpreter who knows the conventions of literary criticism…[ ]; (5)
an audience interpreter willing to accept full responsibility for the act of
interpretation. (Dolby-Stahl, 1985, p. 53)
From this, Hendricks (1999, p. 91) proposed an eight step process for conducting a
literary folkloristic inquiry which was used to guide this study:
1. Locating the participants within a given social category
2. The identifying of salient themes and experiences in the participant’s life.
3. The connecting of the subject’s life history and life story to larger social
meaning, including communal and private folklore.
4. Understanding that the subject’s life story reflects a set of meaningful
experiences which, when told create an emotional bond between the teller
and the listener.
5. Realising that the private, inner meanings of these experiences to the
subject can never be fully illuminated.
6. Interpreting the materials by sharing in the world of the experience of the
subject.
7. Bringing the interpretive approaches of literary theory and criticism to bear
on the life story materials.
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8. Acknowledging that the researcher creates the document that is
interpreted.
This provided a method which guided the study and through which the participants’
stories could be gathered, read and interpreted.

Step 1: Locating the participants within a given social category.
Use of Dolby-Stahl’s (1985, 1989) literary folkloristic methodology required study
participants belong to an identified social group which shared an exclusive private
folklore. This step therefore involved gaining access to BRCA1/2 mutation positive
women who had said no to RRS.

Genetic testing identified the study participants as being at high risk of developing
breast and/or ovarian cancer but they were asymptomatic, ‘pre-disease’ individuals
who had chosen not to undergo RRS and were therefore not ‘patients’ in the
traditional sense of the word. Although the number of women undergoing genetic
testing for breast/ovarian cancer and having RRS continues to rise, the number of
women who are offered then refuse RRS is not known. It may be women who say no
to RRS are in effect rejecting medical intervention and may therefore be unwilling to
continue medical observation and thus may be hard to reach participants.

Gaining access to participants
Women who had tested positive for a BRCA1/2 gene mutation but had said no to RRS
were invited to participate in the study by placing advertisements (Appendix 1) in local
newspapers in different regions of Scotland over a 12-month period. Initially this led
to a sample of six women. A further two women were referred to the researcher by
two of the initial participants who knew the other women to be high risk. One of these
participants also lived in Scotland and one lived in the North of England. An initial
telephone conversation was carried out with the potential participants to confirm
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eligibility and willingness to take part in the study and arrange a mutually convenient
place and time for interview to take place. Most interviews took place in the woman’s
home although two women requested to be interviewed elsewhere to avoid family
members being aware of the interview: these interviews took place in a friend’s house
and a private room in a local library. A Patient Information Sheet (Appendix 2) was
also posted at this point to allow the women to make an informed decision about
participation.

In the end, six interviews were completed and used in the study as two potential
participants withdrew at short notice. Qualitative research aims to collect data which
is rich, meaningful and contextualised to create understanding rather than
demonstrate statistical significance, making smaller sample sizes both sensible and
practical (Morgan, 2008). This number of participants is appropriate when the aim of
the research is to explore a shared perception, belief or experience amongst a
relatively homogenous group (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006) and when analysis
relies upon the in-depth interpretation of data from a small number of sources
(Morgan, 2008) since larger samples may dilute the relative importance of each
participant’s responses (Lloyd et al., 2000).

Ethical considerations
Ethics in research became prominent following the abuse of human rights under the
guise of research including Nazi experimentation and led to a number of ethical codes
being formulated and adopted by those involved in research (Preissle, 2008).
Although the purpose of research is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on
a given topic, the research process may result in the disclosure of information about
individuals which is not already known (McHaffie, 2000), consequently the entire
research process is subject to a number of ethical considerations from the choosing of
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the research topic through to the dissemination of the findings (Bryman, 2004;
Preissle, 2008).

Ethical issues raised by this study included the vulnerable nature of the participants,
participants’ autonomy, informed consent, potential harm to participants and issues of
confidentiality and anonymity, all of which are interlinked.

Respect for autonomy
Autonomy is defined as “the ability of an individual to make reasoned decisions about
issues which affect them” (Royal College of Nursing, 2009, p. 6) and can be
threatened when research participants are vulnerable (National Health and Medical
Research Council, 2007). The participants in this study could be considered
vulnerable as they had been identified as having a BRCA1/2 mutation which
predisposes to cancer but had said no to refused RRS. It was essential potential
participants received adequate information to allow an informed decision on whether
to participate to be made. Thus potential participants were provided with a Patient
Information sheet (Appendix 2) which contained explicit information to protect patient
autonomy namely:
 The aims and objectives of the study.
 Why their participation was being sought.
 Participation was entirely voluntary.
 The participants themselves would not directly benefit from the study.
 The participants could withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice.
 The study findings would be made available to others with an interest in the
subject.
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Informed consent
Informed consent is inextricably linked with autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013)
and in addition to the measures outlined above, participants were given time to
consider participation and have any outstanding concerns addressed prior to the
interview commencing. Polit & Beck (2010) stated to respect participants’ autonomy
and ensure informed consent is obtained, the right to decline participation at any time
and without prejudice should be apparent.

Written consent was gained from

participants (Appendix 3) confirming they understood the nature, purpose and
possible consequences of taking part in the study and that they were free to withdraw
at any time.

Potential harm to participants
The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are applied in research to ensure
the risks of research do not outweigh potential benefits (Duffy, 2008; Polit & Beck,
2010).

Non-maleficence and beneficence are important concepts in the research

process in part owing to the unpredictable element of discovery embedded in
research (Orb, Eisenhauer & Wynaden, 2001). However, it could be argued it is
impossible to eliminate all potential physical and emotional harm from the research
process therefore the most important issue is the researcher strives to promote nonmaleficence and beneficence.

There was no potential for physical harm in this study although it was possible
emotional upset or distress could occur as a result of discussing sensitive issues in
the interviews.

Participants were provided with contact numbers for reputable

support services (Appendix 4) in order they could access support were it required. It
was also possible a participant could have, in the course of telling their story, reconsidered the decision to refuse RRS. Although none articulated such a desire, the
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researcher clarified participants were aware they could contact their General
Practitioner or Genetics Clinic for further discussion if necessary.

Confidentiality/Anonymity
All research participants have the right to privacy (Duffy, 2008; Polit & Beck, 2010)
and the concepts of confidentiality and anonymity are used to safeguard privacy. To
ensure confidentiality, participants’ identities and the information they provided will not
be displayed publicly without prior consent.

The patient information sheet made

participants aware the study findings may be presented at conferences and/or
published but all information provided would be anonymised.

Anonymity is the

process of separating data from provider, and may be full or partial (Ogden, 2008).
Full anonymity occurs when no-one (including the researcher and the participants)
can identify who provided the data. In this study, partial anonymity was achieved by
using pseudonyms on the interview transcripts so only the researcher was be able to
link data with participant (Ogden, 2008). Furthermore, data obtained was edited to
ensure the participant was not identifiable from other means such as age, occupation
or distinguishing features (Redsell & Cheater, 2001).

In accordance with the National Health and Medical Research Council guidelines on
Ethical Conduct in Human Research (NHMRC, 2007), electronic data was stored on a
password protected computer and hard copies of data stored in a locked cabinet.
Participants’ details were kept separate from their responses at all times by use of
identification codes and the data collected was enough to answer the research
questions but not excessive. The data will be held until the study is completed and
published then destroyed in accordance with the NHMRC (2007) guidelines and Edith
Cowan University policy.
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Gaining Ethics approval
Ethics approval was obtained from the Edith Cowan University Ethics Committee and
the researcher was required to submit an annual report to maintain the currency of
ethics approval.

Inclusion criteria


Identified genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer.



Offered and declined RRS more than six months prior to recruitment.



English speaking Western Caucasian women.



Age > 18 years.

Exclusion criteria


Significant co-morbidity which may shorten life outside potential cancer diagnosis.

Justification for inclusion/exclusion criteria
The inclusion criteria were necessary to ensure participants were able to provide the
data required for the study. A period of at least six months between saying no to RRS
and study recruitment ensured participants had time to live with the decision. Nonwestern, non-Caucasian women were excluded to avoid cultural influences which may
impact on decision making, body image and health beliefs and whilst important, were
not the focus of this study.

Women who had significant co-morbidity and/or a

potentially life-limiting illness may have attitudes and beliefs which influence health
behaviours which are not the focus of this study.
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Step 2: The identifying of salient themes and experiences in the participant’s
life.
This step involved the gathering and recording of the participants’ stories of being
identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer and saying no to RRS.
Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biographical method contends biographical texts begin
with a family history and collate a chronological sequence of experiences and events
in relation to turning point or epiphany moments in the individual’s life. These turning
point moments equate with what Dolby-Stahl (1989) referred to as themes or ideas
within the text and are a means through which the teller of the story reveals personal
values and character traits.

Dolby-Stahl (1989) posited themes which emerge from personal experience narratives
often represent items of folklore and cultural norms. In this way, the salient themes
reflect societal expectations which influence how a person experiences life and tells
their story (Williams & Holmes, 2005).

In this study, the participants drew from

communal and personal folklore to try to make sense of their experiences.

For

example, beliefs about what a woman should look like often conflicted with beliefs
about how women, especially mothers, should respond to the threat of cancer.

The participants were asked to tell their story, recounting events and experiences
relating to realising there might be a history of breast/ovarian cancer in the family,
being identified as having a genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian
cancer and saying no to RRS. This required the participants to re-live and re-interpret
certain experiences (Denzin, 1989) and revealed themes and turning point moments
related to the meanings women attributed to those experiences and attempts to make
sense of them.
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Data collection process
Semi-structured interviews were used to gather biographical data for analysis and
interpretation. This was an appropriate method of data collection as it provided a
focus in terms of the data to be collected but allowed flexibility in terms of the wording
and sequencing of questions, and clarification of participant responses at the time of
interview (Parahoo, 2006). An interview guide (Appendix 5) which contained openended questions pertinent to the areas of interest (Bryman, 2004; Polit & Beck, 2010)
was developed which allowed the researcher to capture the world through the eyes of
the participants. The interview guide was carefully constructed to gather data which
would address the study aims whilst avoiding leading and/or ambiguous questions
and jargon (Bryman, 2004).

The questions whilst open-ended also ensured the

participants remained focussed on the aims of the study (Polit & Beck, 2010). The
final question allowed participants the opportunity to add anything important not
already covered (Bryman, 2004).

The interviews were tape-recorded for later

transcription with participant permission.

In keeping with the methodological approach underpinning this study, it was important
the participants were able to tell their story freely to an interested listener to ensure
the story told reflected what was important to them and what sense was made of the
experience at the time. However, it was also important the data collected was able to
address the study aims. Consequently the interview guide was used only when the
participants required prompting and to keep the focus on the experiences related to
the study aims. The interviews varied in length from approximately 55 minutes to 90
minutes.

Field notes
Field notes are a record of concomitant observations collected by the researcher
during the conduct of qualitative research (Thorpe, 2008), and facilitate a deeper
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understanding of the phenomenon under study (Polit & Beck, 2013). Field notes
contribute to the construction of an account of personal meanings of experience which
can be reflected upon at various points during the research study.

In this study, preliminary field notes were completed immediately following the
interview to avoid disturbing the participant or obstructing the flow (Holloway &
Wheeler 2010; Polit & Beck, 2013). These were added to when the audio-recordings
of the interviews were listened to and again when the transcripts were read. The field
notes included commentary on but not limited to, the creation of intimacy, the
participant’s demeanour and mannerisms, initial thoughts, feelings and assumptions,
participants’ non-verbal communications, any surprising findings/feelings and personal
reflections of the researcher. In keeping with Denzin (1989) and Dolby-Stahl (1985),
they also included reference to what emerged as turning point moments for each
participant.

The field notes were useful in contextualising the participants’ experiences and for
collecting evidence of what was not said in their stories.

For example, the

participants’ were generally reticent about discussing the mastectomised bodies of
other women in a negative way, but their body language and non-verbal
communications suggested they held negative views about this. One participant for
example, when discussing her sister’s mastectomy, did not say how she would look if
she lost her breasts but rather said; “I would think I looked [pause] you know?” whilst
making a squeamish face.

Data analysis
Following collection and transcribing of the interview data, the participants’ stories
were analysed for significant events, ideas in the text, themes and categories of most
concern to the teller and researcher (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).

The resulting personal
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experiences narratives were created by linking non-random events in relation to the
participants’ experiences in a meaningful way (Denzin, 1989).

The first significant

cancer death in the family or realisation there might be a family history of cancer in the
family marked the beginning of the personal experience narrative. Since the presence
of a gene fault which predisposes a woman to developing cancer is a permanent
biological marker, the life trajectory of the participants in relation to turning point or
epiphany moments up to completion of interviews provided the scope of the personal
experience narratives.

Key steps in narrative analysis (Blix et al., 2012; Fraser, 2004; Liamputtong, 2009;
Riessman, 2008) were then applied within the framework of Denzin’s (1989)
interpretive biographical method as follows.

Following transcription, the audio

recordings of the participants’ personal experience narratives were listened to so the
stories were heard and the emotions of the participants experienced. Simultaneously,
the transcribed texts were read to immerse the researcher in the data. Field notes
were consulted and a reflexive journal maintained to describe feelings and emerging
thoughts and considerations. The transcripts were then read again carefully line by
line and points of interest, importance and significance highlighted on the transcripts.
The researcher worked with one personal experience narrative at a time, isolating and
ordering relevant episodes into a chronological biographical account. Attention was
paid to the types and directions of the personal experience narratives and any conflict
and contradictions present. Individual personal experience narratives were analysed
for themes, ideas, epiphany moments, underlying assumptions, what was
emphasised, what was glossed over, pauses, gaps and silences and what these
suggested.

The overall focus was on illuminating patterns of meaning and

experience. Following this, a process of interpretation took place to make sense of
the participants’ experiences by illuminating larger cultural contexts and ideological
forces which shaped experience (Denzin, 1989).

Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary
116

folkloristic methodology was applied using the techniques of Foucauldian, Marxist and
Feminist literary criticism. This process is discussed in Step 7.

Step 3: The connecting of the subject’s life history and life story to larger social
meaning, including communal and private folklore.
In this study, the participants told stories about their experiences of being identified as
having a BRCA1/2 mutation then being offered and saying no to RRS. However, a
personal experience narrative is not an independent production: the woman’s story is
emitted outward when told but is taken inward into a social group where it acquires
structure, meaning and context (Denzin, 1989).

Barnett (1998, p. 194) described personal experience narratives as “embedded texts
that connect the social and the private”. This compares with Dolby-Stahl’s (1985,
1989) concepts of communal and private folklore. Communal folklore is that which is
shared in the social world while private folklore is that which is exclusively generated
by a particular group, in this case, the high risk women who said no to RRS.
Communal folklore is identified within texts as representations of traditional ideas
which symbolise ideas, values and themes which are widely held in the
cultural/societal group and thus allow creation of a social reality (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).
Communal folklore serves as a form of “collective memory” (Trubshaw, 2002, p. 43)
which delineates how people function in society and how women should look and act.
However, high risk women who say no to RRS may develop private folklore as a
result of their shared experiences. Private folklore concerns deeply personal and
idiosyncratic values and ideas which create meaning in a text but are usually excluded
from communal folklore (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).

Thus searching for private folklore

embedded in the participants’ stories facilitates the creation of meaning of the inner
life of the teller. Inherent in this is acknowledgement the participants’ experiences
although personal, occurred within Western society and must, therefore, be
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interpreted in light of social structures and ideologies which shape and influence how
a life is lived and experienced (Denzin, 1989).

Women are social beings who translate signs into meaning to make sense of the
world.

Personal stories and those inherited from others are brought to bear on

experience to create order and make sense of experience (Denzin, 1989; Frank,
1995; Rosenbaum & Roos, 2000).

The participants in this study created their own

stories but also inherited stories from others in society in relation to the breasts,
ovaries, cancer and surrounding folklore. On the one hand, the breasts and ovaries
symbolise femininity and womanhood and Western society expects women possess
these organs (Ehlers & Krupar, 2012). Simultaneously, Western discourse demands
women keep themselves healthy, nurture the family and generally conform to what is
expected of the female role (Acero, 2012; Gibbon, 2006).

This study argued that

these conforming standards included being compliant with Western medical discourse
which constructed RRS as a utilitarian option for staying healthy. To understand the
decision to say no to RRS, one must understand the wider societal discourses and
communal folklore which permeate Western society.

Personal experience narratives then are created from stories which are both learned
and told in cultural and social groups (Denzin, 1989) reflective of the discourses and
power relations of the time (Riessman, 2008). The participants’ experiences of their
disruptive life events and the telling of them are contextually bound to social, cultural
and historical milieus. To understand the life of the woman and the experiences
contained within it, one must seek to understand these larger structures which impact
upon how a life is lived and experienced (Denzin, 1989). In this study, this step
involved connecting biographies and lived experiences including epiphanies, to the
groups, conventions and social, cultural and historical relationships which surround
and shape people’s lives (Surr, 2006).

Accordingly, the participants’ personal
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experience narratives and the epiphanies contained within them were contextualised
against a backdrop of social, gender and medical discourses which define what
women look like, how women behave and how women respond to the threat of
cancer.

Linking the participants’ stories to wider social meanings involved

consideration of how dominant discourses and social conventions shaped the
interpretive framework for understanding the personal experience narrative (Fraser,
2004). Their personal experience narratives were cultural productions which mirrored
and reflected characteristics, values and beliefs which are shared in the society which
produced them (Lewis, 2010).

Dundes (1980) advocates such cultural productions

are lore and should be contextualised within the social and cultural constructs of the
folk who produce them and their shared cultural background.

Dolby-Stahl (1989) proposed eight key folk groups which shape a storyteller’s life and
provide understanding of their social world: family, ethnic, religion, place, age, sex,
social network and occupation. Of particular relevance to this study, these folk groups
typically generate and maintain folklore in relation to gender, heritage, familial ties,
relationships and kinship. Communal folklore equates having two breasts and ovaries
with femininity and womanhood and constructs women as self-sacrificing, nurturing
individuals who put the needs of the family first (Acero, 2012).

Simultaneously,

cancer folklore conveys everyone to be at risk of cancer and a taken-for-granted
assumption medicine is the assumed solution to cancer (Clarke & Everest, 2006).
This communal folklore is reinforced by the medicalisation of women’s bodies which
positions the doctor as expert over women and suggests sensible women do
whatever it takes to stay healthy for the sake of the family.

In this study, it was

argued larger societal meanings acquired through discourse, ideology and communal
folklore transmitted conflicting messages to women at high risk of developing
breast/ovarian cancer. This highlighted the conflict and contradiction which may exist
between cultural/societal and personal realities therefore it was not surprising high risk
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women who said no to RRS developed a private folklore to make sense of their
experiences and explain their behaviours.

In summary, in order to understand the decision to say no to RRS, it was necessary to
understand the experiences of the participants which led them to the decision to
refuse surgery, and to contextualise these socially, culturally and historically. Allowing
the participants to tell their stories illuminated the reality of these women’s lives and
exposed the disunity between societal expectations and real life experiences and
between communal and private folklore.

Step 4: Understanding that the subject’s life story reflects a set of meaningful
experiences which, when told create an emotional bond between the teller and
the listener.
A central assumption of Dolby-Stahl’s (1989, 1985) methodological approach is
personal experience narratives are replete with private folklore and express aspects of
the inner life of the storyteller. The revelation of private folklore was a crucial step in
understanding the experiences which led to the decision to say no to RRS. DolbyStahl (1985) further contended since private folklore is selectively rather than widely
shared, it will only be revealed during the research process when intimacy is present
between the teller and the researcher-as-listener. The creation of intimacy is thus a
pre-requisite for uncovering meaningful experiences, epiphanies and private folklore.

For Dolby-Stahl (1985), intimacy is the creation of an emotional bond between two
people who are considered to be of equal status and is essential if authentic
interpretations of the text are to occur. Intimacy develops between the participant and
the researcher-as-listener because there exists a shared body of knowledge and
realisation the experience is mutually understood (Williams & Holmes, 2005).
Moreover, the creation of intimacy guarantees the value and importance of the
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participants’ responses and avoids the participant feeling devalued in the research
process (Williams & Holmes, 2005). This is particularly relevant in studies where
participants struggle to have their voice heard because their actions are at odds with
dominant discourses and communal folklore, such as the participants in this study.

The creation of intimacy was an explicit aim in this study and the researcher took
steps to facilitate emotional bonding with the participants prior to and during the
interviews.

Participants initially responded to an advertisement placed in local

newspapers which was carefully worded to reach out to women using plain language
and requested an initial telephone contact from the women to a named researcher
(the Principal Investigator). A separate mobile phone was used for this purpose and
the researcher took care during the initial contact to sound friendly and gently outline
the study aims. A balance was struck between creating intimacy and ensuring the
participants gave consent freely. The researcher explained her interest in the study
and what she aimed to achieve by collecting the participants’ stories.

The interviews were arranged at a mutually convenient time and place, mostly in the
participants’ homes. Those who requested to be interviewed out-with the home were
easily accommodated by arranging a quiet, private room in a local library or
interviewing in a friend’s home. The researcher was mindful to make this process as
straightforward as possible to build a bond with the participants and facilitate the
creation of intimacy. It was also necessary to ensure the participants knew that the
experience was mutually understood as intimacy develops when the researcher
shares aspects of the teller’s folk group (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).

This was achieved

through a short explanation of the researcher’s interest in their stories and through an
exchange of information about shared aspects of life such as children, employment
and general life experiences.
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Dolby-Stahl (1985) also argued that people who choose to tell their stories to an
interested listener seek the creation of intimacy as a way of sharing private folklore.
The creation of intimacy was therefore an aim of both the teller and the researcher. It
is precisely this desire for intimacy which motivated the participants to engage in the
storytelling process in order that private folklore and personal meaning were unveiled:
“without apology, the personal narrative makes a gesture toward intimacy” (DolbyStahl, 1985, p. 48).

It was apparent the participants in this study were eager to tell their stories and
grateful for the opportunity to be listened to. This suggested that the participants
enjoyed the experience of intimacy through telling their story to an interested listener
who did not judge them or attempt to persuade them otherwise.

All participants

commented they had, at times, felt unable to discuss their experiences with people
close to them for fear of causing distress or being misunderstood.

In summary, the creation of intimacy and the telling of the story to the researcher-aslistener drew the researcher into the teller’s world and allowed illumination of
epiphanies and turning point moments which shaped the teller’s life and contributed to
the story told. Focussing on the researcher’s desire to tell the participants’ stories and
to shape understanding of their experiences, meant the participants felt listened to
without being judged and all expressed gratitude at being able to tell their story to an
interested listener.

Step 5: Realising that the private, inner meanings of these experiences to the
subject can never be fully illuminated.
Utilising literary folkloristic methodology requires the listener to enter the world of the
teller and perceive the world through the teller’s perspective (Hendricks, 1999;
Williams & Holmes, 2005). The creation of intimacy (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) draws the
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researcher-as-listener into an intersubjective agreement with the participant-as-teller
as to how the participant’s experience was. The stories told covered a section of each
participant’s life including epiphany moments in their life trajectory, which were offered
as legitimate accounts of experience. The participants were recognised as experts of
their own experiences (Grassley & Nelms, 2009); however, the role of the
audience/listener in applying their own interpretation to what was said and heard was
equally acknowledged (Gray, 2007). Thus personal, social, cultural and historical
influences on both teller and listener shape the story told and heard, making the entire
process an interactive and creative act (Dolby-Stahl, 1989) open to multiple
interpretations (Denzin, 1989).

In this study, the participants were asked to tell their stories for a purpose: to address
the research aims, allow the researcher to make-meaning of their experiences and
communicate this meaning to a wider audience.

The participants’ personal

experience narratives were literary productions because the story-teller continually
deliberates on what to say and what to keep silent (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) depending on
the cultural and societal conventions of the time (Denzin, 1989; Thorne et al., 2004).
Moreover, the participants in in this study communicated their stories through
language from which literary texts, in the form of personal experience narratives, were
created.

Integral to this study then is how the teller uses language to tell the story and how the
language/story is interpreted by another (Bornat, 2008; Williams & Holmes, 2005), in
this case, the researcher. Language is recognised as a socially constructed medium
which creates rather than describes reality (Haralambos & Holborn, 2000) and which
acquires meaning through time and context bound social practices (Sandberg, 2005).
Thus language is not abstract but rather confers meaning within particular discourses.
The unstable, ambiguous and changing nature of language mean a number of
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differing interpretations of what reality is potentially exist (Denzin, 1989; Haralambos &
Holborn, 2000).

This in turn means a straightforward representation of reality is

unachievable as the ‘truth’ of any story is dependent upon future readers’
interpretations of it (Frank, 1995; Gray, 2007). In keeping with Denzin (1989), the
researcher’s aim was to present a credible interpretation of the personal experience
narrative, one which demonstrated verisimilitude, whilst acknowledging it is one of
many which could have occurred.

The approach in this study held that the literary texts produced by the participants
were reflective of personal, social, cultural and historical influences on the life lived
and contained reference to communal and personal folklore.

Their stories were

interpreted through the use of language and by the researcher actively drawing out
meaning and understanding not necessarily articulated in the texts (Bornat, 2008).
The telling of the story to an informed listener (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) was a joint
enterprise which utilised shared interpretive practices (Bornat, 2008).

However,

although the participants were exposed to communal folklore and shared aspects of
private folklore, each participant’s story was different; therefore an overall depiction of
one universal reality was not possible (Gray, 2007). Additionally, the act of telling a
story to a listener requires the teller to re-live and re-interpret the experience in
response to their own and others’ reactions to it (Denzin, 1989). Rich (1972, p. 18)
referred to this process as “re-vision”: a process whereby storytellers look back at
experience through fresh eyes as new insights into experience are gained through
revisiting the story. Consequently, the inner experiences of the study participants can
never be fully illuminated as there are multiple un-ending numbers of possible stories
which could have been told. Moreover, the subjective nature of language and plurality
of the text means there can be no final or fixed meaning located in the participants’
stories.

This was acknowledged by Denzin (1989) and Dolby-Stahl (1985) who

conceded it is not possible to become the person telling the story therefore it is not
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possible to know everything the teller knows: the most the researcher can do is
present a credible interpretation of the participants’ experiences whilst accepting other
interpretations of experience and the meanings attached to them were possible and
may yet occur in the future.

Step 6: Interpreting the materials by sharing in the world of the experience of
the subject.
Dolby-Stahl (1985) described an informed listener as one who shares aspects of the
participants’ folk group and takes steps to become as fully informed about the
phenomenon under investigation as possible. Likewise, Denzin (2001, p. 67) used
the term “informed reader” to describe someone who knows the language used in the
participant’s story; knows at least partially the biography of the teller; is able to take
the teller’s perspective and shares some of the experiences of the teller.

The

informed reader also accepts meaning is created through the response to the story
and takes steps to secure an interpretation which is faithful to the storyteller’s
perspective.

In this study, the researcher was motivated by a genuine desire to enter into the
worlds of the participants, to create understanding of their experiences and to make
meaning of the decision to say no to RRS. The researcher is a woman in Western
society and as such, shared aspects of the participants’ folk group and was exposed
to the same dominant discourses and ideological influences which impact on how a
life is lived and experienced. Through the creation of intimacy and immersion in the
participants’ stories, the researcher was able to come to know the biographies of the
tellers and take the participants’ perspectives in the stories told. The researcher was
well informed about the phenomena under investigation through completion of a
comprehensive literature review on topics relevant to the study. The researcher also
drew upon prior experience working with women having genetic counselling for HBOC
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and both affected women and high risk women undergoing breast/ovarian surgery.
This provided prior understandings which were incorporated into the interpretation of
the participants’ experiences to create new understanding (Denzin, 2001). Finally, the
researcher acknowledged the interpretation provided is one of many possible
interpretations which could have been made of the participants’ experiences.

Step 7: Bringing the interpretive approaches of literary theory and criticism to
bear on the life story materials.
Dolby-Stahl (1989) argued personal experience narratives were literary works since a
single truth cannot be presented; rather the listener actively interprets the story being
told in a literary process. Moreover, whilst anyone can listen to a narrative or story and
offer an account of what they believe it to mean, an informed listener (Dolby-Stahl,
1985) is able to interpret the story in such a way as to make it collectively meaningful
through the application of the techniques of literary interpretation and critique (Denzin,
1989).

An informed listener uses literary theory to deconstruct stories of experience

and offer an interpretation in light of social, cultural and historical influences thereby
demonstrating how their particular interpretation came about (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).
Such literary techniques, therefore, capture the spoken word as text which may be
later analysed and interpreted to create understanding of certain life experiences, or
as Dolby-Stahl (1985) suggested, provide a means by which the teller can teach the
listener to know her/him better.

Integral to this is the connection of biographically meaningful experiences to the
society in which the participants lived and to larger social, cultural and historical
structures which influence how a life is lived and experienced (Denzin, 1989). The
literary nature of personal experience narratives and the resolve to uncover folklore
involves the use of an interpretive framework based on various literary theories, an
approach which enables the researcher to make sense of the personal experience
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narratives in light of both communal and personal folklore (Williams & Holmes, 2005).
In this study, Foucauldian, Marxist and Feminist literary theories informed the analysis
and interpretation of the personal experience narratives and allowed an interpretation
which was both culturally and personally grounded (Hendricks, 1999). The following
section describes and justifies the application of these literary theories in this study.

Overview of Literary Theory
Literary theory is defined as “the systematic account of the nature of literature and the
methods for analysing it” (Culler, 2011, p. 1). Literary theory informs literary criticism
which Newton (1990) contended is concerned with interpretation, highlighting
distinction must be drawn between reading written works and understanding and
interpreting same works.

Literary theory can be understood as a tool used in the

practical reading of the text (Brewton, 2005) to understand the many different ways of
interpreting text (Eaglestone, 1999).

Contemporary literary theory creates a

relationship between the author, the literary work and the reader and allows
examination of the ways in which race, gender, class and so forth are represented in
literature and may influence the author’s perspective (Brewton, 2005). Literary theory
therefore provides a lens for the study of literature and also for the analysis of cultural,
historical and social influences which both create the text and influence how it is
interpreted.

Various schools of literary theory exist, each with a set of assumptions or theoretical
positions which allow critics to offer an interpretation of the text in relation to aspects
or characteristics of the work considered most important (Culler, 2011). Culler (2011)
cautioned against treating these schools as competing approaches because they
share similarities as well as differences: all focus on how the reader responds to the
text. Thus literary theory is most useful when it is used to problematise social and
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cultural assumptions as this allows an exploration of how meaning is created (Bertens
2008; Culler, 2011).

The birth of modern literary theory is attributed to the nineteenth century German
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of knowledge and his theory facts only
existed after they had been interpreted (Brewton, 2005).

Nietzsche’s (1873)

influential essay “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-moral Sense” presented a persuasive
thesis on language and literature, and contended no text speaks for itself: meaning is
only acquired through an interpreting reader. More recently, the 1930s School of
Formalism took a structuralist approach which was concerned with literary form and
focussed on the structures of language rather than thoughts, feelings or subject
matter within the literary text (Eagleton, 1996). The Formalist approach was criticised
on the basis literary devices found in the ‘special’ language of literature were also
found in everyday language, and it failed to consider the context in which the
language/literary work was produced (Eagleton, 1996). This criticism came to be
seen as a serious flaw as the world changed socio-economically and politically and
poststructuralist critical approaches which focussed on social, cultural and political
contexts took centre stage (Bertens, 2008; Eagleton, 1996).

Poststructuralist approaches consider literature in light of social, cultural and
ideological influences on what was written and how it could be interpreted (Eagleton,
1996). Language is considered as process rather than structure as it is the means
through which literary productions are communicated. Language is purposeful: it is
constructed and employed for a reason hence rather than representing reality,
language effectively creates reality because what is said and heard acquires meaning
through language and the social conditions in which it is defined and used (Holcombe,
2007; Sandberg, 2005). Hence there can be no single truthful interpretation of an
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experience: interpretation was temporary and only applicable to the discourse in
which it was produced (Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985).

In keeping with Denzin’s (1987) and Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) methodological approach,
application of poststructuralist literary theory was therefore appropriate in this study.
The participants in this study communicated their stories of experience through
language which was then converted into a literary text. They told a story, one of many
which could have been told: an edited version of reality which shared what was
important to the participants’ and how they made sense of experience at the time.
The participants’ stories and the meanings attached were acknowledged as temporal,
plural and open to multiple interpretations. This was of great importance, as one can
never accurately replicate a life or life experience; therefore, the focus was on the text
created by the individual and not the individual per se (Denzin, 1989). Therefore,
participant’s personal experience narratives were analysed for specific purposes and
enabled a focus on meaning in the text from which an understanding of their private
folklore was created. The following sections discuss and justify the literary theories
utilised in this study namely Marxist, Foucauldian and Feminist literary theory.

Marxist Literary Theory
Introduction
Marxist literary theory is a form of critical inquiry which interrogates all societies and
their texts in relation to shared attitudes within a culture and specific issues including
class, gender and race (Bertens, 2008). It contends subconscious drivers determine
how individuals perceive and situate themselves within society:

“it is not the

consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that
determines their consciousness” (Marx 1859, cited in Bertens, 2008, p. 63). In other
words, an individual’s social circumstances determine his or her life. This in itself is
not controversial: for example, a relationship exists between poverty/wealth and the
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development of certain diseases, or life opportunities.

However, Marxists are

sceptical of the belief individuals could alter personal life circumstances through
education, employment or such, arguing instead capitalist society is structured in a
way to maintain power in the hands of the ruling classes.

Marx postulated society’s base determined its superstructure (Bertens, 2008):
economics is the base upon which the superstructure of social, political and
ideological realities are built. Education, the Arts including literature, culture, religion,
institutions such as medicine and the legal system and values and beliefs are
contained within the superstructure and as such are primarily influenced by economic
drivers (Bertens, 2008). Marxist literary theory contends the way in which society is
organised drives the production of literary texts: literature is a production of capitalist
society not a reflection of it (Tyson, 2015). Literary texts are analysed for themes
which illuminate ‘hidden’ messages which identify and maintain the position of the
ruling classes.

The methodological approach taken in this study presupposed living occurs within a
construct, therefore to understand the participants’ decisions to say no to RRS, one
must understand the social, cultural and historical milieus which led to that decision.
Since Western society is a capitalist society in which ideology shapes human
experience (Denzin, 1990), Marxist literary theory provided a useful means of
examining the participants’ stories for themes in relation to beliefs about gender,
sexuality, the family and other social and cultural influences relevant to the study.
Several key areas of Marxist thought are particularly relevant to this study and a
summary of these now follows.
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Ideology
The concept of ideology and its importance in organising and controlling human
behaviour is central to Marxist literary theory. In its broadest sense, ideology is a
belief system (Tyson, 2015). Eagleton (1996, p. 13) defined ideology as a “concealed
structure of values which informs and underlies our factual statements” and explained
ideology encompasses an individual’s unconscious images of themselves and others.
Marx argued ideology created a “false consciousness” (Bennett & Royle, 1999, p.
161), a false representation of society, for example, that disease is caused primarily
by lifestyle choices as opposed to economic and social deprivation.

This false

consciousness existed subliminally and persuaded individuals of the rightfulness of
the class/capitalist system, directed people in how they should live their lives and
prevented recognition of the true society which repressed them (Bennett & Royle,
1999; Tyson, 2015).

The French Marxist Louis Althusser (1918 – 1990) expanded Marx’s concept of
ideology to include a critique of the ways in which systems and structures in society
maintained and reproduced ideologies. Sawyer (2002) views Althusser’s concept of
ideology as an extension of Gramsci’s (1971) original notion of hegemony. That is the
State exerted power over its inhabitants through both coercive and subtle means of
control: ideology is a form of invisible power which acts as a social regulator.
Althusser (1971) used the term ‘ideological State apparatuses’ to describe key
agencies involved in maintaining ideological control of the population including the
Church, the media, political parties, the family, schools, medicine and cultural
agencies such as the Arts, literature and those associated with sport. Distinction was
drawn between repressive State apparatuses which sat in the public domain and
included the police, penal system and the army, and ideological State apparatuses
which sat in the private domain, such as those identified above. Althusser (1971)
further argued although separate entities, repressive and ideological State
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apparatuses were interlinked and neither entirely excluded the other: although
medicine is a form of ideological control, it has certain rules which can exclude and
curtail, for example being removed from a General Practitioner’s patient list or being
denied a particular treatment if certain symptoms cannot be proven to exist.

The most successful ideologies are those which appear natural or given (Bennett &
Royle, 1999; Tyson, 2015) which perpetuates their legitimacy and influence (Kroska,
2007). For example, gender ideologies serve as unconscious drivers for taken-forgranted beliefs about male and female behaviours in relation to the family (Davis &
Greenstein, 2009), including the woman’s role as carer, nurturer and homemaker
(Acero, 2012; Kroska, 2007; Mikkola, 2012; Warner & Procaccino, 2004) and
responsibility for the health of families Acero, 2012; Ferguson & Kasper, 2000). The
natural authenticity of ideology validates individuals as free, that is outside ideology,
when in reality they are within ideology. Thus ideology effectively denies its own
existence. Althusser (1971, p. 175) explains this paradox thus:
That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by
definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is
the practical denegation [original emphasis] of the ideological
character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, “I am
ideological”.
Althusserian theorising of ideology has been criticised for suggesting ideology was
oppressive to the point of subjugation (Eagleton, 1976) thus leaving little room for
ideological struggle. However, it could equally be argued that Althusser’s theory does
allow for ideological struggle to be analysed since it contends all humans are
inherently ideological (Bennett & Royle, 1999) and thus define themselves as
individuals through ideology. Herein lies the crux of Althusser’s argument: individuals
create personal ideologies whilst ideology simultaneously creates individuals as
subjects. Hence, ideology is both an internal and an external driving force leaving
scope for individuals to create personal ideologies which challenge or resist the
dominant externally driven ideological forces.
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To sum up, the concept of ideology is central to Marxist literary interpretation and
critique.

Ideology functions as a means of social control because what appears

natural or given is intended to maintain the power of the ruling classes in capitalist
society.

A Marxist critique is therefore concerned with the ideological function of

literary texts and seeks to reveal underlying social and political significances
concealed within the text which perpetuate the reproduction of social power. The
following section explores the ideological function of literature in more depth.

Literature as an ideological tool
A Marxist critique contends literature is a product of socioeconomic and ideological
conditions rather than a reflection of such, since authors are humans and humans are
products of ideological and cultural conditions (Tyson, 2015). Tyson (2015) further
argued the critique of literature can encourage a robust examination of historical and
material conditions and ideologies hence literature is inextricably linked to historical,
social and cultural practices which influence both its production and how it is read.

From this, an understanding of literature as an ideological tool in Western society is
achieved. Literature produces and is produced by ideology (Bennett & Royle, 1999),
reflects “the ideology from which it is born” (Althusser, 1971, p. 222) and functions to
allow individuals to see what the ruling classes allow to be seen (Eagleton, 1996).
Eagleton (1996) further contended literature became an agent for the reproduction of
ideology when religion began to lose its pacifying influence on the working classes in
Victorian times.

Religious ideology demanded individuals lived a meek life,

conformed to social norms, were self-sacrificing and generally worked hard to achieve
an ‘honest’ living which created the “social cement” (Eagleton, 1996, p. 20) in society.
However, as religion began to lose appeal and the working classes began to demand
more, ‘English literature’ emerged as an academic subject through which desirable
morals, values and behaviours were promoted which allowed individuals to
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understand what a ‘good citizen’ was and how one should act in society. Qualities
such as generosity, patriotism, heroism and tolerance were identified as timeless
truths which individuals should seek to exhibit, thus distracting the working classes
from socio-economic issues such as low wages, poor housing and working conditions
and ill-health (Eagleton, 1996). Literary texts were therefore considered as sites of
ideology production and reproduction.

The text was not a passive reflection of

ideology but rather a site of conflict and difference, where values, prejudices, beliefs,
knowledge and social structures were produced and transformed (Bennett & Royle,
1999).

Macherey (1978) further proposed literary works were tied to ideology as much by
what they did not say as by what they did. The presence of ideology is also felt in the
significant silences, gaps and absences in a text because some things are
“ideologically forbidden” (Eagleton, 1976, p. 32) thus unable to be said. These gaps
are unintentionally omitted from the author’s text and imply the text is always
incomplete, because there is always something else which could have been said, had
it not been silenced by ideology (Eagleton, 1976). A Marxist critique aims to make the
silences speak and reveal the unconscious content which resides behind the
expressed text to expose the conflict between the spoken and unspoken text and the
text’s relationship to ideology (Abrams & Harpham, 2009). Thus, understanding of a
text requires the reader to consider both what is present and what is not; the unsaid,
the glossed over and the ignored, and to link these to social, cultural and historical
influences on the production of the text.

Accordingly, examining gaps in the

participants’ personal experience narratives exposed what women may have felt
unable to say because it conflicted with ideology.

It may be postulated that the

participants’ narratives revealed gaps and significant silences which may represent
resistance to the prevailing dominant ideologies and which were reflective of individual
ideology and private folklore.
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Medicine and ideology
A Marxist critique of Western medicine identifies medicine as an ideological tool which
mirrors society’s class structure and maintains patterns of domination (Waitzkin, 1984,
1989). Waitzkin (1984, 1989) contended Western medicine’s authority to determine
who was fit to work exposed medicine as an institution of social control and medical
encounters as sites for the transmission of ideological messages.

Waitzkin’s (1984)

seminal research examined transcripts of medical encounters and found the doctorpatient interaction contained ideological themes and messages which reinforced
existing patterns of domination and relations of economic production.

Of particular note, Waitzkin (1984) found a key way in which medical social control
occurred was through support for the institution of the family.

From a Marxist

perspective, the relationship between the family and successful economic production
in capitalist societies is paramount. The role of the female in both economic
production and sexual reproduction places women central to the maintenance of a
healthy productive workforce. Women function as the ‘gatekeepers for health’ (Acero,
2012; Warner & Procaccino, 2004) and take primary responsibility for the family’s
health (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Lerner, 2000). Patterns of sexuality, child rearing
and stereotypical roles including the female as mother, homemaker and nurturer,
sustain the population’s acquiescence and participation in economic production
(Waitzkin, 1984, 1989).

Women who disregard health messages in relation to

breast/ovarian cancer development are therefore putting not only themselves, but also
the institution of the family at risk.

Ideological messages communicated through doctor-patient interactions are endorsed
by other ideological state apparatuses including the education system and the media
and legitimised by the symbolic impact of medical science (Waitzkin, 1984). Again,
these messages assume a willing patient who shares the societal (ideological) view
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sensible people do what is expected of them to stay healthy and fit for work.
Moreover, a ‘good’ patient is accepting of their illness or condition, compliant with
medical instructions and acquiesces to the requirements of the medical institution
(Ferrie, 2010). Barry, Bradley, Britten, Stevenson and Barber (2000) also found
doctor-patient consultations were generally conducted in the “voice of medicine” (p.
1250) and patients behaved in consultations as they were expected to behave rather
than how they would have liked to behave. It was further reported the actions and
beliefs of doctors influenced what patients said in consultations again suggesting
medical ideology acts as a form of social control. Similarly, Martin (2014) contended
the voice of medicine remains dominant in medicine because it is doctors who control
the consultation and because both doctors and patients are socialised into particular
ways of acting in medical consultations.

This may occur because in medical

discourse, the voice of the doctor is seen as factual, objective and active whereas
patients’ voices may be reduced to emotional and subjective qualifiers (Davis, 2008).
The use of medical jargon and an emphasis on disease processes and specific body
parts rather than the person further normalises medical techniques and endorses
medical ideology about what is best for the patient (Bunton & Burrows, 1995; Martin,
2014).

Importantly, normalising medical techniques according to Bunton & Burrows (1995)
reflected a change from medicine as care of the sick, injured and diseased to an
institution which targeted the general ‘healthy’ population.

Nettleton and Burrows

(1998, p. 156) further identified a general consensus existed within medical literature
that medicine had entered a new paradigm and was “generally governed by notions of
surveillance or risk”. Risk has become an increasingly prominent feature of modern
medicine and popularisation of the language of risk is linked to ideological notions of
health and health promotion (Peterson & Wilkinson, 2008).
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Webster (2002) argued health surveillance, notions of risk and the capability to
identify what conditions an individual is genetically predisposed to have blurred the
boundaries between health and ill-health, increased the extent of the medical gaze
and created patients without symptoms, occupying a “therapeutic limbo” (Webster,
2002, p. 445) which triggered more, rather than less uncertainty for these individuals.
Western medical ideology is increasingly concerned with the ideology of “genetic
determinism” (Finkler, 2000, p. 4) which in effect creates a breakdown of the body’s
boundaries and allows medicine to enter into the lives of people who are not yet
diagnosed with disease but rather are at risk of developing disease. Finkler (2000)
contended women who belonged to breast cancer families were transformed from
active beings to passive patients as a result of medical ideology of the genetic
inheritance of disease.

This is supported by Earle, Foley, Komaromy and Lloyd

(2009) who drew attention to the changing nature of surveillance medicine and an
increasing concern with health surveillance, biotechnology and geneticisation, issues
which directly impact on the participants in this study and their families: the presence
of a gene fault means women who are disease-free are also expected to fulfil the
ideology of the compliant patient.

A Marxist analysis was necessary to illuminate the dominant ideological forces which
impacted on the study participants and which created and maintained social order and
processes. Ideology is sustained through various institutions, including the institution
of medicine, and is reproduced in literary texts.

Gendered divisions of labour in

capitalist society situate women as nurturer and primary carer for the family and
encourage women to make health decisions based on what is best for the family.

The success of capitalism is dependent upon a highly commodified society (Irvine,
2002). Capitalist ideology transforms goods, services and even the human body into
commodities (Gerstein Pineau, 2011) which can be exchanged in the market
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economy.

In modern Western society, health care is no exception. Moody (2011)

argued health care commodification occurred in tandem with the development of the
modern hospital. Furthermore Moody (2011) claimed that the nature of contemporary
medicine means hospitals compete for demand for health care services.
Consultations, diagnoses, treatments and medical interventions are all argued to be
commodities which have an associated value or price in return for improvements to
health. Health care thus has an exchange value, that is, profit is able to be created
because medicine has a use-value which people are willing to pay for, such as good
health, freedom from disease and longevity. Health care becomes an act of exchange
in the market system irrespective of the directness of payment whether it be direct-toconsumer payment, payment through health insurance schemes such as in Australia
(Cancer Australia, 2015) or through ‘single payer’ schemes such as the UK NHS
system (Moody, 2011) where the State is effectively the consumer, purchasing health
services for its citizens. Particularly germane in the context of this study are issues of
commodification of women, their bodies and genes, a critique of which now follows.

Commodification, genetics and the HBOC journey
The concept of the commodity is an important strand of Marxist critical theory. The
term commodity pre-dates Marx and was used to refer to any entity considered useful
or which satisfied human needs (Sammond, 2007).

Marx developed the concept of

commodity in relation to capitalism, arguing the market concealed the true nature of
the production of goods by commodifying labour and the products of labour.

A

commodity is “an economically valued good within a relationship of exchange”
(Hanson, 1999, p. 268). Marx used the term ‘commodity fetishism’ to describe the
process whereby commodities are endowed with enigmatic and emblemic qualities
which made them appear to be of value in themselves rather than for any utility or
use-value (Jenkins, 2011).

The usefulness of a commodity is determined by its

physical properties whereas the value of a commodity is constituted by its social worth
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(Thomas-Pollei, 2008).

The value of a commodity is thus measured not only in

monetary terms, but also for its exchange value.

People come to desire and

subsequently consume commodities, even when they have little use for them. The
nature of capitalist society requires this because when commodities are fetishised, or
fixated upon, people are prevented from seeing the reality of exploitation upon which
capitalism is built (Sharp, 2000).

Lock and Nguyen (2010, p. 1711) define commodification as “the production or
conversion of ideas, knowledge and objects into items which are considered useful
and/or have exchange value”.

The success of capitalism is dependent on the

generation of profit so increasing commodification is an essential feature of capitalist
societies (Allan, 1998). In the capitalist society, commodification of individuals occurs
as people are reduced to objects with an associated monetary value in terms of ability
to produce goods or social status.

A key requirement of commodification is alienation; “the capacity of a given
commodity, and specific classes of commodity, to be physically and morally separated
from their sellers” (Castree, 2003, p. 279). If a product or service is not able to be
alienated, it is protected from market forces and the marketplace. This concept raises
questions regarding the ownership of human bodies and body parts, including an
individual’s genetic material (Andrews, 2006; Hanson, 1999, 2002). From this, until
relatively recently, genes in particular were protected from market forces since they
were unable to be alienated, or separated from their ‘owners’. However, advances in
genetic and biotechnology now allow human genes to be isolated, cloned, copied and
used for commercial purposes (Hanson, 2002; Thomas-Pollei, 2008) and therefore
commodified.
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Biotechnology is described as the science of using living things to produce goods and
services (McCormick & Kautto, 2013).

Parry (2008) concurs with Radin’s (1987)

seminal work which claimed the biotechnology-aided global marketplace for human
body tissue and parts required a new conceptual framework for understanding
commodification. Parry (2008) claimed such biotechnologies transformed body parts
into artefacts which were able to be exchanged for money or other forms of currency
such

as

academic

prestige

gained

through

biotechnological

research.

Biotechnologies are said to be transforming the bioeconomy; economic relations
created through the latent value in biological materials (Birch, 2012). In contemporary
Western society, biotechnologies are acknowledged and promoted as a significant
source of new growth and wealth (Birch & Tyfield, 2013) and no more so than in the
area of genomic medicine.

Although body commodification is not a new phenomenon (Sharp, 2000),
contemporary definitions of commodification encompass previously unreachable
areas such as cells, genes and genetic material and constitute an “alienation of
inalienable goods” (Ryan, Team & Alexander, 2013, p. 471). Purdy (2001) contended
commodification facilitated health care consumerism by creating new markets for
medical products, services and technologies.

Moreover, the creation of a new

commodity, in this case genetic material, is a key tenet of capitalism (Birch & Tyfield,
2013; Zones, 2000). The commodification of ‘new’ pathologies thus creates potential
new markets and generates further profit for corporate interests (Pryce, 2002;
Thomas-Pollei, 2008).

The majority of breast/ovarian cancers occur for reasons other than inherited gene
faults yet most current focus is on genetic causes (Conrad, 2005). A Marxist critique
contends the focus on genetic causes of disease to the relative exclusion of other
causes is necessary to justify the vast resources given to genetic endeavours
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(Rosser, 2000). The technical ability to separate body organs, tissues, fluid and other
appendages right down to a sub-cellular level effectively allows body parts to be
isolated as objects, constructed as commodities and creates new potential sources of
wealth for biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries (Acero, 2012; Baird, 2002;
Cahill, 2001; Hanson, 1999, 2002; Thomas-Pollei, 2008; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Rose,
2007). A critique of commodification from a Marxist stance was particularly relevant to
this study since it raised questions about the relationship between commodification
and nature and the effects of commodification on human experience.

Commodification of entities considered nature is not a new concept, for example,
genetic engineering in agriculture has existed for some time (Cahill, 2001).
Commodification of the human body in medicine likewise has a long history, from
Burke and Hare’s ‘body snatching’ of corpses for teaching human anatomy in the 19th
century through to modern organ transplantation techniques (Lock & Nguyen, 2010).
Similarly, the role of genetics in human disease has been explored using genetic
technologies for some time (Baird, 2000). However, biotechnological advancements
create a tension in health care (Hanson, 1999) because although individuals may
benefit, such advancements are primarily developed for economic gain (Birch, 2012).

The Human Genome Project and subsequent gene sequencing technology has
increased the scope of medical interventions in the form of genetic tests, gene
manipulation and genetic therapies for the treatment of disease (Hanson, 2002). A
significant part of this enterprise concerns testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations,
one of the first genetic cancer tests to be widely marketed. This was not without
substantial controversy owing to the patenting of these genes which led to the
company Myriad Genetics gaining a monopoly of rights to genetic testing and
therapeutic uses of the BRCA1 and 2 genes, essentially allowing ownership of these
genes (Thomas-Pollei, 2008). The patenting and marketing of genes provides power
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over the use of the genes and gives the patent holder exclusive rights to commercial
exploitation (Thomas-Pollei, 2008). This raises important questions on who owns
genes and genetic material (Castree, 2003) more so because the genetic industry is
generally led by commercial interests who fund research and genetic services (Cahill,
2001).

Furthermore, since genes are essentially the most basic units of human life, the
patenting of genes implies the ultimate commodification of human life (Hanson, 2002).
From a Marxist stance then, genetic technologies and BRCA1/2 genes are able to be
understood as marketable commodities which are protected through ideologies of
empowerment and personal responsibility for health which trigger demand for wealthgenerating medical services (Paul et al., 2014).

Although the patent for BRCA1 and

BRCA2 genes was eventually invalidated by the US Supreme Court in June 2013
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2013), the case nonetheless highlights the tension
between the biological and non-biological identities of individuals and the question of
who owns life.

The female body and commodification
Marxists argue commodification in capitalist society means people or objects are not
valued in terms of what they can do (use value) but rather in terms of money or other
commodities for which they can be exchanged (exchange value) or the status
conferred by them (sign-exchange value) (Tyson, 2015).

Since capitalist society

depends upon consumerism, exchange and sign-exchange value are promoted as
appropriate and natural ways of relating to the world. Tyson (2015) further explained
capitalism promotes insecurity in order to promote consumerism and cites the
increase in cosmetic surgery in the Western world as a symptom of this. Turner
(2008) argued modern capitalist societies are essentially narcissistic and grounded in
personalised consumption, under the guise of self-development and fulfilment. Self142

actualisation and increased self-esteem are able to be pursued through the purchase
of commodities (Frank, 2002) which transcend materiality as a result of the hidden
social meaning attached. People feel compelled to have the latest fashionable items,
the whitest teeth, ageless skin, perfect breasts and such to feel good and worthy.
Not only are these ideals sold to individuals, but individuals also feel the need to ‘sell’
themselves to be successful and to fit in to modern society (Tyson, 2015).

Cox (2011) contended capitalism produced normative notions of females and
femininity which then became commodified and sold in the marketplace.

The

gendered structure of capitalism disproportionately targets and commodifies women
who are then compelled to fit in with the idealised stereotype and thus “participate in
their own objectification” (Cox, 2011; p. 20).

In Western society, women are

frequently reduced to descriptions of their bodies, a demeaning process which
constructs women as objects rather than people and promotes a particular aesthetic
in line with the patriarchal gaze (Twigg, 2000). The commodification of women and
notions of normative gender fail to account for women who do not fit with the ideal
aesthetic, either through choice or as a result of illness, disease or accident.

In relation to this study, it is reasoned that the female image is a marketable
commodity and the image of the female as a product sells the concept of what is
considered ideal female looks and behaviour. Moreover, the emphasis on the female
breast as a symbol of femininity in Western society (Crompvoets, 2012; Davis 2008;
Emilee, Ussher & Perz, 2010) accentuates the role breasts play in being a woman
and reifies the importance of perfect breasts (Filc, 2004). The negative implications of
this are illustrated by Ferguson (2000) who identified the 1980s saw the inception of a
new disease of ‘micromastia’, or small breasts. Women with this ‘disfiguring’ condition
could be ‘cured’ by cosmetic surgery which created breasts in keeping with the
gendered ideal. Furthermore, the costs of breast augmentation may be subsidised by
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the State through National Health Care plans, if women were psychologically
distressed as a result of having small breasts, or viewed by surgeons as deviating
significantly from the ‘normal’ breast size (Wilson, 2002) which again promotes
commodification in relation to the female body and demonstrates medicine fulfils an
ideological role.

More recently, Boulton and Malacrida (2012) highlighted the increasing normalisation
of cosmetic breast surgery in Western culture, a culture which rewarded women who
conformed to the image of idealised femininity and censured those who don’t.
Cosmetic surgery allows women to pay for breasts which conform to the Western
ideal, the image of which can be sold literally and figuratively. For example, it may be
asserted that there is no intrinsic good in surgically enlarging women’s breasts: breast
augmentation is undertaken purely to fulfil a socially constructed idealised body state
and because idealised breasts are able to attract other values. A certain social status
and “cultural valuation” (Ferguson, 2000, p. 83) is attached to having the ideal
body/breasts and those not conforming to this ideal, including those who undergo
mastectomy, have reduced sign-exchange value: in other words, the social value or
worth of the female is assigned by humans in a particular given context. Hence when
bodies and breasts are commodified, market forces permit interventions on the body
to be undertaken not on the basis of inherent good, but to satisfy consumer demand
based on socially and culturally constructed body ideals.

Commodification and

ideological practices coalesce here to allow this to happen because women have the
financial means to fund surgery and surgeons are willing to insert foreign objects into
women’s bodies under the guise of personal autonomy and freedom of choice.

The prominence of breast reconstruction in definitions of breast cancer treatment
further commodifies the breasts (Ferguson, 2000).

From a Marxist perspective,

ideologies of sexuality and femininity frame breast reconstruction as essential
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following breast loss and allow the commodification of breasts to be expressed
through the consumption of reconstructive surgery, hence is a significant source of
wealth generation for some. Reconstruction is presented in ideology as an essential
step in recovery from breast loss however equally it may be purported to be a process
of commodification which aims to close the gap between the ideal and the actual body
of the consumer. Frank (2002) reasoned this in itself was not problematic as all
societies and cultures have within them a dominant body aesthetic of the time.

The

key issue, therefore, was a form of commodification which required the body to be
fragmented so that different body parts can be incrementally improved through
consumer activity in the form of reconstructive surgery.

To conclude this section, applying Marxist literary theory allows the text to be
considered in terms of social, historical and cultural contexts which reflect the author’s
ideologies as well as those which are dominant in society. In this study, the Marxist
concepts of ideology and commodification were particularly useful in constructing an
understanding of the lives of high risk women as both construct understanding of the
world and expose ways in which the HBOC journey is ideologically driven. From a
Marxist perspective, medicine provides a service to women identified as high risk of
developing breast/ovarian cancer by offering various interventions to diagnose and
manage risk. Hence, a Marxist interpretation exposed ways in which HBOC acted as
a source of economic gain for some by supporting ideologies of risk and offering
surgery as the best approach to deal with the risk of cancer.

Foucauldian Literary Theory
Introduction
Foucault’s work is complex, often controversial and at times obtuse.

Although

Foucault did not intend his work to be considered literary criticism, it impacted greatly
on literary theorists owing to his argument power was located within language
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(Bertens, 2008) making language one of the most significant forces in shaping human
experience (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000).

Since literature is essentially

language, it is not difficult to see why Foucault’s work was of such importance to
literary theorists. Bertens (2008, p. 123) further referred to the “hegemonic power” of
language, including literature, underscoring Foucault’s position that language was the
site of social rather than textual power. In other words, power was not a result of the
cleverness or accuracy of the text produced by novelists, doctors and the like, but
rather was a result of the discourse created by them and to which they themselves
claimed expertise (Culler, 2011).

An understanding of Foucault’s theoretical and methodological contributions to
modern literary and social theory highlights that Foucault did not attempt to provide an
orthodoxy which scholars could apply to a particular area of concern to uncover the
‘truth’. Rather, Foucault’s influence encourages thinkers to question and problematise
a situation, ideology, discourse or opinion in order new points of view may be created:
to question what was considered as given or natural and seek solutions in the form of
varying responses.

Of particular relevance to this study is Foucault’s critique of

modern medicine and in particular the concepts of power and discourse and their
associated techniques, since it was argued the participants in this study were involved
in a process of negotiating competing dominant discourses and connected power
relations in Western society which shaped and influenced experience, and ultimately
decision making in relation to health. To this end, the following sections, elaborate
upon key areas of concern in Foucault’s work pertinent to this study.

Power, modernisation and Western medicine
The concept of power was central to much of Foucault’s work because power
relations were argued to be the means through which individuals in society were
subjected, regulated, controlled and potentially emancipated (Lynch, 2011).
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Foucault’s theorising on modernisation and the rise of
conceptualised medicine in terms of power.

modern medicine

In earlier sovereign states, classical

forms of power were exercised through the right (of the King) to take life or let live
(Taylor, 2011). Power forms were legislative, prohibitive and censoring and were
wielded when individuals in society transgressed (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014). However,
the modernisation of Western society saw the emergence of the modern State as a
political structure concerned with the needs of its people (Lynch, 2011). The modern
State sought to admonish life rather than take life away hence in contrast to the
sovereign state, power was the right to make live or let die (Taylor, 2011). Power in
modern states then was less violent and coercive and more about the State’s
attempts to administer the welfare of its citizens (Murphy, 2003; Simons, 2013). For
Foucault this represented a shift from sovereign power to biopower: the technologies
developed during the eighteenth century in the new human sciences for managing
populations (O’Farrell, 2007). Biopower can be understood as a form of life power
which is exercised through techniques and technologies of and on the body which
exert control though the interlocking and overlapping practises of discipline,
surveillance and knowledge production (Klawiter, 2008). Biopower allows bodies to
be disciplined at a societal level through managing the life and death processes of the
population including births, deaths, reproduction and illnesses (O’Farrell, 2007).

Rabinow and Rose (2006) contended Foucault’s concept of biopower originally
polarised biopower into separate anatamo-political and biopolitical strands which dealt
with disciplining and regulating of the body respectively.

However as with other

aspects of Foucault’s work, there is ambiguity in terms of whether Foucault
considered these strands as distinct, overlapping or inclusive of each other at different
times in his writing. In general, there is consensus biopower is operated through the
State whilst disciplinary power is operated through the institutions of the State (Taylor,
2011). Thus biopower can be understood as the task of governing entire populations
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(Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014) and within this, disciplinary power can be understood as
targeting individual bodies (Taylor, 2011). Disciplinary power is therefore incorporated
within the mechanisms of biopower (O’Farrell, 2007) the overall aim being to
maximise the potential and outputs of the body (Hoffman, 2011; Rabinow & Rose,
2006). Central to this are ways of knowing the body hence medicine is understood to
take a prominent role in disciplinary power through its ability to expertly read and
produce knowledge of the body.

Disciplinary power and Western medicine
Disciplinary power is a non-violent, non-coercive form of social control which utilises a
range of power techniques and operates through various societal institutions including
medicine, the family and education (Gutting, 2008). The overall aim is to produce
obedient, capable citizens who can contribute effectively to the economic and political
functions of the State (Gastaldo, 1997). Western medicine provides guidance on how
people should understand, regulate and experience their bodies (Lilja & Vinthagen,
2014; Lupton, 1997), therefore disciplinary power operates through persuading people
certain ways of being and acting are desirable to achieve good health. Part of this
guidance relates to how women at risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer should act
to prevent disease. Within Western medical discourse, this guidance leaves little
scope for those who make decisions inconsistent with the aims of disciplining the
body, such as high risk women who say no to RRS.

From a Foucauldian perspective, disciplinary power is able to be effected in medicine
through three interlinking controlling techniques of hierarchical observation,
normalisation and examination (Gutting, 2008; Hoffman, 2011).

In this study, these

techniques of disciplinary power were reasoned to be operating at both the macro and
micro level as a result of the Human Genome Project. Widespread testing for genetic
variation and disease opens up the body to a level of hierarchical observation and
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scrutiny never seen before, adding a molecular gaze to the medical arsenal aimed at
maximising body potential.

The identification of gene faults which predispose

individuals to certain forms of cancer (and other conditions) and the ability to test for
them, has resulted in the development of guidelines for the classification and
management of individuals based on the likelihood of disease development, including
breast and ovarian cancer. These guidelines normalise the process by which women
with a gene fault are targeted, classified and managed.

The dominant medical

discourse establishes how ‘normal’ women engage with the process and sets out the
expected norms. This includes subjecting women and their bodies and genes to the
medical examination so the truth about their particular situation can be uncovered
thus securing future health. Data is collected on the outcomes from preventative
interventions such as RRS, chemoprevention and ongoing screening for disease
which adds to the growing body of expert knowledge about breast/ovarian cancer and
further allows regulation and disciplining of bodies.

Attempts to influence individual behaviour and discipline bodies in relation to RRS can
be understood as a part of the project of government which aims to protect the current
and future health of the population. Biopower and disciplinary power are organised
around normalising techniques which produce self-governing individuals and
populations and persuade people of the sensibility of health interventions such as
RRS for cancer risk. The power of medicine lies in the ability to take charge of the
practices through which individuals seek to regulate and improve their health and
consequently their daily lives.

Moreover, the effects of disciplinary power are

productive because knowledge of individuals is produced which is directly linked to
‘official’ knowledge, or “discourses of truth” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93) produced by the
Human Sciences.

In other words, disciplinary power exists in medicine because

medicine knows ‘the truth’ about disease and how to avoid it. Foucault’s analysis of
power thus exposes the relationship between power relations, the production of
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knowledge and the transformation of certain forms of knowledge into ‘truths’ which
maintain disciplinary power.

The next section elaborates on this relationship and

draws attention to medical knowledge, power and ‘the truth’ and ways in which these
regulate and discipline bodies in relation to cancer risk.

Power/knowledge and the ‘truth’
Foucault argued against the notion of fixed absolutes awaiting discovery by experts
and labelled as the ‘truth’. Despite the connotations associated with the word ‘truth’,
truth is not neutral, out-with or without power (Goldstein, 2003). Rather, the ‘truth’ is a
product of power relations: “(…) truth is not by nature free - nor error servile (…) its
production is thoroughly imbued with relations of power” (Foucault, 1978 p. 60).
Importantly, since power relations exist within discourses, there can be no power
without a discourse:
(…) in a society such as ours, but basically in any society,
there are manifold relations of power which permeate,
characterize and constitute the social body, and these
relations of power cannot themselves be established,
consolidated nor implemented without the production,
accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There
can be no possible exercise of power without certain economy
of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis
of this association. We [sic] are subjected to the production of
truth through power and we [sic] cannot exercise power except
through the production of truth. (Foucault 1978, p. 93)
Foucault’s argument power, knowledge and truth are inextricably linked and the
individual- as-subject is created within this knowledge-power relationship is clearly
articulated above. On this point, Foucault concurred with earlier work of Nietzsche
(1873), who problematised the objectivity of truth and held it was power, as opposed
to knowledge, which shaped the truth. Power and knowledge have the same goal:
simply, knowledge means power and power allows one to know.

The positive

potential of power is also identified because once knowledge is known; one has the
power to act.
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Foucault further theorised on power/knowledge and truth in relation to medicine in The
Birth of the Clinic (1973) in which he constructed an historical and critical analysis of
the development of modern medicine. Foucault argued the focus of medicine shifted
with the emergence of clinical medicine in the late 18th century. Modern medicine had
the power to look deep inside the body, look beyond the symptoms of disease and
develop new understandings of how the body functioned in health and disease.
Foucault used the term “medical gaze” (Foucault, 1973, p. xiv) to describe the
dehumanising separation of the body from the person (identity) (Kendall, 2011) which
resulted from the search to uncover truths about the body. Increasingly, modern
technologies can be understood as expanding the medical gaze through genetic
testing for presymptomatic disease such as HBOC.

Foucault did not deny there were verifiable truths which could be found within the
natural sciences, nor that medical knowledge lacked scientific validity, rather he
opposed the ways in which (scientific) knowledge and expertise led to a privilege
which became power: power of experts over non-experts arising from an acceptance
scientific knowledge was somehow more truth-like and superior to other forms of
knowledge. The creation of scientific knowledge propagated as ‘truths’ or ‘facts’ about
the human body enabled the body to be disciplined and the population to be studied
and regulated by ‘experts’. In contrast, Foucault believed that knowledge of the body
was unstable and humans were too complex to be isolated into separate parts for
investigation thus no legitimate, decisive ‘truth’ about the individual could ever be
gained (Foucault, 1968). For Foucault, ‘truths’ were historical events, not absolutes
awaiting discovery (O’Farrell, 2007).

The medical gaze not only constructed the body and body parts as objects of
knowledge, it also allowed the knowers of such information to be constructed in a
particular way (O’Farrell, 2007). Foucault argued the medical gaze was supported by
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an increasingly sophisticated language which conferred a growing knowledge of facts
and truths about the human body and thus allowed the creation of a “scientifically
structured discourse about an individual” (Foucault, 1973, p. xiv).

The discourse

which supported the medical gaze was of crucial importance because power is
fundamentally discursive (Lynch, 2011). That is, power operates through what people
say as much as what they do. This leads on to the next section in this thesis which
introduces Foucault’s concept of discourse and how discourses give rise to power
relations through the creation of knowledge and truths about objects of concern in
Western society.

Foucault’s concept of discourse
Foucault’s work on discourse has been described as his most significant contribution
to critical inquiry (Vighi & Feldner, 2007). In the Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault
(1972, p. 107), proposed discourse is “a group of statements which belong to a single
system of formation”. A statement is not the words themselves, but rather the rules
which make the words meaningful: in other words, provide discursive meaning.
Statements are thus the basic units of discourse and create relationships with other
statements which provide context for the discourse (Danaher et al., 2000). Systems of
formation refer to a “complex group of relations that function as a rule” (Foucault,
1972, p. 74) and relate to a collection of institutions, social groups and relations
between discourses.

Significantly, the system of formation is not external to the

discourse but rather resides within it and in effect, it creates its own existence.

For Foucault, there existed a difference between what could be said using appropriate
logic and language, and what one actually says: “(…) discourse is constituted by the
difference between what one could say correctly at one period [under the rules of
grammar and logic], and what is actually said” (Foucault, 1968, p. 63).

In other

words, conversations reflect what people feel can and cannot be said under particular
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conventions, thus Foucault was able to speak of a clinical discourse, an economic
discourse, a psychiatric discourse and so forth. For example, it would be logical and
grammatically correct to say to a woman ‘please remove your clothes from the waist
up’.

However, it is unlikely such a statement would be acceptable during social

discourse, whereas it may form part of a patient examination in medical discourse.
Discourse then is identified as an activity or practice, bound by certain rules and which
co-exist in a world of other (competing) discourses. Multiple discourses exist within
modern societies but some discourses are dominant to others. Dominant discourses
are those which operate through established institutions such as medicine, the family
and the law and although dominant, are under constant challenge owing to the
unstable nature of knowledge (Manias & Street, 2000).

In relation to this study, a cancer discourse exists (Armstrong, 2007; Davis, 2008;
Harrington, 2012; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004) which establishes how people should act
when faced with cancer and gives consent to certain ways of speaking about the
disease.

Although fear and uncertainty are acknowledged, the cancer discourse

reflects the dominance of the medical perspective as the only appropriate way of
managing the disease (Clarke & Everest, 2006). Notably, the cancer discourse is
replete with metaphor which may influence the experience of the disease (Davis,
2008; Harrington, 2012; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004). War/military metaphor (Clarke &
Everest, 2006; Cobb & Starr, 2012; Grant & Hundley; 2008; Haines et al., 2010;
Reisfield & Wilson, 2004), sporting metaphor (Grant & Hundley; 2008; Seale, 2001)
and journey metaphor (Harrington, 2012; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004) are commonly
applied which promote a certain way of talking about cancer and confer an accepted
set of underpinning values and expectations (Davis, 2008).

These dictate people

exhibit a positive outlook, fight the disease, engage with treatment interventions, win
the war on cancer and become cancer survivors (S. King, 2004; Sulik, 2012). Doubts
about the efficacy of treatment, refusing treatment, pessimistic thoughts and generally
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‘lying down’ or giving in to the disease are not viewed as worthy attributes and are less
likely to be verbalised (Davis, 2008). It is a discourse of encouragement, consent and
cooperation which imposes a moral imperative on the person with cancer (Sulik, 2012;
Wilkinson, 2001). In particular, Crabb (2006, p. 103) described the breast cancer
discourse as a “discourse of responsibility” which obliges women to partake in health
practices such as breast cancer screening in order to create health benefits for
themselves, their families and the wider community.

Hence, discourse creates a

“culture of conformity” (Jones et al., 2005, p. 378) in which the patient is unquestioning
and compliant. The cancer discourse suggests patients who do not conform to this
ideal are uninformed, mistaken or foolish (Crabb, 2006; Davis 2008).

Discourse provides the means by which knowledge about a particular topic at a
particular time in history can be spoken. For Foucault, discourse creates meaning
therefore knowledge of anything is only meaningful within a discourse (Hall, 2004).
Furthermore, dominant discourses, such as the medical discourse, are those which
determine what knowledge is considered important and of value (Manias & Street,
2000). For example, although cancer is an organic disease, it only exists meaningfully
within a discourse about it: it is the discourse, not the disease itself, which produces
knowledge of it. In other words, breast and ovarian cancer exist but only take on
meaning when they become objects of knowledge within a discourse. The dominance
of medical and genetic discourses ensures the authority of genetic, medical and
scientific knowledge and statistical data in relation to breast/ovarian cancer risk,
effectively equating risk of disease with inevitability of disease (Armstrong, 1995;
Crabb, 2006). Women with a positive genetic test are described by statements such
as ‘high risk’, gene carriers’, ‘genetically pre-disposed to developing cancer’ ‘faulty
gene carriers’ and the like. RRS is constructed in medical discourse as not only a
reasonable option for high risk women (Crabb, 2006) but is put forward as the primary
intervention for reducing risk and securing a disease free future (Ingham et al., 2013).
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The medical discourse thus sets out a problem and a proposed solution which serves
to organise and regulate women with a family history of breast/ovarian cancer.

Hall (2004, p. 347) further contended knowledge and ‘truth’ were “historicised” by
Foucault’s position that knowledge or ‘truth’ about anything only applied within a
specific historical context. Moreover, from a Foucauldian perspective, the fluidity of
discourse is more to do with power than logic as change occurs because those who
create the discourse also have the power to make it true.

This highlights the temporality of discourses which Foucault (1972) believed were
shaped by the ‘episteme’ or ‘world view’ in which they existed. The existence of the
rules of discourse and historical and cultural affiliations mean discourse both creates
and sustains social norms by establishing knowledge or ‘truth’. This is expressed
through language and governs how individuals should behave within a particular
discourse; therefore, it is a form of power. In other words, discourse is the site at which
truths and power relations are produced (Foucault, 1968).

Moreover, discourse

creates the means by which the body can be socially controlled, disciplined and
regulated.

In keeping with this analysis, Crabb (2006) argued the analysis of

discourse allowed a critique of ways in which individuals were constructed and talked
about in discourse. Thus, both body and mind are governed by hidden historical and
culture-bound rules which determine what is said (or not) and how it is said within
discourses. Foucault (1972, p. 49) referred to these as discursive practices which
“systematically form the objects of which they speak”.

Discursive practices
Discursive practices are rules which constitute how discourses are formed (Manias &
Street, 2000).

These practices are ways of talking which serve as collective

organising tools, sanctioning certain actions and compelling individuals to behave in
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certain ways within discourses. Power is a direct result of discursive practices which
are created within a discourse (Bertens, 2008).

Foucault’s notion of discursive practices was influenced by the work of Heidegger
(1889 – 1976) regarding the interpretation of everyday practices (Dreyfus, 2004;
Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). In Heidegger’s notion of being, humans are seen to be
formed within certain cultural and historical conditions which provide a contextualised
background against which humans interpret everyday life and become socialised
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Importantly, those existing and functioning within these
shared practices are unaware of them unless made aware through the actions or
words of others.

Similarly, Foucault argued social and official institutions and

associated discourses support discursive practices which created accepted norms and
legitimised subjects and behaviours, against which individuals unknowingly interpreted
their everyday lives (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Thus, discourses are power relations
and discursive practices ensure order by directing humans to do what is expected in
given situations.

In Western medical discourse, power operates through discursive practices which
compel individuals to act in certain ways to protect health. Crabb (2006, p. 175)
referred to discursive practices as “rhetorical devices” which constructed certain
preventative strategies, including RRS, as good, responsible and rational actions
which indicated to high risk women what is expected in their given situation. Similarly,
genetics can be understood as a discursive practice which reinforces the medical gaze
and subtly persuades individuals to engage with risk reducing interventions in order to
self-regulate and protect health. From a Foucauldian perspective, self-regulation is
more effective than coercive techniques in controlling people as resources or policing
are not required and resentment is avoided.
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To sum up then, discursive practices enable power relations because power is
asserted through language and the ways things are spoken about. However, the
nature of power is such that discursive practices both enable and inhibit, because
what constitutes the truth is unstable and contingent.

Power and resistance
The centrality of power in Foucault’s work was introduced earlier in this section.
Foucault argued the individual-as-subject could not be separated from the complex
power relations within which the subject is placed (Foucault, 1982).

Central to

Foucault’s argument is power is not a thing, and power does not exist until it is put into
action. Rather, power is a relation, a way in which certain actions modified others:
“[power is] a set of actions upon other actions” (Foucault, 1982, p. 789) therefore
power is exercised rather than possessed (Manias & Street, 2000). This is an
important concept because it underscores power as relative and dynamic hence
Foucault was able to defend against critics who posited his analysis of power was
suffused with pessimism and rendered the subject repressed and impotent.

Foucault rejected conceptualisations of power which supported the futility of
resistance (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014) and posited power dynamics mean different
responses to power were available hence resistance to power was not only possible,
but inevitable.

Power and resistance are allied rather than oppositional because

resistance is shaped by power relations and power relations are also, paradoxically
reinforced through resistance (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014). If resistance was not possible,
if there existed only one way of acting, power could not be exercised and would not
exist. For Foucault, freedom was a condition of power: “freedom must exist for power
to be exerted” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790). Thus individuals are constituted as subjects
through power relations but are also capable of deliberate self-transformation through
resistance to power relations (Allen, 2008). Individuals may resist power through
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marginalised discursive views which disrupt dominant discourses hence power can be
both repressive and productive (Manias & Street, 2000; Simons, 2013). Foucault
(1982) maintained that resistance to power was thus a legitimate and sensible basis
for understanding what power relations exist, where they exist, when they exist and
how they function.

If one accepts Foucault’s definition of power as being a relation and a set of actions
upon other actions, then one sees all societies have power relations embedded within
them. Not only from legal, constitutional or institutional perspective, but also from a
social perspective since living in a society necessitates the actions of an individual
can and do modify the actions of other individuals.

For example, in the medical

encounter, the actions of doctors bring about actions in patients as a result of power
relations supported by a dominant of medical discourse which is internalised and
acted upon (Lupton, 1997). Thus, power is not something held by one group and
exerted over another: rather, it is a relationship in which all take a role, making power
an intrinsic and omnipresent feature of human societies. It is the power relations in
everyday life which categorises and transforms individuals into subjects (Allen, 2008).
In this study, the power relations in which the participants took a role and ways in
which the participants yielded to or resisted such relations are exposed. This created
an understanding of how the participants negotiated power relations and created
individual subject positions, often at odds with the dominant discourse.

To conclude this section, Foucauldian literary critique encourages researchers to ask
questions of the text in order to problematise the taken-for-granted, the given and the
ostensible so that alternate points of view may be offered to illuminate a broader
understanding of society. To understand Foucault’s contribution to literary theory, one
must deliberate his views on power and power relations. Foucault’s key concern was
the culture of the self and how individuals come to constitute themselves as subjects
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in society. Foucault’s focus was the relationship between power relations and the
production of knowledge, and the transformation of certain forms of knowledge into
‘truth’ which led to power and subjectification.

Foucault’s analysis of power articulates historical forms of power from pre-modern
coercive and often violent modes of power to modern modes of power including
biopower and disciplinary power which regulated and disciplined bodies. Power is
relational because power/knowledge regimes differ in their application and
effectiveness. Power and knowledge are irrevocably intertwined because knowledge
allows an authoritative truth to be presented and simultaneously validates itself as the
truth. Medicine is understood as a discourse which is deployed as an instrument of
power which disciplines the body because the medical discourse is expert and lays
claim to knowledge of the truth about the body. Despite the authority of the medical
discourse, the unstable nature of knowledge/power means power relations are able to
produce both positive and negative actions, truth and error hence resistance to
medical authority is possible.

In relation to this study, application of a Foucauldian critique was useful in
understanding how dominant discourses about women’s bodies combined with
accepted health care practices allow medicine to define what is good for the bodies of
women at risk of cancer. Problematic to this approach is it fails to account for those
who do not share the common goal, or those for whichever reason, demonstrate
resistance to the dominant Western medical discourse who were the focus of this
study. The participants in this study were seen as being non-compliant however it was
contended they are only non-compliant within the construct of the dominant medical
discourse and that other discourses are available to help shape understanding of their
experiences.
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Feminist Literary Theory
Introduction
The methodological approach taken in this study posited the experiences of high risk
women who refuse RRS cannot be divorced from social, cultural and historical
influences on the experiences which influence the decision to say no to surgery. A
central premise was the female breast is symbolic of the idealised female body in
Western society, a society which “exults in breasts” (Crompvoets, 2006, p. 79) and
which is “breast obsessed” (Thomas, 2006, p. 350). Western values and traditions in
relation to the breasts serve to oppress women because such messages imply without
breasts, women are not whole (Thomas, 2006). Similarly, the female ovaries are the
fundamental symbol of womanhood (Gubar, 2012) and as such are associated with
femaleness, femininity and sexuality. Ovarian loss is associated with negative effects
on body image, gender and personal identity (Hallowell et al., 2012) and may induce a
feeling of being an incomplete woman (Fry et al., 2001a). Moreover, it was contended
Western society is a patriarchal society in which all human social experience is
gendered (Landman, 2006), therefore the participants’ stories could not be voiced
without reference to the dynamics of gender (Thomas, 2006).

The patriarchal nature of Western culture is both causative and symptomatic of the
gendered text therefore using feminist literary theory allowed an analysis of the text
and the world in which it was read. Potts (2000) argued a feminist analysis gives
voice to women in relation to the experience of cancer, threat or actuality, and
exposes the socially constructed meanings attributed to breast/ovarian cancer which
impact on all women’s lives in Western society. Research examining decision making
in relation to cancer management has largely failed to take gender differences into
account despite the distinctiveness of women’s health problems (Szumacher, 2006).
Szumacher (2006) further claimed the unique nature of breast cancer and breast loss
meant studies examining decision making in this arena must address the issue from a
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female perspective. Consequently a feminist literary approach was applicable in this
study and allowed an examination of ways in which women are constructed in
Western society which can impact on health related decision making (Thomas, 2006).
Taking a feminist perspective lent itself to an examination of the public and private
folklore of the study participants to understand their life experiences within this
context.

Overview of feminist literary theory
At the simplest level, feminist literary theory poses questions relating to power
relationships in literature and other cultural productions to gain a clearer
understanding of the social reality of women (Allen, 2014). The text is analysed for
textual constructions of gendered meaning (Keating, 2005) which reveal power
relationships which impact the lives of women (Brizee, Tompkins & Chernouski,
2011).

Feminist literary theory is complex and draws on a range of other critical theories
including psychoanalysis, Marxism and post-structuralism (Keating, 2005). However,
common to all is the aim to challenge forms of domination and power which
subordinate women and all seek to give women more control over their own lives
(Easton, 1996; Willard, 2005). Millet’s ‘Sexual Politics’ (1970) is credited with being
the first widely read book of feminist literary criticism.

It included a critique of

capitalism and patriarchy and ways in which both sought to control women. Millet
(1970) distinguished between ‘sex’ as biological and ‘gender’ as socially constructed,
hence ‘feminine’ characteristics were products of culture rather than biologically
determined. More recently, Klinge and Bosch (2005) also distinguished between the
biology of ‘sex’ and the socially constructed ‘gender’, arguing both concepts are
equally important in health-related research.
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The following sections elaborate on feminist literary theory in relation to key areas of
concern in this study. Notably, ways in which Western values and traditions in relation
to the breasts and ovaries serve to oppress and control women are explored by
focussing on social constructions of the female role/femininity and breast/ovarian
cancer.

The patriarchal nature of Western medicine is also considered and the

feminist concept of resistance is discussed with reference to power struggles and
ways in which resistance to normalising strategies and regulations is possible through
the body.

The female role and femininity in Western society
A key focus of feminist literary theory is how the female role, femininity and
womanhood are constructed in Western society. A feminist stance contends female
characteristics

are

socially constructed

rather

than

biologically

determined:

“masculinity and femininity are not predetermined by the body itself, but are
constructed within culture” (Warhol-Down & Herndl, 1997, p. xi). Adopting a feminist
stance then challenges biological conceptions of female identity which define women
according to reproductive physiology (A. King, 2004) and suggest a woman’s primary
role is as mother and caregiver (Willard, 2005). Instead, ways in which male and
female genders are socially constructed and the privileging of the male gender are
critiqued and challenged (McAfee, 2014; Tyson, 2015).

A feminist stance reasoned the participants in this study were exposed to gender
ideologies and heteronormative values in Western society which assign certain
attributes and roles to women and men. Gender is argued to be a powerful method of
social control which both produces and restricts bodies (A. King, 2004).

A. King

(2004) further claimed women’s bodies are disproportionately judged and valued for
appearance hence women are subjugated through their bodies.

Women are

socialised into a particular role in Western society through ideological messages
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transmitted from an early age (Thomas, 2006; Tyson, 2015) which convey how
women should conform to Western notions of beauty and sexual attractiveness and
be maternal (Ferguson & Kasper, 2000).

Women are expected and encouraged to

be the object of the male gaze hence experience of breast loss is necessarily tied to a
cultural emphasis on the breasts as objects of male sexual interest (Szumacher,
2006).

Considerable effort has been devoted to examining the role the breasts/ovaries play in
defining femininity. The female breast in particular symbolises sexuality, femininity
and motherhood in Western society (Ehlers & Krupar, 2012; Lantz & Booth, 1998;
Thomas, 2006; Schulzke, 2011). Influential social anthropologist Margaret Mead
referred to the female breast as “the primary source of female identity” (Mead, 1949,
cited in Thomas, 2006, p. 363) in Western culture and having breasts serves as a
public display of femininity (Chan, 2010; Hallowell, 1998, 2000; Saywell, Beattie &
Henderson, 2000; Spadola, 1998). Similarly, ovaries symbolise womanhood and as
such are associated with femininity and sexuality (Hallowell et al., 2012; Gubar, 2012).
Overall, women largely define themselves in opposition to traditional male
characteristics (Ferguson & Kasper, 2000) as a result of essentialist ideology which
reinforces the biological differences between genders (Sischo, 2008; Tyson, 2015).

In relation to this study, cultural norms impose standards of femininity onto women
and give ‘feminine’ characteristics a natural authenticity, one of which is having two
breasts and ovaries. Women who appear to have diseased breasts/ovaries or no
breasts/ovaries may be viewed as ‘unfeminine’ (Emilee et al., 2010) or ‘abnormal’
(Crompvoets, 2012). Mastectomy has been described as a “violation of femininity”
(Saywell et al., 2000, p. 38) and oophorectomy as an “insult to femininity” (Ferrell,
Smith, Juarez & Melancon, 2003, p. 253) highlighting the key role these organs play in
defining femininity in Western society. Breast loss in particular is consistently referred
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to as disfigurement and mutilation (Szumacher, 2006), therefore it is not surprising
loss or potential loss of the breasts and/or ovaries can invoke great turmoil in women
as they seek to understand their altered bodies which contrast with societal norms.

It has also been claimed prosthesis use and post-mastectomy reconstruction
endorses and maintains gendered norms which subordinate women (BáezHernández, 2009). Reconstruction is framed in medical and public discourse as an
essential procedure following breast loss on the grounds it can help women adapt to
surgery (Crompvoets, 2006; Guillem et al., 2006; Haines et al., 2010; Sulik, 2012).
Rubin and Tanenbaum (2011, p. 407) used the term “pinkwashed” to describe a
breast cancer culture in which prosthesis-wearing or post-mastectomy reconstruction
is mandatory in order to avoid appearing radical or oppositional to societal norms
about how women should look. In relation to breast loss and reconstruction, women
in Western society face a paradox: non-reconstructed women may be viewed as
desexualised and oppositional whereas those who do undergo reconstruction face
further surgery, pain and discomfort and ironically may be viewed as supporting
women’s objectification by complying with dominant heteronormative notions of
femininity (Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011).

Failure to adequately place breast

reconstruction within its cultural and social contexts helps reproduce oppressive
normative standards for women because the ‘need’ to have reconstruction goes
largely unchallenged.

Drawing on feminist insights therefore highlighted the conflict and contradictions
women in Western society face with respect to the loss of the breasts and ovaries.
On the one hand, these organs symbolise femininity and womanhood and Western
society expects women to possess them.

Simultaneously, Western discourse

demands women keep themselves healthy, nurture the family and generally conform
to what is expected of the female role (Gibbon, 2006). Such contradictions have been
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discussed by various scholars. Kasper (1994) stated discrepancies existed between
societal expectations of women imposed by dominant cultural processes and
women’s own definitions of self gained through life experience. Women facing breast
loss face a dilemma because taking control of cancer risk through RRS exposes
women to other significant losses including perceived loss of self-identity, femininity
and sexual attractiveness (Hallowell, 2000). Szumacher (2006) drew attention to the
paradox experienced by women facing breast loss who were expected to conform to
cultural standards of beauty yet maintain autonomy over their bodies when making
health-related decisions. Thomas (2006) similarly identified societal contradictions
often made it difficult for women to distinguish between personally and culturally
embedded feelings about their breasts.

These contradictions were spoken and

unspoken, revealed and hidden and emanated from a variety of sources including the
media, parents, peers partners, the medical system and Western society in general.
Thomas (2006, p. 367) used the term “ring of silence” to describe these contradictory
messages. Thomas (2006) contended these functioned as oppressive norms which
distorted definitions of womanhood and influenced women’s decision making with
regard to participation in breast health initiatives.

Thus an analysis of the social construction of femininity and the female role in
Western society provided insight into some of the covert influences which may impact
women’s health related behaviours particularly in relation to their breasts and ovaries.
The next section explores the social construction of breast/ovarian cancer from a
feminist literary stance and discusses the potential impact of this on women
diagnosed with a high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer.
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Social constructions of breast/ovarian cancer and its management: a feminist
perspective
In this study, it was argued a significant social investment in the female breasts and
ovaries existed which allowed others a legitimate say in what happened to these
organs. This is reflected in research which found decision making in relation to
surgery for breast/ovarian cancer and cancer risk is frequently framed within the
context of the woman’s personal/sexual relationships and familial obligations (Crabb,
2006; Gibbon 2006; Sheppard & Ely, 2008; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011; Weiner, 2011;
Zagouri et al., 2013) and the consequences of treatment on others, for example
children and partners (Acero, 2012; Howard et al., 2011; Lloyd et al., 2000; Rowley,
2005). This research underscores how women are expected to consider the needs of
others when making health related decisions in relation to cancer risk. In this sense,
the breasts and ovaries of high risk women can be understood as belonging not only
to the women themselves, but also to their significant others vis-à-vis their obligations
to stay healthy for the sake of others by having their breasts/ovaries removed.

A feminist perspective contends historically women’s bodies have been invaded,
possessed and occupied by others as a result of enduring patriarchy in society
(Acero, 2012). Ownership of the female breasts has been appropriated by agencies
other than the women to which they belong (Szumacher, 2006).

Spadola (1998)

described the breasts as the most public of private parts, as manifested by initiatives
such as breast screening programmes, breast feeding programmes and indeed in
initiatives surrounding RRS for HBOC.

Women’s breasts are also argued to be

subject to a greater degree of public scrutiny and evaluation than any other body part
(Chan, 2010) emphasising their importance in social discourse. It is this prominence
in Western society of the female breast and to a lesser extent the ovary, as signifiers
of femininity, sexuality and womanliness which add a complex layer to decision
making around RRS. Moreover, such social constructions situate decision-making in
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response to cancer risk as both within and out-with the medical arena. Although the
medical discourse outlines what to do in response to cancer risk, social constructions
of the disease and its management bear significant weight for women identified as
high risk.

Social constructions of breast cancer shape the way women experience breast cancer
including decision making in response to therapeutic interventions (Szumacher, 2006;
Thorne & Murray, 2000). In this study, this extended to women diagnosed with a high
risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer because these women were exposed to
images and constructions of breast/ovarian cancer which were influenced by cultural
and societal contexts. Integral to these were perceptions of female norms and
femininity. Breast/ovarian cancer threaten such perceptions by assaulting the female
body physically and emotionally to the extent women facing breast cancer may fear
the loss of the breasts more than loss of life (Davis, 2008; Ferguson & Kasper, 2000).
In Western society, breast cancer is often depicted as a cosmetic rather than physical
crisis because breast loss is constructed as an emotional loss (Rubin & Tanenbaum,
2011) and a loss of sexual attractiveness (Szumacher, 2006). Indeed the threat to life
caused by breast cancer is often overlooked in favour of the threat to female identity,
sexuality and body image (Thorne & Murray, 2000) which paradoxically endorses
gendered norms about how women should think and be.

Studies examining the representation of breast/ovarian cancer expose the unstable
and potentially oppressive nature of the breast/ovarian cancer discourse.

The

majority of work has focussed on how breast cancer is represented (Crompvoets,
2006; Thomas, 2006). Earlier studies in Australia (Lupton, 1994) and the USA (Lantz
& Booth, 1998) revealed breast cancer was consistently constructed as a disease of
epidemic proportions caused by ‘lifestyle’ factors such as alcohol consumption,
obesity, use of oral contraceptives, delaying pregnancy and abstaining from breast167

feeding. The link between oestrogen exposure and breast cancer development was
acknowledged; significantly, Lupton (1994) and Lantz and Booth (1998) expressed
concern at the way this association was linked to female social behaviours to create
an image of breast cancer as epidemic and a crisis situation. The authors posited the
emphasis on a woman’s role in engaging is such ‘risky’ lifestyle ‘choices’ resulted in
victim-blaming and drew attention away from other potential causes of oestrogen
exposure which may promote cancer development.

More recent work suggests an oppressive and punitive discourse persists in relation
to breast cancer. In addition to blame attributed to women through risky lifestyles,
discourses of positivity, silence and concealment place a moral imperative on women
to conform to normative standards which are oppressive and can lead to victimblaming (Wilkinson, 2001). Cultural configurations of breast cancer have changed
significantly over the past four decades from a stigmatised, private disease to a
disease of epidemic proportions requiring public and political debate (S. King, 2004).
Mass media attention to selected aspects of breast cancer presents a skewed reality
which promotes an overly optimistic focus on survivorship and leaves little room for
those who do not engage with the dominant discourse. S. King (2004) further claimed
this was problematic as it diverted attention away from other significant issues such as
the continuing number of women dying from breast/ovarian cancer, lack of universal
health care and lack of research on environmental causes of the disease. Likewise,
Sulik (2012, p. 16) found themes of victim-blaming persisted through survivorship
ideology which allowed blame to fall on women who failed to adopt the “she-ro” role
necessary for bravely battling the disease and accompanying disfigurement.

Although lifestyle factors still feature heavily in breast/ovarian cancer discourse,
increasingly genetic causes of disease take precedence (Conrad, 2005; Finkler, 2000;
Lemke 2002; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Riska, 2003; Wills, 2005). One might argue the
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emphasis on genetic causes of disease rather than lifestyle ‘choices’ suggests
breast/ovarian cancer occurs for reasons outside

a woman’s personal control.

However, the prominence of genetic causes appears to have done little to negate the
victim-blaming messages so frequently attached to breast/ovarian cancer discourse
(Silverman et al., 2001; Szumacher, 2006; Wilkinson, 2001).

One reason for this

relates to the ascribed female role in Western society as discussed earlier in this
section.

Women are constructed in dominant discourse as carers and nurturers

(Gibbon, 2007; A. King, 2004), who are responsible for the health of the family (Acero,
2012; Kasper & Ferguson, 2000; Szumacher, 2006). A key part of this role then is
staying healthy for the sake of others. Responsibility for the disease is also placed
onto women through their requirement to engage with interventions to detect and
manage the cancer (Griffiths et al., 2010). Hence whilst women may not be held
responsible for owning a genetic mutation, personal responsibility for risk is
embedded within medical discourse (Ilkilic, 2009; Lupton, 2006; Robertson, 2000) and
it is likely women will be considered culpable when action to reduce the risk of cancer,
such as RRS, is refused (Hallowell & Lawton, 2002; Resnik, 2014).

A feminist critique suggests common to all social constructions and cultural
configurations of breast/ovarian cancer is an underpinning ideology that noncompliance with the traditional female role is instrumental in the development of
breast/ovarian cancer in women. Social constructions of breast/ovarian cancer are a
conduit for communicating ideas, values and fears and reflect broader messages
about social boundaries and power in society generally (Acero, 2012; Lantz & Booth,
1998). From this, an understanding of the ways in which power emerges and is used
and misused is gained (McAfee, 2014) because women are required to make
decisions in response to breast/ovarian cancer risk within a discourse of medical
hegemony and its accompanying power structures (Szumacher, 2006).
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The next section focuses on an analysis of the institution of medicine from a feminist
perspective and exposes ways in which genetic/risk ideologies and gender biases in
medical discourse coalesce to construct power relations which may oppress high risk
women facing RRS.

Western medicine, patriarchy and power
The institution of medicine has been central to feminist theorising since the body is the
site of most gendered interaction (Bilton et al., 2002; Turner, 2008). Throughout
history, women’s bodies have been relegated in medicine, the reproductive organs in
particular considered intrinsically pathological (Tyson, 2015; Wilkinson, 2001).

In

Victorian times, the uterus was considered the controlling organ of the female body.
Disorders of the female reproductive system were believed to cause a range of
conditions including insanity, dyspepsia, rheumatism, cardiac inadequacy and the
frequently diagnosed ‘hysteria’ (Thorne & Murray, 2000).

A feminist critique of modern Western medicine draws attention to the scientific,
empiricist roots of the biomedical model (Willard, 2005; Wylie et al., 2012). Francis
Bacon (1561 – 1626) is commonly credited with being the founder of modern science
and is said to have believed the mind to be masculine and nature to be feminine
(Darlington, 2010). Medicine is therefore able to be understood as the (male) power
of the mind/medicine over (female) nature (A. King, 2004). Moreover, the biomedical
model of medicine is underpinned by the assumption all illness is secondary to
pathological disorder or disease, therefore removal or amelioration of disease will
return the person to health (Wade & Halligan, 2004). The focus of the biomedical
model is the body in disease rather than the well-being of people and their bodies.

Medicine reflects and reinforces gender divisions in Western society by positioning
women in terms of their ability to fulfil the traditional female role of homemaker and
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nurturer (Gibbon, 2007; Kennedy & Kennedy, 2010). Medical literature also has a
tendency to classify medical issues by gender (Griffiths et al., 2010). For example,
depression, anxiety and insomnia are regarded as problematic in women whereas
industrial and sporting injuries are associated with men (Bilton et al., 2002).

The

objective medical gaze positions women as subjects in the system of medicine (Gray,
2007) and has medicalised normal female events including menstruation, pregnancy
and childbirth (Purdy, 2001; Riessman, 1983; Willard, 2005; Wylie et al., 2012). This
has created the means to control women’s sexual expression and reproductive
capacity through the regulation of women’s bodies (Bilton et al., 2002; Lerner, 2000).

A feminist analysis of Western medicine highlights other patriarchal practices which
serve to oppress women. Prior to 1994, women were largely excluded from clinical
trials to assess the safety and efficacy of new medicines which meant medicines
prescribed for women had only been tested on men (Holdcroft, 2007; Tyson, 2015).
So-called women’s symptoms have been trivialised in medicine which has generally
neglected health issues of concern to women (Klinge & Bosch, 2005). With regard to
treatment for breast cancer, less mutilating alternatives to the radical mastectomy
were not explored until relatively recently in part owing to the prestige afforded to
surgeons who carried out the technically complex yet debilitating surgical procedure
(Löwy, 2010). Löwy (2010) further claimed the use of RRS to remove healthy breasts
and ovaries in some ways represented a return to the type of surgical radicalism for
cancer risk as exemplified by the radical and grossly debilitating Halsted mastectomy.
Medicine is also a key stakeholder in the surgical modification of women’s bodies
through cosmetic and reconstructive techniques (Sulik, 2012), notably those
performed on women’s breasts in order to conform to socially constructed ideals of
women’s bodies (Crompvoets, 2012).
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Feminist perspectives on the prominence of genetic medicine are also valuable
because genetics raises issues of significant concern for women including
reproduction, embodiment, choice and agency (Ettorre, Katz Rothman & Steinberg,
2006).

Within the biomedical model, the genetics discourse reduces high risk

women’s bodies to faulty genes. Medical intervention thus takes primacy and social,
cultural and individual perceptions and circumstances which influence the experience
of ill-health are largely considered irrelevant.

Genetics and risk discourses thus give

medicine power over women’s bodies because risk comes to be located in the
woman’s body and able to be modified primarily through interventions on the body
(Lim, 2011; Robertson, 2000). Such a critique does not deny some women are at
increased risk of developing ovarian/breast cancer and that RRS can reduce this risk,
rather the ways in which genetic and medical discourses represent women’s bodies
in ways which make them more accessible to medicine and medical interventions is
problematised (Happe, 2006).

A feminist analysis suggests genetic medicine is particularly oppressive to women at
risk of breast/ovarian cancer since women are disproportionately targeted because
women bear offspring. Although offspring receive half of their DNA from each parent
and men also carry and pass on BRCA1/2 mutations, the burden of genetic
responsibility falls primarily to women (D’Agincourt‐Canning, 2001; Nycum, Avard &
Knoppers, 2009). Genetic information pathologises women’s breasts and ovaries in
the absence of disease and expands medicine’s jurisdiction over women’s bodies
(Finkler, 2000, 2003; Happe, 2006). Genes become a tool of female oppression
because genes decide who has children, who gets surgery and perhaps even who
gets married, creating an “enslavement to risk” (Samerski, 2006, p. 206) which calls
upon women to become risk managers of their lives and the lives of others.
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To sum, a feminist perspective contends medicine is a site of power where freedom
has been historically denied to women. However a critique using feminist literary
theory highlights not only is power in medicine potentially an oppressive force, it also
acts as a potential form of empowerment (Allen, 2014; A. King, 2004) through the
possibility of resistance to power. The next section discusses the feminist concept of
resistance further. In this study, feminist resistance was a means of interpreting high
risk women’s decisions to say no to RRS by problematising the competing and
conflicting discourses which surround and permeate HBOC and its management.

Feminist concept of resistance
A central tenet underpinning feminist literary theory is forms of domination and power
which subordinate women must be challenged to give women more control over their
everyday lives (Easton, 1996; Tyson, 2015). Although the concept of power per se is
not always articulated in feminist critique, it is none-the-less critiqued in three key
ways: as a form of domination, as a resource to be (re)distributed and as a form of
empowerment (Allen, 2011).

A wide variety of feminist perspectives on power exist.

For example, socialist

feminists support traditional Marxist accounts of power in so much as power is
understood as a form of domination grounded in class inequality and economic
essentialism (McAfee, 2014). However, Marx’s concept of power is criticised for being
gender-blind and for failing to take account of women’s unpaid and reproductive
labour (Allen, 2011).

Allen (2011) further explained post-structuralist feminist

approaches favour an interpretation of Foucault’s concept of power because it
illuminates an understanding of the conflict and contradiction in everyday discourses
which provide women with the potential for resistance to dominating forms of power.
Although some feminists have criticised Foucault’s work for being largely genderneutral (A. King, 2004), a convergence between Foucault and Feminism is
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acknowledgement of the body as a site of power relations and both underscore the
importance of discourse in creating hegemonic practices and power relations which
normalise and control (Armstrong, 2005). A. King (2004) argued the female body was
a particular target of disciplinary power and that femininity was a discipline which
produced bodies and hence was a means of controlling women. A feminist critique
therefore extends Foucault’s work on power relations to create meaning of the nature
and cause of female subordination (Wylie et al., 2012).

Foucault (1980) claimed the potential for resistance to power existed wherever there
was normalisation and domination. In relation to this study, it was purported that
dominant discourses permit and support practices of normalisation in relation to what
is considered worthy attributes in women including stereotypes of femininity, sexuality
and notions of the selfless woman who does whatever it takes to stay healthy. It was
the very nature of these competing and, at times, conflicting discourses which allowed
the female body at risk of cancer to be understood as a site of contested control. In
keeping with Foucauldian theorising, a feminist critique of power supported the notion
where power exists, so too does resistance. Influential feminist writer Judith Butler
summarised this notion: “(…) the subject is neither fully determined by power nor fully
determining of power, [but significantly and partially both] (…)” (1997, p. 17).

Thus

power is wielded on but also wielded by people, giving scope for resistance and
redistribution of power.

Saying no to RRS was able to be understood as an

expression of resistance to power relations which potentially denied women a voice
and instead provided scope for a woman’s personal aspirations to be heard.

Gotfrit’s (1991) seminal work “Women Dancing Back” progressed a feminist concept
of resistance through fighting back against forms of female subordination. Gotfrit’s
(1991) work was an exploration of sexuality and the female body in relation to
nightclub dancing practices. The rituals associated with women dancing in nightclubs
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and the accompanying female/male expectations and behaviours illuminated an
understanding of how women can both reproduce and resist dominant ideologies and
discourses in Western society.

Although an exploration of resistance through

dancing, Gotfrit’s (1991) analysis exposed ways in which oppressive stereotypes of
femininity and sexuality were developed, tolerated and even came to be expected in
Western society.

Gotfrit (1991) argued sexuality and women’s bodies were sites upon which the social
regulation of women in contemporary culture took place. Within this framework, the
construction of the female breast as a potent signifier of femininity/sexuality comes to
be understood as an ideology which attached a particular social meaning to women’s
breasts and bodies.

However, forces of social regulation are many and often

contradictory hence women’s bodies were a site for both oppression and potential
empowerment.

In Gotfrit’s (1991) analysis, dominant ideologies about female breasts and bodies
were both resisted and reproduced by women through ways in which their bodies
were presented to or concealed from the male gaze. In relation to breast cancer, a
discourse of concealment (Wilkinson, 2001) exists which requires women to hide the
physical signs of breast loss (O’Neill, 2013; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011).
Concealment through prosthesis use or reconstruction is the assumed routine
response to breast loss (Cobb & Starr, 2012; Crompvoets, 2012) and from a feminist
perspective reflects the importance placed on meeting the male gaze which serves to
disempower women facing breast loss (Collie & Long, 2005). Points of resistance
emerge from the conflict and contradictions permeated by and through competing
dominant discourses. For example, owning a BRCA1/2 mutation and accepting RRS
to save life is juxtaposed with dominant ideologies of sexuality and femininity which
require women to have two breasts and ovaries. Saying no to RRS is understandable
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within the discourse of femininity yet it is a decision which is ‘anti-health’ in the
discourse of medicine.

A final point from Gotfrit’s (1991) work is that resistance is more than the nebulous
rejection of imposed regulation and normative practices. Resistance is a specific
action which challenges underlying institutions and power relations which support the
subordination of women. Under any paradigm there will be non-compliers and those
who reject the dominant way of thinking. It was resistance to the severely debilitating
Halsted radical mastectomy which paved the way for less mutilating alternatives in
treating breast cancer (Lerner, 2000). Resistance is thus understood as a means of
empowerment and a practice through which women come to be aware of the conflict
and contradictions in everyday discourses and seek to create alternate discourses
and meanings which make sense of their experiences.

In this study, analysis of women’s experiences of owning a BRCA1/2 mutation and
saying no to RRS challenged taken-for-granted assumptions about how people
respond to cancer risk in Western society. Medical discourse with its emphasis on
genetic faults and risk estimates for breast/ovarian cancer fails to acknowledge the
social, personal and political components of risk and of HBOC and consequently,
accompanying discourses are bound to conflict with women’s lived experiences of
living with cancer risk. In this respect, medicine was unable to articulate the truths
women come to know as a result of their personal experiences, lived in the social
reality of multiple, competing discourses.

An examination of resistance thus offered possibilities for understanding the
experiences of high risk women and the meanings attached to saying no to RRS.
Within medical discourse, genetic information aimed at high risk women which
assumes universal responses and actions in response to cancer risk creates the
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conditions for the construction alternate discourses which do not marginalise or isolate
women who say no to RRS. The feminist concept of resistance hence connected the
stories of high risk women who say no to RRS to the communal folklore and signified
the emergence of private folklore to make meaning of experience.

In summary then, utilising feminist literary theory in this study allowed an examination
of ways in which the female role and femininity are constructed in Western society
and how social constructions of breast/ovarian cancer lead to conflict between socially
imposed themes and the participants’ personal meanings.

Reading the personal

experience narratives through the lens of feminist literary theory allowed expression of
issues important to the participants which medical discourse has not recognised. A
feminist stance identified the challenges faced by high risk women arose at least in
part as a result of the status imposed on female breasts, and to lesser extent ovaries,
in Western society. Application of the concept of resistance created new ways of
understanding high risk women’s decisions to say no to RRS. While many women
undertake RRS and find the experience positive and empowering, some do not: these
are the stories of the women in this study.

To an extent, this section unites themes presented in the previous two analytic
sections. Consequently, the convergence between feminist, Foucauldian and Marxist
theorising is acknowledged. Reasons for this are threefold. First, all three literary
critiques provide as Dolby-Stahl (1985, 1989) argued, a means to critically
deconstruct the personal experience narratives of high risk women in order to expose
themes, attitudes and allusions reflective of societal expectations which influenced
how the women’s lives are lived and experienced. Second, all highlight power and its
unequal distribution in society as a result of seemingly rational or natural ‘givens’
which structure everyday life. Finally, feminist, Foucauldian and Marxist positions all
recognise the body as a site of power relations in Western society and contend power
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is something which is both exercised upon and able to be exercised by high risk
women thereby revealing the possibility for resistance to power relations.

Step 8: Acknowledging that the researcher creates the document that is
interpreted.
The overall aim of this study was to capture the meanings the participants attributed to
their lives in written texts (Denzin, 1989). The personal experience narratives of the
participants were constructed from one version of potentially many stories which could
have been told.

Rather than seeking to uncover true and false stories, the

biographical researcher’s task is to understand the story constructed, as stories are
always influenced by wider social, cultural and historical contexts which influence and
determine standards of truth in particular groups and societies (Denzin, 1989).

The participants’ personal experience narratives were “structures of representation”
(Denzin, 1989, p. 8) which provided the study data for analysis and interpretation.
Stories are told and heard in groups and societies therefore the telling, hearing and
interpretation of stories will always be subjective and influenced by an individual’s
personal values, beliefs and experiences (Frank, 1995). In biographical research, the
researcher creates the life which is written about in the same way the teller creates
the story which was told thus the subject is created in the text written (Denzin, 1989).
In this study, this subjectivity is viewed as a privilege rather than a restriction since the
focus is on creating a shared understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.
As discussed in Chapter 3, a preoccupation with validity, reliability and generalisability
is set aside in favour of a concern for meaning and interpretation (Denzin, 1989;
Dolby-Stahl, 1985) and presenting a credible, believable account.

The personal experience narratives of the participants in this study demonstrated an
attempt to document reality (Dolby-Stahl, 1985). Whilst the researcher used literary
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theory to develop an understanding of the experiences contained within the personal
experience narratives, the interpretation was from the researcher’s perspective
(Hendricks, 1999; Williams & Holmes, 2005) and was therefore individual. It was
therefore essential the researcher took full responsibility for the act of interpreting and
translating what was heard during the act of storytelling (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).
Additionally, since “a life or biography is only ever given in the words that are written
about it” (Denzin, 1989, p. 7), the focus of the interpretation was on the text of the
individual and not the individual as such.

The researcher acknowledged each

personal experience represented the words of the woman not their underlying
philosophy or stable identity (Dolby-Stahl, 1985) as these can never be known. By
accepting responsibility for the interpreted document, the researcher absolved the
participant from any ‘blame’ should any discomforting information emerge during the
research process (Dolby-Stahl, 1985). Similarly, the researcher’s primary obligation
was to the people under study hence the promise of privacy was afforded to those
who shared their stories and permitted an insight into their most personal experiences
(Denzin, 1989). The researcher acknowledged she created the document which was
interpreted and therefore provided a reliable method which safeguarded the
psychological privacy of the study participants (Dolby-Stahl, 1985).

In summary, the approach taken in this study blended Denzin’s (1989) interpretive
biography with Dolby-Stahl’s (1985) literary folkloristic methodology to unravel and
interpret the personal experience narratives of high risk women who said no to RRS
within the framework of Western medical discourse and made possible the discovery
of the private folklore of this group of women. The chapter to follow comprises the
analysis and discussion chapter. The participants’ stories are interpreted through the
lenses of Marxist, Foucauldian and Feminist literary theories. In particular, the Marxist
concepts of ideology and commodification, Foucault’s theories on discourse and
power, and the feminist concept of resistance are used to focus on the aspects of
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experience considered most important: the participants’ experiences of being
identified as owning a BRCA1/2 mutation which predisposes cancer development,
and how these experiences led to the decision to say no to RRS.
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CHAPTER 5: THE STORIES OF SUSAN, ANN, PAULINE, ROSIE, MARY AND
JACQUI
This section introduces the study participants and describes how intimacy was
established with each participant to facilitate the uncovering of meaningful
experiences, epiphanies and private folklore.

Following this, the participants’

biographical timelines with family histories and epiphany moments are presented.
The participants’ names and those of others were changed to protect anonymity.

Establishing intimacy with Susan
Susan was 35 years old, divorced with one daughter (Emma) aged 14 years. She
worked as a classroom teaching assistant in a local high school. Susan was first to
respond to the newspaper advertisement seeking study participants. When she
telephoned, she seemed undecided about participation and asked several questions
relating to the purpose of the study and what would happen with the study findings. I
briefly explained the study aims and explained my experiences of working with women
facing familial cancer had made me aware of the difficulties faced and I was keen to
understand these difficulties to better inform support for these women. I reiterated
participation was voluntary and she could give it some thought and get back to me if
she decided she wished to participate. However, she stated she was keen to talk
about her experiences in the hope they might help others and we arranged to carry
out the interview the following week at her home.

On arrival at Susan’s home, she appeared welcoming but anxious. I complimented
her on her home and accepted an offer of coffee. As the coffee was being made, we
chatted about my work and I asked her about her work as a classroom assistant at the
High School. I explained I had two teenage children myself and joked I did not envy
her spending prolonged periods of time with lots of teenagers which she laughingly
agreed was challenging at times.

Susan then explained she too had a teenage
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daughter and being a divorcee, felt guilty she had said no to RRS and worried she
would not be around to see her daughter grow up. I acknowledged this must be
difficult for her and as a mother myself, I could see where she was coming from. I
asked her if she was happy to commence the interview and she stated yes and she
was actually looking forward to sharing her thoughts with someone who had some
insight into what she had been through and who was not there to question the
decision she had made or persuade her otherwise.

Establishing intimacy with Ann
Ann was 47 years old, married with a daughter aged 16 and a son aged 11 years. Ann
and her husband Ken had inherited the family business, a bakery, from Ann’s father,
who had died from prostate cancer, and she fulfilled the role of book-keeper for the
business.

Ann responded to one of the early newspaper advertisements and

appeared keen to participate from the outset. When she initially contacted me, she
asked about the background to the newspaper advert, and wondered if the research
was to inform the writing of a book. When I briefly explained the study aims, she
immediately articulated she was keen to be involved as she felt it was an area of
concern for her family and for women generally. I thanked her for responding, briefly
outlined the study aims and arranged to carry out the interview five days later in her
home.

Ann lived in an affluent area of town and on arrival at her home it was evident family
was very important to her. Throughout the hallway and into the siting area, the walls
were adorned with many pictures of her children and other family portraits.

I

commented on how nice her house was how lovely the pictures looked. She thanked
me for the compliment and offered me tea and biscuits, which I kindly accepted.

I

thanked her again for her willingness to take part in the study and asked if she had
any questions or if there was anything she needed me to explain. She stated no but
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inquired into my motivations for the research. I explained how my interest in familial
breast and ovarian cancer developed when working as a Breast Care Nurse as I had
witnessed first-hand the challenges and dilemmas faced by women and their loved
ones. I offered my view the management of hereditary breast/ovarian cancer was
increasingly the focus of much research and I believed it was important women
affected were given the opportunity to contribute to research by telling health care
professionals about their experiences.

Ann went on to tell me she had herself been doing her own research about hereditary
breast cancer because every day she worried she had made the wrong decision in
saying no to RRS. However, she had found newspaper and magazine articles onesided: their focus tended to be women who had accepted surgery. Similarly, she had
joined an online forum but again, almost all other members of the forum felt accepting
surgery was the best option. I said I would be interested to hear more on her thoughts
about this and asked permission to commence the interview to which she agreed,
thanking me for the opportunity to tell her story.

Establishing intimacy with Pauline
Pauline was aged 33 and lived with John, her partner of 12 years, and her two
children: Ross aged 9 and Eva aged 6. She was the youngest participant to respond
to the newspaper advertisements and appeared anxious from the outset. When she
initially contacted me, Pauline inquired if there was any payment for taking part in the
research. I explained there was not and briefly outlined the purpose of the study. She
seemed hesitant and said she would give participation some thought and get back to
me at a later date.

I thanked her for responding and stated I would be happy to

answer any questions she had or address any concerns. It was another week before
Pauline phoned again saying she was willing to be interviewed. Pauline did not want
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me to come to her home therefore the interview was arranged for the following week
and took place in a private room I reserved at the local library.

When we met the following week, Pauline remained anxious about participation. I
suggested we had a coffee in the library café beforehand to allow her to have her
concerns addressed prior to the interview. Over coffee, she explained to me she was
nervous about saying the wrong thing and although she felt she wanted to talk about
her experiences, she wasn’t sure she would be able to answer all my questions or if
her answers would be the ‘right’ answers. I described the study aims in a little more
detail and explained it was her story and experiences I was interested in hearing
about therefore there were no ‘right or wrong’ answers. She asked me why I was
interested in her situation and I explained my clinical background and work as a
Breast Care Nurse and my interest in women’s health and cancer genetics generally.
Pauline asked if I had children and I told her I had a son of 14 and a daughter of 11.
She then told me she also had a son and daughter, and we discussed our children
and shared anecdotes for a short while. Pauline was quite animated when talking
about her children and she appeared more relaxed. I then asked if she would be
happy to carry out the interview, to which she responded yes, and we finished our
coffees and headed to the reserved room.

Establishing intimacy with Rosie
Rosie was 39 years old, married to Tom with a son aged 14 called Neil. When Rosie
initially contacted me, she seemed anxious and asked several questions regarding the
purpose of the study and what participation involved. I explained my interest in the
subject matter and what I hoped to achieve by doing the research. Although she
stated she would be willing to discuss her experiences, she was concerned her family
would find out as she did not want them to know. I explained protecting participants’
privacy was an important issue in the study and any information she gave would be
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anonymised and at no time would her identity be revealed.

I also explained the

interview could take place somewhere other than her home but stressed participation
was voluntary and she could withdraw from the study at any time. In view of her
anxiety, I suggested she think further about participation and call me back if she was
certain she wished to take part. She agreed to do so and called me back the following
day, stating she wanted to take part as she believed her experiences to be important
and she felt people should know about the difficulties surrounding genetic testing.
Owing to Rosie’s request to keep participation private from her family, we arranged to
carry out the interview at the home of a friend (Jane).

When we met at Jane’s house on the day of interview, Rosie was friendly but still
appeared anxious. Jane was present while we had coffee and Rosie explained her
friend had been a source of support and comfort during her experience whereas she
had felt unsupported by her family and hence had not wished the family to know of her
participation. Rosie again asked about my motivation for undertaking the research
and I explained familial cancer was an area I had always been interested in since my
time working as a Breast Care Nurse because I had cared for women facing difficult
decisions about familial breast and ovarian cancer. I also explained my interest in
women’s health generally, both as a woman and a researcher, and my view health
care professionals needed to know more about the experiences of women in
breast/ovarian cancer families. Her friend Jane agreed this was important and my
research sounded very useful. I again thanked Rosie for her participation and offered
I would be interested to hear more about her experiences. At this point, Rosie’s friend
Jane excused herself and the interview began.

Establishing intimacy with Mary
Mary was 37 years old and married to Robert. She had two daughters aged 21 and
16 years. Her oldest daughter lived with her partner and had a child of 3 months
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whilst her youngest daughter lived at home. Mary was a member of the same online
support group as Ann and contacted me after discussing the study with her. Like Ann,
Mary had found herself in the minority with regards to saying no to RRS, as most
members of the support group were planning or had undergone surgery.

When Mary first contacted me, she explained Ann had discussed taking part in the
study with her. She stated she thought my study sounded very interesting and she
felt it was important people understood how difficult the genetic testing process was
and decision making around RRS was not easy. I thanked her for her interest and
explained I would need to tell her more about the study and give her some time to
carefully consider participation. I explained the study aims, what I hoped to achieve
by undertaking the study, what she would be required to do and she stated she would
consider taking part. She called back a few days later and we arranged to carry out
the interview at her home the following week.

Mary was friendly and welcoming when I arrived at her home. We spent some time
chatting and having tea and biscuits.

I had previously discussed my nursing

background with Mary when I was explaining my interest in women’s health and
familial breast cancer. Mary talked about her work as a care assistant in an elderly
care home and how much she enjoyed the role.

She explained she had fallen

pregnant at an early age (16) and had therefore left school without completing her
education. This was of some regret as she had always wanted to become a nurse but
had been unable to do so. We talked about nursing and health care generally, and
the many changes which had taken place in our lifetime. This led on to a discussion
about cancer and genetics and Mary talked about how different health care had been
when her mother had first been diagnosed with and treated for breast cancer. I then
suggested we commence the interview and Mary agreed.
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Establishing intimacy with Jacqui
Jacqui was 40 years old, married to Paul with two children: a daughter aged 17 and a
son aged 15.

Her son had mild autism but attended main stream school and

appeared to be doing well. Jacqui was the final participant to be recruited following
one of the later newspaper advertisements. She had not seen the newspaper advert
herself but a relative had pointed it out to her. When Jacqui contacted me, she was
bright and cheerful and keen to find out more about the study. I explained the study
aims and what I hoped to achieve by doing the research and encouraged her to ask
questions if there was anything she was unsure of. She said she had no questions
but was very interested in telling her story as she believed her experiences could help
other women in a similar position. I thanked her for her interest and explained what
would be required of her. Since she lived some distance away, we agreed to meet for
the interview four weeks later to allow me time to plan travel arrangements. I advised
her should any questions arise during this time, she could call me for clarification. I
also asked her permission to call her the day before the interview was scheduled to
confirm she still wanted to participate, prior to me travelling to her home town. She
happily agreed to this and I once again thanked her for her willingness to take part
and stated I looked forward to hearing her story when we met.

Jacqui was friendly and welcoming when I arrived at her home to carry out the
interview. As she made coffee, she enquired about my train journey and asked me a
little about where I lived as it was a part of the country she had never been to. I briefly
described my home town and explained I had visited the town she lived in as a child
as it had been a popular seaside holiday destination when I was growing up. Jacqui
was younger than me but remembered being a child and the many tourists who came
to the town, commenting the numbers had declined over recent years. We talked a
little about how things changed generally and how different things were for children
growing up now. Jacqui informed me she had two children aged 17 and 15 years and
187

stated she worried about the world they were growing up in, especially her son with
his autism. I offered I was also a mother of two and agreed how challenging bringing
up children could be at times. Jacqui then talked about her additional worries about
her children as a result of her cancer family history. I acknowledged her worries and
asked if she felt comfortable to commence the interview. She re-iterated she was
keen to tell her story and the interview began.

In keeping with Denzin’s (1989) approach, the participants’ biographical timelines are
diagrammatically presented next.

These represent the life trajectories of the

participants in relation to their family histories and turning point moments up until the
time of interview.
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Susan’s biographical timeline

1989

Ann’s biographical timeline

• grandmother's death from bilateral breast
cancer
• remembers her own mother's distress

• paternal grandmother's death from breast
cancer
• secrecy surrounding diagnosis
1970s

Nov 2003

Oct/Nov 2007

March 2008

June 2008

March 2009

• mother diagnosed with ovarian cancer
• conscious of mother's mortality
• fear of cancer, fear of death
• cancer was bad luck

• aunt diagnosed: breast cancer
• aunt undergoes genetic testing

• aunt reveals positive test result
• result of test forced upon Susan
• whole family affected

• Susan undergoes genetic testing
• problem becomes real
• realisation of seriousness of situation

• Susan receives positive test result
• inevitablity of disease/death
• fear for child

• mother's death from gastric cancer
1988

1990

• father's death from prostate cancer
• shock
• being strong for siblings

1992

• paternal aunt diagnosed /died from breast
cancer
• cancer more than bad luck/familial link
• deadliness of cancer

• sister diagnosed with breast cancer
• realisation of seriousness of situation
Feb 2007

Nov 2007

• sister tests positive for BRCA2 mutation
• further evidence of familial link
• inevitability of cancer

• Ann undergoes genetic testing
March 2008

May 2009

• family receive negative test results
• unfairness of situation
• family relationships strained

Oct 2008

July 2009

• conflict and contradictions surrounding
surgery
• Susan says no to RRS
• fatalistic outlook
March 2009

April 2011
interview

• uncertainty about life
• Susan wishes she had never been tested
• living with a timebomb
May 2011
interview

• Ann receives mutation-positive test result
• no escape from cancer/death sentence
• relief for sibling/concern for children

• Ann says no to RRS
• bodily concerns
• fate/destiny

• negative impact of testing
• concern for children
• constant threat of cancer
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Pauline’s biographical timeline

Rosie’s biographical timeline

• maternal grandmother's death from
breast cancer
1980s

1980s

• mother diagnosed and treated for breast
cancer

• maternal aunt's death: breast cancer
1999

2002

• mother's death from stroke
Aug 2003

• mother diagnosed : ovarian cancer
June 2006

• twin sister diagnosed : breast cancer
• sister refuses testing

• sister diagnosed with breast cancer
June 2007

Jan 2008

2008

November
2008

• maternal grandfather dies
• breast cancer suspected but no clinical
diagnosis

Sept 2006

• sister has disease recurrance in affected
breast
• sister undergoes mastectomy and
genetic testing

• mother undegoes genetic testing
• family relationships strained
March 2007

• sister tests BRCA2 mutation-positive
• sister undergoes risk reducing
mastectomy
Dec 2007

• Pauline has genetic testing
• complexity of testing process evident
• Pauline struggles to understand
• relationship with partner strained

• Pauline receives mutation-positive test
result
August 2009 • can of worms opened

Dec 2009

• body image concerns
• fears over impact of
surgery/menopausal symptoms
• Pauline says no to RRS

June 2011
interview

• negative impact of testing
• relationships with friends changed
• personal interventions to reduce cancer
risk important

• mother receives mutation-positive test
result
• Rosie uneasey but obligated to be
tested

• Rosie undergoes genetic testing
July 2008

Feb 2009

• Rosie receives mutation-positive test
result
• result brings fear
• relationship with husband strained

Nov 2009

• body image concerns
• belief in fate/religious faith
• Rosie says no to RRS

Oct 2011
interview

• regrets being tested
• opening Pandora's box
• living in fear of cancer
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Mary’s biogrpahical timeline

May
1997

2002

• Mary's mother dies from secondary
breast cancer
• mother's death is a devastating loss

• maternal aunt diagnosed with breast
cancer
• first realisation of familial link

• maternal cousin diagnosed with
breast cancer
• familial link now 'official'
• fearful situation

Jacqui’s biographical timeline

• Jacqui's mother dies from secondary
ovarian cancer
Oct 1994

• Jacqui's father dies from lung cancer
• fear of cancer as a fatal illness
Jan 2006

• sister diagnosed with breast cancer
• realisation of familial link
2006

2008

January 2009

• maternal cousin receives mutationpositive test result
• Mary reluctant to undergo testing
but is persuaded by family
• testing is 'tempting fate'

2009

Aug 2009
• Mary undergoes genetic testing
• concerns regarding implications of
testing for daughters
August 2009
Nov 2009

May 2010

• Mary receives mutation-positive test
result
• uncertainty about the future
• body image concerns
Jan 2010

• Mary says no to RRS
• feels some relief with decision 'back
to me'
Sept 2010
Feb 2010

March 2012
interview

• fatalistic outlook
• wishes test not available
• concerns for children and
grandchildren

May 2012
interview

• sister treated for second primary
breast cancer
• sister tests mutation-positive

• testing appears sensible option
• Jacqui undergoes testing
• realisation of implications dawns

• Jacqui receives positive test result
• world falls apart
• feels a different person

• younger sister receives negative test
result
• conflicting emotions
• negative impact on family dynamics
• Jacqui feels sense of isolation

• Jacqui says no to RRS
• difficulty understanding own decision
• bodily concerns

• fatalistic outlook
• fears for daughter
• no-win situation
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
The previous chapters justified the approach taken in this study and presented a
detailed description of the method used to gather the data. This chapter provides an
analysis of the data based on the biographical method. The analysis is written around
what Denzin (1989) referred to as epiphanies or turning point moments and what
Dolby-Stahl (1985) referred to as themes. The most significant epiphany was testing
positive for a BRCA1/2 mutation. The analysis here stems from this and incorporates
other epiphany moments as outlined in the participants’ biographical timelines. The
following sections analyse, interpret and discuss these biographical events as captured
in the participants’ texts in relation to the three identified literary theories. While DolbyStahl (1985) uses the term ‘narrative’ and Denzin (1989) uses ‘personal experience
narrative’, the remaining thesis will refer to the participants’ stories.

This study utilised Riessman’s (2001, 2006, 2008) thematic analysis as the
underpinning framework for analysis of the participants’ stories. The stories have been
“cleaned up” (Riessman, 2008, p. 57) to remove the researcher’s utterances,
dysfluencies in speech and generally edited to make the excerpts more readable and
to ensure the passages presented are contextualised in relation to the issues of
concern. Ellipses (…) are used to indicate omitted words such as repetition and false
starts. Clarification of meaning and explanations of local dialect and vernacular are
provided in square brackets where necessary. The names of the participants and other
individuals referred to have been changed to protect anonymity.

An interpretation through the lens of Marxist Literary Theory
This study explored women’s experiences of being identified as high risk of developing
breast/ovarian cancer and saying no to RRS. Women’s breasts and ovaries carry
distinctive social and cultural meanings in Western society therefore surgery to remove
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them, particularly in the absence of disease, presented participants with a dilemma.
Understanding a woman’s choice to say no to the removal of healthy breasts/ovaries
required their decision to be considered within social, cultural and historical world views
which allowed interpretation of their experience. This chapter applies a Marxist view
which contends Western society is a capitalist society in which dominant ideologies
shape human experience in relation to gender, sexuality, work, the family and other
cultural ideals (Denzin, 1990).

The analysis and discussion to follow drew on two important and interlinked concepts
in Marxist literary critique. That is, ideology and commodification. Both Marxist
conceptual tools were useful for deconstructing participants’ experiences. Ideology
influences beliefs and perceptions in daily life and forms the basis of understanding
reality. Ideology also promotes commodification of gender, sexuality and the breast
presenting each as an essential and natural component of social life and allows the
commercial exploitation of HBOC. Commodification is the process, whereby, people
and the products of labour are transformed into objects considered useful and/or which
have exchange value (Lock & Nguyen, 2010).

A Marxist interpretation exposed

ideological conflict and contradiction in relation to HBOC and how these confirmed or
undermined the decision to say no to RRS, creating ambivalent experiences for the
participants and providing scope for the creation of personal ideologies which resisted
the dominant, externally imposed ideological forces.

Gene mutations as cancer genes
A recurrent and striking feature of the participants’ stories was the continual referral to
BRCA1/2 mutations as ‘cancer genes’. Every participant referred, in some way, to
having ‘the’ or ‘a’ cancer gene and argued this ownership in terms of something found
in their body, but not in the bodies of other women.
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Susan explained how her family first became aware of the presence of hereditary
cancer as a result of her affected aunt’s mutation-positive genetic test result:
We found out about the gene only after Auntie Helen got her testing
done (…) when she was in hospital getting chemotherapy. They said
she could get tested to see if she had a breast cancer gene which could
maybe be passed down the family.
Susan’s family were unaware her aunt was being tested until her aunt revealed the test
result during a family meet-up, which had led to some disquiet at the time:
So it kicked off a bit when we got there [during a visit to her Aunt’s
home] and she says she’s got something to tell us and then just comes
out with it, saying she’s had this test and she’s got a cancer gene and
we’ve all to see a specialist [be]cause we might have it too. This was in
front of Emma [Susan’s daughter] too. She didn’t give us the chance to
say “right, get the weans [children] out the room while we talk about
this”. It was really just sprung on us (…) we weren’t given any option to
not hear about it.
Prior to testing, Mary had hoped she would not have “the gene” and Jacqui admitted
being afraid because she had “inherited the cancer gene” which might shorten her life.
Ann also believed she owned a cancer-causing gene which could be passed on to her
children and discussed her fears this might be the case:
Sometimes I look at her and her friends, all young and full of life and
vitality and all so beautiful, then it pops in my head she might be
carrying the gene and have her life turned upside down. I feel so guilty
sometimes when I think I might have passed it on to her.
There appeared to be a perception only high risk women carried BRCA genes, despite
these genes being part of every human’s genetic makeup, passed on to all offspring
(Arden-Jones et al., 2008). No participant differentiated between the gene itself and
inherited mutations which are associated with cancer development (Rosenthal et al.,
2012). Instead, there was a belief people either had a cancer-causing gene or not, as
illustrated by Rosie who explained her position of risk of cancer in such terms:
But when they actually found the gene in me, they knew my risk was
much much higher than it would be normally, if I didn’t have the gene. I
am higher than her [sister] because I’ve got the gene and she doesn’t.
Similarly, although Ann understood most women who develop breast/ovarian cancer do
not have an inherited gene mutation (NICE, 2013), this was expressed in relation to
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having the gene or not rather than having a mutation or not. Ann explained: “more
women without the gene get cancer than those with it”. These statements typified how
the language used to discuss gene mutations created an understanding breast/ovarian
cancer was primarily caused by genes found only in high risk women; an erroneous
belief which is not in keeping with most cancer development.

BRCA1 and BRCA2 are genes located on chromosomes 17 and 13 respectively and
are found in all human DNA (Yoshida & Miki, 2004), therefore in every person. Certain
deleterious mutations in these genes are associated with an increased risk of
developing breast/ovarian cancer, hence the labelling of the genes as BRCA1 (breast
cancer susceptibility gene 1) and BRCA2 (breast cancer susceptibility gene 2),
(Lodder et al., 2002). Whilst one may reasonably argue this represents no more than a
shorthand way of referring to mutations on chromosomes which predispose
breast/ovarian cancer, a Marxist interpretation suggests that the labelling of the gene
faults as ‘BRCA1 and 2 genes’ can be understood as an ideological practice which
proposes medicine has discovered why women develop breast/ovarian cancer and
belies the reality of limited medical knowledge.

More than 1000 different mutations in these genes have been identified (Antoniou &
Easton, 2006) and much fewer are known to be deleterious (Antoniou et al., 2003).
Current evidence suggests BRCA1/2 mutations account for at most 10% of all breast
cancers and 15% of all ovarian cancers (NCI, 2014). Scientific understanding of the
genetics of hereditary breast/ovarian cancer predisposition remains largely unexplained
(Snape, et al., 2012; Tamir, 2010) and further research is needed to understand the
clinical implications of different gene mutations (Kurian, Sigal & Plevritis, 2010).

As

Werner-Lin (2008, p. 114) pointed out, “genetic testing for HBOC is predictive, not
prophetic” because science is not able to say who will develop cancer and who will not.
The vast majority of breast/ovarian cancers occur for reasons other than BRCA1/2
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mutations, yet these genes are continually referred to as ‘the breast cancer genes’ in
professional journals, the media and cancer charity literature.

Only on one occasion

was there acknowledgement of an inherited mutation in the BRCA1/2 gene as being
the cause of increased risk when Mary said:
(…) they [genetics staff] said with the gene fault the risk of cancer is
really high. They can’t always tell for everyone and it depends on what
one [mutation] you’ve got, what the actual risk will be but they do know
there is a risk. They told us the gene fault I had meant my risk of getting
cancer was 80%.
Interestingly, Mary’s cognisance of a mutation rather than the gene itself as being
responsible for increased risk was couched within her discussion of how her risk status
was communicated by the geneticist: Mary herself referred to “the cancer gene” when
presenting her personal perceptions of risk:
When you first find out you’ve got the cancer gene, it takes a while to
sink in, even though I was half expecting to have it with my family’s
history, I thought it would be the case we had a cancer gene in our
family but it still took a while to accept. I think maybe the shutters just
come down, like a survival instinct. I was really emotional for a while (…)
angry because I had the gene and my risk being so high because of it.
Consequently,

the

participants’

stories

revealed

a

‘reality’

about

hereditary

breast/ovarian cancer has been perpetuated through the ideological use of language
and the labelling of gene faults as ‘cancer genes’. Such an ideology suggests some
people carry a cancer-causing gene whereas others do not, which explains ‘who gets
cancer’.

Interpreting the participants’ experiences through the lens of Marxist Literary Theory
(MLT) revealed the labelling of gene mutations as ‘cancer genes’ commodified risk and
allowed gene faults to be constructed as a form of biocapital (Franklin & Lock, 2003;
Rose, 2007). Biocapital refers to the use of living organisms or life forms to generate
income and occurs when biotechnology becomes primarily a source of market value
(Rajan, 2006).

Helmreich (2008) argued advancements in biotechnology allow

biological materials including human genomes to be increasingly capitalised upon and
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used to underpin projects aimed at profit generation. Life and life forms including genes
as biocapital thus become objects of exchange in the capitalist system and a significant
resource for the joint generation of health and wealth (Acero, 2012).

The construction of BRCA mutations as biocapital is exemplified by the patenting of the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes by Myriad Genetics in 2001. Myriad was able to secure a
monopoly of rights to genetic testing and therapeutic uses of BRCA1/2 genes which
gave power over the use of the genes and exclusive rights to commercial exploitation
(Hanson, 2002), generating billions of dollars of profit for corporate interests (ThomasPollei, 2008).

The labelling of particular gene faults as ‘cancer genes’ also supports what Birch
(2007, p. 85) referred to as a “logic of morbidity” which allowed medicine and science
to create economic yield. It is the creation of new morbidities, in this case ‘cancer
genes’ which generate economic opportunity and allow economic value to be attached
to risk reducing interventions (Birch & Tyfield, 2013). Gene faults essentially allow a
diagnosis of risk to be made which in turn permits the production of new drugs,
technologies and professional services and thus new markets for these services (Löwy,
2010).

Moreover, the material embodiment of risk as residing in one’s ‘cancer genes’ means
people become indistinguishable from their genetic code, since genes are culturally
associated with the essence of life (Thomas-Pollei, 2008).

If one is identified as

owning a ‘cancer gene’, other causes of cancer external to the body are discounted or
relegated; and, genetic causes of disease take centre stage. This in turn creates and
sustains market demand for expensive genetic technologies to diagnose and manage
cancer risk. Jacqui revealed how her new-found genetic knowledge caused her to call
into question why people develop cancer:
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When you think of all the cancer in the family, well its common sense
really isn’t it? I mean, my mother and father both smoked and they both
got cancer. He [father] got lung cancer and her, it was ovarian. Smoking
and cancer, well that’s been known for ages but you think now maybe, is
it smoking? Maybe he [father] had something [genetic] too (…) maybe
that’s why people who don’t smoke like Beth [sister] still get cancer and
how lots of heavy smokers seem to be okay.
Jacqui questioned smoking as a cause of cancer, and instead identified genetic causes
as being “common sense”. This reflects the findings of Finkler (2000) who also found
people stated it was ‘common sense’ that cancer was a result of genetics. Likewise,
the other participants and their families almost entirely attributed cancer to the singular
cause of ‘the cancer gene(s)’. This reductionism represents an “ideology of genetic
essentialism” (Finkler, 2000, p. 2) whereby cancer becomes a product of genes,
ensuring women without disease are dependent upon medical expertise to reduce risk
and stay healthy. Owning a BRCA1/2 mutation thus comes to be understood as a
threat to life, as explained by Susan:
I mean I was pleased for her, really I was honestly, but it wasn’t fair
because she [(sister] had been the one really trying to get me to go, to
persuade me saying we all need it done, then she’s escaped and I’m left
knowing I could have this thing that could kill me. And she’s not even
got any kids. God you must think I’m horrible, but I just felt really hard
done to I suppose, why me, and worried about Emma (…) I mean, no
one wants to be faced with what might kill them.
Here Susan’s story shows how she interpreted her genetic status as a threat to life,
referring to it twice as something which could kill her, equating her cancer risk with her
mortality. This happens in part owing to the cultural significance of the word ‘cancer’
and a collective worry about cancer. Susan said:
So she was okay but it hit me hard (…) when you see your mum in
hospital with all the tubes and stuff and more so when you hear the ‘c’
word [cancer]. I am thinking “okay so they say she’s been lucky, but I
mean its cancer” [said with emphasis].
Susan’s response to her mother’s diagnosis reflects the fear of cancer which is almost
unrivalled (Clarke & Everest, 2006; Harrington, 2012; Vrinten et al., 2014) because
cancer ideologies ensure society takes for granted cancer is deadly and the ultimate
threat to life, a risk to be removed at all costs.

A MLT lens proposes that the word
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‘cancer’ is a potent ideological tool, and the risk of carrying BRCA1/2 gene mutations
creates the need for an industry to manage the risk through genetic testing and
maintains medical power as the overseer of these tests. Cancer risk, as an ideological
tool maintains that those deemed in this category respond in a desired way and that
cancer risk is communicated and perpetuated in society as intended by key agencies
involved in maintaining ideological control of the population.

Ann, in particular,

frequently referred to “the ‘c’ word”, describing it as “your worst nightmare” and “the
one word you never want to hear”. Jacqui also alluded to the cultural significance of
the word ‘cancer’ when she explained:
Common sense tells me there’s something in every family, you know,
something’s got to get you (…) but to have cancer in your family, that
has to be the worst thing you can have, to be told you are a cancer
family. Everyone knows cancer is a killer, even the treatment, the
radiation and the chemo[therapy], well they’re not pleasant. Beth [sister]
had a terrible time with her treatment, it nearly finished her off. So the
thing about having cancer in the family is, well it’s the issue with the
cancer but also the treatment (…) it’s like a double whammy if you have
cancer.
Similarly, Rosie summarised the fear associated with cancer:
You don’t need to be a doctor to know cancer is one of the worst things
you can get, especially when it spreads, there’s not usually much they
can do about it. Plus even having surgery can be risky. Once they open
you up, anything that’s in there can spread. That’s what happened to a
woman my sister knew. She went in for surgery on the bowel and then
within two months, it had spread to her liver and she was dead (…) but
before the operation, the scans were okay, it was the operation, made it
spread.
These findings submit that a belief in the presence and destructive power of a cancercausing gene which serves as an ideological force. A Marxist perspective, therefore,
contends ‘cancer’ is ideologically empowered to mean death. Hence, cancer risk is an
ideological tool which creates and sustains fear. However, this is not to deny cancer is
a disease which causes significant mortality and morbidity, nor that genetic mutations
exist which make cancer more likely. Rather, from a Marxist stance, it is argued that
ideologies of fear permeated through cancer and risk discourses exploit the emotions
and worries of high risk women and permit ideological control for economic gain.
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The creation of BRCA1/2 mutations as ‘cancer genes’ adds to their value as biocapital
and effectively places a monetary value on cancer fear. The ideology of fear obscures
the vast wealth generated through genetic technologies and what goes unnoticed is
that most breast/ovarian cancers occur for reasons other than BRCA 1/2 mutations.

To sum, interpreting the participants’ stories through the lens of MLT submits that the
labelling of certain genetic mutations as “the breast cancer genes” is an ideological tool
which endows risk with a material reality. The deadliness of cancer generates a level
of fear which compels individuals to take steps to stay healthy and simultaneously
supports medical intervention for dealing with cancer risk. The next section turns to an
analysis of the participants’ stories in relation to ideologies of treatment for risk and
ways in which risk was constructed as something which could be dealt with through the
consumption of a number of medical technologies. Again, conflicts and contradictions
were inherent in the influences of ideologies which diffused uncertainty and both
consented and silenced resistance to the dominant medical pathway for HBOC risk.

Ideology, genetic responsibility and consumerism
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui and Mary revealed the stressful and
enduring pressure exerted upon them which obligated them to attend to the threat of
cancer.

There was strong belief no woman could ignore a family history of

breast/ovarian cancer or a mutation-positive test result.

Despite current focus on

genetic testing as a key step in managing risk of breast/ovarian cancer, analysis of the
participants’ stories revealed testing was not always keenly initiated by the participants
but rather there was often a degree of ambivalence around testing. Susan described
her initial uncertainty about genetic testing thus:
When we were first told we needed testing, I wasn’t really sure I was
going to have it done. I’m a bit superstitious really (…) the more you talk
about something the more likely it is to happen. But everyone else, they
were all like, think about Emma [Susan’s daughter], you need to do it for
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her, you need to know if you’ve got it or not. I don’t know, maybe I was
just trying to bury my head in the sand.
Mary also stated she was initially cautious about entering the genetic testing process
but discussions with others had made it clear knowledge of genetic status was
something which could and should not be ignored:
I was never keen for the testing. Angela [Mary’s cousin] was keen to
have it done because she thought it would help everyone get protected.
I think it’s different when you’ve already got cancer, the testing is like
finding a reason for it. An explanation of ‘this is why I got it’ [cancer].
But when you don’t have cancer (…) to me it was like tempting fate.
Getting it done. But there was a lot of pressure on me, from people who
said “how can you not get it done, you need to know, how can you get
sorted if you don’t know”, that kind of thing.
These excerpts show Susan and Mary had initial reservations about genetic testing but
were subjected to pressure from others in the family to uncover their genetic status.
Lock and Nguyen (2010) argued reluctance to undergo genetic testing is a plausible
response in nature of the potential negative consequences of being identified as
owning a genetic mutation which predisposes cancer.

However, what this study

illustrates is ideologies around cancer risk and prevention strategies direct how one
should respond to the threat of cancer, namely by submitting to genetic testing. What
is omitted from cancer and medical ideologies is the option to avoid knowledge of
genetic status by declining genetic testing.

As the participants’ stories revealed, any

reservations an individual might have held regarding testing and finding out one’s
genetic status were likely to be quickly quietened, even condemned by others, on the
basis knowledge of genetic risk is paramount. Ann described how her cousin’s refusal
to be tested had been met with incredulity by others:
There was a lot of cancer in our family. We were all already worried
about it, being in the family. (…). Christine’s [sister] test wasn’t a
surprise, she already had cancer and at a young age. (…) there was an
understanding after Christine’s diagnosis we would be tested, all of us,
because of the history. When my cousin said she wasn’t interested,
there was (…) a huge intake of breath. (…). I don’t think anyone quite
believed what she was saying. (…) I have to admit I was at first
anyway, shocked. Assumed she would. Of course I see where she’s
coming from now but at the time, no. I think she was put under the
spotlight, “why are you not having it?” Her husband was really off with
her, got the kids to speak to her. It was all really unpleasant.
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Medicine provides a service to women with a family history of breast/ovarian cancer by
offering interventions to diagnose and manage risk.

Medical technologies and

pharmaceuticals are then able to be consumed by health care professionals and at risk
individuals in the quest to modify risk and prevent cancer.

Genetic medicine has

resulted in a globalised industry which generates substantial profits for pharmaceutical
and biomedical technology companies (Baird, 2000; Birch & Tyfield, 2013, Hanson,
2002; Lock & Nguyen, 2010; Zones, 2000). The Human Genome Project is estimated
to have cost $3billion (UK Parliament, 2012) and genetic testing is now a multi-billion
dollar industry with spending on genetic testing set to reach $25 billion dollars in the
United States of America by 2020 (United Health Group, 2012). In the UK, more than
£5 billion pounds annually has been allocated to genetic science and research
programmes as part of what the government describes as a $100 billion synthetic
biology marketplace (UK Parliament, 2012). In Australia, the current spend on human
genetics Research and Development is estimated to be in the region of $795 million
dollars per year (The Centre for International Economics, 2013).

A Marxist interpretation contends ideologies about breast and ovarian cancer create
fear and fuel demand for genetic testing and risk reducing interventions. High levels of
cancer fear are necessary to ensure people, or by proxy the State, are prepared to pay
the costs of genetic tests. A key way in which the fears of Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline,
Jacqui and Mary were exploited through such ideologies related to their concerns for
their families, especially children. The participants’ stories revealed the obligation to
uncover one’s genetic status was experienced as an individual’s responsibility to
themselves and to their families. Pauline explained her sister’s first reaction to being
confirmed as mutation-positive was to request testing for others in the family:
Because she [Pauline’s sister] got tested when she was still getting
treated, it didn’t seem to take long. We weren’t really thinking about the
test until it came back and it was positive but it was to be expected
really. Her first reaction was for me to get tested. She asked the doctor:
“can my wee [younger] sister have it done”? Her first concern was for
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me really. We’ve always been close but after mum died and then she
got cancer, well we were even closer as it was just the two of us. They
had told her before-hand if she was [mutation] positive, they might be
able to test the others in the family if they wanted it (…) to be honest I
think that was one of her reasons for getting it done, to see if it would
help me find out my risk.
Here, Pauline believed her sister underwent testing in order to help others in the family
find out their risk of cancer. Not only does this highlight her sister’s obligations to the
family, it also appears to have influenced Pauline’s decision to have testing:
Of course when it came down to it, of course I would have it done
[testing]. I couldn’t not have it done could I? What would that say to
Sarah [Pauline’s sister]? It would have been a right slap in the face after
what she’d gone through. And then of course there was Ross and Eva
[children] and John [partner] to think about.
Hallowell (1999) and Rowley (2005) reported women undertaking genetic testing for
hereditary cancer often did so because of promises made to afflicted relatives which in
turn reinforced their obligations to others and influenced their risk management
decisions. Pauline

exhibited a deep responsibility to her sister and her partner and

children to undergo testing. The use of the words ‘of course’ appears three times in the
short excerpt above and reveals a certainty about Pauline’s decision to undergo
testing, but a certainty brought about through her responsibilities to others rather than
personal need to find out. Although Pauline did not explicitly outline her obligations to
others, her decision to undergo testing was entirely framed with reference to her sister,
partner and family and the refusal of testing was considered almost an abuse of others
in the family. Pauline alluded to the possibility of not being tested but ruled this out
because of responsibility to her sister who had been treated for cancer.

Familial

obligations thus emerged as an important motivator for engaging in genetic testing and
it was clear such obligations played an initial role in convincing participants to act to
attend to cancer risk.

Marxists view the institution of the family is part of society’s superstructure and key to
maintaining a healthy, productive workforce (Waitzkin 1984, 1989). This lends support
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to claims the importance of the family and a woman’s role as protector of health is
persistently endorsed in Western ideology (Acero, 2012; Lerner, 2000; Warner &
Procaccino, 2004). The nature of genetic medicine inevitably implies medicine for the
family (Geelen, Hoyweghen & Horstman, 2011; Novas & Rose, 2000) as the whole
family is implicated through risk of disease (Kenen, Ardern-Jones & Eeles, 2003).
Accordingly, decision-making on risk reducing interventions is argued to be best taken
within the context of a family clinic (Zagouri et al., 2013). This has implications for
women at risk of HBOC who may be ideologically consigned to making decisions in the
best interests of the family.

Ann’s story also displayed how her fears for her children

influenced her decision to find out her genetic status and her subsequent feelings once
a gene mutation was identified:
Well as a mother, your first thoughts are always for your family, your
children and what it means for them. You need to find out things, you
need to know, like, am I going to be around for them? Will they get it?
And of course it wasn’t just Gillian [daughter] to worry about because it
looked like our gene came from my grandmother through my father (…)
so Jack [son] was also at risk of cancer, well more at risk than normal,
which was really hard to believe at first, men could get breast cancer. I’d
never heard of it in men so I didn’t really think about Jack until later on
when I had more counselling and it came up. So I was really worried for
both of them, and how to broach the subject with them.
Like Pauline, Ann framed her decision-making vis-à-vis genetic testing in the context of
family responsibilities and explained her decision was influenced by her role as a
mother and the need to find out the implications of her genetic status for the sake of
her children. Ann’s first concerns were not for herself, but for her children; would she
still be alive for them and would they develop cancer.

The analysis here supports previous work which suggested women at high risk of
developing cancer made decisions in response to risk in part due to feelings of
responsibility for the health of the family (Bottorff et al., 2002; Bruno et al., 2010;
Foster, Watson, Moynihan, Ardern-Jones & Eeles, 2002; Hallowell, 1999, 2000;
Hamilton, 2012; Rowley, 2005). Being a parent is reported to be a significant predictive
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factor for uptake of RRS (Fang et al., 2005; Karp, Brown, Sullivan & Massie 1999;
Meijers-Heijboer, et al., 2000). This is perhaps not surprising when caring for the family
is central to the breast cancer discourse (Blackstone, 2004) and the value of female
nurturing is promoted and endorsed through medical encounters (Gibbon, 2007).
Thus, ideology has the potential to impact women’s decision making in ways which put
the needs of others first. The family complete with nurturing mother, is key in Western
society and is endorsed through medical discourse which situates women as the
gatekeepers of family health and guides women to undertake interventions to reduce
the threat of cancer.

Likewise, a Marxist perspective emphasises that a stable

relationship between the family and successful economic production in capitalist
societies is crucial; therefore, protection of the female (mother) as homemaker and
nurturer is essential to the maintenance of a healthy productive workforce (Althusser,
1971; Waitzkin, 1984).

HBOC is viewed as a threat to economic stability because it threatens the lives of
women and their ability to produce and reproduce.

Official guidelines on the

management of HBOC such as NICE (2013) recommend that women preserve their
ovaries until childbearing is complete further endorsing the importance of women’s role
to reproduce in Western society.

Women who say no to genetic testing and risk

reducing interventions may be construed as putting not only themselves at risk, but
also the entire ideological framework underpinning capitalist society because of the
covert linkage between the family and successful economic production (Waitzkin,
1984). The application of MLT, in this study, thus contended that the nature of genetic
medicine conveniently strengthened the ideological impact of the family and allowed
the transmission of subliminal messages through medical encounters to reinforce
dominant social patterns in relation to health behaviours, the family and women’s
responsibilities to themselves and others. Jacqui said:
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When she [sister] got the second breast cancer, she was referred to a
bigger hospital and she saw a specialist (…) he was the first to ask
about the family’s history and bring up the genetics. He said it was
important to think about testing because with the situation with my mum
and Beth and if it was in the family we would need to think about it
because the whole family could be affected. Beth was really poorly at
the time but she thought it was something she could do for us.
Given the above, it is not surprising that the analysis of the participants’ stories
revealed decision-making around genetic testing and RRS were often framed as moral
endeavours. Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui and Mary were exposed to a barrage
of opinions from others and at times felt coerced into action through comments which
induced both blame and guilt. Pauline revealed a friend had suggested not having
RRS was akin to not loving her family:
Everyone finds it strange I decided not to [have the surgery]. Some
people have been right nasty. I had one friend tell me I was selfish. If I
loved my family I would have it [surgery] for them (…) quite the expert
on what I should and shouldn’t be doing. (…) as if I was a bad mother
for not [having surgery]. Well she’s not a friend anymore! I cut her right
out. Others have been more nice about it but I can tell they struggle to
understand. It’s hard for me to explain to them, they seem to think I’m
mad or something.
Ann also explained how friends and family used various techniques to persuade her to
undergo RRS and how she struggled to explain her decision to say no to surgery to
others:
When I said I wasn’t going to have surgery, everyone wanted to know
why and they would try and talk me round, tell me it was a no-brainer as
it would stop me getting cancer. I even had friends quoting statistics to
me (…) it was hard for them to understand as they saw it as the most
obvious and sensible thing to do. Even my cousin said I should have it
[surgery]. Now that really [raised voice] pissed me off because she
refused to even be tested! So it felt like a constant battle to try and
explain why I didn’t want the surgery. I could barely explain it to myself
but I just couldn’t do it. But there is a lot of pressure, it almost seems
like a moral dilemma. People at the end of the day mean well but they
don’t understand and they don’t help (…) you can feel like you are
drowning. You just want to scream “shut up” at the top of your voice to
make them just listen and not talk.
It was clear Ann was perceived by others as taking the wrong route with regards to her
genetic status. Interestingly, Ann’s cousin had refused genetic testing yet still proposed
Ann should undergo RRS in light of her BRCA2 status, which served to highlight the
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complexity surrounding genetic testing for familial cancer.

Likewise Susan explained

how other people’s reactions caused her to feel guilty;
People also always make you feel dead [really] guilty for not having it
[surgery] done (…) as if you don’t care about your child. My mum said “if
you can’t do it for yourself at least do it for Emma, you need to be here
for her”, as if I didn’t know.
Susan demonstrated how her decision to refuse RRS was perceived by others to be
uncaring and a decision which failed to take into account Susan’s duty to her daughter
by staying alive for her. Mary also explained how she was made to feel guilty and
reminded of her duty to safeguard others, especially children;
(…) but other people were sometimes not so nice. I did get the old guilt
trip (…) people with their opinions again about how I was crazy, avoiding
something which could save my life. The guilt trip about the kids and
the grandwean [grandchild], staying alive for them.
The analysis in this section supports an emerging body of literature on genetic
responsibility (Acero, 2012; Douglas, Hamilton & Grubs, 2009; Hallowell, 1999;
Hamilton, 2012; Konrad, 2005; Novas & Rose, 2000; Lemke, 2004; Raz & Schicktanz,
2009; Resnik, 2014; Steinberg, 1996; Taylor, 2004; Weiner, 2011) which permeates
genetics and provides a means for shaping responses to genetic risk in terms of moral
negotiation and how risk is managed (Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi & Clarke, 2008). Weiner
(2011, p. 1760) defined genetic responsibility as “the responsibility to know and
manage one’s own genome for oneself and the sake of others, focussing particularly
on responsibilities to family and kin”. In keeping with this, the findings from this study
suggested high risk women shoulder a substantial genetic responsibility to their
families as a result of gendered ideologies and women’s special status as nurturers
and gatekeepers of family health. It is not difficult to understand why a woman might
wish to act to protect her family nor is it difficult to understand why concerned relatives
might wish to encourage women to do whatever is perceived as necessary to prevent
cancer. However what this study shows is the health choices of high risk women may
be constrained by an ideology of genetic responsibility which surpasses personal
choice.
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Reading the stories of Susan, Ann, Jacqui, Pauline, Rosie and Mary through the lens of
MLT allowed genetic responsibility to be understood as a tool through which medicine
maintains control of the population and supports technologies which unite health with
wealth (Acero, 2012; Birch & Tyfield, 2013; Novas & Rose, 2000). Although genetic
responsibility emphasises particular values and moral actions, it is expressed through
demand for genetic testing and risk reducing interventions (Lemke, 2006) because
genetic status cannot otherwise be known or attended to. Genetic responsibility thus
ensures high demand for genetic medicine and associated biotechnologies which are
able to be marketed and consumed (Acero, 2012) and is therefore effective in securing
the huge economic gains which can be realised through biotechnologies.

The participants’ stories also revealed that genetic responsibility was enacted through
the responsibility to communicate knowledge of risk to others. Rosie’s twin Sheena
was diagnosed with left-sided breast cancer while her mother was also undergoing
chemotherapy for ovarian cancer. Sheena had refused genetic testing which Rosie
explained had led to her mother being pressurised to undergo testing so others in the
family could exercise their right to know her genetic status. Rosie described the
reaction from her other sister Julie and Julie’s husband when Sheena said no to
testing;
They’ve got three girls themselves and they were both like, “you’ve got
to have this done Sheena, it’s not fair, we have a right to know if it’s
going to happen to us”. (…) saying I had the right to know as well
because I could be affected too and might need treatment, one way or
the other for Tom [husband] and Neil’s [son] sake (…). But even then I
wasn’t sure I would want to know but Julie just couldn’t get her head
round it (…) me not wanting to know. She wouldn’t even discuss it. As
far as she was concerned it was the only right thing to do so we could
be prepared (…) and mum and me were caught in the middle really.
Then Julie took it upon herself to speak to the genetics people and when
she told them about mum and Aunty Sue, they said mum could get
tested to see if they could find the gene in her. So that’s what
happened. Julie really made mum get it done. She didn’t ask her, just
told her she was to go because the rest of us had a right to know if it
was in us (…) so my mum did it and of course, it came back positive.
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Genetic accountability is increasingly used to support agendas which purport an
entitlements-based discourse of rights (Cahill, 2001; Faulkner, 2012; Novas & Rose,
2000) where beliefs about an individual’s right to know, right to decide and right to
treatment dominate.

Rosie’s excerpt above highlighted how knowledge of genetic

status was perceived as both a right and a necessity by others, even when the affected
individuals did not necessarily wish to know their status. Ann also referred to her
estranged brother Rob’s right to know the family’s genetic status which placed a
responsibility on her to facilitate this;
Then there was also Rob [Ann’s estranged brother] to think about if men
can get it. Rob had some problems years back and we’ve not had
contact from him for quite a while but it has made me think maybe I
should be trying to find him. I mean he’s got a right to know about this
gene and for all I know, he could have daughters too which is even more
of a worry (…) so I’ve been trying to track him down but with no joy as
yet.
The ‘right to know’ genetic information is underscored by medical discourse which
assumes knowledge of risk factors improves health outcomes (Crabb, 2006; Paul et al.,
2014) because people can then do what is necessary to reduce risk (Griffiths et al.,
2010; Press et al., 2000) and gain protection from potential future harms (Lock &
Nguyen, 2010; Tamir, 2010).

Finding out and communicating genetic information is

thus not only sensible, but the hallmark of a loving, caring family relationship. This was
eloquently captured by Mary who explained how her love for her children influenced
her decision to be tested but also the negative impact her test result had on her and
her family:
This whole nightmare is not something I would wish on my worst enemy.
I really don’t see the point in everyone knowing what’s ahead for them. I
mean, who really wants to know what they are going to be struck down
with, what bad things might happen to them. Maybe I shouldn’t have let
them talk me into it [genetic testing] but you are really caught, torn in two
really. You love your kids yeah, so you want to do everything for them,
everything possible to protect them but really you can’t protect them
from this. There is no protection [be]cause you’re damned if you do and
damned if you don’t. But everyone’s going on, they’ve got a right to
know, and you love them so you get tested, for them as much as
yourself. (…). And now my lassies [daughters] are faced with the same
problem because I’ve got the gene, they have to wait and watch and see
if it [cancer] happens to me, and they’ve got to think about testing. My
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oldest doesn’t talk about it but then she’s got a toddler to keep her
occupied and she works too. She’s the type to just ignore things and
hope they go away. Not like Lisa [youngest daughter]. She is always
going on about it, what if she’s got it. She’s even saying if she gets
tested and has it, she’s not having children in case she passes it on
which makes me feel real bad. I’ve passed it on to her if she does get it
(…) well it feels like it’s my fault. If we had never had the tests, we’d be
none the wiser (…) I wish I didn’t know.
Mary was clearly reluctant to uncover her genetic status yet was “talked into” finding
out through pressure from others. Here we see a tension between Mary’s genetic
responsibility to others and her own autonomous decision making. Ultimately, despite
her own misgivings, Mary was persuaded to be tested because others had a right to
know her genetic status and because she bore a genetic responsibility to them, a
decision she now appears to deeply regret. Mary stated she wished she did not know
her genetic status. However, the rights discourse which underscores an individual’s
genetic responsibility to others ensures risk is communicated to facilitate risk reduction
(Lemke, 2006; Paul et al., 2014). Consequently, the right not to know and hence not to
engage with risk reducing strategies, does not enter into ideology.

Somewhat

paradoxically, the right to know genetic information also serves to deny the right not to
know (Paul et al., 2014). Susan said:
But she didn’t tell anyone [she was having a genetic test], not even
Elaine and Claire, they’re her girls, my cousins. She says now she didn’t
want to worry anyone and you can see where she’s coming from but
they were really bealing [angry], they were raging she didn’t tell them. I
mean, it’s a big thing isn’t it? It affects them too well it affects us all
really. (…) I told her I wasn’t happy at the way it was done. We didn’t
get any warning or anything. I wasn’t sure I wanted to know but she just
told me “don’t shoot the messenger” and made out it was information we
had to have, so we could do what was needed to keep us safe from
cancer.
Susan’s experience illustrated how there was no prior discussion about genetic testing
before being informed her aunt carried a BRCA mutation.

Instead, her aunt

constructed herself as the transmitter of important genetic information which the family
had a right to know to protect them from cancer, effectively denying Susan the right ‘not
to know’. From a Marxist perspective, the rights discourse ensures knowledge of risk is
widely communicated and supports an ideology of risk in which individuals are able to
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modify their risk of cancer through the consumption of medical and pharmaceutical
interventions. Simply put, doing nothing in response to cancer risk does not generate
economic yield. Thus it appears ideologies of genetic responsibility and people’s right
to know take primacy in decision making around genetic testing and risk reducing
interventions. Moreover, the stories of Rosie, Ann, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline
show how the ideology of genetic responsibility encompassed doing ‘the right thing’ in
response to risk in order to protect others. The participants were often reminded of
their autonomy in decision making, but at the same time, there was a perception some
decisions were more acceptable than others. Jacqui explained:
I really did think I would go for it [surgery]. You know it’s the right thing
to do. (…). Beth [sister] pleaded with me, told me I was crazy, making
the wrong decision. She said look how bad she had been when she had
cancer and I had the chance to avoid it and I should do everything I
could, take what they offered. She said I was playing Russian roulette
and it was not fair on any of them, she didn’t want to watch me go
through what she went through (…) what about my children, all that
stuff. Paul [husband] wasn’t much better. He would just say ”it’s your
decision, do what’s right for you”, but at the same time, I always felt he
wanted me to do what they [health care professionals] wanted, which
was to be a good girl and take the surgery.
The emotional conflict experienced by Jacqui is evident here: she acknowledges RRS
as “the right thing to do” because it could potentially protect her and her children from
the experience of cancer, yet ultimately she was unable to go through with surgery.
Her sister tried to influence her decision whereas her husband emphasised her
autonomy with regards to RRS. However despite this, Jacqui’s perception was her
husband thought she should have RRS because he perceived it to be medically
necessary. By describing those who accept surgery as ‘good’, Jacqui consequently
identified herself as ‘bad’ as she said no to RRS.

The usefulness of Marx’s concept of ideology is exemplified in the ways in which
genetic responsibility directs high risk women down a particular course of action to deal
with the risk of cancer. In Western medicine, ‘good’ patients are those who accept their
illness or condition and acquiesce to the requirements of the medical institution (Ferrie,
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2010). Medicine is the legitimate caretaker of establishing sickness and how it should
be managed (Bilton et al., 2002; Conrad, 2005), therefore the ‘right’ health choice is
one which conforms to medical discourse and treatment ideologies for the
management of risk.

Pauline, Ann and Rosie also at some point referred to genetic testing and RRS as the
‘right thing’ either in terms of their own perceptions or the perceptions of loved ones.
Rosie explained:
(…) so it seemed like the right thing to do [genetic testing]. (…) when
your results come back, family and your friends all seem to think the
only option is to have the surgery (…) you’d be mad not [said with
emphasis] to have it and you should just do the right thing (…) for the
sake of your family I’ve had people say to me I’m lucky,[said with
emphasis] lucky [raised voice]! Lucky I can do something about it. Well if
it is luck it’s all bad!
In this excerpt, the dominance of treatment ideologies for cancer risk is evidenced
through Rosie being constructed by others as ‘lucky’ for knowing she is high risk of
developing breast/ovarian cancer because she could now undergo RRS in response to
risk. The framing of RRS as the only rational option underscores it as the right course
of action. Saying no to surgery is therefore the wrong course of action, construed as
madness and clearly not in the interests of Rosie or her family. Paradoxically, to act
autonomously is to attend to cancer risk by doing ‘the right thing’, a phrase which
effectively functions as a colloquial idiom which indicates a particular acceptable action.

Women are not held personally accountable for their genetic material but are held
responsible for the actions taken or avoided to manage genetic risks (Hallowell &
Lawton, 2002; Lemke, 2006; Press et al., 2000; Resnik, 2014).

Refusing medical

intervention was seen as an irrational rather than an autonomous choice (Bishop &
Yardley, 2004; Resnik, 2014).

Simply put, the autonomous choice becomes the

rational choice, but ideology ensures that the rational choice is never free from external
influence.

The rational choice is that which is ideologically sound and which
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acquiesces to the institute of medicine. Hence the responsible/moral subject becomes
the economic/rational subject (Lemke, 2006) because irrational actions are nonacceptable behaviours which threaten the State and the prevailing rational order (Lim,
2011). Problematic to this is that such constructions fail to consider underlying
structures of exploitation for commercial gain (Thomas-Pollei, 2008). Interpreting the
women’s stories through the lens of MLT then illuminated the relationship between the
ideology of genetic responsibility, autonomy and the rights discourse in relation to
HBOC and reasoned this was necessary to ensure growing demand for wealth
generating risk reducing interventions.

In summary, MLT analysis suggested a number of enabling ideologies existed which
influenced and constrained the participants’ decisions in relation to HBOC.

The

language of cancer genetics was understood as an ideological tool which endowed risk
with a material reality and suggested medicine had discovered why women develop
breast/ovarian cancer. An ideology of genetic responsibility ensured women were
directed to respond to cancer risk in the desired way and ensured the rights of others to
attain genetic information to attend to risk were also addressed.

This mesh of

ideologies allows the commercial exploitation of cancer fear and ensures demand for
biotechnologies and risk reducing interventions which maintain and expand the cancer
industry. However, despite the dominance of treatment ideologies for dealing with
cancer risk, Rosie, Mary, Pauline, Jacqui, Susan and Ann said no to RRS. It was,
therefore, necessary to explore the participants’ stories for the influence of other
dominant discourses and ideologies which shape human experience in Western
society.

To this end, the next section turns to an analysis of participants’ stories using Marx’s
concept of commodification. Participants revealed the ways in which their breasts and
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bodies had been turned into commodities to be sold to medical technologies that
confirm or deny their experiences in relation to being at high risk of developing HBOC.

Breasts, ovaries and commodification
Ideologies of cancer risk and fear are important drivers of health care consumerism
and the resulting commodification of women’s bodies, since risk makes body parts
disposable (Ettore et al., 2006).

Additionally, breasts and ovaries hold special status

in Western society prompting an analysis of the participants’ stories for the effects of
dominant discourses of sexuality, femininity and female attractiveness which objectify
and commodify women’s bodies through the creation of normative standards to which
women are expected to conform (Crompvoets, 2012; Emilee et al., 2010; Peterson,
2007).

The usefulness of Marx’s ideas of commodification was exemplified in the ways in
which women’s bodies were constructed to create an image of an idealised female
body which served as a marketable commodity. To this end, images of the idealised
female body are used to sell everything from shampoo to chain saws, cars to bottles of
beer (Kilbourne, 2012). Rosie was aware that ‘sex sells’ and the omnipresence of
women’s bodies in the marketplace:
Everywhere you look it’s all ‘tits ‘n’ ass’, sex sells, doesn’t it? So there’s
the whole thing with how you look, as a woman (…) which sounds like
you are putting your looks before your health. I couldn’t explain to
people though, they wouldn’t understand would they? But how would
they feel if they thought they were going to look, you know, no breasts,
like that? (…) I couldn’t face the thought of it.
Rosie explained the importance of her breasts to how she saw herself as a woman, but
also acknowledged women are commodified through the use of particular body parts
(in this case breasts and buttocks) to sell goods in consumer culture. The concept of
the idealised female body is integral to consumerist ideology in Western society
(Peterson, 2007).

Consequently, capitalism promotes normative gender ideologies
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which define what is considered attractive and appealing in the female gender (Cox,
2011) and subsequently endorse a particular aesthetic in relation to how a woman
should look (Adams, 2010). Hence, it was not difficult to understand why Rosie was
acutely aware of the importance of her breasts in how she measured up to the ideal
woman.

Rosie’s unquestioning acceptance of the commodified, idealised female

image resulted in a tension between protecting her breasts and her health because the
thought of breast loss was so worrying. Similarly, Susan revealed the prominence of
an idealised female image and how such images impacted on her thinking at the time:
At the start when I was thinking of going for surgery, well it really hits
home what is being asked of you, removing your breasts, it’s massive, a
massive thing to do. I was separated at the time, on my own, but even
still. It was like they [breasts] were suddenly everywhere. Wherever
you are, they’re all over the place (…) women’s breasts, boobs selling
cars, Wonderbra adverts, all that sort of stuff. It’s like a constant
reminder of what you are giving up. There’s massive pressure on
women to look sexy, to be like a certain way, isn’t there? It’s bad
enough when you have them [breasts] so I can’t imagine how sh*t it
must be for those poor women without them. So, well, why would
anyone want to be without them?
In this excerpt, Susan tied being breasted to sexual attractiveness and as a result, the
thought of breast loss through RRS was inconceivable. Like Rosie, Susan was aware
‘sex sells’ (Kilbourne, 2012) and the highly visible images of idealised women’s bodies
and breasts resulted in her feeling compelled to look a certain way. A mastectomised
body is inconsistent with what Susan took to be a socially acceptable female body as
verified through imagery in her everyday life.

How women should look is implicit in everyday discourses (Cox, 2011; Gallagher &
Pecot-Hebert, 2007) and women are confronted with idealised images of commodified
female bodies on a daily basis through advertisements, the media and art (Piot‐Ziegler,
Sassi, Raffoul & Delaloye, 2010).

Ironically, Haines et al. (2010) found idealised

images of the female body were also emphasised in breast cancer literature with
sexualised images comparable to the imagery used in commercial advertising
predominant.

Likewise Wilkinson (2001) drew attention to breast cancer awareness
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publicity campaigns which used images of conventionally attractive models with
mastectomy scars super-imposed onto their torsos, rather than images of ‘real’ women
with breast loss. Such idealised images reinforce the physical differences which occur
through breast loss and invite comparisons to sociocultural norms in relation to the
female body. Mary explained:
After my test results, I wasn’t sure what I was going to do. Surgery was
an option and I swithered between yes and no. But then, the idea of
surgery was hard, there was some self-pity if I’m honest, a lot of “why
me”? I don't want to. So it’s really hard. It didn’t help that everywhere
you look there’s these, you know adverts and stuff, with beautiful,
perfect women and their perfect breasts. It hurt to see them. Even now I
get quite angry when I see them. You see them everywhere and it
makes you think about things differently. It’s hard to explain. Deep
down it’s always been like that, but when you think you might not have
breasts anymore, it’s like a crushing realisation, you suddenly become
hyper aware (…) over sensitive about your breasts, and really want to
hold onto them [breasts].
Like Susan and Rosie, Mary was acutely aware of idealised images of the female body
which were commonplace in everyday life and served as an indication of what was
socially expected from a woman’s appearance. The prominence of idealised bodies in
the media, advertising and popular culture reduces the body to a commodity with an
aesthetic exchange value (Peterson, 2007). Viewed through the lens of MLT,
commodification opens the female body up to commercial exploitation. Radin and
Sunder (2005) argued that the marketplace was a key site for the transmission of
cultural and social ideals with those who control the terms of commodification securing
their position as a society’s ruling class. Consequently, representations of women’s
bodies are never objective but rather grounded in ideologies and hegemonic ideals
which support the interests of the powerful in society (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007).

When women’s bodies take on commodity status, they are held to socially prescribed
and highly gendered standards of attractiveness and sexuality (Gallagher & PecotHebert, 2007).

The importance placed particularly on breasts in Western society

emphasises the outward appearance of the female body (Haines et al., 2010; Piot‐
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Ziegler et al., 2010) and constructs the body in objective and visible terms
(Crompvoets, 2012). Body parts such as breasts are then able to be used to sell the
ideal. Body commodification thus links women’s breasts problematically to societal and
cultural expectations of attractiveness. Jacqui explained how the thought of breast loss
was particularly difficult and distressing because it would radically change her outward
appearance and perceived attractiveness:
Sometimes it was the little things what set me off. You would put it
[surgery] to the back of your mind and be going (…) getting about
everyday life as normal as possible then something would trigger it. I
remember having a total meltdown one night before a do [party] we
were going to just because of my dress. It was what some might say
quite revealing but I thought, well it made the best of my chest, you
know? I looked really good in it. I always got compliments wearing it.
But putting it on that night, I couldn’t get it back off again quick enough.
I couldn’t look at it, I hid it away at the back of the wardrobe. It was just
thinking, I couldn’t deal with how different I would be, looking down and
not having them. Never being able to be proud about them again. I
know there’s more to life, to me, I’m not stupid but at the same time, I
just couldn’t bear to be without them.
Jacqui valued her breasts and took a certain pride in her appearance as a result. This
pride is corroborated by comments from others in terms of compliments about her body
because of her cleavage. Grubs, Parker & Hamilton (2014) argued individuals build
self-identity in light of characteristics important to them, in this case having ‘good
breasts’. Hence, good breasts can be understood as assets which allow women to
conform to socially defined expectations of the ideal female body. Indeed, idealised
breasts are colloquially referred to as ‘good assets’. For Jacqui, to lose her breasts
was to lose an asset from which she took pride and pleasure at social events. Jacqui
acknowledged she was more than her breasts but none the less, she found the thought
of breast loss unbearable because it would effectively de-valued her outward
appearance. Thus the loss of her breasts/assets constituted the loss of a socially
valued sign of femininity (Schulzke, 2011). Jacqui’s story continued as she revealed
how her feelings about her breasts influenced her decision to say no to RRS:
I just couldn’t go through with it. Too drastic. I mean your breasts are
part of you, part of being a woman and I am not over the hill yet, you
know (…) and there was nothing wrong with them [breasts], they still
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look fine. If I’m honest I was scared of losing them. Paul [husband] was
always a breast-man, always liked the big ones, so they [breasts] were
important to me, to us. Every woman wants to think she’s desirable I
suppose (…) and my breasts made me feel desirable.
For Jacqui, her breasts were also important in terms of what was considered to be
male expectations of attractiveness. Ann also discussed the value of her breasts in
both her perceptions of how she looked and also the meanings attributed to her
breasts:
Ken has aged really well, he looks better now than he did when we got
married [laughs], so I do like to look good for him. He used to say I had
great breasts (…) he was first attracted to me because of my figure and
he’s always been a boob man, how ironic. And even after having
children, mine were still quite good, not droopy or saggy, they’ve aged
quite well. My friend said I am more worried about my looks than living
but I don’t see it like that. She doesn’t understand how important they
[breasts] are to me, as a person, as a wife.
Ann benchmarked her physical appearance against her perception of what was valued
physically in a woman.

Like Jacqui, Ann constructed herself as being attractive and

hence valuable because of her breasts and it was clear she also perceived her
husband to value her because of her breasts.

Ann and Jacqui also acknowledged a

particular type of breast was privileged and normalised; ‘good’ breasts which were not
‘saggy’ (Emilee et al., 2010) which added to their value as an asset. To this end,
interpreting the participants’ stories through an MLT lens made visible ideologies which
constructed women, their bodies and breasts as objects with an associated value in a
system of exchange.

Female breasts are important signifiers in Western society and serve as a visible
indication of femininity, motherhood and sexuality (Ehlers & Krupar, 2012; Piot‐Ziegler
et al., 2010) hence are subject to intense public scrutiny and evaluation (Chan, 2010;
Spadola, 1998). The value attached to breasts is reflected in the relationship between
women’s bodies and breasts and socially determined standards of femininity, beauty
and attractiveness in Western society (Cobb & Starr, 2012; Thomas, 2006). Simply,
breasts are ‘exchanged’ for an acceptable body image and certain social status. This
218

means the potential loss of breasts through RRS poses a devastating threat to high risk
women.

Commodifying body parts in terms of their value fragments the body and constructs
body parts as objects of variable worth which are then able to be accentuated or
disregarded (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007). Although differences existed in how
participants discussed their bodies, all constructed particular body parts as assets.
Rosie explained;
I’m not even that bothered about them [breasts], mine are really small
and not really what I would say my best feature, not a lot more than
nipples really, but they are still there. Tom always said he was more of
a leg man, they were my best feature. It was more about losing my
ovaries as to me, that’s what makes you a woman. I mean, men have
breasts don’t they, but they don’t have ovaries. So for me, having
ovaries was what made me a woman. Without them, I wouldn’t feel like
I was a woman. I’d be like, well like a non-woman [be]cause I wouldn’t
be a man and it wouldn’t be natural, like the menopause. So yeah, it
was more about the ovaries really.
Here several references to body parts and their value as assets are evident. Rosie
appeared ambivalent about the value of her breasts because they contrasted with the
ideal in so much as they were ‘really small’ hence not her ‘best feature’. Rosie
constructed her legs as valuable assets because they were her best feature and
source of attractiveness to her husband Tom.

Rosie framed her ovaries as assets

because they were the essential defining feature of womanhood, therefore to lose
one’s ovaries was to become a ‘non-woman’.

The ovaries hence play an important

ideological role in defining women because women’s bodies are valued for their
reproductive potential (Sharp, 2000), symbolise womanhood and as such are
associated with femininity and sexuality (Gubar, 2012).

Pauline also discussed

concerns about the removal of her ovaries:
The thought of the menopause and all the side effects, getting fat, night
sweats, growing a moustache, losing your sex drive then add in, you
become a moody cow, for a while anyway, so everyone’s got to put up
with that too. So you look hellish, you feel hellish then to top it all,
there’s depression and all sorts maybe going on too. I was worried it
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would make me look and be old, maybe vanity you might say (…) but no
thanks.
Pauline articulated ways in which ovarian loss would damage her physical and
emotional health. Oophorectomy and resulting oestrogen deprivation are known to
change women’s bodies (Bresser, 2009) negatively impacting on physical and
emotional well-being (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fry et al., 2001b; Guillem et al., 2006;
Hallowell et al., 2012). However Pauline constructed these potential impacts as being
in opposition to the idealised female body image in Western society: a slim, hair-free,
youthful body (Ashikali & Dittmar, 2012; Jones et al., 2005) and an upbeat disposition
(Wilkinson, 2001). This is further evidence of how women and their body parts are
commodified and constructed in terms of assets which increase or reduce the social
value of a woman.

Breasts and ovaries signify femininity, sexuality and womanliness

and are thus a form of currency which can be exchanged for social acceptance and
desirability (Parry, 2008).

By constructing certain body parts as assets of varying

value, Jacqui, Ann, Pauline and Rosie could be argued to be complicit in their own
commodification.

From a Marxist perspective, this occurs because the gendered

structure of capitalism disproportionately targets and commodifies women (Adams,
2010; Cox, 2011) in order to promote body insecurities (Peterson, 2007), stimulate
consumerism (Crompvoets, 2012) and create profit (Allan, 1998). Moreover, so-called
‘common sense’ beliefs about how women should look conceal ideologies which draw
on normative notions of womanhood, femininity and sexuality and thus appear natural
and given (Bennett & Royle, 1999). Susan explained:
The main issue I think is how you would look after [mastectomy]. It just
seemed so drastic to have so much surgery when there’s nothing wrong
with you. It changes everything. Every woman wants to think she looks
good. No-one wants to think they are not attractive do they? And like it
or not, as a woman your breasts are a big part of that, so it’s really a
terrible position to be in.
Susan’s story reproduced two key ideological influences. First, breasts are inherently
and essentially tied to female attractiveness. Second, women innately strive to be
attractive to others. It is the very ‘naturalness’ of such ideologies which encourage
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women to internalise socially determined acceptable standards of beauty and sexual
attractiveness in Western society (Coco, 1994; Cox, 2011; Riessman, 1983; Serdar,
2006; Thomas-Pollei, 2008) and to value themselves accordingly.

The participants, in this study, assessed their value as a woman largely in terms of the
presence and condition of their breasts and ovaries. Marx’s ideas of commodification
were useful in understanding breasts and ovaries as assets which gave value to a
woman’s body or through ways in which women were constructed as being less
valuable without breasts and ovaries (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007).

It is not

surprising, therefore, potential breast/ovarian loss caused Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui,
Susan and Mary to question how valuable their post-surgery bodies would be and how
the loss of their ‘assets’ might impact on their lives. All voiced concerns breast and/or
ovarian loss would negatively impact on how others saw them and damage current or
future sexual relations.

Rosie discussed her fears related to the removal of her

breasts:
Tom and me, well without going into the gory details, we were still very
sexual in our relationship (…) still enjoying that side of things at the time.
With Neil being a teenager, we had been having a bit more freedom that
way [sexually] again with having the house to ourselves a lot. If I had
(…) [points to breasts and makes cutting off gesture]), every day I would
be thinking, “I’m not a whole woman, it’s not me”. Tom said it wouldn’t
bother him but it would bother me [said with emphasis]. I wouldn’t be
able to let him see me, look at me again, I don’t think.
Rosie believed breast loss would impact negatively on her body image to the extent
she would have to shield her post-surgery body from her husband, despite his
reassurances to the contrary.

Mary also described her belief breast loss would

diminish how attractive she was to her partner:
Robert [husband] of course said it wouldn’t matter to him what I looked
like, but a man is going to say that isn’t he? I mean, he wouldn’t be
much of a man if he said, “don’t you dare have them off, I won’t fancy
you after”. No-one’s going to actually say it. But it’s how I would feel, I
wouldn’t feel fanciable. I wouldn’t feel like a woman.
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Like Rosie, Mary questioned the reassurance offered by her husband. Self-image was
so closely bound to perceptions of what makes a woman attractive, they thought they
would be less sexually attractive following breast loss. Rubin and Tanenbaum (2011)
found that breast loss in particular was equated with a loss of sexual identity and
attractiveness. Studies also show women often wrongly assumed their partners would
be repulsed by their mastectomised bodies (Sheppard & Ely, 2008; Sulik, 2012) and
continued to harbour negative thoughts even when partners offered reassurance this
was not the case (Bertero, 2002).

Gallagher and Pecot-Hebert (2007) contended

culturally determined standards of attractiveness encouraged women to define
themselves in relation to their relationships with partners and male expectations of
appearance and attractiveness, therefore a perceived loss of attractiveness was likely
to be translated as a failure to meet male expectations. Susan, a single parent at the
time of interviews, explained such perceptions thus:
At first I was going to have it done, the mastectomies and the ovaries
because Emma is my priority and I’m not really wanting any more
children, don’t have a man anyway [laughs], and no-one would want me
with no chest anyway. I mean it’s not a priority for me by any means, but
you never know, Mr Right might be waiting round that corner and if he
is, well, it wouldn’t be a very good start would it? Nothing down there
[points to chest]. I wouldn’t be much of a catch with no women’s bits,
would I? [laughs]
Although Susan laughed as she discussed not being a good ‘catch’, her story
demonstrated how the social value of women may be reduced as a result of
breast/ovarian loss. Susan’s perception of her post-surgery body was problematically
linked to her perceptions of male expectations of attractiveness hence she constructed
her changed body as unfit for consumption in the marketplace for attracting a partner.

The significance of the male gaze was captured in the stories of Rosie, Ann, Pauline,
Jacqui, Susan and Mary.

Women facing breast loss fear their bodies will shock

partners and experience doubt about submitting themselves to the male gaze
(Szumacher, 2006), describing their breastless bodies as hideous, undesirable and
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monster-like (Piot‐Ziegler et al., 2010).

Drawing from Marx’s concept of

commodification, not only are breast/ovaries commodified as assets of varying worth,
but consequently women without these assets are constructed as ‘damaged goods’.
Jacqui explained her thoughts on breast loss in the context of her relationship with her
husband:
I know he [husband] loves me and it feels stupid even saying it, of
course he would, but I needed reassurance we would be okay and he
would love me boobs or no boobs, because you know he loves you but
it doesn’t stop the voice in your head going on and on. You’d be different
somehow, incomplete. Not the woman he married.
Here, it was apparent Jacqui’s breasts and what they symbolised formed an important
part of her self-image (Hallowell et al., 2012). To lose her breasts meant she would
become a different woman, an incomplete woman. Numerous studies have identified
women facing breast loss worry about being perceived as damaged goods (Esplen,
Stuckless, Berk, Butler & Gallinger, 2009; Grubs et al., 2014; Hamilton, 2012; Hoggan,
2014; Karp et al., 1999; MacDonald, Sarna, Weitzel & Ferrell, 2010; Robinson &
Lounberry, 2010; Sadeh-Tassa, Drory, Ginzburg, & Stadler, 2000; Spiegel & Classen,
2000).

Women facing breast loss construct post-surgery bodies as unattractive,

abnormal or damaged (Crompvoets, 2006; 2012); ugly (Bertero, 2002), handicapped or
incomplete (Piot‐Ziegler et al., 2010) and disfigured or deformed (Freysteinson et al.,
2012).

The concept of ‘damaged goods’ is made possible through a Marxist interpretation and
links between women’s concerns about becoming breast-free and the value placed on
retaining breasts are evidenced. When breasts are commoditised as body ‘assets’, it
stands that bodies which lose assets are damaged. Pauline touchingly outlined the
impact being damaged could have on her life:
Our ‘thing’ is to have a bath together and take a bottle of wine in (…) it’s
how we relax or what we do if we get a night away together and it would
be out the window. A really special thing for us and it would be totally
ruined. Sarah [sister] has told me she feels the same, she doesn’t feel
attractive any more, even though her husband is trying to be supportive
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about it. (…) John said I should do what I want and he wouldn’t mind but
I know he would. What man wouldn’t? And even if he didn’t mind, I
would mind and I would lose all confidence in myself. I would never be
undressed in front of him again.
Pauline subliminally framed herself as damaged goods when she explained she would
no longer feel attractive to her husband should she lose her breasts.

She was

therefore forced to call into question aspects of her relationship with which she was
previously confident of, as a consequence of the anticipated bodily changes incurred
through RRS. A perception of the body being damaged goods was also evident in the
ways participants referred to the bodies of others.

Although not always openly

acknowledged, mastectomy in particular was perceived as damaging the body. Rosie
explained:
I’ve seen Sheena’s [sister] [points to breast area] and I don’t like saying
this, but it’s not pretty. I couldn’t cope with looking [shrugs shoulders],
you know, if I didn’t need to. It would be different if I actually had cancer.
(…) I don’t like saying this because it’s saying something bad about
other women who have had to have it [mastectomy] done, which I don’t
mean, but I would think I looked [makes ‘squeamish’ face], you know?
Rosie had trouble articulating her thoughts about how she might look following RRS
although it was clear from her silences and body language the thought of breast loss
was almost too difficult to imagine. In this next excerpt, Jacqui shared an experience
from her childhood which poignantly revealed how a woman with breast cancer was
rather cruelly reduced to a description of her mastectomised body:
I remember being at high school and there was this teacher, she taught
home ec [economics], everyone used to call her rubber tit and wooden
tit. She had breast cancer. God I cringe now when I think about it (…)
what terrible, nasty things. The boys used to throw toilet roll at her, you
know, sniggering and saying behind her back to stuff her bra. We all
laughed but, well I didn’t really know what they meant, it was older kids.
Then someone told me (…) but even then, I was only about 13, I
suppose I just shrugged it off. Then when Beth [sister] had to have her
breast off, for some reason I remembered back, Miss Wilson, and I
could weep for her, for what happened. It must have been hideous,
having cancer, losing your breast then having to cope with that sh*t. I
just couldn’t think of myself like that (…) looking that [said with
emphasis] way. I don’t even like to think about being like that.
Jacqui’s fear of breast loss arose in part from a negative experience of a
mastectomised body from her childhood, and like Rosie, she was unable to imagine
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her own body in this way. Although Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Mary
recounted different meanings and understanding of their experiences of facing breast
loss, all saw their post-surgical body’s as ‘damaged goods’ in some way.

The participants’ stories revealed high risk women’s responses to breast and ovarian
loss are multiple, conflicting and complex.

Marx’s ideas on commodification provided

a useful framework for interpreting the participants’ stories within the context of
everyday discourses in Western society which shape and influence human experience.
Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Mary’s conscious reflections on the fear of
breast/ovarian loss support gender and sexual ideologies but contrast with medical
ideologies which position breast/ovarian loss as a necessary and somewhat pragmatic
step in dealing with cancer risk. However, medical ideology does also attend to breast
loss, and the premise of the perfect female form by offering breast reconstruction as a
necessary procedure to repair damaged bodies following mastectomy.

The next

section explores this notion in detail and situates breast reconstruction within wider
frameworks of understanding which expose ways in which reconstruction is
ideologically and economically driven and how the institution of medicine is complicit in
the commodification of women’s breasts.

Commodification and breast reconstruction
In the previous section, an interpretation of the participants’ stories through the lens of
MLT suggested breasts and ovaries are commodified as bodily assets hence bodies
without these assets are able to be constructed in ideology as damaged. Accordingly,
breast reconstruction following RRM, herein referred to as ‘reconstruction’, can be
understood as a means of repairing damaged bodies. Furthermore, this interpretation
contends that reconstruction is a manifestation of commodification since it is the means
through which bodies at risk of cancer can be rendered safe and repaired through the
procurement of reconstructed breasts in exchange for high risk breasts.

Simply,
225

commodification of the female body/breasts is expressed through the consumption of
reconstructive surgery.

Reconstruction is inextricably embedded in medical ideology (Gallagher & PecotHebert,

2007;

Sulik, 2012)

and participants

were

encouraged to consider

reconstruction as part of the package of cure for cancer risk.

Mary described being

“sent” for counselling and her perception surgery was the assumed outcome following
the testing and counselling process:
Early on I considered it [surgery] and you get sent to see a counsellor
and a breast care nurse, so you talk through lots of things, about coping,
losing your breasts and ovaries, the menopause and things. I think
when they send you for counselling, at this point it’s assumed you are
going through with it (…) the surgery talk is ramped up, the choices of
implants or expanders, all about that. Not having surgery didn’t appear
to be even on the radar.
Although Mary was still undecided about RRS, the potential for reconstruction was
introduced early on in her HBOC journey. Mary recalled seeing various health care
professionals and being offered information about different types of reconstruction
surgery on the assumption she would undergo RRS hence reconstruction to replace
breast loss would be necessary.

The essential nature of reconstruction after breast loss is apparent in public,
consumerist and health-related literature (Crompvoets, 2006, 2012; Haines et al., 2010;
O’Neill, 2013; Sulik, 2012; Wilkinson, 2001).

Reconstruction is framed as something

all women want (Crompvoets, 2006) and calls are made by plastic surgeons for the
‘under-utilisation’ of reconstruction to be addressed through policy and fiscal measures
(Alderman, Storey, Nair & Chung, 2009). Official guidelines such as NICE (2013) state
reconstruction

must

be

made

available

to

all

women

facing

mastectomy.

Reconstruction is framed as an inherently positive offering and a “beacon of hope”
(Crompvoets, 2006, p. 76) in a woman’s journey of recovery following breast loss. The
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only reasons for not undergoing reconstruction are purported to be financial or the
presence of co-morbidities.

All participants referred to reconstruction in some way and it was evident that
reconstruction was presented to participants as another key step in the management of
HBOC.

Susan revealed that reconstruction was offered to her during preliminary

medical consultations:
They said my risk of breast cancer was higher but because mum had
ovarian cancer, to think about that too. You need to see a plastic
surgeon, and a psychologist. And if you have surgery you need
implants, or I think they said there was other types [of reconstruction],
using your own (…) fat from your stomach type of thing.
In her own words, Susan framed the option of reconstruction as a necessity: she
‘needed’ to see a plastic surgeon and would ‘need’ an implant or some other form of
reconstruction if

she accepted surgery.

Like Mary,

Susan acknowledged

reconstruction as something women facing breast loss must be concerned with to
repair the body following surgery.

From a Marxist perspective, the commodification of women’s breasts and bodies is
enabled through reconstruction ideology which reifies its importance in facilitating
recovery from breast loss. In fact, it is generally framed as the only means through
which women can overcome the assumed negative self-image following breast loss
(Crompvoets, 2006). To this end, this discourse implicitly and explicitly constructs
reconstruction as potentially disparaging of breastless bodies. Breast loss is presented
as a disabling abnormality (Crompvoets, 2012) which creates a gender crisis (BáezHernández, 2009) and causes a loss of femininity, sexuality and (Emilee et al., 2010).
Moreover, breast loss is branded as so personally and publically alarming, it must be
camouflaged (Báez-Hernández, 2009; Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011) or hidden from sight
(O’Neill, 2013; Wilkinson, 2001) so that women appear unaffected and unchanged by
surgery (Schulzke, 2011). Crompvoets (2012) further argued that the construction of
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breast loss as abnormal and disabling and something which must be concealed is
heavily marketed by various stakeholders in restoration technologies and taken up in
consumer and public discourse. Thus, the need to exhibit a ‘normal’ appearance which
disguises breast loss is continually presented to women, albeit very subtly at times:
But the family all seemed to think I would jump at the surgery. Ken was
really good but I could tell he thought I should have it [surgery] even
though he said he would support whatever decision I made, but you can
just tell. He would make comments about people who had the surgery
[mastectomy] and say how good they looked. He would never have said
anything before. I remember Kylie Minogue had been treated for breast
cancer and Ken was talking about how good she looked, and “you would
never know” (…) if she was ever on television. (Ann)
Although Kylie Minogue did not undergo mastectomy but lumpectomy, Ann’s
husband attempts to offer comfort to Ann by suggesting women can be treated for
breast cancer and still maintain a normal, attractive outward appearance.
Reconstruction is presented and reinforced as a means through which women
facing breast loss can repair their damaged bodies and look ‘normal’, bestowing
reconstruction with an aura of necessity.

Evidence suggests RRM with reconstruction is becoming increasingly prominent
with almost 70% of women having RRM also having reconstruction (Semple et al.,
2013). Mary also discussed the considerable effort women facing breast loss take
to attend to their post-surgical bodies:
I went online to ask other women about it [experiences of surgery].
There were umpteen stories about tissue expanders, implants, nipple
reconstructions and tattoos. Unreal. On one website there was even
pictures women had put up to show their new boobs. (…) everyone
seemed to be getting it done. I was the only one who wasn’t too keen I
think. It was all a bit weird if I’m honest (…) some of them, it was like
they were showing off a bit, you know, “check me out, how great do I
look”. Well not to me you don’t. (…) sure it was probably their way of
coping but, no, it wasn’t for me.
Mary discussed the commonality of reconstruction and positioned herself in the
minority amongst a majority of women for whom reconstruction had been accepted and
essentially embraced.

The increase in the number of women undergoing
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reconstruction following prophylactic mastectomy may in part reflect improvements in
reconstructive surgical techniques which make surgery more appealing (Peled et al.,
2013) such as nipple and areolar-sparing techniques which give an improved cosmetic
result (Spear et al., 2011). However, an alternative position is offered by Cobb and
Starr (2012) who drew parallels with the cosmetic surgery industry in so much as both
cosmetic and reconstructive breast surgery are socially mandated but medically
unnecessary procedures, making them both aesthetic practices which generate
significant profit.

In the same vein, Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert (2007) argued that a makeover culture
which normalised and glamorised cosmetic surgery in the name of self-improvement
existed which now also served as a mode of reference for women facing breast loss.
In contemporary culture, reconstructive surgery for breast loss is now strongly affiliated
with cosmetic surgery, itself a routine and acceptable means of achieving selfimprovement and self-image (Löwy, 2010). Susan recounted:
But everyone tells you it’s a no-brainer. Take the surgery, get the
implants and you’ll probably look better than you did before. It’s as if
it’s no big deal, like you are some sort of celebrity, getting your boobs
done (…) like out of choice or something. Thanks very much! There’s
nothing wrong with mine [breasts]!
In this excerpt, Susan explains how RRS and reconstruction was constructed as a
straightforward procedure from which she could potentially gain body improvement.
Although Susan was satisfied with her natural breasts, she was encouraged to think
her breasts could be better with implants, a perception which appeared to reflect the
increasing prominence of breast augmentation in popular culture. Rosie similarly
explained how her sister suggested she might consider RRS with reconstruction as
an opportunity to enlarge her naturally small breasts:
(…) [reconstruction is] a good thing for some women, it would be a
comfort, to know, you know that you wouldn’t be left with nothing (…)
you’d still have something there, a proper shape. But it didn’t really
bother me too much with mine [breasts] only being little, double As, it’s
never been a big deal for me, how I looked up top. But then, you don’t
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want to have nothing at all. Mind you, Sheena [sister] did say I could go
bigger, so it could be a good thing, getting implants. But it wasn’t about
that for me. I was happy the way I was.
Cobb and Starr (2012) also proposed the discourse surrounding reconstruction is
comparable to that of cosmetic surgery. They built on Ehrenreich’s (2001) seminal
work ‘Welcome to Cancerland’ which contended contemporary culture demanded
women facing breast loss exhibit a particular type of experience and participate in
the experience as a form of makeover and self-improvement from which they can
emerge prettier, sexier and more feminine. The makeover discourse exploits body
insecurities and promotes improvement through the consumption of lotions, creams,
cosmetics, cosmetic procedures and ultimately through the consumption of
reconstruction following breast loss (Crompvoets, 2012).

The integration of the makeover discourse exposes HBOC as a market driven
industry of survivorship (Sulik, 2012) in which reconstruction can be consumed by
women facing breast loss so they can regain their value in Western society. This
was useful in interpreting the ways in which participants’ bodies and breasts were
frequently framed in medical encounters as potentially enhanced following
reconstruction. Mary said:
The surgeon I saw was very upbeat about it to be honest. I think he
thought he was being positive but it bugged me a bit. I was thinking
“you’re a bit cheery about this, how would you be like if someone
wanted to whack your nuts off”? He was like, “you’ll be back to normal
in six months” like I will I ever [said with emphasis] be normal again.
He showed me before and after pictures and made comments, some
women look better after. Well I didn’t see anything that looked better
after.
Mary explained here how her surgeon suggested some women’s natural breasts were
in need of medical repair by framing reconstructed breasts as potentially looking
‘better’. Also, by suggesting reconstruction offers ‘normality’ in six months, Mary’s
recovery is centred primarily on her restoring her outward appearance, a claim
vehemently rejected by Mary who felt she would never again achieve ‘normality’.
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Similarly Jacqui outlined a discussion with her GP following her genetic test during
which the GP had suggested reconstruction could improve her natural breasts;
He [GP] was really good, understanding (…) he signed me off [work]
straight away (…). He was very sympathetic and you didn’t feel, like
you were being, over-reacting or anything. He was asking if I knew my
options but it was too early. Then he goes “oh well, it’s not like years
ago. They can do so much now and you never know, you might end up
with a better pair than before”, or words to that effect. It was a bit off
putting if I’m honest. I didn’t know quite how to take it. I just laughed
and said “yeah maybe”.
Mary and Jacqui’s excerpts indicated that there had been times when health care
professionals were complicit in the commodification of their bodies and breasts by
presenting reconstruction as a routine intervention which could even be considered a
‘bonus’ in terms of improving their breasts. Like Susan and Rosie, Mary and Jacqui
were encouraged to think of breast removal with reconstruction as a package not only
to render their risky bodies safe again, but to consider the process as a package of
improvement which could upgrade their bodies. The makeover discourse suggests
women at risk of cancer are in a win-win situation: remove cancer risk whilst
simultaneously restoring the body to its former glory or even achieving a better body
than before. There is, as Löwy (2010, p. 215) found, a promise of “new breasts for the
old” which supports the overly optimistic claims attached to reconstruction post-breast
loss.

Additionally, it is notable such ‘improvements’ to the body are universally considered in
terms of a socially constructed ideal breast which fits a particular aesthetic. The notion
of the ‘perfect breast’ is highly prevalent in Western society and reinforced by
consumer and medical literature which suggests a particular type of breast is ideal
hence desired by women (Mallucci & Branford, 2014; 2012).

Decades ago, Morgan

(1991) argued elective cosmetic surgery was becoming normalised to the extent
women not having surgery would come to be viewed as stigmatised and deviant. More
contemporary literature reaffirms this and suggests not only is cosmetic surgery
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normalised, but also glamorised (Gallagher & Pecot-Hebert, 2007) and routinised as a
staple feature of modern life (Adams, 2010).

Adams (2010) further contended

cosmetic surgery could be understood as a form of commercial medicine which
aggressively markets itself to consumers through a mandate of surgical selfimprovement.

Accordingly, if surgery to correct and improve aged, pendulous, small,

unequal, sagging, stretched or any other breast imperfection is routine, then surgery
when breasts are removed or missing is likely to be deemed obligatory.

Medical and public literature on breast loss provides little discussion of women deciding
not to have reconstruction. A culture of survivorship and optimistic outlook emphasises
restoration of the body to ‘normality’ through reconstruction and denies women the
chance to mourn their changed bodies and express anger and fear (Sulik, 2012). No
attention is paid to the potential normality of the mastectomised body (Crompvoets,
2012) and the option of not concealing breast loss is unavailable to women (Rubin &
Tanenbaum, 2011; Wilkinson, 2001).

Instead, women facing breast loss are

continually presented with options all of which require a renegotiation of the body in
relation to the outward appearance (Báez-Hernández, 2009). The prospect women
might not want or feel the need for reconstruction rarely, if ever, enters the debate.
The market potential of breast cancer is increased through a survivorship culture and
reconstruction ideology. From a Marxist stance, this is necessary to ensure a high
demand for and consumption of reconstruction and wealth generating medical
technologies.

When women undergo reconstruction, ideology conceals the profit making potential
available to various stakeholders as part of the way the body is commodified. Thus as
O’Neill (2013) contends, reconstruction is promoted as essential in recovery from
breast loss but is economically tied to various health care providers.

Additionally,

ideology conceals the human costs of surgery which include pain, numbness, scarring
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and unacceptable physical changes (Rolnick et al, 2007) and failed reconstructions
(Koskenvuo et al., 2013) which may require women to undergo numerous surgical
procedures. In contrast to the new, improved breasts promised through makeover
discourse, reconstructed breasts are found by many to be unpleasant (Gopie et al.,
2013) and women report being unprepared for the lack of sensation in their
reconstructed breasts (Hallowell et al., 2012).

To conclude this section, an interpretation through the lens of MLT suggested
reconstruction was sold as part of the package of cure for cancer risk. Reconstruction
effectively serves corporate interests which link ideologies of women’s bodies with
recovery from breast loss (Crompvoets, 2012). Reconstruction promises restoration of
normality, femininity and sexuality (Cobb & Starr, 2012) hence breasts are further
commodified (Sulik, 2012) for the corporate manipulation of what is a life threatening
and feared disease (Selleck, 2010).

The analysis problematised the framing of

reconstruction as essential and routine, and revealed the participants rejected the
promise of reconstruction and instead perceived it as a risk to the body.

The

participants’ stories accordingly exposed what is hidden in ideology: RRS potentially
damages bodies and reconstruction is limited in what it can offer high risk women in
terms of repairing their damaged bodies. This was an important theme which emerged
from the study and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.

Joining to the role of power in maintaining ideologies
Marxist power is based on economics. However, an understanding of how ideological
practices are sustained and exert power to maintain the dominance of certain
discourses in relation to cancer and cancer-risk management is best understood by a
Foucauldian interpretation of how power is spread through discourse and social
relations.
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Foucault was critical of the concept of ideology as false consciousness, something
unknown or fake which obscured ‘true’ knowledge. Foucault disagreed with aspects of
Marx’s ideology mainly in relation to the suggestion man has an innate consciousness
which power acts upon. Foucault focussed more on the effects of power on the body
and argued there is no such thing as false or true consciousness: we are all the
products of culture and history. For Foucault, truths were socially, historically and
culturally bound positions which were fluid and ever changing depending on the
dominant societal discourses of the time. The next section provides an analysis of the
participants’ stories from a Foucauldian perspective and reveals further the conflicts
and contradictions which bind HBOC management and which influenced the
participants’ decisions to say no to RRS.

An interpretation through the lens of Foucauldian Literary Theory
Foucault’s primary concern related to how individuals came to be constructed as
subjects and conform to covert organising practices which constrain and control in
modern societies. Foucault argued subjectification was facilitated by modes of power
including biopower and disciplinary power which regulated and disciplined individuals in
society (Taylor, 2011). Biopower governs populations whilst disciplinary power targets
the individual body through various non-coercive techniques and mandates the ways in
which individuals exist and act (Hoffman, 2011). Power, from Foucault’s perspective is
intertwined with authoritative truth because power operates through what people say as
much as what they do (Lynch, 2011). Hence discourses create and maintain the rules
and norms which define realities for women with BRAC gene mutations and give rise to
power relations through the creation of knowledge and truths about why and how they
should respond to their mutation-positive status.

The stories of Susan, Ann, Mary, Rosie, Pauline and Jacqui are fraught with their
responses to feeling powerless.

However, a Foucauldian lens provided an
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interpretation of participants’ experiences in regards to concepts of power relations,
discourse and how knowledge is constructed as power in the medical discourse. A
Foucauldian analysis to the participants’ stories disrupted taken for granted
assumptions about how RRS is understood and exposed discursive elements and
power/knowledge relations which shaped their experiences. This approach illuminated
the struggles the participants in this study faced as they followed a path at odds with
the dominant discourses in which their experiences took place, but also highlighted the
possibility for resistance to the dominant medical pathway for HBOC.

Knowledge, truth and the medical discourse
Foucault’s concept of discourse posits individuals in society are regulated and
controlled through discursive practices which serve as collective organising tools within
particular discourses (Bertens, 2008). Discourse is the means by which knowledge is
represented and validated as ‘truth’ hence discourse is intertwined with power since
individuals are socialised within discourses (Seymour-Smith, Wetherell & Phoenix,
2002) and therefore their experiences of owning a BRAC1/2 mutation acquire meaning
through various discourses.

The findings from this study revealed the effects of irrefutable truths about HBOC which
disempowered those who did not conform to the accepted treatment norms and
constructed them as aberrant.

The participants’ stories of medical consultation

revealed that medical advice was significant in determining ‘the truth’ about familial
cancer. Mary, Ann and Pauline described prior experiences of family members with
cancer and concerns cancer may have been ‘passed on’, only to have these concerns
dismissed by relatives, friends or physicians. However, once genetics was popularised
and genetic testing revealed the presence of a BRAC1/2 mutation, their concerns were
accepted without question. Mary explained:

235

So what I had believed about it being a family disease, it was backed up
by what the doctors were saying. It made it all official (…) and real. I
had been saying it for years and everyone said I was daft, being over
dramatic. So part of me felt, well not pleased, that’s not the right word
(…) but a bit, I’d been proved right. Didn’t make it any less scary though
(…) more scary now it was official and not just me saying it.
Mary’s words evidenced not only how knowledge of her family’s disease pattern was
dismissed as foolish and melodramatic, but also the power of medical knowledge to
determine truth and therefore risk of cancer and necessary actions to combat the
genetic risk factor. Ann’s story also provided evidence of how medicine determines the
truth about cancer;
For as long as I can remember, I’ve been expecting it to happen to me,
so when she [sister] was tested and it came back positive, it really just
confirmed what I had always known. (…) Before the test, Ken said it
would be good to have it done, then we would know for sure one way or
the other, we’d find out the truth. I said I already knew but he said, …
“well you don’t really, you just think you do, we need to find out the
truth”(…) maybe that’s why I was shocked, him saying it made me really
think maybe it would be negative and I’d be off the hook. (…). Even
though I had deep down knew it would be positive, it was still a shock,
the finality of it.
Although Ann felt certain she would be mutation-positive, others dismissed her
knowledge as insufficient and it fell to medicine to authenticate this as the truth about
her family’s cancer status. Ann described her shock once this ‘truth’ was discovered
through genetic testing, her use of the word ‘finality’ suggested an inevitability which
was now unavoidable.

Pauline also discussed how the concerns of women in the family were initially
dismissed prior to genetic testing. Pauline’s maternal grandmother was first diagnosed
with breast cancer in the 1970s and subsequently died from the disease in the early
1980s. Her mother was diagnosed with breast cancer in 2002 but died shortly after
from a stroke.

Her story showed how her mother’s request for RRS was denied

despite her mother’s belief her cancer was familial:
My mum’s mum, she was the first we knew of although after my mum
died, it came out there had been others, as far back as the war they
said. When mum got hers [breast cancer], she said to the docs, “just
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take them both off, just get rid of it”. I think she knew then it might be
something in our family (…) it really brought it all into focus in a way.
They only took the one breast away and then of course she took the
stroke and died, so we’ll never know if the cancer would have come
back. Mum really believed we were cursed by it [cancer], she used to
say it was a curse, but back then it wasn’t treated the same. They said
taking away her good breast was overkill. I thought she should have it
off too, you know, just wanting her to be okay (…) but they didn’t want to
[remove the unaffected breast]. Then Sarah [sister] got it [breast cancer]
too and it was a whole different ball game (…) right from the start they
were asking about mum and gran and then bringing in me too and the
rest of the family. By then, they knew it was passed on through families.
Pauline’s story shows how removal of the unaffected contralateral breast was
described as ‘overkill’, highlighting how her mother’s knowledge was considered less
important than medical knowledge at the time. In medical discourse, concerns about
hereditary cancer and requests for RRS were largely not taken seriously prior to the
widespread availability of genetic testing (Hamilton, 2012; Happe, 2006).

Genetic

mutations, as pathological entities, existed but were not branded as risks for disease
until technology was developed which allowed mutations to be named, classified and
responded to (Lerner, 2000). Lay knowledge was thus dismissed until made visible
and accessible through genetics then claimed by medicine as its own.

Matloff, Bonadies, Moyer and Brierley (2014) found cancer genetics specialists’ views
on genetic testing and RRS changed between 1998, when the speciality was in its
infancy, and 2012 as more had become known. Matloff et al. (2014) found as genetic
testing became routine, specialists were more accepting of testing and RRS and more
likely to accept these measures for themselves.

Removal of healthy breasts pre-

disease, once considered an “unthinkable step” (Thompson, 1994, p. 38) is now
considered the principle primary intervention for reducing breast/ovarian cancer risk
(Guillem et al., 2006; Ingham et al., 2013), despite much remaining unknown about the
genetics of hereditary cancer (NICE, 2013) and how best to manage people with
BRCA1/2 mutations (Kurian et al., 2010).

Similarly, contralateral prophylactic

mastectomies in women affected with breast cancer, previously denied to women such
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as Pauline’s mother are now common despite a lack of evidence regarding its efficacy
(Newman, 2014).

From a Foucauldian perspective, the key point is no permanent or

timeless criteria for determining the truth exists. What is problematised is the discourse
surrounding medical knowledge which constructs some information as facts which
represent ‘the truth’ about breast/ovarian cancer while other information is relegated to
the background. Thus, medical discourse reflects a hierarchy of credibility around
HBOC which privileges some types of knowledge over others and supports power
relations which endorse RRS.

Not surprisingly then, medical/genetic knowledge validated the women’s and their
families’ concerns about familial cancer and was regarded as the official explanation or
‘the truth’ about why people develop cancer.

Susan’s story revealed changing

perceptions of the cause of cancer in her family from non-genetic to genetic reasons
once testing had taken place;
And I knew by then cancer had taken my granny so you do worry about
someone dying from it. The doctors did ask my mum about her mum
but nothing was done about it so we just thought we were unlucky
getting cancer twice in the family. (…) Plus they both smoked so we just
assumed it was maybe the smoking brought the cancer on. Then after
my aunt got tested, that showed us (…) the cancer must have been
caused by bad genes, probably not through smoking.
Susan came to attribute her mother’s and grandmother’s cancers entirely to genetic
causes, discounting other potential causes as unlikely now the genetic information was
known. Again, while this may be understandable given a deleterious mutation was
identified in her family, it suggests genetic knowledge was accepted over other
knowledge as ‘the truth’ about why people get cancer despite the greatest majority of
breast/ovarian cancer occurring sporadically through non-heritable causes (NICE,
2013).

There was some acknowledgement of non-heritable causes of cancer, for

example, Pauline alluded to possible environmental causes when she said;
I read on a web site about one woman like me, BRCA2 positive and not
having the surgery. She talks about pollution and the environment and
how it can cause cancer. (…) now I know [genetic status] I am watching
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my diet and trying to be more healthy. Doing things like, trying to avoid
chemicals and stuff, things linked to cancer. It’s my way of trying to get
my risk down and do something positive myself. I think doing something
about it yourself makes you feel better.
Similarly Susan and Mary acknowledged there was a link between smoking and cancer
but generally, the participants and their families appeared to adopt the genetics
discourse as the most likely explanation for cancer.

This showed how BRCA1/2

mutations are now normalised in public discourse to the extent they are increasingly
considered a concomitant factor in non-inherited causes of breast cancer, reflecting
what Ilkilic (2009, p. 140) referred to as a “cultural adoption of meaning”. Ann likewise
highlighted the primacy of genetic information as providing ‘the truth’ about cancer and
its deadly consequences:
(…) there had to be something that was killing us off. We don’t just get
cancer, we get terminal cancer so I guess it [gene fault] sort of explained
it really. All this cancer was down to our own bodies killing us, (…) an
awful thought really.
Foucault would argue that the uncritical acceptance of medical authority and an almost
dogmatic belief in inherited genetic causes for cancer is symptomatic of the
medical/genetics discourse which gives consent to particular ways of acting in
response to cancer risk. Mary said:
When she [Mary’s mother] died (…) you didn’t really know much about it
[breast cancer] back then. We didn’t have computers like you do now so
you only had what they [health professionals] told you. It was when her
sister, my Aunt Yvonne got breast cancer too, well it seemed more than
a coincidence. Two sisters both getting it [breast cancer], well it was like
lightening striking twice in the same place (…) then when Angela
[cousin] got diagnosed too, the doctors seemed to get interested. (…).
Of course hers [Angela’s genetic test] came back positive for the gene
and (…) gave us concrete proof cancer was in our genes, running
through our family.
Here, Mary’s story reveals two key effects of discourse: the construction of genetic
knowledge as ‘the truth’ or as Mary believed, ‘concrete proof’ of why cancer develops,
and also the reliance on experts to legitimise concerns about health. Thus, genetic
knowledge as the truth is privileged and creates reliance on doctors as experts who
regulate the body.
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The issue of specialism
Specifically, the medical discourse dictates what is considered the truth or facts about
health and disease and who is allowed to speak legitimately about health matters
(Stoddart, 2007).

From a Foucauldian stance, genetic information and how it is

discussed may be understood and delivered as a discursive practice which defines the
specialist nature of genetics. Pauline explained:
You need to have quite a few sessions before they even test you. They
tell you how they calculate your risk and things (…) it’s really specialised
information they give you, very complicated. (…) And some of the
words they use (…) they give you booklets and web sites but it’s quite
hard. Without being a medical person, it’s really difficult to understand.
It was even harder to tell it to John [partner]. He kept asking me
questions I couldn’t answer. Then he would get all angry, shout at me I
needed to ask more if I didn’t understand. They didn’t let him in [during
counselling] because (…) it’s privacy and to do with making sure I make
my own decision and (…) be totally honest. John got a bit stressed,
made me feel a right idiot at times, not knowing. I think that’s why I was
a bit scared with this [taking part in the interview], worried I wouldn’t
know the right answers.
Genetics counsellors were frequently referred to as ‘the specialists’ and there was a
perception genetic information could not be challenged because of its ‘specialised’
nature. Susan said;
At the [genetic] counselling, it’s not like seeing a normal doctor, it wasn’t
like anything I’d ever experienced. You wait ages for an appointment
which I understand, because they’re so specialised and there’s not a lot
of them. So I was (…) quite worked up when I went. She [genetic
counsellor] did her best to help (…) understand your risk and what are
the chances you might get a tumour in the breast, but it’s not as easy as
you might think. It’s not like they are telling you you’ve got a broken leg
that needs a plaster (…) when it’s genes, it’s a different matter. You
don’t understand for a start, well I couldn’t really understand it all, and
you are going in completely blind, knowing absolutely nothing except
what’s happened to your family. Genetics, well it’s not the type of thing
the man in the street is going to know much about is it? So I just
thought, “who am I to disagree with what they’re saying”?
It was thus evident those who were able to speak about genetics were constructed as
experts who knew the truth about breast/ovarian cancer. Unanswered questions as to
why people get cancer are addressed in the genetics discourse.

However, the

specialised and scientific nature of genetics means genetic information is a particular
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type of information, the acquisition of which makes people dependent on and maintains
the dominance of medicine as the expert authority.

From a Foucauldian perspective, genetics can be understood as a particular form of
medical specialism which supports biopower (Lemke, 2004). Increasing specialism
and rapid advancements in genetic technology has resulted in “overgenetization”
(Willis, 2005, p. 152) and has cemented the importance and value attached to genetic
information (Helén, 2005; Paul et al., 2014). In Western society, genetics is hailed as a
new frontier and a triumph of medical advancement (Finkler, 2000). A Foucauldian
interpretation accordingly allowed genetics to be understood as an emergent discourse
which maintains and reinforces medical prestige and power. The language of genetics
is important because it reinforces how specialised genetic information is, thereby
potentially isolating non-experts, such as the people undergoing testing.

Jacqui

discussed her isolation from the discourse thus:
The genetics woman [counsellor] was really good (…) but there’s just so
much to take in. She went back over all the research and the statistics
and tried to put my risk into understandable language but I still couldn’t
quite take it all in. (…). Every time they asked “do you have any
questions?” I think I said something like “no, no, you’ve explained
everything really well”, or words to that effect (...) you don’t like to ask
too many questions, they’re the specialists after all, they’re the ones
who know what they’re talking about.
The participants’ stories show how discourse has the potential to both enable and
exclude (O’Farrell, 2007). Foucault (1973) argued medical discourse was supported by
an increasingly sophisticated language which conferred a growing knowledge of facts
and truths about the human body.

On the one hand, this is enabling because

knowledge of cancer risk allows individuals to take action to reduce risk (Paul et al.,
2014). On the other, genetic information is extremely complex (Braithwaite et al., 2006;
Hoskins et al., 2012) and requires knowledge of genetics and statistics (Case et al.,
2005) which is out with the scope of most people’s understanding (Ilkilic, 2009; Tamir,
2010) and hence is largely unavailable to them (Tonkiss, 2012).

Like Susan and
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Jacqui, Ann also revealed the challenge high risk women face when attempting to
locate themselves within such a discourse;
The first few meetings at the hospital [to discuss management options]
seemed unreal. Looking back I think I sleep-walked through them. Ken
had to take notes (…) because I could never remember the discussions.
Even what I did manage to take in, it was not easy, not straightforward.
I don’t think I am particularly thick but some of it was a struggle to
understand. There is an enormous amount of information to be given
and a lot of it is very complicated and you are trying to deal with it when
all you can think of is, am I going to die, is this it?
The analysis suggested the voices of those at risk may be lessened because the
expert language of the discourse authorised certain speakers and excluded others
(Tonkiss, 2012).

Whilst medical discourse defines HBOC and prescribes its

management, the discourse of specialism which underpins genetic medicine conceals
the persisting uncertainty about why people get cancer (Löwy, 2010) and that the
information on which management guidelines are based is incomplete (NICE, 2013),
temporary and open to multiple interpretations (Timmermans & Buchbinder, 2012).

Applying a Foucauldian analysis then suggested breast/ovarian cancer is an object of
interest in medical discourse which acquired different meanings in different historical
contexts. Accordingly, although an organic disease, the construct of breast/ovarian
cancer is itself fluid and understandings of it are dependent upon what is considered
rational and ‘the truth’ at a given point in time.

Somewhat ironically, as genetic

technology continues to advance and new genetic knowledge emerges, inevitably risk
estimations for some people will prove to be inaccurate and require revision (Lock &
Nguyen, 2010). Moreover, advancements in less mutilating techniques such as MRI
screening are likely to offer survival rates comparable to RRS hence RRS may become
less ‘routine’ (Kurian et al., 2010). Despite this, women are undergoing irreversible,
life-changing surgery; such is the strength of the current medical discourse. However,
as this study shows, resistance to the dominant discourse is possible, because as
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Foucault contended, knowledge and ‘the truth’ are unstable constructs and hence are
always open to challenge.
The issue here is not whether genetic information is true or false/right or wrong, and
there is no question owning a BRCA1/2 mutation increases the likelihood of developing
cancer in high risk populations. What the analysis in this study suggests is that the
construction of genetic risk as ‘the truth’ about why people develop breast/ovarian
cancer and the representation of those who are able to speak about genetics as
experts who can accurately read, interpret and remedy the body, sustains a discourse
which may exclude the very people it seeks to assist. The issue of risk appears critical.
The risk discourse has become significant because medicine was able to utilise the
emergent genetics discourse to maintain dominance. A space was created within the
medical discourse to encompass the risk of cancer as another way of controlling the
body, enabled through genetic testing.

This in turn highlights another effect of discourse evident in the participants’ stories: the
conflation of risk with disease. The next section presents an analysis of the effects of
genetics, risk and cancer discourses which revealed a discursive matrix in which
cancer risk was located in women’s bodies, generating fear and subjecting high risk
women to medical intervention to control the deadly inheritance.

Genetics, risk and the cancer discourse
It was apparent being identified as owning a genetic marker for breast/ovarian cancer
was a traumatic and frightening event for the participants and their families. Although
Susan, Rosie, Ann, Pauline, Mary nor Jacqui had a personal cancer diagnosis, their
stories revealed epiphany moments around the realisation their relative’s cancer might
be hereditary hence they and their own children might come to be afflicted with the
disease. Analysis of their stories revealed the effects of the medical/genetics discourse
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which created hegemonic constructions of risk and influenced how risk status was
perceived and negotiated.

From a Foucauldian perspective, discourses around and about cancer construct and
present cancer in particular ways and are supported discursively in the ways cancer is
spoken about.

Specifically, discursive practices alert people to the seriousness of

cancer through the language employed and the cultural connotations attached to that
language. Sontag’s (1979) seminal work exposed how military metaphors constructed
understanding and experience of cancer and presented the body as under attack from
a deadly invader, and such metaphors remain prominent in the cancer discourse
(Clarke & Everest, 2006; Cobb & Starr, 2012; Grant & Hundley; 2008; Haines et al.,
2010; Reisfield & Wilson, 2004). Analysis of the participants’ stories suggested this
militaristic discourse has extended to the discourse on cancer risk. Jacqui described
an online discussion in which she had taken part when she was considering RRS:
When I was first going through this thing (…) deciding whether to have it
[surgery] or not, I looked on the computer quite a bit (…) research it
myself. I remember going on one of the self-help [web]sites (…) but
everyone seemed to be having the surgery done. I couldn’t see anyone
who was not having it [surgery]. (…). There were some who were
struggling [with the decision] but most seemed to want it [surgery] asap
and couldn’t wait to get on with it. Someone described their boobs as
ticking time bombs and everyone agreed, it was, yeah, how they felt too,
having them off was the best way to fight it (…) they felt different about
their bodies now I suppose. You feel out on a limb really, is my decision
really so strange? It was like, feeling like a coward, running away and
not facing up to it.
Here we see how Jacqui has constructed herself as a coward as she has been unable
to accept RRS to fight back against the threat of cancer. Being cowardly and ‘running
away’ by not accepting surgery contrasts with the heroic battler who fights to win the
war on cancer so frequently depicted in cancer discourse (Davis, 2008; Sulik, 2012).
This excerpt also shows how high risk women’s breasts were talked about as ‘ticking
time bombs’, the suggestion being their breasts harboured a deadly threat which could
devastate at any moment. The use of the term ‘ticking time bombs’ clearly articulates
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the life-changing and confronting impact genetic information may have on women and
it is a phrase frequently encountered in research exploring BRCA1/2 carriers
experiences (for example see DiMillo et al., 2013; Grubs et al., 2014; Hamilton, 2009;
Karlan & McIntosh, 2007). Rosie also referred to her breasts as ‘time bombs’ when
she said;
(…) when mine [genetic test] came back positive, I was just totally in
shock. I think I had persuaded myself I’d be okay, you know, negative
(…) strange logic really but I was thinking because my mum, aunt and
sister all had it [cancer], then maybe the chances were the gene had
skipped me. They say one in three get cancer then our three had
already been used up. (…) So to say I was devastated was an
understatement. It literally took the legs from under me. When the
specialist tells you you are really high risk of getting cancer, it’s really
bloody awful. You go from being a normal person to this, well, like going
from being normal to having these time bombs attached to your chest.
And there’s no way of knowing when they are going to go off (…) like
you are sitting waiting on something bad to happen but you have no
idea when. (…). I suppose you worry more because, well it’s a fear of
the unknown. It’s not like having arthritis or something like a skin
condition. (…) [be]cause of course you still look the same on the outside
but it’s what’s happening inside (…) what might be growing in there.
These excerpts illuminate how cancer risk, as revealed through genetic testing,
disrupted the previously held sense of self as ‘normal’ and instead constructed the
body as defective and dangerous. Although none of the participants had cancer, their
stories revealed the intensity of the emotional reaction to being identified as high risk of
developing breast/ovarian cancer and confirmed the presence of significant levels of
distress and anxiety which accompany this type of genetic information (DiMillo et al.,
2013; McLamara, 2013; Samson et al., 2014). Mary also highlighted how women’s
breasts come to be considered deadly as a result of carrying a BRCA1/2 mutation. In
this excerpt, Mary discusses an online conversation on a breast cancer self-help forum
which she had taken part in shortly after her genetic test result:
Some of the women had already had cancer in one breast and had the
other one off [preventatively]. They all said if they’d known before and
had them off sooner they wouldn’t have got cancer. One of them said I
had to get rid of my killer boobs, not just for me but for my family (…) to
stay alive for the sake of my kids. There was not really anything being
said you might not get cancer (…) it was all very definite it would
happen, it was when, not if.
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Here, cancer was constructed as residing in women’s “killer” breasts, the removal of
which was necessary to ensure survival. Thus although BRCA1/2 mutation carriers are
disease-free, their lives are effectively at risk because of the tendency to treat genetic
risk as a disease in itself (Conrad, 2007). Risk is medicalised and represented as an
empirical calculation and an objective marker which can be modified by engaging with
risk reducing interventions such as surgery.

Moreover, although genetic risks are

based on models of probability, they are constructed socially as certainties (Finkler,
2000). This was clearly articulated by Pauline who explained:
Although my mum and granny had both had breast cancer, it was a
major shock when Sarah was diagnosed because she seemed quite
young to get it. I don’t remember my granny much but my mum was in
her late fifties when she got caught [diagnosed with cancer] which we
were told wasn’t unusual really (…) but Sarah got her’s before the
menopause which they [doctors] said was more unusual and with mum
and gran (…) that’s the first we heard about familial cancer. We knew it
[cancer] ran in families so the chances are someone would get it but we
didn’t know about genes (…) cancer could spread from the mother to
the daughter through the gene.
Pauline clearly located risk within genes and equated genes with disease. Thus, the
risk of disease as determined by the presence of the genetic marker was equated with
disease itself.

Notably, deviations in DNA are labelled as ‘mutations’, ‘faults’ and

‘defects’ making the genetics discourse a “discourse of deficiency” (Gottweis, 1997, p.
65) fostering a dependence on medicine to ‘repair’ broken bodies (Conrad, 1999, 2005;
Lemke, 2004). This was cogently articulated by Jacqui:
When I got the letter, I just fell apart (…) it felt like the old me was gone
and replaced with another faulty version. I ended up going to my GP.
(…) as I just couldn’t function. I couldn’t speak to anyone without
breaking down. I shocked myself at how badly I took it (…) I thought I
was stronger.
It was clear Jacqui was devastated by her genetic test result to the point of her being
unable to function and “falling apart”. Like Rosie whose genetic status transformed her
from ‘normal’ to a ‘time bomb’, Jacqui reconstructed herself as ‘faulty’, and was also
forced to call into question aspects of self which were previously certain, in this case
her strength of character, despite having no disease.

Samson et al. (2014) asserted
246

that genetics and risk discourses not only affected a person’s sense of the physical
body, but also affected the sense of self, altering a person’s biography and creating a
re-establishment of the self as ‘faulty’. They also contended that these individuals had
to re-negotiate a life transition as BRCA1/2 mutation carriers to actively create and
adapt to new life realities.

Genetics, risk and cancer discourses coalesce to construct a woman’s body as a site of
risk and move cancer from the clinical arena into everyday life (Davis, 2008). The
conflation of risk with disease causes existential implications which require BRCA1/2
mutation carriers to learn to live under Damocles’ sword (DiMillo et al., 2013; Samerski,
2006). Ann described her feelings following her mutation-positive test result:
I remember being in a daze for ages, days and days, then waking up
one day and thinking ‘where do I go from here, what do I actually do with
this?’ It was all just so depressing really, so in-your-face, no escaping it
and no way of putting it out of your mind. I know this sounds really
dramatic, but it was like getting a death sentence.
Here, the notion of risk-as-disease is exemplified through Ann’s depiction of carrying a
BRCA1/2 mutation as comparable to getting a death sentence. In the same vein,
Susan revealed how she initially equated her genetic test result with an impending
terminal event:
The day we got the results is imprinted on my brain for ever.
I
remember feeling, “oh well, that’s it then, that’s me fekked [done for]”. I
did cry when I thought about Emma. How am I going to tell her her
mum’s probably going to get cancer and die? How do you tell your wee
girl you might not be there to see her grow up? It was the worst possible
thing (…) it just felt really bleak (…) you know, doom and gloom, finding
out you could die young.
This conflation of risk with disease goes some way to explaining the women’s and their
families’ fearful reactions to a positive BRCA1/2 mutation test result. Rosie, Susan,
Pauline, Ann, Jacqui and Mary did not have cancer, yet in keeping with Samson et al.
(2014) and DiMillo et al. (2013) their BRCA1/2 mutation status meant they experienced
a raft of emotions including fear, anger, anxiety which left them feeling frightened,
vulnerable and with a palpable fear of dying. It was thus evident owning a BRCA1/2
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mutation induced feelings similar to being diagnosed with cancer. From a Foucauldian
stance, this occurs because of the power of dominant discourses. The contemporary
genetics/risk discourse on breast/ovarian cancer has reconstructed breast/ovarian
cancer from something which happened to the body to something which happens
because of the body. Whereas previously cancer was seen to occur as a result of
external factors, the increasing organisation of medicine around genetic causes of
cancer supports a discourse which situates the cause of cancer as residing primarily
within the body. Hence BRCA1/2 mutations take on the status of cancer: it is this
conflation between risk and disease/death which makes genetic information potentially
devastating.

Evidence of the equating of risk with disease was also apparent through the depiction
of those who tested mutation-negative as not at risk of cancer.

Susan somewhat

derisively described her aunt’s relief about her cousins’ negative test results:
My aunty Helen was over the moon Elaine and Claire’s were okay. I
can understand they were all really relieved, to know it [cancer] wasn’t
going to happen to them, they were in the clear (…) but it felt like they
were so busy celebrating I got a bit forgotten about. And mum was
really happy about Rhona [Susan’s younger sister], saying well at least
Rhona’s going to be okay and she only needed to worry about me.
Helen being all “yes, we’re alright, so glad we had it done, what a relief,
everything’s rosy in our garden”, which was a bit off I thought really,
considering mine [test result].
Susan’s story confirms that those who did not carry a BRCA1/2 mutation were
considered ‘safe’ and perceived as being insusceptible to the disease. Rosie also
believed her sister and cousin were not at risk of cancer because test results had been
mutation-negative:
But looking back, as well as being devastated, I was also a bit peeved,
well angry really it was me, the “why me?” They [sister and mother] were
obviously really happy she [sister] was not at risk, and I was for her too,
really, but it was ironic in a way (…) Julie [sister] was the one who
wanted it [testing] so much and she was getting away scot-free. She
was going to be okay and I was the one getting the bombshell. I admit I
did feel sorry for myself and my family. It was hard to look at Julie. I
really did feel happy for her but it did change things if I’m honest. I didn’t
like her feeling sorry for me and I think she found it hard to be happy
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around me. It’s a bit like someone you getting pregnant when your
sister can’t (…) it’s the elephant in the room.
Likewise, Jacqui discussed her sister Joanne’s mutation-negative result thus:
When Joanne got the all clear, I was really chuffed for her. She’s the
baby of the family so I really did want everything to be okay for her. The
three of us are really close, especially after losing both mum and dad,
but at the same time I did feel a bit resentful she got good news and I
didn’t. (…).Beth [affected sister] genuinely thought the testing and the
results were a great thing. Joanne was in the clear and I was now able
to do something about it. By then I was outwardly more calm but I didn’t
feel it inside. I felt I had to stay positive for everyone else so it did drive a
bit of a wedge between us if I’m honest.
The labelling of those who tested negative for a gene fault as ‘not at risk’ or ‘in the
clear’ conflicts with empirical risk calculations which confer the general population risk
for developing breast/ovarian cancer to mutation-negative women (NICE, 2013).
Medical risk calculations relate to high risk women with BCA1/2 mutations, but as many
as 1 in 8 women will develop breast cancer regardless (AIHW, 2012). A Foucauldian
interpretation suggests this reflects the contemporary genetics discourse as the truth
about why people get cancer. What is hidden in this discourse is that non BRCA1/2
mutation carriers may still develop cancer, or indeed, that BRCA1/2 mutation carriers
might not.

The dominance of the genetics discourse reflects what Conrad (2001, p. 225) referred
to as “genetic optimism”: a belief that by studying genetic material causes for disease
and ill-health can be identified, manipulated and rectified.

To a degree conflicting

discourses are present because contemporary cancer discourse is paradoxically one of
fear and reassurance (Crabb, 2006). On the one hand, the equating of genetic risk
with disease means owning a BRCA1/2 mutation is considered devastating and deadly.
On the other, cancer/risk is an invader to be bravely battled against and people can win
the war on cancer. This means cancer is simultaneously presented as being deadly
yet survivable if the afflicted individual takes appropriate steps to deal with the problem.
The following discussion explores how dominant discourses coalesce to translate
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beliefs about cancer risk into health actions through the operation of disciplinary power.
Power relationships enacted through discourse show the subtle ways women are
regulated through normalising practices in relation to HBOC but also reveal how
women negotiate, confront and resist power.

Disciplinary power and cancer surveillance
In the previous sections, interpreting the stories of Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan
and Jacqui through a Foucauldian lens illuminated a number of discursive practices
which maintained the dominance of medical authority, namely genetics as ‘the truth’
about breast/ovarian cancer, the conflation of risk with disease and medicine’s ability to
expertly read and attend to risky bodies.

In particular, Foucault’s concept of

disciplinary power was useful in understanding genetics as a technique of biopower
which targeted individual bodies in the quest to reduce cancer risk.

The analysis of the participants’ stories revealed genetic testing was generally
considered to be the most sensible action or indeed the only action to take when
confronted with the threat of cancer. Once a BRCA1/2 mutation was suspected or
identified within the family, it was taken-for-granted and expected that family members
would undergo genetic testing.

Jacqui and Pauline had accepted testing without

hesitation, although interestingly both commented on the seeming simplicity with which
their affected relatives had undergone testing which may have influenced their initial
decision making.

Jacqui’s sister was identified as carrying a BRCA1 mutation whilst

receiving treatment for breast cancer and her family’s main concerns had lain with her
sister’s health therefore when testing was offered to Jacqui, she accepted without
question:
When they offered us testing, it seemed like the most obvious thing to
do. I don’t think I really thought about the implications. It’s like you are
caught up in the emotion (…) you don’t really question, you just do.
Unfortunately it soon struck me it was a bigger and more important
250

decision than I first thought (…) the implications. I only thought about it
after I got the letter with the results, which seems crazy now.
Similarly, Pauline was also at the outset keen for testing to determine her personal risk
of cancer and believed knowledge of her genetic status would offer control over her
future health:
So there was never any issue of me not having it [genetic testing]. I felt it
was really important to know if I had it [gene fault] so I could do
something if I did. Looking back, I just never appreciated what it meant,
what it involved (…) it was all new to us. I thought it would be a simple
test then, well I would do what needed to be done, if it came back
positive. But of course, life’s not like that is it? Once you are on the
rollercoaster it’s hard to get off.
Disciplinary power trains and controls individuals to think and act in similar ways by
defining ‘the norm’ and constructing deviation from the norm as abnormal or aberrant
(Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014). In keeping with Armstrong’s (2007) contention, disciplinary
power was reasoned to be operating through the genetics discourse through the
positioning of genetic testing as the norm; a straightforward, routine procedure which
was the only sensible action for women at risk of cancer. Foucault (1977) argued the
nature of disciplinary power was such that bodies were required to be docile and
manipulable in order for non-coercive controlling techniques to be effective. A docile
body is one that “may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” (Foucault, 1977,
p. 136), making the body a site of regulation and both an object and target of power
(Turner, 2008). Observation, surveillance and control are key components in creating
docile bodies (Forbat, Maguire, McCann, Illingworth & Kearney, 2009) therefore
disciplinary power works to recruit those at risk of cancer into surveillance strategies
aimed at maximising the body potential by attempting to control cancer risk.
Accordingly, a Foucauldian interpretation contended knowledge of genetic status was
not the end point; rather it permitted technologies to be performed on the docile body.
For disciplinary power to achieve its objective, that is transformation of the risky body to
the lower risk/improved body, knowledge of genetic status was the first step in allowing
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‘something to be done’, namely RRS, to render the body safe. Here, Ann recounts her
sister’s advice:
(…) at least now we know what’s wrong, they [medicine] can do
something about it. At least there’s stuff they can do to sort it. I didn’t
have the chance at first but you have the chance to get yourself sorted.
You can beat it [cancer] before it even begins.
Ann’s sister had breast cancer and had undergone mastectomy, contralateral
prophylactic mastectomy and prophylactic bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, and whilst
it was not explicitly articulated ‘what could be done’, it was clear Ann’s sister believed
RRS would transform Ann’s body from risky to safe as Ann could ‘beat’ cancer before it
developed.

In this study, a Foucauldian interpretation suggested high risk women’s bodies may be
rendered docile in medical discourse which convincingly constructs cancer surveillance
and

risk

reducing

interventions

as

strategies

which

control

future

health.

Presymptomatic genetic testing for HBOC is predicated on the assumption it facilitates
a comprehensive surveillance strategy and effective interventions which reduce risk
and save lives (Esplen & Bleiker, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2012). Such assumptions are
endorsed through the official HBOC discourse as outlined in clinical guidelines such
NICE (2013) and Cancer Australia (2011, 2015) which make recommendations for the
management of BRCA1/2 mutation carriers. However, applying a Foucauldian critique
illuminated notions of surveillance which were particularly relevant to contemporary
understandings of breast/ovarian cancer because unlike other forms of cancer
surveillance such as mammography which detect the signs of disease, genetic testing
is a form of medical surveillance which scrutinises people for the potential for disease.

An effect of genetic testing is that it allows women who test positive for BRCA1/2
mutations to be marked as “genetically at risk” (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 486) and
constructed as “asymptomatically ill” (Billings et al., 1992, p. 476), “pre-disease”
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patients (Kreiner & Hunt, 2014, p. 870) and “patients-in-waiting” (Timmermans &
Buchbinder, 2010, p. 409).

Accordingly, genetic testing can be understood as a

modern form of surveillance for the asymptomatically ill.

For Foucault (1973),

surveillance was a feature of modern medicine which expanded the medical gaze to
include not only the sick, but the potentially sick. The shift towards surveillance in
medicine was supported by increasing technological advancements, or a “technology
assisted medical gaze” (Griffiths et al., 2010, p. 7) which permitted the internal body as
well as the external to be visualised, recorded and assessed.

Genetic testing further extends the scope of surveillance down to the cellular level
(Armstrong, Michie, & Marteau, 1998) and offers what Hoffman (2011) described as a
multiplicity of gazes which opened more people up to scrutiny and extended
disciplinary power. In this study, a further effect of disciplinary power was that even
those who initially resisted genetic testing were persuaded to submit to the medical
gaze, as Mary explained:
But I was worried about what it [genetic testing] would mean. My
youngest is only 16 and she might need a mortgage one day. They said
it shouldn’t affect it but you never know. (…). It just seemed to me to be
asking for trouble. It was all a bit up in the air (…) the doctors couldn’t
really answer the questions I had. But in the end I let myself get talked
into it. They [friends and family] persuaded me it was the best thing,
and in reality, part of me was really keeping everything crossed it would
come back normal.
Applying Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power proposes genetic testing is a
surveillance practice which creates rhetorical modes of understanding and exposition
which discipline risky bodies in support of the medical discourse for managing cancer
risk. Participation in cancer surveillance is a socially mandated behaviour presented as
a rational act; therefore placing one’s body under surveillance is an expression of
social responsibility and rationality (Willis, 2005). Disciplinary power dominates when
groups of individuals such as high risk women, are subjected to the same interventions,
practices and outcomes irrespective of individual needs (McCarthy, 2005). Genetic
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testing appears to be a common-sense response to risk but from a Foucauldian stance
is technique of power which controls bodies in the interests of the specialism and
contributes to the regulation and government of individuals at risk of cancer (Lemke,
2004), extending the authority of medicine over people with no disease. This enables
disciplinary power to be discreet yet ubiquitous and provides the mechanism which
persuades people of the need to surrender their bodies to the medical gaze and
conform to normalising strategies as outlined by medicine (Armstrong, 2007; Crabb,
2006; Happe, 2006). Rosie also described how she came under the medical gaze:
I was always a bit uneasy going for the testing but I kind of felt I had to
do it for Tom and Neil, plus there was, well he [husband] sort of
assumed I’d go, he didn’t even question it. It was just assumed I’d go.
No-one really forces you, but it’s there anyway (…) a pressure because,
well it seems like you should go and (…) have it done. Also, since mum
had gone and got it done for us, it seemed a bit pathetic for me not to
go.
Rosie succinctly exposed the non-coercive, persuasive nature of disciplinary power:
Rosie has not been ‘forced’ into testing but none-the-less felt she had to be tested and
clearly her loved ones also assumed she would undergo testing. Although not explicitly
stated, the need to discipline the body and partake in surveillance permeates through
discourse and is taken up as the desired response when faced with cancer risk. This
was further evidenced through references to family rifts and those who refused testing
being rejected within the family unit. Rosie’s affected sister (Sheena) had refused
testing which had led to bad feeling and a falling out between her siblings:
When we found out Sheena wasn’t going to have the [genetic] testing,
there was a lot of drama, especially Julie [sister] and her man [husband],
they were not happy bunnies!. They both flipped out because they
wanted to know what were the chances of the rest of us having it, or
spreading it on to our kids. They were also on at me to put pressure on
her to have it done which really upset me. (…) But Sheena was
adamant she wasn’t getting it done so she stuck to her guns. They fell
out about it in the end (…) Julie stopped visiting Sheena because she
was so angry with her.
Rosie’s sister’s refusal of genetic testing may be understood as resistance to
disciplinary power, or a refusal to take part in self-disciplining practices (Lilja &
Vinthagen, 2014). The impact of this resistance was significant because in the case of
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HBOC it extended to others in the family who may be denied access to the medical
gaze to determine their own risk of cancer, leading to anger and upset. Genetic testing
produces new knowledge about individuals and functions as a “politics of truth”
(Lemke, 2002, p. 8) hence those who resist genetic testing are especially problematic
because others are denied the chance to uncover the ‘truth’ about their genetics and
hence their own bodies. Ann’s cousin Shona had also refused testing, which led to
family discord and attempts at emotional blackmail to persuade her otherwise:
She [cousin] got offered it even though her mum was dead because
they were doing research on the cancer genes and her family history
was so strong. The genetics people said they might not find anything
but would still do [test] her and keep it on file for later. Shona said she
didn’t see the point and it would do more harm than good (…). They
[family] all said she had to go and find out. She’d be mad not to grab
this chance to find out with both hands and then we’d all know who
needed what. My Uncle Stuart even said it was an insult to Jean’s
[deceased aunt] memory as Shona had the chance to do something to
avoid what happened to her mum. Shona was really angry at her dad,
they didn’t speak for ages.
In this case, refusal of genetic testing was perceived as unacceptable because it
prevented the revelation of knowledge which could avert cancer and ultimately death.
Resistance to testing consequently exposed the presence of disciplinary power in
genetic testing because it challenged the mandate to take part in cancer surveillance
and made visible other positions which were available (not being tested) but not
desirable.

The above excerpt was also interesting in that it revealed what was

otherwise hidden in surveillance discourse, namely the tension between docility and
agency and the risks of surveillance.

Viera (2011) contends surveillance strategies for pre-disease conditions only make
sense when certain conditions met: the measures must have discriminating ability, that
is, those identified as pre-disease must be significantly more likely to develop the
disease than those not; there must be an effective intervention which prevents or
reduces the likelihood of disease and the benefits of the intervention must outweigh the
risks. This may in part explain why Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui
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submitted to genetic surveillance but said no to RRS. The analysis suggested that for
the participants in this study, Viera’s (2011) third condition was not met hence
resistance to disciplinary power was possible because the risks of the intervention for
the pre-disease condition, namely RRS, were too great.

Lilja & Vinthagen (2014) argued resistance to disciplinary power can entail a form of
reversed power in which the same technologies of power are employed but in ways
which open up spaces for individuals to make their own decisions. This is in keeping
with Foucault’s (1980, 1982) stance that power is productive as well as repressive
because power allows things to happen and permits positive transformation through
the negotiation of power relations (Allen, 2008).

From this perspective, cancer

surveillance strategies can be understood as providing a means through which high
risk women renegotiate power relations in medicine by accepting interventions which
allow them to self-regulate their risky bodies in ways which make sense to them.
Although Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Jacqui and Susan discussed many challenges
thrown up by their genetic test result, surveillance strategies, in particular
mammography appeared to offer some promise of control over their future health. All
discussed personal or others’ beliefs mammographic surveillance offered an
opportunity to detect early cancers which could then be successfully managed through
medical intervention. Jacqui explained:
(…) with my risk, going for the scans, the mammograms, well that’s
really important now you know, because then if there’s anything starting,
a tumour or even changes in the breast which maybe could turn
cancerous (…) things like changes can be seen on the scans before it
turns into cancer.
Here Jacqui acknowledged her risk of cancer as high and appeared somewhat
reassured that mammographic surveillance was able to detect precancerous lesions as
well as early cancers. High risk women may be reassured by surveillance because the
body is under close observation (Hamilton, Williams, Skirton & Bowers, 2009; Kurian et
al., 2005) and may therefore prefer to take part in surveillance (Griffiths et al., 2010;
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Sabatino et al., 2004) despite limited evidence on the safety and efficacy of breast
surveillance in high risk women (de Gonzalez, et al., 2009). Rosie also articulated a
belief in the value of mammographic surveillance:
I know I should have scans as well but I don’t go anymore. (…) I went
the first few times but it was horrible. I know it’s stupid and deep down I
should go and I’ve been on and off about going, although I do really
know I should go. But I am really going to try and go back. I should then
if it does happen [cancer] at least they can catch it early (…) then I
would take it [surgery], if I got cancer.
Here it can be understood that Rosie was in a process of renegotiating her position in
medical discourse: despite finding mammography deeply unpleasant and initially
withdrawing from it, her belief in the value of surveillance meant she was willing to
resume participation. Likewise, although Pauline voiced some doubts, she was nonethe-less in favour of surveillance:
Some people say cancer is either in you or it’s not. I read on a web site
about one woman like me, BRCA2 positive and not having the surgery.
(…) She also said she stopped having any tests or scans because they
were making her so anxious she felt the stress would bring on cancer. I
think there is some truth, maybe but even still I am going for the
mammos [mammograms] so they can catch it early. But not the ovary
one as my risk is quite low and it [screening] doesn’t really work for
ovary cancer anyway.
Intensive surveillance may enable individuals to renegotiate power in the medical
encounter by having their concerns listened to and acted upon (Forbat et al., 2009).
Hence surveillance is both a technique of power and empowerment because taking
part in surveillance is a means through which high risk women can have their risky
bodies monitored and protected by medical intervention should a future cancer
develop. This was evidenced across the participants’ stories through repeated
intonations that ‘early detection saves lives’. Like Pauline, Jacqui, Rosie and Ann,
Mary and Susan also viewed surveillance as a means of protection rather than control:
Living with this [gene fault], well it’s something you’ve got to contend
with I suppose. We are lucky in this county we get the NHS [National
Health Service] and the mammograms with it, which means I might not
get cancer at all (…) so I go and keep everything crossed it [screening]
stops me getting it [breast cancer]. It’s [having mammograms]
something I can do to help myself. (Mary)
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I just think, to lose your breasts and ovaries for something which might
or might not happen? I am superstitious and I think, if it’s going to
happen, it’s going to happen (…) if you are so high risk, then it’s
probably going to happen anyway. So I have opted to have screening
so I get checked out more frequently so if anything happens it will get
picked up quicker and (…) chances are it will still be able to be cured.
(Susan)
Again this reinforces Foucault’s position that power is not necessarily repressive but
always contingent, creating the conditions through which individuals re-position
themselves in medical encounters as holding power and directing medicine to attend to
their bodies as required (Forbat et al., 2009). Although Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline,
Jacqui and Susan said no to RRS, they renegotiated power through an acceptance of
mammographic surveillance as a means of dealing with cancer risk and potentially
securing future health.

To sum, this section explored how ‘the truth’ about hereditary breast/ovarian cancer
and RRS came to be and how the medical discourse came to dominate. From a
Foucauldian stance, the ‘truth’ about familial breast/ovarian cancer and how it should
be managed cannot be known as it cannot exist. What does exist, and what has been
demonstrated in this analysis, are the conditions and discourses which prevail at any
given time and make possible claims about familial breast/ovarian cancer and its
management to be made.

The interpretation offered contended power operated

through the HBOC discourse because high risk women were persuaded of the
sensibility of certain ways of being and acting to avoid cancer and prolong life.
However, as Foucault claimed, dominant discourses are effective in creating a range of
subject positions because the creation of an ideal subject position invariably creates
other subject positions at odds with the ideal, creating the space through which
resistance to the dominant medical pathway for HBOC is possible. The next section
applies a Feminist analysis to the participants’ stories and illuminates ways in which
Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline sought to make sense of their
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experiences and have their voices heard. A focus on their resistance to the medical
pathway for dealing with breast/ovarian cancer risk extends the interpretations
presented in the previous analytic sections in light of the convergence between the
three literary theories utilised, as discussed in Chapter 4.

An interpretation through the lens of Feminist Literary Theory
Feminist literary theory poses questions relating to power relationships in societies to
gain understanding of female social reality (Allen, 2014). Key to this is the argument all
human, social relations are gendered; therefore how women have been constructed
and represented in society reflects power struggles at the individual and societal level.
From a feminist perspective, female characteristics are socially constructed rather than
biologically determined. For example, men are constructed as strong, dispassionate
and career-orientated whereas women are constructed as weaker, emotionally labile
and nurturing (Mikkola, 2012).

While differences between males and females are

acknowledged, the extent to which these differences are innate or socially constructed
is problematised through the lens of feminist literary theory. Analysis of how the female
role, femininity and womanhood are socially constructed allows an exploration of the
dynamics of gender and power relations which may subordinate women.

A feminist critique added a valuable perspective to this study as it concerned an
important female issue: hereditary breast/ovarian cancer. Although male breast cancer
does exist and men can pass BRCA1/2 gene mutations to their children, women at risk
of HBOC face exacting challenges because norms of feminine embodiment are
fundamentally tied to female breasts hence breast loss is especially confronting for
women (Ehlers, 2012).

Additionally, the unique positioning of women as the

gatekeepers of family health in Western society (Acero, 2012; Warner & Procaccino,
2004) exaggerates the moral component of health decision making and adds another
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layer of complexity to the HBOC journey because women are also obliged to protect
others from the threat of cancer.

In this section, a feminist critique served as an analytical tool through which the
participants’ stories were read by the researcher for ways in which Susan, Rosie,
Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline sought to interpret, negotiate and make sense of their
individual circumstances. There was a focus on how their personal decisions to say no
to surgery were not fully understood within the broader social and cultural frameworks
which endorsed or denounced the decision to refuse RRS. The rejection of the advice
and cancer pathway offered by the official medical discourse on HBOC, and a decision
which is argued to be ‘anti-health’ in the context of Western medical discourse,
confirmed other discourses existed. The participants’ personal journeys and the ability
to say no served as a potent signifier of competing discourses and multiple, conflicting
ideologies which defined, described and directed HBOC and its management and
underscored the vexing reality of women who found themselves living with this risk.

The feminist concept of resistance provided the key focus of this analytic section. To
reiterate, resistance is understood as a means of fighting back against forms of
oppression and dominant ways of thinking which support the subordination of women
(Gotfrit, 1991). Utilising a feminist critique aims to problematise and make visible the
workings of hegemonic discourses which may oppress women by reframing the body
at risk of breast/ovarian cancer as a potential site of resistance to such dominating
practices. A feminist perspective thus highlights resistance as a potential practice of
empowerment which challenges taken-for-granted assumptions which may oppress
women through an illumination of the conflict and contradictions present in everyday
discourses (Allen, 2011).

Talbot, Bibace, Bokhour and Bamberg (1996) posited

women’s narratives function as forms of resistance to master narratives and discourses
which seek to hold individuals to culturally driven standards which define acceptable
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behaviours, in this case, the dominant medical discourse. In this study, resistance was
a means through which high risk women became aware of the competing and
conflicting discourses which surround HBOC and its management which led to the
creation of alternative discourses which made sense of their experiences. Application
of the feminist concept of resistance was a means through which the analysis
connected the women’s stories to the prevailing communal folklore on HBOC and
highlighted the creation of a private folklore in relation to saying no to RRS.

This section examines the multiple resistances to dominant discourses and ideological
practices which were discussed in the previous analytic sections. This means some
sections of narrative are referred to again when particularly useful in supporting the
analysis. Additionally, owing to the relative paucity of research in this area, it was
necessary at times to extrapolate from the wider literature relating to refusing
conventional medical treatment.

Many discourses, competing ideologies
The analysis in the previous sections revealed high risk women may be conflicted by
competing and contradictory messages on how best to attend to breast/ovarian cancer
risk.

The dominant medical discourse lays claim to knowledge about the truth of

HBOC and how best to manage cancer risk. Being identified as high risk of developing
breast/ovarian cancer places a genetic responsibility on high risk women to be active,
concerned, patients-in-waiting and take affirmative action in the present to protect
themselves and others from the future risk of cancer. Simultaneously, ideologies of
femininity and sexuality produce a persuasive discourse on how women and their
bodies should be in Western society, a crucial part of which is having two breasts and
ovaries.
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In the stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline, there was
acknowledgement of gendered discourses in Western society and ways in which
women were confronted with idealised images of the female body in everyday life,
particularly in relation to the female breast.

Rosie alluded to this when she said

“Everywhere you look it’s all ‘tits ‘n’ ass’ (…) sex sells, doesn’t it?” and Susan
acknowledged the prominence of an idealised female image when she explained
“they’re all over the place (…) women’s breasts (…) boobs selling cars, Wonderbra
adverts, all that sort of stuff. It’s like a constant reminder of what you are giving up”.
Susan’s words here highlighted the painful enormity of the decision to forfeit one’s
breasts because of risk. In many ways, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui
faced a no-win situation. To attend to cancer risk as defined by the medical discourse
results in a number of other risks to self, thereby creating an uneasy tension between
the provision of risk reducing strategies which may protect women from cancer but
which also strip them of socially mandated essential female characteristics.

It was evident then societal and medical concerns about cancer risk generally and
breast/ovarian cancer, in particular, were represented through various discourses and
ideologies which surrounded HBOC. Key stakeholders in HBOC discourse include
medicine, biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, the media, patient advocacy
groups, academics, scientists and researchers and the public at large, therefore it is
not surprising different discourses and their attendant ideologies may conflict as each
vies for ascendency. However, the participants’ stories revealed high risk women can
and do demonstrate resistance to such dominant discourses and ideologies.
Resistance can be understood as a positive force which exposes the contradictory
nature of conflicting ideological stances which burden high risk women with impossible
choices. Simply put, in Western society it is unacceptable for high risk women to fail to
attend to breast/ovarian cancer risk yet it is also unacceptable to be breastless. It is
from this very contradiction that resistance emerges and it is resistance itself which
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exposes competing ideologies and contradictions in discourse in relation to HBOC
which may oppress women.

A feminist interpretation suggested the potential for resistance emerged as high risk
women became aware of ways in which dominant ways of thinking conflicted and
diffused uncertainty, creating ambivalent and unpleasant experiences.

This was

summed up expressively by Rosie when she offered her interpretation of making her
decision regarding RRS:
Well I say options but (…) I’m not sure of the right word, they’re not
really options. It’s like choosing between two forms of torture. Option
one, get them [breasts] off, mutilate your body, option two, get cancer
and die. Not much of a choice! (…) then they say “oh well, you know,
it’s your decision”, like they expect you to be able to decide on the back
of that? Okay so you’ll be a survivor but at what cost? Left half the
woman you once were?
Here, Rosie clearly articulated a ‘choice but no choice’ dilemma. Although it appeared
Rosie’s autonomy had been promoted, she did not articulate a feeling of freedom or
empowerment in making her decision. In cancer risk discourse, individual autonomy
and choice are emphasised (Sato, 2012) and decision making around RRS is
consistently framed within the context of rational decision making. For example, Fry et
al. (2001a, p. 584) noted “cancer worry seems to override a more rational consideration
of costs and benefits of (risk reducing) surgery” while Lodder et al. (2002, p. 111)
stated “ideally, it should be prevented that high anxiety would impede rationally
weighing pros/cons of prophylactic mastectomy”. More recently, Zagouri et al. (2013,
p. 207) showed little has changed by stating “the decision for prophylactic mastectomy
should be evidence driven and rationally guided by genetic testing”.

The positioning of high risk women as autonomous decision makers in medical
discourse exposes the inherent ideological conflicts and posits medical authority as
problematic in the accounts of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline. Bishop
and Yardley (2004) claimed medical expertise was problematic in egalitarian societies
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because the positioning of doctor-as-expert gives power over non-experts hence
resisting medical authority is regarded as irrational rather than agentic. Knowledge
obtained through genetic testing is considered as Zagouri et al. (2013) and other
researchers’ positions demonstrate, as knowledge which allows an individual to make a
rational decision based on knowledge of the ‘facts’ about one’s genetic status. Genetic
testing leads to normative expectations on how to respond to risk (Paul et al., 2014)
since the underpinning assumption is the consequences of risk are made avoidable
(Ilkilic, 2009). The following quotes from three health care practitioners in Witt’s (2013,
p. 117) study demonstrate how the importance of autonomy is embedded in medicine
but also the restricted and narrow discourse within which decision making takes place:
I would be very happy if all my patients who were at risk for ovarian
cancer had oophorectomies. I wouldn’t want to push oophorectomies on
them, but rationally it is the best way to manage that risk, but ultimately
it’s the woman’s own decision.
I mean we are very emphatic that surgery is the thing that we
recommend. And that really, you know, if you are in your 40s and
certainly if you are over 50, you should be having your ovaries out.
Everyone of us has to die, but I feel very strong that women don’t have
to die of ovarian cancer. It might [be] easier to have a heart attack.
It is clear from Witt’s (2013) study health care practitioners held personal beliefs about
what actions high risk women should take based on their positioning as experts who
knew the ‘best’ way to respond to risk. Health care practitioners are socialised within
the dominant medical discourse (Martin, 2014). It is therefore not surprising to find
ideologies consistent with this discourse namely ideologies of autonomy, selfresponsibility for health and surgical intervention for risk. Other influencing contexts
within which women make decisions may be acknowledged but are largely relegated
over the expert view on what is the best way to respond to risk. Managing cancer and
by extension cancer risk, hence presents the potential for ideological conflict (Bishop &
Yardley, 2004) because autonomy requires high risk women to be accountable for their
own decisions but conflicts with the ideological mandate of medicine as best equipped
to deal with the threat to health/life.
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From a feminist perspective, ideological conflict bears particularly heavily on women
because women are encouraged to take the path of least resistance and comply with
societal conventions regardless of personal views, hence true autonomy is rarely
available (Meyers, 2010). This was reflected in Rosie’s story above and in the words of
Jacqui who earlier explained how she was expected to make her own decision but “at
the same time, [she] felt they wanted me to do what they wanted, which was to (…)
take the surgery”. In the same way, Susan acknowledged she was given information
so she could make a personal choice but this was set against “being told in the first
place [you have a gene fault] makes it seem as if you must have the op[eration], or else
what’s the point [of testing]?”.

These excerpts clearly demonstrated how decision making in response to
breast/ovarian cancer risk was contextualised with a discourse of medical hegemony
and its accompanying power structures (Szumacher, 2006) which may severely curtail
the freedom to choose and restrict autonomy. In research which examined some of the
conflicts in obstetric medical decision-making, Abrams (2015) contended women’s
autonomy was threatened when decision making frameworks which sought primarily to
reduce risk were utilised. While such frameworks were purported to actualise the
women’s autonomy, Abrams (2015) provided a compelling argument this was an
illusion because the decisions made by the women were taken entirely within the
discourse of medical expertise and the primary necessity to reduce risk. Whilst this
was not problematic to women who aligned themselves to the medical discourse, it
created normalising standards of behaviour which were problematic to those who
resisted the dominant view, such as the participants in this study.

Within these

contexts, decision making frameworks which outline women’s choices in attending to
risk conceal the more limiting realities women face (Löwy, 2010).
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It is important to acknowledge the requisite to undertake RRS to manage risk is not
explicitly articulated in medical encounters and health professionals do not ‘tell’ high
risk women what to do to lower cancer risk. In keeping with contemporary approaches
to health and social care, shared decision making models are emphasised in clinical
guidelines for the care of women at risk of familial breast/ovarian cancer, for example,
the NICE (2013) guidelines.

Implicit in such models is the belief decision making

should take cognisance of what matters most to the patient with judicious use of
professional knowledge and status (Greenhalgh, Howick & Maskrey, 2014). However,
as Abrams (2015), Martin (2014) and Bishop and Yardley (2004) highlighted, the
provision of factual information and advice supports a medical discourse which directs
health choices in prescribed ways which may serve to reduce autonomy. In medical
consultations, the risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer is calculable and
quantifiable, able to be visually displayed in numerical data and in written texts. For
example, Jacqui explained how much her risk could be reduced through RRS:
When they show you the statistics, how much surgery lowers the risk
(…) my risk was said to be about 60 percent for breast cancer and 50
[percent] for ovarian but surgery would take it down to less than 5
[percent] [for breast cancer] and practically zero for ovary [cancer].
Such statistical calculations suggest risk is able to be defined with certainty and RRS is
constructed as offering a dramatic reduction in cancer risk for Jacqui. What is not said
in discourse is that these statistics apply to populations and therefore may not be
representative of individual risk (Grossi, 2005; Samerski, 2006). Hence whilst high risk
women are given ‘choices’ or options with regards to managing risk, the decision to say
yes or no to RRS is made within the dominant discourse and culture (Gotfrit, 1991)
which in the case of HBOC means attending to risk through surgical intervention.

In this study then, conflict was apparent in the participants’’ stories as personal
autonomy was promoted but simultaneously challenged by the dominant understanding
of RRS as the ‘cure’ for cancer risk. This was evidenced in the participants’ stories
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through references to RRS as a ‘no-brainer’, the obvious and logical action to take
when one is identified as high risk of developing cancer.

It was, therefore, not

unexpected the participants struggled at times to make sense of their decision to say
no to surgery and to make their decision understandable to others.

Here, Mary

explained how others found it difficult to accept her decision to say no to surgery:
It felt like being in a dark tunnel with no light at the end. Even though
you are surrounded by people, your friends and family, and all the
counsellors and the nurses and doctors and (…) they were all really
good, but you still feel so alone because people can’t understand (…)
and they can’t stop giving you their opinion. Just stop with the bloody
opinions [raised voice], you know what I mean?
This excerpt illustrated how resisting the ideal subject position outlined in medical
discourse was an isolating experience for Mary because her decision to say no to
surgery was challenged by others who could not comprehend it.

A feminist interpretation posited this was exacerbated through women’s subjected
positioning in society and the legitimate say others had in determining what was right
for high risk women (Szumacher, 2006). The contingent positioning of women means
concerned others such as family and friends are likely to advise high risk women to
comply with medical convention rather than demonstrate autonomy (Meyers, 2010).
The language of choice and autonomy which is integral to breast/ovarian cancer risk
discourse is therefore not solely empowering but also serves to constrain because the
discourse has already defined the right choice to make in response to risk (Hallowell &
Lawton, 2002; Sato, 2012).

Ann also explained how her autonomy was severely

restricted because her choices dissented to those around her:
(…) it all rests on your feelings, how you feel inside. I want to be worry
free, to have a life without the stress of it all but at the same time I don't
want the ops. I mean who would? I don't want the pain. I don’t want lots
of surgery to fix me up again after. If I’m honest, I was worried about
what I would be like (…) after. How would I look? Worried I wouldn’t
look like me anymore. (…) But how can you explain these feelings to
those who love you? They just want you to be safe, to protect yourself
so they just can’t see it (…) why you don’t just go for it [surgery].
Eventually you give up trying [to explain].
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Ann’s concerns about surgery were evident and it was clear she struggled to convey
these concerns to loved ones who spoke in support of the medical discourse. Although
Ann ultimately said no to RRS, taking this alternate position was problematic as desire
to be free from worry conflicted with the risks of surgery.

Previous research has

identified BRCA1/2 mutation carriers experienced constant conflict between two
threatening conditions namely the threat associated with being a mutation carrier and
the risks associated with surgery (Dagan & Goldblatt, 2009).

On the one hand, RRS

offers protection from risk (Guillem et al., 2006; Ingham et al., 2013), freedom from
worry (Gopie et al., 2013; Hallowell et al., 2012; Lostumbo et al., 2010) and is therefore
the obvious path for high risk women to take. On the other, RRS potentially threatens
female embodiment (Ehlers, 2012; Piot-Ziegler et al., 2010) and presents women with
a number of negative physical and emotional impacts (Altschuler et al., 2008; Hallowell
et al., 2012) and therefore may be understood as a risk in itself (Dagan & Goldblatt,
2009). Consequently, surgical interventions which aim to render the body safe from
cancer may fail to mobilise high risk women because power and social relations
embedded within discourse may conflict with or contradict personal perceptions of risk
(Lock & Nguyen, 2010). Hence, the participants’ stories exposed the complex and
contingent positioning of high risk women and their bodies in Western society which
created the conditions for resistance. This section now focuses on an examination of
the multiple resistances which emerged from the stories as the participants sought to
negotiate the medical discourse and work out their position to and within it.

Resistance to the risk discourse
A fundamental issue for Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui was negotiating
biomedical constructions of risk which created normalising responses on how to attend
to the risk of cancer. The analysis suggested risk discourse produced an ideal subject
position in which the person at risk of cancer does whatever it takes to reduce or avoid
risk.

The participants’ own knowledge and understandings emerged as signs of
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resistance to this position, thereby challenging clinically hegemonic representations of
how HBOC risk should be managed. Highlighting the incompleteness of biomedical
knowledge about breast/ovarian cancer risk created the space to assume an alternate
subject position to that offered by the medical discourse.

The subtexts of the

participants’ stories confirmed a fear of cancer which created persuasive arguments in
favour of RRS but which failed to account for uncertainty. Susan described attempts to
justify her decision to say no to surgery to her mother who felt Susan should accept
surgery so she could remain alive for her young daughter:
I said “but mum, even if I get it done, I still might not be here for her,
that’s life”. But she would just start crying again and, so, end of
conversation. I think in the end I just decided to take my chances. If
they could have given me a guarantee it might have been different. It
just seemed so drastic, having all that done, when there’s nothing wrong
with you (…) and not be able to say it definitely won’t happen.
Susan articulated personal understanding of RRS as being a procedure which was
unable to completely neither protect women from cancer nor ensure longevity. Her
position contrasted with that of her mother and evoked a strong emotional response,
the implication of which was refusing surgery was akin to a premature death. Likewise
Rosie also demonstrated understanding of the uncertainty inherent in risk discourse in
contrast to her significant others:
(…) but I mean even with the surgery, there’s no guarantee I won’t get it
[cancer] but no-one seems to understand. They talk as if you have the
(surgery, (…) you will never get it, but you still can. It’s not set in stone.
There is a good chance you are having it all for nothing, who knows?
Like Susan, Rosie’s story highlighted some high risk women express understandings of
genetic cancer risk which differ to those in the dominant risk discourse. Susan’s story
continued as she further problematised dominant constructions of risk:
But the more they tell you the less you felt you actually knew. It’s weird
[be]cause I thought I was pretty sure at the time. I thought the doctors
were sure but the more I found out, you find out no-one’s really sure.
No-one could tell me what my [said with emphasis] risk actually was. I
asked straight out if surgery would mean there’s no chance of me
getting it [breast/ovarian cancer] but they couldn’t answer that one. I
mean, they didn’t know. They don’t really know why [cancer develops].
So you can go ahead with it [surgery] and you still might get it [cancer].
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These excerpts confirmed how Susan and Rosie were conflicted as they came to
understand knowledge of genetic status failed to deliver the promise of certainty
alluded to in the risk discourse, namely RRS as protection against cancer.

Their

stories also revealed suggested there was an acceptance that medical knowledge was
incomplete, uncertain and changeable: Rosie described genetic information as not
being ‘set in stone’ and Susan discussed her doctor’s inability to address all her areas
of concern or explain why people get cancer. Likewise Pauline acknowledged the
uncertainty in risk discourse when she said:
The surgery might be the right thing for some women (…) I couldn’t go
through with it. I feel like a bit of a coward but it’s a very, very personal
choice and (…) the doctors don’t always get it right. Hopefully someone
or something is watching over me and I’ll be okay.
At this point, Pauline appears dissenting in her story. Doctors-as-experts are credited
in medical discourse with knowing the best way to manage breast/ovarian cancer risk
hence by acknowledging doctors are not ‘always right’, Pauline resisted the authority of
medicine to know what was best for her. Ann too alluded to the limits of medical
expertise when she stated “there is a lot they don’t know so they can’t answer all your
questions”.

Grassley and Nelms (2009) reported on women’s accounts of

breastfeeding and noted resistance emerged when women’s personal experiences
differed to those of the expert view. The limited ability of medical experts to address
women’s questions or concerns, and conflicts between the expert view and personal
experience, led to resistance and validation of personal explanations of why things
happen as they do.

Positioning oneself in opposition to medical discourse is one of the strongest positions
of active agency people can make when deciding upon anti-cancer interventions
(Bishop & Yardley, 2004) because those who decline may be labelled as ‘difficult’ or
‘non-compliant’ rather than considered as active and informed (Frenkel, 2013). Frenkel
(2013) further argued personal values and beliefs influenced decisions about cancer
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treatment more than medical evidence but that medicine was resistant to those who
refused conventional approaches based on personal understandings.

Resistance

emerges then when those who exhibit an opposing stance to the expert view draw on
counter discourses to challenge the medical discourse and validate their individual
understandings. In this study, perceptions of medical knowledge as limited, uncertain
and incomplete challenged the appropriateness of RRS as a strategy to manage risk
and corroborated the decision to say no. Ann’s story also exposed uncertainty, this
time through acknowledgement owning a BRCA1/2 mutation did not make cancer
inevitable:
If I had cancer, then obviously I would not refuse surgery. But I still
might not get it [cancer]. Having the gene doesn’t make it 100% you will
get cancer (…). I guess I do believe in fate, what’s for you won’t go by
you, yes I think it all comes down to the hand you’ve been dealt.
The interpretation offered here posited Susan, Rosie, Pauline and Ann took an
opposing stance to the contemporary public discourse on breast/ovarian cancer risk
which is underpinned by a belief genetic knowledge is a means of providing certainty
and control over cancer (Claes et al., 2005) because a person’s future can be defined
and predicted (Paul et al., 2014) and appropriate steps taken to reduce risk (Ilkilic,
2009). To this end, the experiences of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline
signalled a point of resistance to the dominant way of thinking about risk.

Their

alternate understandings of what risk means reflected what Paul et al. (2014, p. 82)
referred to as the “captious certainty” of genetic information. Genetic knowledge has
an aura of certainty but in reality it is similar to other forms of medical knowledge in that
it is incomplete, changing and at times inconsistent.

The promise of certainty is

therefore captious as it may lead to more rather than less uncertainty about one’s
situation, as the participants’ stories showed.
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Resistance to the dominant risk discourse was also demonstrated through ways in
which the objective, factual nature of statistical calculations was challenged.

Pauline

said:
(…) eventually the result came back as BRCA 2 positive and they told
me my chance of getting breast cancer was about 50% and for ovary
cancer, about 15%, much higher than normal. I feel a bit silly admitting
this but I thought the risk would be higher, like 100%. So yes it’s higher
than if I didn’t have the gene, but it’s still not 100%. I thought if you had
the gene, you got it [cancer] which was the first shock. Then I find out
even having them take away your breasts and ovaries, you can still get
cancer (…) and you are higher risk of other cancers like skin cancer. It
was like opening a can of worms. They brought up stuff I hadn’t even
thought about. It was totally nerve-wracking.
Like Susan, Rosie and Ann, Pauline articulated some uncertainty about what her risk
meant. She acknowledged RRS did not always prevent breast/ovarian cancer but she
assumed a different subject position by framing her risk as being ‘not high enough’ to
justify surgical intervention. This demonstrated Pauline’s understanding of her risk was
inconsistent to and challenged the level of risk assigned to her through objective risk
calculation.

Considerable attention has been paid to the importance of the meanings people attach
to risk. There is compelling evidence that genetic knowledge does not necessarily alter
personal risk perceptions (Braithwaite et al., 2006; Heshka et al., 2008) and perceived
risk is more important than objective risk in decision making about RRS (Hoskins et al.,
2012; Witt, 2013). In women newly diagnosed with breast cancer, Citrin et al. (2012)
found refusal of conventional treatments was associated with a perception treatment
was riskier than no treatment/non-conventional treatments, irrespective of the strength
of supporting evidence. Indeed the strength of medical evidence in support of RRS
may be largely irrelevant to women because fear and worry can lead to an overestimation of risk which is more meaningful to women than objective risk (Rosenberg et
al., 2013). It is also widely acknowledged that differences exist between scientific and
lay understandings of risk (Ahmed et al., 2012; Hoskins et al., 2014; Paul et al., 2014;
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Wagner, 2011) yet in the medical arena, objective measures remain central to decision
making and personal meanings of risk are largely ignored (Dauer et al., 2011; Ilkilic,
2009; Wagner, 2011).

Certainly Pauline would be considered high risk in clinical

guidelines for the management of HBOC (for example, NICE, 2013 and Cancer
Australia, 2011) hence the personal meaning she attached to her risk appeared
instrumental in allowing her to adopt an alternate subject position which resisted the
need for RRS. Mary also challenged dominant ways of thinking about risk:
The other thing was, they said with the gene fault the risk of cancer is
really high. (…). 10 times higher than for other people, which made me
think “well if it’s so high, it might happen anyway”, and they couldn’t say
“no, it won’t happen”. So even with it [RRS] there’s no guarantee.
Having this gene means there is a good chance of me getting cancer
any way you look at it.
Mary said no to RRS on the grounds of risk but from a different perspective. Unlike
Pauline who perceived her risk estimate as ‘not high enough’, Mary perceived her risk
of cancer to be so high she was powerless to control it through RRS. Mary’s story
continued as she acknowledged the uncertainty attached to her life despite knowledge
of her BRCA1/2 status:
There’s no guarantees for any of us. I might get cancer or I might not.
You might get it or you might not. I might have a stroke or get hit by a
bus. (…) I think maybe because I smoke I don’t expect to live to a ripe
old age anyway.
Mary identified herself as being at risk through smoking and other risks to health which
were for her, as meaningful as her cancer risk. Thus, perceptions of risk were exposed
as

deeply

personal

and

experienced

in

resistance

to

statistical,

objective

measurements. It was evident Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline came to
see genetic risk as uncertain and medical knowledge as unstable. Their divergent
meanings of risk suggested high risk women may be confronted by similar challenges
but internal and external contexts mediate the meanings attributed to risk and how risk
is personally interpreted and understood. Although meanings differed, the participants’
responses to risk converged in that all resisted the dominant thinking of risk as
controllable through surgical intervention.
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Resistance to the risk discourse and the illusion of certainty which accompanies it was
also exhibited through reference to other meanings of life and death. The excerpts
above showed how Ann believed her future was down to fate and ‘the hand she’d been
dealt’. Rosie, Susan and Mary all referred to the role of chance in determining whether
they developed cancer or not. Rosie also discussed her religious beliefs and how they
may have influenced her decision to say no to RRS:
I wouldn’t say I was overly religious, not really god-fearing (…) but we
have been brought up as church-goers. I don’t go [to church] now but
my mum still does, every week. So we were brought up believing God
was looking down on us and God had a plan for us all (…) it [religion]
affects you more than you think, I suppose I think it will happen [cancer]
if it’s what’s meant for me, you will get it if God’s wish or whatever you
want to call it. What will be will be, you know?
Earlier in this thesis Jacqui described how high risk women’s breasts were colloquially
referred to as ‘ticking time bombs’, something she in part agreed with whilst
simultaneously acknowledging non-genetic causes of cancer:
The weird thing was, I felt a bit like it as well (…) but having them off
doesn’t feel like the answer. There’s part of me thinks it’s all down to
fate, it’ll either happen or it won’t. It just comes down to luck.
The analysis here illuminated ways in which Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and
Pauline adopted alternate subject positions which resisted the dominant way of thinking
about cancer as inevitable in BRCA1/2 mutation women and cancer risk as controllable
through surgical intervention.

Their stories revealed understandings about disease

and death exist which were as, or more, meaningful to high risk women as genetic
knowledge, but which were unaccounted for in cancer risk discourse. When medical
knowledge is not seen as certain, unproblematic and fixed, high risk women may come
to draw upon a number of alternate discourses to construct divergent subject positions
even when these challenge the dominant way of thinking.

It is the conflicts and

contradictions which emerge from dominant discourses in relation to HBOC which
create the space for resistance. Although various alternate positions were constructed,
all participants questioned the necessity of RRS in the absence of disease.
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A feminist interpretation contended saying no to surgery for cancer risk may be
understood as an opportunity for high risk women to take actions other than those
ascribed by the dominant medical discourse and to act in accordance with what was
personally important. In this way, Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline were
active in redefining medical advice by claiming expertise over their own bodies and
their embodied experiences. The decision to accept or refuse RRS was more complex
than medical discourse suggested (Hallowell & Lawton, 2002) and was not perceived
as the solution to cancer risk.

By resisting the notion of risk-as-disease, the

participants were able to create personal ideologies and modes of reference which
made sense to them even when these conflicted with the dominant medical discourse.
However, such resistance lays women open to accusations of irresponsibility (Bishop &
Yardley, 2004; Frenkel, 2013) therefore high risk women must seek alternative means
of demonstrating their sensibility.

Earlier Ann ascertained “If I had cancer, then

obviously I would not refuse surgery”, a view shared by Rosie:
So it just seems so drastic. I don’t [said with emphasis] have cancer
(…) but you are made to feel like you do. Who is having a heart
transplant because they might get a heart attack in 10 years? It just
doesn’t make sense when you are still healthy. It would be different if
you already had it [cancer].
The subtext of Rosie’s story here implied surgery would be acceptable should she be
diagnosed with cancer. In this next excerpt, Jacqui also highlighted surgery as an
appropriate response to the disease of cancer when referring to online chats with other
BRCA1/2 mutation women:
To be fair, some of them had cancer in one breast already so you could
understand it, why they would want to be tested and have the other one
off. I think it’s different then, you’ve no choice really. I can understand
you would want everything away then.
It was evident Jacqui was able to rationalise the ideal subject position when one has
cancer but not for cancer risk, demonstrating the same surgery acquires different
meanings according to personal perceptions (Press et al., 2005).

Risk discourse

attempts to locate disease and death in women’s breasts and ovaries in the same way
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the disease of cancer does (Piot-Ziegler et al., 2010). When one has cancer, surgery
is acknowledged as the appropriate response (Witt, 2013) however the participants’
stories show the framing of surgery as the solution for cancer risk is resisted by some
high risk women. The subtext ‘I would have surgery if I had cancer’ avoids accusations
of irresponsibility and reinforces resistance to the discourse of medically managing risk
by accepting the need for surgery should a diagnosis of cancer be made.

In the same way, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui‘s acceptance of more
intensive surveillance for their risk can be understood as attempts to construct
themselves as sensible by acknowledging the materiality of cancer whilst refuting the
materiality of risk. Hence, high risk women position themselves as active in accepting
medicine’s ability to attend to the disease of cancer but negotiate medicine’s access to
their bodies on the basis of risk of cancer.

The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline reveal how they attempted
to make meaning of their experiences of risk even when discursive spaces were
severely restricted.

Medical discourse defined risk as something measurable,

calculable and reducible, giving risk a materiality and an almost tangible aura which
conflated risk with disease. Cancer risk-as-disease was a threat because cancer is
deadly thus risk comes to mean premature death. However, as the participants’ stories
showed, risk is experienced as something out with its construction in medical
discourse.

To conclude this section, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui were unable to
situate themselves within a discourse which constructed the body as diseased because
they resisted the conflation of the body-at-risk with the body-as-diseased hence the
removal of body parts was unnecessary and incongruous. A further point of resistance
emerged through personal understandings of breast/ovarian loss which differed to
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those outlined in the medical discourse. In medical discourse, the loss of breasts and
ovaries is routinely attended to through surgical and chemical restoration, offering
women the opportunity to reduce cancer risk whilst maintaining the body. In contrast,
as the analysis in this study revealed some high risk women demonstrate resistance to
the reconstruction/replacement discourse in HBOC management and create counterdiscourses which make sense in the context of their personal experiences.

Resistance to the discourse of replacement
In medical discourse, RRS is understood as a beneficial process which removes risky
body parts and renders the body safe, like the bodies in biomedicine (Turner, 1998).
Moreover, in contemporary HBOC discourse, the loss of body parts through RRS is
able to be ameliorated through surgical and chemical means.

All the participants

discussed breast replacement in the form of surgical reconstruction and most
discussed the chemical replacement of ovarian function.

It was evident breast

reconstruction was framed as a routine and necessary step for women facing breast
loss. For example, Susan said:
You need to see a plastic surgeon, and a psychologist. And if you have
surgery you need implants, or I think they said there was other types [of
reconstruction], using your own fat from your stomach, type of thing.
The analysis revealed references to the make-over metaphor (Cobb & Starr, 2012)
which permeates breast reconstruction and advocates women’s risky breasts can be
replaced or even improved hence reconstruction is part of the package of cure for
HBOC. Susan, Jacqui, Mary and Rosie all discussed being told by others, including
health professionals, their bodies could be improved through reconstruction. Susan’s
friends suggested she would “probably look better” after surgery and reconstruction,
Rosie was encouraged to “go bigger” through breast reconstruction, Jacqui’s general
practitioner joked she might acquire “better” breasts and Mary’s surgeon commented
some women “looked better” after reconstruction.
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In Western medical discourse, the consistent representation of high risk women as able
to be ‘cured’ of cancer risk through RRS and their surgically modified bodies
simultaneously ‘fixed’ through reconstruction offers women hope they can circumvent
genetic destiny and gain reassurance of future health without compromising their body.
What this discourse conceals is the potential for bodies to be further damaged through
reconstruction. A feminist interpretation revealed that collisions occur when personal
meanings and experiences differed to dominant representations of reconstruction.
Accordingly, it was evident Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline did not
recognise their experiences within the discourse as presented.

Mary discussed

potential negative physical impacts of reconstruction:
There wasn’t one thing put me off the surgery, it was loads of things. If
I’m honest, I really did not want to lose them [breasts]. I wasn’t keen on
implants because I imagine them as cold and hard. But I think that is
so. I’ve spoken to women [with implants] and they’ve said as much.
Cold, hard lumps with no feeling. There’s no sensation with them. But
at the same time, I wouldn’t want to be left like an ironing board. They
said I couldn’t get the reconstruction with my own muscle because I’m a
smoker and it probably wouldn’t take and I’ve got high blood pressure.
Ann also discussed concerns about implants and reconstruction using tissue transfer:
There are some safety issues with implants aren’t there? Are they really
safe? Why would they be trying to make new ones if silicone was safe?
They did show me pictures of women who had reconstruction using their
own skin and muscle but it made me squeamish just looking at them.
These excerpts further illuminated the meanings Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and
Pauline attached to breast reconstruction which were discussed earlier, and confirmed
that the participants made meanings of breast replacement which differed to those
outlined in the reconstruction discourse. The dominant understanding of reconstruction
as a solution to breast loss was resisted in favour of a stance which constructed it as a
risk to the body, in keeping with research which found women’s experiences of
reconstruction often differed to those presented in reconstruction discourse
(Koskenvuo et al., 2013; Rolnick, et al., 2007). The negative physical impacts of breast
reconstruction

are

well

recognised,

the

more

significant

of

which

include

numbness/loss of sensation (Barton et al., 2005; Gahm et al., Hallowell et al., 2012;
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Rolnick, et al., 2007), pain (Barton et al., 2005; Bresser, 2009; Gahm et al., 2010;
Hallowell et al., 2012; Rolnick, et al., 2007) and infection (Barton et al., 2005; Gahm et
al., 2010; Metcalfe et al., 2004). A considerable negative impact on women’s lives can
result owing to other adverse effects such as swelling (Metcalfe et al., 2004), lymphatic
fluid leakage (Barton et al., 2005), limited arm movement (Barton et al., 2005; Hatcher
& Fallowfield, 2003) and difficulty sleeping (Gahm et al., 2010; Hatcher & Fallowfield,
2003).

Women also report experiencing their reconstructed breasts as ‘dead’

(Hallowell, 2000) and like Mary above, describe them as hard, cold objects (Löwy,
2010). Post-operative complications mean many women require multiple interventions
(Barton et al., 2005; Hatcher & Fallowfield, 2003; Koskenvuo et al., 2013; Zion et al.,
2003) hence it is not surprising women report feeling unprepared for the enormity of the
impact of mastectomy/reconstruction (Hallowell et al., 2012; Lee, Hultman & Sepucha,
2010; Rolnick, et al., 2007).

In the discourse surrounding HBOC, it is not only breast loss which can be
compensated though medical intervention.

A discourse of replacement surrounds

ovarian loss namely chemical replacement of ovarian function to avoid or reduce the
negative impacts of

premature menopause.

In addition to understanding

reconstruction as a risk to the body, Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline also
perceived risk reducing oophorectomy to be a risk. Mary said:
(…) then if you have the ovaries out it’s an early menopause, which
causes problems. They also talked about tablets for hormones but I
can’t remember it all. Too much to take in. I mean its life changing
surgery. Like I said, taking out the ovaries gives you the menopause
early (…) which then means you then need to take HRT [hormone
replacement therapy]. But then it can give you breast and womb cancer
(…) so you have to worry about those too. It’s too much to take in
really.
Earlier, Mary articulated her concerns about breast implants and her disquiet about
chemical replacement of ovarian function was evident here. It was clear the potential
adverse impacts of both ovarian loss and hormone replacement therapy has been
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outlined to Mary in medical consultations and she appreciated RRS is “life changing”.
Similarly, Susan, Rosie and Pauline were also aware of the potential negative impacts
on their bodies which might follow RRS:
And if you have surgery you need implants and hormone tablets which
can cause breast cancer (…) which was strange. How can they give you
something to make you not get cancer then give you something which
means you might? (Susan)
You can get HRT but then it is linked to other cancers. I just didn’t think
it was right, for something you never know, might not happen [ovarian
cancer]. It’s like sorting out one problem then bringing on a new one.
(Pauline)
I wasn’t planning any more [children] but at the same time we hadn’t
ruled it out, it just hadn’t happened. But I might have been a mother
again. I’m not even 40 yet. I didn’t want to turn into an old woman
before my time. Taking the ovaries away brings on the menopause and
you get all those problems. The sweats, the weight gain, the hair
thinning. I’m just not ready for it, especially when I don’t have cancer.
(Rosie)
Like RRM, the potential adverse effects of RRSO are well documented. Risk reducing
oophorectomy is associated with potential serious impacts including urinary tract
damage (Guillem et al., 2006; Kauff et al., 2002), bowel problems (Kauff et al., 2002),
pain/discomfort (Fang et al., 2009; Madalinska et al., 2005; Michelsen et al., 2009), and
vaginal atrophy (Guillem et al., 2006).

Following risk reducing oophorectomy, the

abrupt decline in oestrogen gives rise to additional psychosocial impacts including
sleep disturbances (Bonadies et al., 2011; Tollin, 2011), cognitive changes (Guillem et
al., 2006; Taylor, 2001), weight gain and change in body shape (Bonadies et al., 2011;
Hallowell et al., 2012).

Sexual activity may be negatively compromised as a result of

vaginal dryness (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2009; Finch et al., 2011; Robson et
al., 2003) and dyspareunia (Bonadies et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2009; Finch et al., 2011;
Hallowell et al., 2012; Madalinska et al., 2005; Robson et al., 2003).

Oestrogen

deprivation may also shorten lifespan because of an in increase in onset and incidence
of cardiovascular disease (Guillem et al., 2006; Sharma, 2011) and osteoporotic
fracture (Cohen et al., 2012; Guillem et al., 2006; Sharma, 2011; Taylor, 2001).
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In medical discourse, further medical intervention in the form of hormone replacement
therapy (HRT) seeks to alleviate the negative impacts of risk reducing oophorectomy.
HRT is associated with a reduction in menopausal symptoms and confers benefits to
cardiovascular and bone health (Bresser, 2009; Rebbeck et al., 2009).

However,

evidence regarding the safety of HRT in high risk women is inconclusive. Whilst some
studies have reported an increase in breast cancer risk (Beral et al., 2011; Fournier et
al., 2005) others have not demonstrated such an association (Challberg et al., 2011;
Domcheck et al., 2011). Additionally, there is no consistency in study design and no
randomised trials hence the evidence to date is of varying quality (NICE, 2013) and
remains inconclusive as to whether HRT in this group of women is beneficial or harmful
(Madalinska et al., 2006; Rebbeck et al., 2009).

The lack of robust evidence on the safety of HRT following RRS means NICE (2013)
have not made specific recommendations but rather advise that all women facing
premature menopause should be informed of the risks and benefits of HRT and
decisions made according to individual circumstances. Whilst it could be argued this
facilitates autonomy and personal decision making, it could equally be argued this
presents a dilemma to high risk women since as the participants’ stories showed,
decision making on interventions which could harm is problematic when there is a lack
of evidence to support their use. Again attention is drawn to the point that these
women have no disease, yet they are expected to submit to extensive and potentially
harmful surgical and medical interventions, even when gaps exist in safety and efficacy
data.

The reconstruction discourse is significant in the experiences of high risk women as it
presents reconstruction in ways which encourage acceptance. The discourse is aimed
at all women and promotes a particular vision which is typically viewed through a male
lens (Rubin & Tanenbaum, 2011) and bound to norms of feminine embodiment which
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are fundamentally tied to female breasts (Ehlers, 2012).

Women’s bodies are

reconstructed primarily in ways which appeal to the male gaze, as evidenced by a
focus on a woman’s outward appearance (Báez-Hernández, 2009) and body symmetry
(Piot-Ziegler et al., 2010) resulting in a need to “hide and fake” breast loss (O’Neill,
2013, p.17).

Equally, oophorectomy is consistently referred to as more acceptable

and less troublesome than mastectomy because it is less disfiguring (Claes et al.,
2005; Dagan & Goldblatt, 2009) despite the potentially serious negative physical and
emotional impacts on women’s health. A fixation on how women look rather than how
women feel conceals the many meanings women attach to their breasts which are not
addressed in reconstruction discourse. Earlier, Jacqui explained the importance of her
breasts in terms of how attractive and desirable she perceived herself to be. Her story
continues as she discusses another important meaning attributed to her breasts:
I breast fed mine [children] and I loved every minute of it, not, not like
some [women] who couldn’t take to it or find it too hard. I just loved it, it
made me feel like a proper mum, so it wasn’t like a big sacrifice or
anything. So they are important (…) they’re not just lumps of fat or
whatever.
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline serve as poignant
indicators of the difficult decisions women at risk of breast/ovarian cancer face. In
medical consultations, the focus is on attempts to lower risk therefore much of the talk
surrounds gene faults, statistical calculations, risk estimates, surgical procedures and
reconstructive techniques.

In RRS consultations, talk centres mainly on the more

tangible or technical aspects of surgery such as risk reduction and surgical options,
with less emphasis on psychosocial impacts such as impact on sexuality, libido and
body image (Bonadies, Myer & Matloff, 2011). What may be lost in such consultations
is the importance women place on their breasts and ovaries as essential parts of selfidentity (Hallowell et al., 2012). Piot-Ziegler et al. (2010) found breast loss was a
traumatising experience for women which led to a negative body transformation and
challenged self-identity.

Reconstructed breasts were perceived as objects which

allowed women to appear ‘symmetrical’ and outwardly ‘normal’ and hence to maintain
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their social appearance, suggesting some comfort was taken in conforming to
normative female standards. Overall however, women experienced their reconstructed
bodies as challenged, strange and lacking, because crucially, reconstructed breasts
were not their own breasts.

Earlier Mary discussed her concerns breast implants

would be ‘cold, hard lumps’ and that she was not a candidate for autologous tissue
transfer. Her story continued as she explained how her somewhat ambivalent feelings
towards her breasts changed when confronted with breast loss:
It’s funny in a way because I’ve had a thing about my boobs since
[having] the kids. They were huge when I was pregnant and they never
really went down again. I must have been a double G or something
then and now they are still probably an E cup. I’ve actually being going
on for years before all this about a [breast] reduction. Then of course
when faced with surgery and the thought of losing them, suddenly they
seemed okay, great even. I became really attached to them. You start
to be very conscious (…) of them being there, a part of you. Then
knowing you won’t have them anymore, you really think about what a
horrible loss it would be.
Although Mary was dissatisfied with her breasts, she came to value her breasts as an
important part of her self-identity, a part of her, and it was clear reconstruction did not
offer a satisfactory solution to breast loss.

Rosie previously also articulated

ambivalent feelings about her small breasts and in this section, her story revealed how
she was advised reconstruction could enhance her body by providing her with bigger
breasts. Her story continued as she shared the primacy of her breasts to self-identity,
equating breast loss with losing part of her personhood:
When people ask me, they don’t anymore but at the time, why I decided
not to have the surgery, there’s not one specific reason. It was just
something so, what they were suggesting, just felt a step too far. I just
couldn’t see myself with no female bits. They [breasts] don’t need to be
big to be beautiful. I used to say, “small but perfectly formed”. So I had
nothing to lose outwardly, in a sense. But I know you lose all sensation
and I wouldn’t want that. It’s more than how you look. I had to get a big
mole cut off once and I had wanted it off for ages, it kept catching on my
clothes. But when it wasn’t there anymore, that bit of me felt strange.
Not bad strange, just different. I would run my finger over my skin and
think “it’s not there anymore”. And it was just a mole (…) I’d been
wanting rid of. And I thought, “Rosie if your body feels different after a
mole, how are you going to feel with no breasts?”
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Here Rosie emphasised how breast loss compromised body integrity and self-identity
by drawing on her experience of losing a mole and describing breast loss as being
more than ‘looks’. Although the mole was bothersome and it was removed at her
request, Rosie’s story suggests it left a space which made her body feel different;
causing her to call into question her sense of embodiment should she lose her breasts.
Hence, Rosie demonstrated an acute awareness of the biographically disruptive nature
of RRS, because women experience being a body as well as having a body (Hallowell
& Lawton, 2002).

Applying a feminist lens, in this study, underscored the enormity and complexity of
decision making around RRS and suggested as Rolnick et al. (2007) contended,
reconstruction fails to deliver the promise of normality and wholeness women facing
breast loss may anticipate. Breasts were seen as more than aesthetics and were
deeply connected to the sense of self and body awareness.

However, body

appearance was also important and the stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and
Pauline all reiterated the importance of breasts and ovaries as defining features of
femininity and sexuality. Ann referred to her husband as a ‘boob man’, explaining her
breasts initially attracted him and her pride in her breasts which had ‘aged well’ and still
looked good. In this excerpt, Ann struggled with the illogicality of breast loss for risk
and reaffirmed the importance of her breasts in her life:
The whole surgery thing just didn’t sit well. I just couldn’t imagine what it
would be like to have no breasts when I didn’t need to. They were not
cancerous (…) and I’ve never been a fan of implants. I would not like
them [implants] but I wouldn’t want to have nothing. (…). I’m not vain
but I do worry about my looks and my breasts are an important part of
how I look. I know he [husband] would still love me, he’s not like that,
fickle, but I think losing them would really affect my confidence and our
relationship because of how I would feel even if he was okay about it.
Ann acknowledged she was more than her breasts but at the same time, she was
unable to comprehend giving up her breasts for risk. Her perception she ‘didn’t need’ to
lose her breasts suggested mastectomy may be ‘needed’ or logical should a woman
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have cancer.

Interestingly, Pauline used very similar words to refer to the potential

loss of her breasts:
With the breasts you can get a reconstruction but even the good ones
they showed me pictures of didn’t look very good. I know it sounds big
headed but I think I have a really good figure for my age. I like my body
just as it is and I just wouldn’t feel right without breasts or with implants
(…) having no breasts really scares me, I’m not afraid to admit it. I am
happy with me, I don’t want to lose a bit of me if I don’t need to.
For Pauline, her breasts were important to how she looked and to her personhood,
describing her breasts as a ‘bit of her’ and constructing her breasted body as a source
of happiness and contentment.

Having no breasts threatened this sense of body

wholeness and for Pauline, reconstructed breasts were not an acceptable replacement.
Like Ann, Pauline constructed breast loss as something which was needed or not;
indeed Pauline drew distinction between her position and that of her affected sister who
had undergone mastectomy: “But the difference is she’s got cancer, she needs (said
with emphasis) to have it done”, supporting the earlier discussion which framed surgery
as necessary for cancer but not for risk. Mary also alluded to a perception of surgery
as unnecessary in the absence of disease, tying this to the uncertainty she
experienced when making her decision:
You’d ask one question and the answer would bring up loads of other
stuff you hadn’t even thought about. I swung from thinking, “I should
have this done [surgery] because it will really lower my risk” to “this is
mad, I’m having this done and there’s nothing actually wrong with me!”
The inter-relatedness between risk and replacement discourses in the experiences of
Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui was evident. It may be some high risk
women are unable to position themselves within the reconstruction/replacement
discourse in part because they have already resisted the risk discourse. When surgery
is

understood

as

a

means

of

managing

disease

but

not

risk,

reconstruction/replacement is unacceptable, even inconceivable, because surgery is
‘not needed’. In this case, the negatives of reconstruction/replacement are likely to
dominate as there is no perceived gain from losing one’s breasts and ovaries. Or it
may be those who align with the risk discourse are more able to accept
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reconstruction/replacement because of a perception of breast/ovarian loss as being
‘needed’ to manage risk.

A third position may be those who are able to position

themselves within the reconstruction/replacement discourse and perceive their bodies
as potentially improved through reconstruction, are more able to rationalise surgery as
a suitable solution to cancer risk. It is not possible to say which of these positions is
most likely for high risk women however what was evident is multiple resistances
emerge as a result of competing discourses which play out in the contested landscape
of HBOC management.

The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline revealed that whilst high
risk women’s breasts are constructed in HBOC discourse as risky, the qualities of
breasts as a source of femininity, sexuality, nurturing and self-identity were equally or
more important to women. By emphasising the personal importance of breasts and
rejecting reconstruction/replacement discourse, the participants resisted a discourse
which advocated their treasured body parts were easily replaced and exhibited an
alternate position in which they were free to keep their bodies intact. Resistance was
possible because these women wanted to keep their breast and ovaries in spite of their
cancer risk hence their experiences contrasted with the usual sequence of events
outlined in medical discourse.

From a feminist perspective, fighting back (Gotfrit, 1991) against the dominant way of
thinking about RRS represented a strength in high risk women to challenge the
dominant discourse and keep their still-healthy bodies intact.

However, this was

juxtaposed against the opportunity to undergo a procedure which may prevent cancer
and free a woman from worry, hence resistance presents a dilemma. The strength of
dominant discourses in Western society and the conflicts and contradictions inherent to
them mean women are not free to choose or free to refuse because their choices are
made within cultural frameworks and prevailing power relations. In Western society,
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high risk women receive many mixed messages which simultaneously require them to
both own and remove their breasts and ovaries hence resistance will always be
negotiated and never complete.

Resistance as incomplete
The stories of Susan, Rosie, Jacqui, Ann, Mary and Pauline revealed ways in which
they resisted the dominant way of thinking about HBOC risk as something which could
be effectively and expediently managed through RRS.

Their multiple and varying

perceptions on what led them to say no to RRS suggested resistance was shaped by
the cultural contexts in which cancer risk was lived and experienced. For Gotfrit (1991,
pp. 176-177) “lived culture is a terrain of contradiction where dominant ideologies and
practices are contested as well as produced”.

Accordingly, breast/ovarian loss is

especially problematic for BRCA1/2 women owing to the social investment made in
women’s bodies but as the analysis showed, the decision to accept or refuse RRS is
more than a simple dichotomy of following or not following codes of female normativity.

This study confirmed living with a BRCA1/2 mutation is a complex, emotional and
challenging journey irrespective of whatever decisions are made with regards to
managing risk. Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui took control over their
own bodies, an action which is fundamental to any notion of resistance (Allen, 2014;
Gotfrit, 1991, 1992) but by demonstrating resistance, they encountered other risks to
self. It was evident the decision to say no to RRS was not a liberating moment in part
owing to the inability of loved ones to accept this decision. Pauline discussed how her
husband, despite encouraging her autonomy, was unable to accept her decision which
led to a break down in an important part of their relationship:
John doesn’t like to talk about it. He said the decision was made so
there was no point in discussing anymore and to be honest, I got
drained talking about it, thinking about it constantly, all the time. It’s sad
really because I used to think we could talk about anything, face
anything together, but no. He just couldn’t accept it I suppose, even
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though he said “it’s your decision”, he still couldn’t agree with it. Yes, I
didn’t that see coming (…) the loneliness from feeling like you are on
your own.
Pauline appears to have experienced a sense of isolation and perhaps alienation
because her decision was not understood by her husband. Similarly Rosie’s story
suggested she experienced feelings of isolation which were also particularly evident
when discussing her husband’s reaction to her decision to say no to surgery:
It was really difficult to get Tom [husband] and Jane [friend] to
understand and there were a few heated discussions, I can tell you.
Jane eventually came round and I could talk to her. She said as long as
I was happy, well not happy, but happy with my decision, she could go
along with me. But Tom, he’s a different story. He struggled to
understand my decision and we couldn’t talk about it without arguing,
well he couldn’t, so we just stopped talking about it. I wanted to talk
about it, don’t get me wrong, but it was just easier not to. It became
natural just to bottle things up (…) I couldn’t say “I’m having a down day
today” or anything. He might say “well you should have thought about
that before”.
Jacqui also described her sense of isolation in the family as her thoughts and feelings
about her genetic status and about RRS differed to those around her. Her story
continued as she discussed her emotions when she was confirmed as owning a
BRCA1/2 mutation whereas her sister Joanne was mutation-negative:
Beth [affected sister] got hyper-excited about it, going on as if everything
was all okay and my result got a little side-lined I think. So I was left
feeling alone, not really able to talk about it, it would have been as if I
was being really negative and not sharing Joanne’s [sister] good news.
It was also, the fact everyone was being all positive and “it’ll be alright”
about me when they did discuss it. It was as if now I knew I could have
the preventative surgery and hey presto! [raised voice]. (…). I pulled
back from everyone and stopped talking about it. Just kept my thoughts
to myself and told them what they wanted to hear. But mentally the
impact was huge, it just left me feeling totally drained and lost (…) and
alone. The whole thing is a very isolating experience. It can tear
families apart.
The participants’ stories illuminated the power of genetic information and the strength
of the medical discourse for cancer risk. How to attend to risk becomes the subject of
extensive family debate, endlessly discussed and perhaps even argued over, which
may lead to family discord (DiMillo et al., 2013; Eijzenga et al., 2014). In saying no to
RRS, Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui made a decision which was right
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for them, but it was a decision which caused a degree of upset and disharmony in their
families and left them feeling isolated and alienated. Hence as Gotfrit (1992, p.121)
stated, resistance can be “incomplete, ill-conceived, contradictory, inconsequential and
even damaging”.

Rosie, Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui did fight back against the dominant way
of thinking about managing cancer risk but they were unable to feel confident and
secure in their decision and in this way, their resistance was incomplete. Perhaps not
surprisingly then, they were themselves confused at times by their decision to say no to
RRS and admitted to some uncertainty as to how they would deal with risk in others.
Jacqui talked of the possibility of her daughter owning a BRCA1/2 mutation:
My daughter is 18 in less than a year and she’s wanting tested. She
can’t understand why I don’t have the ops, but she’s young and she
hasn’t had a chance to really think about the consequences. Of course I
hope she won’t need to, there’s a 50 50 chance of her not inheriting it,
which is how I try to think of it, be positive. I don’t know what I will do if
she does have it. Funny thing is I’m not sure I won’t encourage her to
have the ops if she does have it [gene fault]. I know it’s like having
double standards, but maybe I just want her to be safe, you know, to
protect her? The worst bit about this whole thing is, you just don’t know
what to do for the best. It’s a bit of a no-win situation.
Jacqui herself acknowledged the contradiction apparent in her story but put this aside
and instead emphasised her desire to protect and ‘save’ her daughter. Jacqui’s stance
here can be understood as an act of incomplete resistance and compromise whereby
she was able to meet the requirements of a good mother by protecting her daughter
from cancer despite resisting surgical intervention on her own body.

Westfall and

Benoit (2008) found pregnant women identified as ‘high risk’ demonstrated various
modes of resistance to medical discourse and the medicalisation of pregnancy, from
out-right non-compliance to partial compliance whereby elements of the ‘high risk’ role
were adopted as a compromise to meet the demands of competing discourses on
childbearing. Since women are socialised within the dominant culture and the available
modes of meaning, it is not possible to escape all traditional norms and expectations
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(Gotfrit, 1991), hence resistance may be incomplete as high risk women negotiate the
competing demands placed upon them. The primary requirement of women to be
protectors of the family (Acero, 2012) means there is limited discursive space in which
to challenge and completely dismiss medical discourse when children are at risk.
Susan said:
I’ve talked to Emma and she knows I am at high risk and one day she’ll
need to get tested to see if she is a carrier and needs anything done. I
suppose it does include surgery, it would be her decision and of course
as her mother, I’d support her. She’s still too young to take in all in but I
think she understands why I’ve gone this way [saying no to surgery]. I
try not to think about her having it, it’s too upsetting. Overall I think I am
okay with it all then at times I just wish we’d never been tested then I
wouldn’t have had to make a decision because there’s not a day goes
by I don’t think, “have I done the right thing”? I really have to force
myself go for the scans. I hate it. Every time you go you are thinking “is
this the day it’s going to be discovered?” It’s always at the back of your
mind. I think that’s what makes it so hard for people to understand why
I’m not having the surgery (…) not sure I understand it myself. I just
know for me it’s not the right thing to do.
Susan’s story here reflected several elements of communal folklore in HBOC
discourse. Despite Susan’s regret at being tested, she positioned her daughter as
‘needing’ to be tested so she could potentially undergo surgery should she own a
BRCA1/2 mutation. Susan reinforced the requirement for autonomy by highlighting it
would be her daughter’s personal decision and she, as her mother, would support this
decision.

This suggested in spite of Susan saying no to RRS, her personal

perceptions and evaluations were insufficient in justifying her decision because she
was unable to discount this for her daughter. The ability to resist dominant ways of
thinking in popular and health care culture may be critical to women maintaining a
sense of well-being (Grassley & Nelms, 2009), however as the analysis in this study
showed, resistance itself can be a risk. Dominant ways of thinking about cancer risk
may be so persuasive, even when women are able to demonstrate resistance, it is not
without conflict and it is often incomplete.
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It was also evident from this excerpt Susan continually questioned her decision to say
no to RRS and lived with uncertainty on a daily basis, the fear of cancer never far from
her mind. DiMillo et al. (2013, p. 128) found women living with BRCA1/2 mutations
who did not undergo RRS experienced an “unending and uncertain process” whereby
they lived constantly with the fear of cancer; the only conclusion available being a
diagnosis of cancer. Ann alluded to an unending worry when she discussed there
being ‘no escape’ from her risk:
I don’t regret making the decision as such but I do think about it every
day. And I do wonder if I should’ve had it [surgery]. I don’t think it will
ever be completely out my mind, but I am hoping it stops as time goes
on and I come to only think about it rarely. Just now, it still feels a bit
like there’s no escape from it, especially since Gillian [Ann’s daughter]
will be coming up to 18 soon and she might go for genetic testing. (…) I
love her so much but at times I think maybe I shouldn’t have had any
[children]. So I tell her to just go out and enjoy herself. I try not to stress
the small things (…) maybe there’s one good thing to have come out
this nightmare, but truth be told, I wish the testing didn’t even exist in the
first place. I wish it was never invented.
Although Ann appeared to have come to terms with her decision, her resistance was
incomplete as like Susan, she questioned the sensibility of saying no to RRS. A key
motivator in undergoing genetic testing is the need to reduce uncertainty and cancer
worry (DiMillo et al., 2013; Witt, 2013) however as this study showed, the opposite may
occur and knowledge of genetic status may lead to the creation of new uncertainties
and a chronicity of cancer worry. Rosie said:
It’s been nearly two years [since saying no to RRS] but it’s still on my
mind. Have I done the right thing? It’s ironic because I used to examine
my breasts but I don’t anymore, it’s too scary. I am probably just
burying my head in the sand but I don’t touch or look at them unless I
really have to. (…).Sometimes I regret being tested at all and think it’s a
really bad idea. I know I’m being selfish because, well, it’s helped other
women, if they’ve had the surgery, not got cancer. But for me it’s been a
can of worms. I am left with this hanging over me, like opening
Pandora’s box. What is it they say? She opened the box and all the
bad came out but hope was left inside. It’s like, hope has been, it’s
gone. I’m usually a positive person but it was hard to see any positives.
Well it’s [hope] still there but it’s hard to find now. I hope for different
things now, like to have a full week when I don’t think about all this.
Here, Rosie’s story cogently captured the uncertainty, insecurity and fear and which
can hang over the lives of BRCA1/2 mutation carriers (DiMillo et al., 2013; Samerski,
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2006). In this study, the act of keeping one’s breasts and ovaries intact denied Rosie,
Mary, Ann, Pauline, Susan and Jacqui the opportunity to reduce risk, isolated them
from friends and family, perpetuated feelings of guilt and worry and left them in a state
of flux as they continued to experience their bodies as risky and vulnerable.

Analysis of the participants’ stories revealed the ways in which discourses of femininity
and biomedicine formed an interlocking set of ideologies which served to silence their
voice.

Resisting RRS allows women to keep their breasted bodies intact and align

themselves with normative standards which although oppressive, are none-the-less the
standards upon which women are necessarily dependant for understanding their body
(Ehlers, 2012). At the same time, saying no to surgery means the opportunity to be
free from cancer worry and reduce cancer risk is lost and may ultimately lead to a
woman developing cancer.

The conflicts and contradictions inherent in HBOC discourse means high risk women
are confronted with dilemmas for which there are no wholly satisfactory solutions.
Having the strength to say ‘I am keeping my breasts’ requires high risk women to
demonstrate resistance to the socially mandated requirement to protect oneself from
cancer, a position which denies the personal and cultural importance attached to
female breasts and ovaries.

Keeping one’s own breasts and ovaries intact lays

BRCA1/2 women open to accusations of foolishness, recklessness and vanity and
places upon them complete accountability for a decision which may result in cancer
developing. The following quote from an advertisement for the chemoprevention agent
tamoxifen (taken from Press et al., 2000, p. 244) accentuates how women who care
about their breasts are denigrated despite the necessity of being breasted in Western
society; “If you care about breast cancer, care more about being a 1.7 than a 36B”.
Here, the figure ‘1.7’ denotes a risk assessment computation with anything equal to or
above 1.7 is categorised as high risk, and ‘36B’ refers to the size of a woman’s breasts.
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The message here is clear: women should care more about their risk of cancer and
less about their breasts. Thus, the exercise of personal autonomy conflicts with the
ideal subject position outlined in medical discourse and requires high risk women to
create alternate subject positions which make sense of their experiences but which
may also be unsatisfactory.

To conclude this section, the analysis revealed ways, in which the participants sought
to navigate, negotiate and manage the conflicts and contradictions inherent in medical
discourse in the contexts of the alternate subject positions which they arrived at.
However, it also suggested the alternate subject positions assumed were at times
problematic and insufficient in justifying the decision to say no to RRS, such was the
strength of the medical discourse, hence their resistance was an act of compromise, an
incomplete process and ultimately a risk in itself.

Summary of analysis and discussion
A key argument underpinning this study was that the decision to say no to RRS for
cancer risk must be understood within the context of the social, cultural and historical
milieus in Western society which shape experience and direct the meanings attached
to HBOC and RRS. Three literary theories were used to provide a contextualised
interpretation of the experiences of six women who said no to RRS.

The application of Marxist literary theory was useful in providing an interpretation of the
participants’ experiences in light of dominant ideologies in Western society which
shape human experience in relation to gender, sexuality, work, the family and other
cultural ideals. The analysis submitted that an economic discourse underpins genetic
medicine in which the ‘at risk’ body is conceived of as a potential source of economic
gain for various stakeholders in the HBOC industry.

Ideologies of risk appear to

impose a genetic responsibility on high risk women making them accountable for
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cancer risk in themselves and others. Additionally, ideologies of risk fragment the body
and allow breasts and ovaries to be commodified as assets of varying worth which may
be removed or replaced in the reconstruction marketplace.

A Marxist analysis of the

participants’ stories revealed conflicts between interests and forces in society. The
contradictions in the participant’s stories were reflective of the contradictory nature of
social reality, including the tension created by conflicting medical and gender/sexual
ideologies.

From a Foucauldian perspective, RRS is a practice open to multiple, changing
interpretations, all of which vie for ascendency and which could equally be chosen as
accurate representations at particular points in time. The analysis explored how ‘the
truth’ about breast/ovarian cancer came to be and how this truth supported the
dominant medical discourse and sanctioned surveillance strategies and risk reducing
interventions to discipline the bodies of the asymptomatically ill. This dominance made
the participants’ decisions to say no to RRS perplexing. It was evident Susan, Ann,
Mary, Rosie, Pauline and Jacqui initially conformed to dominant understandings of
cancer risk and RRS, but subsequently came to question the medical discourse,
ultimately arriving at a decision to say no to RRS. This highlighted the possibility for
resistance to the dominant medical discourse and revealed ways in which high risk
women negotiate competing societal discourses to make sense of their experiences.

A feminist interpretation revealed that saying no to RRS could be understood as
resistance to the official discourse on HBOC management; an action which provided
the capacity to be oneself, to acknowledge the importance of one’s breasts and ovaries
and a desire to keep one’s healthy body intact. The analysis demonstrated resistance
is possible through the body and suggested high risk women were able to reinvent the
risky body and subvert the construction of normalising strategies inherent in the
discourse of cancer prevention. However, it was also evident that the female body
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represented a contradictory site for women.

In some ways, the participants

demonstrated a strong sense of agency to keep their bodies intact despite the strength
of the discourse of surgical intervention for risk.

It took strength to challenge the

dominant way of thinking and courage to keep one’s body intact in the face of great
opposition.

However, this strength was juxtaposed against the epidemiological

evidence which confirms RRS does reduce cancer risk in high risk populations, and the
strength of the medical discourse which speaks in support of RRS.

Why they said no
Given the above analysis and use of the three literary lenses, this study found different
understandings of risk to be central to the decision to say no to RRS. Although
individual interpretations sometimes differed, the personal meanings the participants
attached to risk differed to the dominant understandings of risk which permeate the
communal folklore of breast/ovarian cancer and which support the medical pathway for
cancer risk. The women who took part in this study said no to RRS as a result of a
shared a private folklore in which:


The genetic risk of cancer was not conflated with the disease of cancer;



Genetics was not considered to be the only ‘truth’ about why people develop
cancer and genetic mutations were understood as only one of a number of
equally important risks to health and life;



Medicine was not credited with knowing the solution to cancer risk;



The risk of cancer was not understood as something which was treatable in the
same way as the disease of cancer is treatable;



The risk of cancer was not seen as something which could be controlled
through RRS;



Breasts and ovaries were treasured as vital body parts which could not be given
up or replaced on the basis of risk;
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RRS was perceived as damaging the body and hence was a greater risk to self
than genetic cancer risk;



RRS simply did not make sense given no disease was present and given the
risks of surgery to body and self.

Chapter summary
The analysis in this study proposes that contemporary understandings of cancer risk
and how this risk should be managed are highly problematic and potentially harmful to
high risk women who do not align with the views of the medical discourse. Essentially,
the participants’ experiences took place within a framework of technologies and
disciplinary forces which did not take into account their personal meanings and
contexts. This research finds that far from being the evidence-based and obvious
solution to cancer risk, RRS was understood by the participants in this study to be a
risk to body and self which superseded the genetic risk of cancer.

This study revealed how high risk women may be conflicted by competing and
contradictory messages on how best to attend to HBOC risk. The official discourse on
HBOC risk is persuasive. That is, women designated at risk need to remove healthy
breasts and ovaries to avoid cancer.

Simultaneously, the discourses of gender,

sexuality and femininity ordained that RRS was perceived by the participants as a risk
in itself, because to lose these valued organs was to damage the body and render it
less valuable.

By examining high risk women’s experiences of saying no to RRS this study also
illuminated the significance of how such totalising, universalising discourses burden
women with contradictory choices because the solution to cancer risk mimics the
disease of cancer and strips the body of its essential female characteristics.
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To conclude this section, this study showed the experiences of some women identified
as being high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer contrast starkly and rather
poignantly with the expected experiences reinforced through medical discourse. This
study highlighted the ways in which the high risk women are able to create a new
space in the discourse of HBOC. To this end, the participants made meaning of their
experiences through the creation alternative discourses and personal ideologies which
made sense of their decision to say no to RRS. However, it was also apparent that
despite making a decision which was right for them, they remained confused.

At the

time of writing, these women did not feel empowered because they still lived within a
discourse in which RRS was necessary to protect themselves and their families from
risk.

By resisting the official management pathway of testing positive to BRCA

mutations, Rosie, Susan, Pauline, Mary, Jacqui and Ann came to grasp the
contradictions inherent within the official treatment pathway and consequently took
steps to find meaning in their experiences which reaffirmed their sense of self rather
than accepting their alienation from self. Paradoxically, the need to control risk through
RRS as outlined in the medical discourse, exposed the women to different type of risk:
loss of the embodied self.

The next section comprises the conclusion to the thesis. The purpose and aims of the
study and the methodological approach taken are revisited prior to a recapitulation of
the key findings.

The strengths and limitations of the study are presented and

recommendations for practice and further research in relation to HBOC are considered.
The thesis concludes with a reflexive account which provides a critical reflection of the
researcher’s perspective during the conduct of the study and which, in keeping with
Dolby-Stahl (1985), acknowledges the researcher’s full responsibility for the final
interpretations of the participants’ stories as presented in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Introduction
This study set out to explore the experiences of women who said no to RRS for
breast/ovarian cancer risk following a mutation-positive genetic test result.

This

research is important because it addressed an increasingly prominent and significant
area of concern in contemporary health care: the care of people identified as ‘at risk’ of
disease by virtue of their genetic status. Genetics means medicine is now able not
only to identify those with disease, but also those at risk of disease, which has
redefined understandings of health, medicine and the human body (Webster, 2002).

Although a relatively new branch of clinical medicine, genetics is at the centre of the
public and professional dialogue on cancer (Maturo, 2012).

People at risk of disease

are now able to be categorised as “pre-disease” (Kreiner & Hunt, 2014, p. 870) and
people who are identified as owning a genetic mutation which increases the risk of
cancer may be called “previvors” (Mahon, 2011, p. 126) or pre-survivors. These new
conceptualisations of health and disease mean risk is treated as a disease in itself
(Moynihan et al., 2012) and medical interventions such as RRS, are able to be made
on the still-healthy bodies of those at risk. This may be understood as representing a
communal folklore which defines how people understand the risk of cancer and
accordingly how cancer risk should be dealt with. However, despite the strength of the
discourse surrounding cancer risk, some people who are identified as genetically
predisposed to developing cancer say no to RRS. The purpose of this study was to
explore the experiences of high risk women to illuminate an understanding of why.

Genetic medicine is a rapidly developing and dynamic field. Although a growing body
of evidence in relation to HBOC and RRS is emerging, research to date has focussed
primarily on interventions to manage risk and the efficacy, benefits and potential harms
of such. The potential physical and emotional impacts of RRS have been investigated
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but consideration of the material and social conditions which shape the everyday lives
of high risk women has been neglected. Notably research into the social, cultural and
political contexts within which decision making about RRS takes places is lacking. This
study sought to remedy this weakness and to bring a new perspective to HBOC
research by considering the positions and experiences of high risk women within the
contexts of dominant discourses in Western society.

Revisiting the methodological approach
This study was underpinned by a belief the decision to say no to RRS for cancer risk
must be understood within social, cultural and historical contexts in Western society
which shape experience. It contended that a communal folklore surrounding
breast/ovarian cancer exists, underpinned by dominant discourses and ideological
practices which give consent to certain ways of acting in response to cancer risk.
Likewise, a communal folklore about the female body means women’s bodies are
understood in particular ways in Western society, a key component of which is having
breasts and ovaries.

In the dominant medical discourse, ideologies of risk and

treatment demonstrate that medicine has the power to prevent disease, through the
practice of RRS.

The decisions of high risk women to say no to RRS are thus

understood to be ‘anti-health’ within Western medicine, but are worth considering from
the interpretive assumption of the multiple truths and in the context of other societal
discourses which validate the self and offer competing understandings for women who
opted to say no to RRS.

This study used a synthesis of Denzin’s (1989) interpretive biography and DolbyStahl’s (1985) literary folkloristics as a framework for gathering, reading and
interpreting the stories of the participants. This strategy provided a contextualised
narrative of the life experiences of high risk women who said no to RRS. Foucauldian,
Marxist and feminist literary theories were selected as suitable lenses through which
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the participants’ stories could be read and interpreted since these theories allowed a
focus on the key areas of concern. Foucault’s theories on discourse and power, Marx’s
concepts of ideology and commodification and the feminist concept of resistance were
chosen as the concepts which could best explain the themes arising from the research
in light of social, cultural and historical contexts in Western society.

What this study found
The findings from this study show HBOC is tainted by many discourses and multiple
ideologies which as Turner (2008, p. 150) stated, are “never uniform in their effects or
unified in content”. The multiplicity of such discourses and ideologies allowed questions
to be posed in terms of how high risk women negotiated competing and conflicting
messages in relation to the HBOC journey. Unravelling the participants’ stories to
illuminate an understanding of why they said no to RRS was challenging because the
women themselves found it difficult to understand and articulate why. Like the HBOC
discourse, the participants’ stories were fraught with conflict and contradiction. This
was not surprising given they and their families had experienced first-hand the
undesirable impacts of breast and/or ovarian cancer and its treatment.

The

participants faced constant exposure to the communal folklore surrounding HBOC and
its management and to gendered stereotypes on what a woman is and looks like.
Privately, these women feared the loss of their breasts, and to a lesser extent their
ovaries, and held a belief they would be less of a woman without them. Publicly
however, they were expected to put ‘health before looks’ and do whatever it takes to
protect themselves and others from cancer, including removing their healthy breasts
and ovaries.

The participants’ stories revealed a communal folklore about HBOC existed in which
RRS was a ‘no-brainer’, the obvious choice when one’s body is at risk of cancer. It
was evident that all the participants had been encouraged to think of their bodies as
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‘ticking time bombs’ because their genetic risk for cancer was considered in the same
way as the disease of cancer. Like cancer, risk became tangible: a thing which could
take lives, devastate families and orphan children, but also something which was
controllable through surgical intervention. In this context, radical interventions on their
healthy bodies made sense to others. In contrast, the participants in this study shared
understandings of risk which differed to the communal folklore and accordingly RRS
did not make sense in their personal experiences.

Epiphany moments such as being

identified as a BRCA1/2 mutation carrier and saying no to RRS appeared to call into
question existing perceptions of self and required these women to construct alternative
discourses and modes of reference which made meaning of their experiences and
allowed them the strength to keep their healthy bodies intact. However, as has been
revealed, the covert power of the medical discourse remained a constant challenge to
the resistance shown by participants when constantly presented with images, health
advice and the reaction of family members and friends.

This research clearly demonstrated that the social reality of women identified as high
risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer comprised a complex, emotional and
challenging journey in respect to their decision with regards to managing risk. Their
genetic status became the subject of extensive family debate, endlessly discussed and
perhaps even argued over, as families and friends became concerned with their
decision to say no to RRS.

Their bodies were debated, examined, scanned,

discussed, invaded, medicated and for some, at the time of writing, perhaps even
permanently altered in the quest to reduce cancer risk. Being identified as owning a
BRCA1/2 mutation placed their bodies in an enduring vulnerable and contingent state.
What was discovered was that the medical discourse on managing risk through RRS
was so entrenched in bringing meaning to this experience, that the women in this study
were unable to fully escape its influence and reconcile with their decisions to say no to
RRS. Despite demonstrating resistance to the accepted medical pathway, the
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participants continued to benchmark and evaluate their decisions to say no against
those who had undergone RSS and the constant pressure of family members, leaving
them in an unending state of flux as to whether they had made the right choice.

Another key finding of this study was that the participants shared a genetic pessimism
which negatively transformed their lives and forced an awareness of the body as
dangerous and potentially diseased. Furthermore, the legacy of genetic responsibility
meant the participants also experienced an awareness of their children’s bodies as
dangerous for which they blamed themselves, even though genes are out with
personal control. It may be postulated that genetic risk is lived and understood in ways
not accounted for in medical discourse: as a type of embodied risk for which there are
no universal, acceptable prevention strategies. The participants were largely unable to
see the benefits in genetic testing, with most stating a wish it never existed and
referring to genetic testing as opening a ‘can of worms’ which changed life for the
worse and ultimately transformed them into asymptomatic patients.

It is clear from this study that the relationship between genetic testing and cancer
prevention strategies is not straightforward.

Counter to the conventional view that

knowledge of genetic status empowers individuals to take action to improve health
and/or prevent disease, this study revealed the potential for genetic testing to
disempower and cause harm.

Genetic testing and RRS were exposed as

biographically disruptive events for which there were no wholly satisfactory solutions,
only negotiated positions which were taken up and which made sense at the time.
Competing discourses allowed scope for resistance to medical discourse and showed
other discourses do exist in which high risk women make decisions other than what
medical experts advise. By resisting medical discourse, the participants acknowledged
they were rejecting the ‘normal’ response to breast/ovarian cancer risk. This was part
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of a reflexive process through which they came to understand themselves as
individuals within multiple competing and conflicting discourses.

The competing threads of communal folklore presented the participants with a dilemma
and often silenced their voice, as their personal experiences had not yet been
galvanised into a private folklore of their decision to say no to RRS. Private folklore
requires the sharing of stories with others having the same experience thus creating a
space for the development of new understanding of an experience at odds with the
communal folklore of having the genetic mutation. The effects of dominant ideologies
and discourses were so strong, those who said no were dubious of their own decisions
and were still dealing with the effects of a discourse which isolated them from family,
friends and from each other, because a discourse of saying no was not yet established.
This research is therefore a conduit for communicating a new phenomenon and the
emergent private folklore of the participants represents a new way of thinking about
cancer risk and RRS in contemporary health care. By saying no, the participants in this
study are at the frontier of an alternative way of thinking about RRS in which high risk
women are able to say no to surgery without being ostracised and in which they and
their concerned others may be able to make peace with their decisions. It is these noncompliers who expose cancer risk management as a contested terrain and create the
conditions in which people can restore agency and reclaim power over their still-healthy
bodies. The emergence of their private folklore shows how women attempt to make
sense of their experiences and negotiate the conflicts and contradictions thrown up by
competing discourses, as outlined in the diagram below.
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Ideological
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Dominant
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Alternative
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Personal
ideologies

Private
folklore
Transformed
woman

Resistance

Figure 6: Interplay between the key theoretical constructs and what these mean.
To sum, this study challenges the dogma that genetic medicine is inherently beneficial
and empowering and lends support to calls for more research into how genetic
information impacts on the daily lives of people. The study findings are thus important
and timely given the increasing prominence of genetics in cancer care, and indeed the
increasing numbers of women facing decisions on whether or not to surgically remove
their healthy breasts and ovaries. This study provides a means through which women
who say no to RRS can know there are others who share their experience, thus
legitimating their right to say no and creating an avenue for resistance, and, an
emerging alternate discourse.

A closing point here therefore is that although the resistance demonstrated by the
participants in this study was not complete, neither was it inconsequential.

The ways

in which high risk women understood their genetic risk and how other discourses and
ideologies influenced decision making are important considerations for cancer
prevention policies and strategies. This study advocates that rather than motivate
individuals to take steps to reduce risk, the medical discourse may alienate and isolate
people who do not conform to their edits and thus expose them to greater health risks.
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Contribution to knowledge
This study makes a key contribution to knowledge because it problematises and
challenges taken-for-granted assumptions about how BRCA1/2 mutation carrier
women will respond to cancer risk. Rather than adding to the body of research which
has explored the potential physical, emotional and psychosocial impacts of RRS, a
particular strength of this study is that it adds knowledge about the cultural, social,
political and economic implications of HBOC and RRS and focusses on the
experiences of women who have said no to RRS thus giving an alternative voice to
those living with experience of having BRAC1/2 mutations. Although RRS is offered
and refused/accepted in the context of the medical consultation, personal and
subjective contexts in which everyday lives are lived are shown to be central to the
decision making process.

This study exposed the divergence between medical and other discourses in Western
society which high risk women use to make sense of their experiences. Accordingly, a
strength of this study is its ability to illuminate how personal, individual negotiations of
breast/ovarian cancer risk are critical to understanding decision making and how these
supersede factual, objective information about risk.

This study also contributes to

knowledge by exposing how high risk women may be denied the opportunity to reduce
their risk of cancer because of gendered discourses which construct women’s bodies in
particular ways. Again, acknowledgement of these discourses is not well articulated in
medical discourse and where acknowledgement does occur, the solutions offered are
equally problematic for some high risk women.

Study limitations
The findings from this study are drawn from a small sample of women who volunteered
to take part in the study. It was difficult to recruit more women owing to difficulties of
access. There was no formal provider looking after the women who decided to forego
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RRS, therefore access was via media advertising. Taking part in this study required
the participants to make public what was privately difficult. The issues these women
were dealing with including anxiety, family conflict and isolation may make this a hard
to reach group who are reticent to come forward and take part in research. Indeed two
participants asked to be interviewed without family knowledge owing to such issues.

This was an exploratory study in which the focus was limited to a particular group of
people. The findings are thus limited to discussion of women who carried BRCA1/2
genetic mutations which increase the risk of breast/ovarian cancer who said no to RRS.
The participants were interviewed at one point in time and none had received their
genetic test result more than three years prior to interview. It is therefore not possible
to say what the long term impact of saying no to RRS might be, or whether the
participants’ decisions change over time.

Recommendations
One of the aims of this study was to make recommendations for the care, counselling
and support of high risk women who say no to RRS.

Although health care

professionals attempt to advise and counsel high risk women to make an autonomous
decision which is right for them, there is evidence to suggest concealed discourses and
ideological practices influence the decision making process from the perspective of
both the individual and the clinician. The assumption that health care professionals are
always objective and impartial in advising high risk women must therefore be avoided
and it is necessary to consider the implications for practice for all women identified as
high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer, whether they say yes or no to RRS.
With this in mind, the following recommendations are proposed.
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Recommendations for health care professionals:


Health care professionals involved in the care and support of high risk women
should be encouraged to be reflexive practitioners to ensure they are aware of their
own beliefs, attitudes and subjectivities in relation to HBOC and how these might
impact on their dealings with high risk women.



To this end, the findings from this study will be widely disseminated through
publication in journals, presentation at conferences and through the researcher’s
professional networks and will specifically identify and encourage reflexive thinking
as a way of enhancing the support given to high risk women.



More attention should be paid in medical consultations to the subjective ways in
which genetic risk is understood, interpreted and experienced by high risk women.
This includes cognisance of the various resources, practices and discourses high
risk women use to make health decisions and acknowledgement that even
statistical ‘objective’ risk estimates are uncertain and unstable. Educating health
professionals about the wider factors which influence risk communication is an
important step towards acknowledgment that conventional risk/benefit models of
communicating cancer risk, may not be helpful for those identified as high risk of
developing cancer.



Models for communicating risk information which encourage exploration of
subjective elements of risk perception should be developed to provide a more
holistic, person-centred means of communicating risk. For example, Dauer et al.
(2011) recommend risk communication models should be cognisant of the
perceptions of those making the decision, perceptions which are dependent upon
emotional factors such as fear, anxiety and mood rather than objective risk
estimates. Eijzenga et al. (2014) also advocate the inclusion of a psychosocial
assessment when communicating cancer risk, to identify issues of personal
importance so that tailored information can be given which addresses the issues of
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most concern rather than focussing on the communication of risk per se. The
development of more holistic models for risk decision making may go some way
towards ameliorating the potential negative impacts of genetic information which
were evident in this study.


Health services involved in supporting high risk women should be proactive in
providing tailored support to women who say no to RRS. This may help ensure
those who say no do not opt out of services, are identified quickly should cancer
develop and are not made to feel blameworthy for their decisions.

Recommendations for researchers:


Avenues for future research should be explored including studies which;
o

Identify less damaging ways of managing HBOC risk.

o

Take a longitudinal approach in which women’s experiences are
investigated over time to create understanding of how their experiences and
decisions might change and what the impacts of these might be.

o

Develop understanding of how genetic information impacts on the daily lives
of mutation carriers and their significant others, for example daughters,
partners and relatives who tested mutation-negative and male BRCA1/2
mutation carriers.

o

Create counter-discourses which challenge the oppressive discourses of
responsibility, positivity and concealment which surround HBOC and instead
expose the social and economic forces which present HBOC and RRS in
particular ways and thus limit the choices offered to high risk women
considering RRS.

o

Advance a politics of HBOC which resists ideologies which silence high risk
women’s voices and which counteracts victim-blaming.
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Recommendations for policy holders:


These stories of high risk women who said no to RRS should be used as a valuable
resource to inform and underpin aspects of care for women considering RRS. Wide
dissemination of the study findings as outlined above will facilitate this. It is also
the intention of the researcher to present a synopsis of the study to prominent,
influential cancer charities which support women with and at risk of breast/ovarian
cancer. This will allow the voices of those who said no to be heard by stakeholders
who are in a position to influence the delivery of health care for high risk women.



Support groups for those who say no to RRS should be established to help manage
this group of women and allow them to seek out others and share their experiences
with those in a similar position.

Reflexive account
This section is a personal statement which revisits my own reflections over the course
of undertaking this thesis. It presents my perspective, both as a researcher and as a
health care professional and woman who shared aspects of the participants’ folk group.
It is a means through which I summarise information about the methodological
approach taken and my personal motivations, inflections, thoughts and feelings in
relation to the study and how undertaking the study has subsequently shaped and
influenced me.

My interest in hereditary breast/ovarian cancer stems back to my clinical experience as
a Breast Care Nurse when I was directly involved in the care of many women with
breast cancer at all stages of their cancer journey, including end of life care to those
who had unfortunately succumbed to the disease. Caring and supporting women with
breast cancer from diagnosis to ‘cure’ or end of life was a privilege: it also meant I was
intimately familiar with their experiences, good and bad, and the thoughts, worries and
concerns they carried.

I witnessed first-hand how they struggled to cope with a
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diagnosis of cancer and the impacts of surgery, chemotherapy and radiation therapy on
their bodies and saw them weep over the loss of their breasts. They shared with me
their fears about their sexuality and their relationships following breast loss and it
always seemed to me to be hugely unjust: at a time of crisis and facing a potentially
deadly cancer, these women had the added burden of grieving for the loss of a body
part which was so much more than just ‘breast tissue’. Often, their situation was
exacerbated through fears for their daughters, increasingly so as genetic causes for
cancer began to take prominence in medicine and the media. It was their predicament
which ignited my interest in hereditary breast/ovarian cancer and led to this research. I
sought a research approach which would allow an insight into the very real struggles
faced by women affected by hereditary breast/ovarian cancer, a situation made
significantly worse because it was their breasts they were giving up.

A key motivator

was to make the voices of such women heard, hence although my research training
and experience has exposed me to a range of research methods, a qualitative
approach was most suited to the study aims.

The qualitative approach acknowledges that the researcher has influence over all
aspects of the research process (Denzin, 1989; Dolby-Stahl, 1985; Parahoo, 2006)
hence it is important the research is presented in a trustworthy and credible way
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Major & Savin-Baden, 2010).

Cohen & Crabtree (2008)

contend one of the hallmarks of good qualitative research is the researcher’s attention
to understanding how personal preconceptions and subjectivities influenced the
research process, through the use of a reflexive journal. Many definitions of reflexivity
exist (Carolan, 2003) but there is consensus it is a process whereby the researcher
continually reflects upon the ways in which he or she may have influenced the research
process (Parahoo, 2006). This may be in terms of the approach taken, study design
employed, analysis of data and/or in the interactions between the researcher and
participants (Bryman 2004).

Being reflexive is a process of turning the research gaze
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onto the researcher therefore this next section comprises an evaluation of my own
conduct during the research.

To this end, I maintained a reflexive journal which

included personal understandings, assumptions and preconceptions, ponderings about
the participants’ experiences, insights into how my perspective may have affected the
interpretations and what could be considered my own epiphany moments.

In keeping with Dolby-Stahl (1985), the reflexive process also helped with the creation
of intimacy and drew me into the private folklore of the participants through the shared
understandings which resulted from the dialogue between us.

I have provided a

summary of the steps taken to facilitate the creation of intimacy in Chapter 4 (Step 4).
The participants all appeared to welcome the opportunity to tell their story someone
‘neutral’, that is, someone interested in their situation but with no wish to influence or
criticise. Indeed, several commented that family dynamics had changed for the worse
as a result of the genetic revelations and therefore they had felt at times unable to
discuss their experiences with family and friends.

My previous experience of working

with women with cancer and their families meant I was familiar with the language used
by women and the range of fears and emotions which accompany familial cancer. This
had to be balanced with a concern for appearing as expert and looking for what I
expected to hear in their stories. Thus I explained to the participants that whilst I was
experienced working alongside women with familial breast/ovarian cancer, every
woman’s story was unique and it was this uniqueness I wished to capture. When
listening to their stories, I consciously reflected on what surprised me and why this
might be. For example, I was surprised that none of the participants spoke positively
about breast reconstruction, perhaps because I have worked with many women who
have had very positive reactions to reconstruction.

My reasons for undertaking this research were presented in Chapter 1.

I am a nurse

and academic and as such, I have been educated and socialised in a discipline aligned
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to medicine and have therefore assimilated certain beliefs regarding the management
of HBOC. During the course of this research, I have learned that I too have talked in
support of the medical discourse. Part of the initial drive in examining the experiences
of women who said no to RRS, was my belief they were unwise in rejecting a course of
action which could prevent cancer and save their life. I never questioned the statistics
and believed ‘the facts’ about HBOC and RRS were the solid, reliable truth. It was the
job of medicine to help women avoid breast/ovarian cancer and part of this was
supporting procedures such as RRS as lives would be saved. I realise I never fully
understood the risk estimates, that RRS lowers risk in the population but not
necessarily the individual, and that although RRS reduced the risk of cancer, it did not
necessarily significantly add to years of life gained.

Reflecting back on my previous clinical practice as a Breast Care Nurse supporting
women prior to mastectomy, I observed occasions when surgeons would, unsolicited,
offer women larger/smaller breasts, ‘perkier' breasts or more ‘youthful’ breasts through
reconstruction. TRAM flap procedures used to reconstruct breasts would be described
as also offering the bonus of a ‘tummy tuck’.

At the time, I considered such

suggestions as helpful to women, a way of coping with the negative impact of breast
loss. However, I am now able to see the gendered discourse which underpins breast
reconstruction and how this perpetuates the communal folklore about the female body
and what it should look like. Assumptions about the type of body women ‘want’ are in
fact ideologies which may limit women’s choices and create illusions of normalcy which
subjugate all women.

As a woman in Western society, I share similar fears and

concerns regarding my body and the communal cancer folklore.

I appreciate the

potentially devastating effects of the loss of the breasts or ovaries and of developing a
potentially fatal disease and I have pondered “what would I do if it were me?”
Fortunately, the answer to this question is not for me known, although I am aware of
the assumption ‘sensible’ women opt for surgical intervention to cure the problem.
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Critiquing the medical discourse has thus been somewhat discomforting, as it has
made me question aspects of my previous practice which may not have supported
women facing breast/ovarian loss in ways most helpful to them.

My position has

moved from concern for women facing RRS, to one of unease about the uncritical
acceptance of genetics as the solution to cancer and the at times cavalier attitude with
which high risk women and their breasts and ovaries are treated. However, like the
participants in this study, I too am unable to completely resist the medical discourse, as
I remain concerned that high risk women may be risking their lives by saying no to
RRS.

Concluding statement
This study has presented an exploration of high risk women’s experiences which led to
the decision to say no to RRS. The participants’ stories were constructed as personal
experience narratives which were interpreted through the lenses of three literary
theories, thus offering a novel and original way of examining the subject area. The
biographical approach utilised gave a voice to the participants and maintained a focus
on real lives being lived by real people in the real world as their stories unfolded over
time.

Accordingly, the biographies of the women in this study provide the social

context of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer and saying
no to what is deemed the primary method of reducing that risk. The methodological
approach taken in this study allowed an illumination of the emergent private folklore of
high risk women; a folklore which was at odds with the communal HBOC folklore and
the medical discourse.

The stories of the participants in this study thus revealed discourses of control and
resistance. RRS has the potential to both increase and decrease the control women
have over their bodies and thus potentially both secures and undermines the future.
Two important questions emerge from this study which have not yet been addressed;
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1. By resisting the medical discourse are high risk women risking their lives?
2. Does the conflict and contradiction apparent in medical discourse which aims to
reduce risk paradoxically expose high risk women to cancer risk in an even greater
way?

The participants in this study shared a genetic pessimism and while they resisted the
medical discourse and kept their bodies intact, they were largely unable to transform
themselves in a positive way. Their decisions to say no to RRS left them in a position
of regret, uncertainty and ambiguity as they were transformed into perpetual patients
awaiting their fate. However, by sharing their stories, these participants provided a
means through which aspects of the inner lives of those identified as high risk of
developing breast/ovarian cancer could be better understood. This in turn provides a
valuable resource for informing the care and support of women considering RRS.

This study was designed to address a gap in the research relating to HBOC: decision
making around RRS within the context of dominant discourses and ideologies which
shape experience. No other studies have interpreted high risk women’s stories about
saying no to RRS using multiple literary theories. This innovative approach facilitated a
detailed and close examination of the phenomena of interest and allowed the research
to be presented from the perspective of the participants. The value of this study was its
ability to document specific issues and challenges faced by high risk women and
interpret these from a number of different perspectives. No single interpretation is able
to account for the many complex and intersecting discourses and ideologies which
imbue HBOC. Therefore multiple interpretations are needed to create meaning. This
research has problematised the dominant HBOC discourse and alternate meanings
attached to the experience of being identified as high risk of developing breast/ovarian.
It will therefore generate debate on how HBOC is talked about and ultimately
experienced.
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Appendix 1: Study Recruitment Advertisement

Family history breast/ovarian cancer research participants required
A research study is being conducted which aims to understand the experiences of
women who chose not to have breast and/or ovarian surgery for a high risk of getting
breast/ovarian cancer. The research will involve being interviewed about their
experiences and why they decided not to have surgery. The information gained from
the research will be used to make recommendations for the care and support of future
women facing this choice. The research is being carried out in conjunction with Edith
Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia.
If you can answer yes to all of these questions and would like to talk to us, we would
like you to contact us;







I have a family history of breast and/or ovarian cancer and have undergone
genetic testing which has shown that I have a gene fault.
I have been offered surgery to lower my risk of getting breast and/or ovarian
cancer.
I have decided not to have surgery.
I am an English speaking woman living in the mainland United Kingdom.
I am over 18 years of age.
I am interested in taking part in this research.

Please contact the lead researcher Doreen Molloy on telephone number XXXXX.
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Appendix 2: Patient Information Sheet

INFORMATION LETTER TO POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS

Title of study: Saying ‘no’: A biographical analysis of the experiences of women with
a genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer who reject risk reducing
surgery.
Participant’s summary:
This is an information sheet inviting you to take part in a research study being carried
out as part of a PhD that the researcher is undertaking at the Edith Cowan University,
Perth, Western Australia. The purpose of this study is to find out more about the
experiences of women who have been told they have a genetic predisposition to
developing breast and/or ovarian cancer and who have been offered, but have chosen
not to undergo, risk reducing surgery.

The aim of this study is to find out as much as we can about the experiences people
have so that we can improve the information and support given to women. Although
you will not benefit directly from taking part in this research study, it may improve the
care given to women in the future.

You have been asked to consider taking part in this study because you have had a
genetic test and been told you have a high risk of developing breast and/or ovarian
cancer, and been offered risk reducing surgery which you have chosen not to undergo.
If you choose to participate in this study you will be asked to take part in an interview
carried out by the researcher. The interview will be carried out at a time and place
convenient for you. It is anticipated that each interview will last approximately 45 – 60
minutes and will be tape-recorded so that the researcher carrying out the study can go
over and understand what you have said. The tapes will be transcribed onto paper and
all material will be destroyed at the end of the study.

During the interview, you will be asked questions about your experiences of being told
you had a genetic predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer and influences on
your decision not to undergo surgery. You will also be given an opportunity to tell the
researcher anything you feel is important regarding your situation. The researcher will
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use the information you give to produce a report on women’s experiences, which may
be presented at conferences and published. You will be encouraged to be as honest
as you can as your views are very important. Any information you might give will be
anonymised and at no time will you be identified. Participation in the study is voluntary.
If you choose to participate, you will be required to sign a form stating your consent to
take part. If you would like to become involved and then decide to withdraw from the
study, you are free to do so at any time without giving a reason and with no negative
consequences.

Thank you for considering this request.

If you are interested in taking part in this study or have any questions regarding this,
please contact;

Doreen Molloy
Lead Researcher
Telephone number here

Dr Joyce Hendricks
Research Supervisor
Room 21.454
School of Nursing, Midwifery and Postgraduate Medicine
Edith Cowan University
Joondalup
WA 6027.
Email: here
Tel: here
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Appendix 3: Consent Form

CONSENT DOCUMENT
Saying ‘no’: A biographical analysis of the experiences of women with a genetic
predisposition to developing breast/ovarian cancer who reject risk reducing surgery.

I have been provided with a copy of the Information Letter, explaining the study.
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and any questions have been
answered to my satisfaction.

I understand that participation in the research study will involve taking part in an interview
which will be tape-recorded and then transcribed onto paper.

I understand that the

information provided will be anonymised and will only be used for the purposes of this
study and I will not be identified in any written assignment or presentation/publication of the
results of this study. I understand that I am free to withdraw from further participation at
any time, without explanation or penalty.

I freely agree to participate in the study.

Name (Print)

____________________________________

Signature

____________________________________

Date

____________________________________

Researcher’s signature

____________________________________
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Appendix 4: Support Services

Support services
The following list contains reputable organisations that provide a free, confidential help
and support service to people affected by cancer.

Organisation

Telephone

Website

Breast Cancer Care

0808 800 6000

http://www.breastcancercare.org.uk/

Macmillan Cancer
Relief

0808 808 0000

http://www.macmillan.org.uk/Home.aspx

Cancerbackup

0800 735 0275

http://www.cancerbackup.org.je/
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide


Tell me a little about when you first became aware you had a family history of
cancer.



Were you aware cancer could run in families?



Describe how you feel about having a family history of cancer.



Describe what it was it like to be offered a genetic test for cancer.



What were your main concerns at the time?



Tell me what it was like to be told you had the genetic fault and you were at high
risk of developing breast/ovarian cancer.



Explain your understanding of the options offered to you because of your genetic
test result.



Describe how you felt to be offered surgery to remove your breasts/ovaries
because of the test result.



What sorts of other things were going on in your life at the time?



Were there other things which helped you to come to a decision to say no to
surgery?



How are you feeling about things now?



Overall, how do you think this whole experience has affected your life?



Is there anything else you would like to tell me about your experiences?
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